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**The Relationship between Religious Rules and the Moral Judgments of
More Religious and Less Religious Turkish Muslims**

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More Religious and Less Religious Turkish Muslims**

by

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This dissertation is dedicated to my first and true moral exemplars:

my grandmother Zeynep Firdevs Ozcan,

my parents Nurten and Hayati R. Ozkan,

my brother Kubilay S. L. Ozkan,

and

the love of my life, Turker Kuyel

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**The Relationship between Religious Rules and the Moral Judgments of
More Religious and Less Religious Turkish Muslims**

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Nucci and Turiel (1993) have demonstrated that conservative Christians and Jews judge moral issues in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, and do not solely rely on religious precepts in their moral reasoning. The purpose of this study was to examine whether Turkish Muslims' moral reasoning is also relatively independent of religious prescriptions. Using Turiel's (1983) Domain Theory, the study investigated similarities and differences in the reasoning of more religious and less religious Turks on a variety of moral issues addressed by the Qur'an (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy). The study also investigated whether Turkish Muslims associate harmful and unjust behaviors [e.g., violating others' rights, hurting others

(physically or psychologically)], which are considered grave sins in Islam (5:8) (Hashmi, 2002), with God's most severe punishment.

The study included 49 less religious Turkish students (20 males 29 females) and 49 more religious Turkish students (23 males 26 females), 18 years of age or older. Participants completed a self-report questionnaire containing six stories. Results were analyzed using a combination of Chi-Square and ANOVA techniques.

Findings largely supported the proposition of Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983) that all individuals use moral reasoning that is in part based on justice and rights concerns, even highly religious individuals. The reasoning of more religious participants was mixed between moral and religious concerns. Moral concerns dominated their reasoning when considering forcing a daughter to marry or polygamy, while religious considerations dominated their reasoning for the issue of homosexuality only. The majority of less religious participants judged the issues in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, rather than on religious precepts. Also, the majority of all participants indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others. This suggests that Turkish Muslims consistently value principles of justice, rights and welfare when considering moral issues, regardless of religious orientation.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Statement of the Problem

The relationship between morality and religious beliefs has been debated by theologians and philosophers since Plato's time (Nucci, 1985). Until the eighteenth century, practically no philosopher publicly questioned God's existence and, thus, morality was thought to have a divine origin. That is, almost all the philosophers before the eighteenth century believed that God endorses specific moral principles (e.g., justice, fairness) and declares them as "law" by instilling them in human nature (Fieser, 2001). Since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, however, there has been a turn toward secular moral thinking and theorizing. The most commonly argued foundation for secular morality was reason and human experience which laid the foundation for the view called rationalism (Gunasekara, 2000). Rationalists argued that natural moral law was nothing but a construct of the mind of man and, thus, they grounded natural law in human reason (Sandlin, 1999). According to rational view, then, natural moral principles (laws) are not commands of God but products of the individual's personal judgment. As moral principles have their foundations in reason, as opposed to revelation, they are theoretically discoverable by anyone regardless of their religion. Therefore, they are universal rather than a result of cultural or religious conditioning (Abelson & Friquegnon, 1991).

The natural law tradition and rationalism have made a strong impact on moral psychology. Kohlberg (1974), the most influential researcher in the field of morality,

proposed a moral development theory based on the assumption that there is a natural or universal moral order centering on principles of justice and that these moral principles can be arrived at through guidance of rational thinking independent of specific religious revelation. Following Kohlberg, Turiel (1983) asserted that reasoning about social conventions, based on religious rules or social norms, and reasoning about morality, based on concepts of justice, rights, and welfare, are separate and distinct domains of thought, which suggests that moral judgments are not determined by religious prescriptions. Even though Turiel acknowledges that both cultural values and religion are important components of moral life, he points out they are not unique causes of the development of fundamental moral principles which have their foundations in rational thought. His ideas, however, have been criticized by social scientists who believe that moral values stem from religious beliefs or, more generally, from cultural traditions. Richard Shweder (1990), for example, argues that a culture's ideology plays a major role in shaping the child's moral understandings and that in many parts of the world, customary practices (religious or social) are part of the natural moral order. Because of cultural and religious diversity, Shweder insists, moral values are not universal but are "relative to whatever society in which one happens to be" (cited in Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999, p. 176).

The discussion between moral relativism and universalism accounts for an important proportion of philosophical reflection in ethics (Wong, 1997). Even though the opposition between relativistic and universalistic views has been debated by philosophers (Fieser, 2001) and moral psychologists (Miller, 2006) for a long time, writings on this

subject seem to have flourished with the contemporary “globalization movement,” which, according to Kessler (2000), promoted the moral issue of human equality and universalism. Indeed, the world is changing rapidly. Nations have become increasingly interdependent over the years. Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and many other believers are living together all over the world (Anderson, 1992). Today, many religious leaders and interfaith organizations are in agreement about the necessity “to define and then use as a global standard for behavior the central ethical principles common to all religions” (Fisher, 2002, p. 472). In such a globalized world, then, educators have a significant responsibility for developing moral education programs that provide people from different religious beliefs with a common ground for moral principles.

Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983) is important to show that moral principles (concepts of justice, rights, and welfare) are universal and that they can be achieved through reason independent of the effects of social and religious rules. In fact, Nucci and Turiel (1993) have demonstrated that conservative Christians and Jews judge moral issues in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, and do not solely rely on religious precepts in their moral reasoning. This finding might suggest that “public schools can engage in moral education consistent with the moral aspects of any religion without also promoting the precepts of religious belief” (Nucci, 2003, p. 269-270). In today’s globalized world, this might be the only ethical way to promote simultaneously the moral development of all groups of students.

Nucci and Turiel’s study, as pointed out by Lickona (1991), “provides new support for what many philosophers have long held: There is a natural moral law that

prohibits injustice to others and that can be arrived at through the use of human reason” (p. 42). Nucci and Turiel’s (1993) study, however, was limited to Christian and Jewish participants and, thus, its findings may not apply to other religious contexts. Given concerns with the role of highly religious Muslims in today’s world, it is important to determine if this population also focuses on universal moral principles in their reasoning, or if they focus exclusively on religious prescriptions.

Using the theoretical model of Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983), this study examined whether Turkish Muslims’ moral reasoning is also relatively independent of religious prescriptions. More specifically, using Turiel’s Domain Theory, the study investigated similarities and differences in the reasoning of more religious and less religious Turks on a variety of moral issues addressed by the Qur’an (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy). The study also investigated whether Turkish Muslims associate harmful and unjust behaviors [e.g., violating others’ rights, hurting others (physically or psychologically)], which are considered grave sins in Islam (5:8) (Hashmi, 2002), with God’s most severe punishment. As the results of this study were expected to show that Turkish Muslims tend to rely on justice, rights, and welfare in their moral judgments, it was reasonable to examine whether they view harmful and unjust behaviors as deserving God’s most severe punishment. This was important to determine if there is consistency in Turkish Muslims’ thinking.

Chapter Summary

This dissertation has six chapters. In Chapter One, the statement of the problem is given. In Chapter Two, the literature on the philosophical discussion surrounding morality and the will of God, psychological approaches to morality, the link between religion and moral attitudes, and moral reasoning in Muslim societies is summarized. Purpose of the study concludes Chapter Two. The results of the pilot study are given in Chapter Three. Chapter Four reports the hypotheses and methods of the current study. Chapter Five summarizes the findings. And Chapter Six presents discussion, limitations of the study, suggestions for future research and application, and conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

Review of the Literature

Philosophical Discussion on Morality and the Will of God

The philosophical discussion surrounding morality and the will of God first appeared in the writings of Plato, in his dialogue, the Euthyphro (Fieser, 2001).

In this dialogue, a character named Euthyphro is prepared to turn his father over to the authorities for mistreating and causing the death of a slave. In ancient Greece, children were expected to show unconditional loyalty to their parents, and so, by turning in his father, Euthyphro would be violating the standard code of morality. Nevertheless, Euthyphro believes that he is following the will of the gods and, therefore, doing the right thing. On his way to the courthouse, Euthyphro bumps into Socrates, and the two start debating on the connection between morality and religious obedience. (Fieser, 2001, p. 75)

Socrates asks the following question: “Is an act morally good because the gods command it, or do the gods command it because it is morally good?” (Oser & Reich, 1990, p. 95) Socrates introduces two options concerning the link between the gods and morality. The first option suggests that “something becomes good when the gods will that it is good” (Fieser, 2001, p. 75). In this perspective, the gods independently create the standards of morality. The second option, on the other hand, implies that “good things are objectively good, and the gods merely recognize them as such” (Fieser, 2001, p. 75). In this view, contrary to the first option, gods endorse previously existing moral standards that are external to them.

Plato himself believed that “morality is grounded in a preexisting standard of moral goodness, which the gods themselves have no control over and must adopt” (Fieser, 2001, p. 75), and so favored the second option. According to Plato, moral

principles, such as justice, charity, and honesty are eternal, universal, and unchanging, and people access these moral values through reason. In Plato's view, then, morality is not man-made or dependent upon religion, or divine authority. It is part of the natural order, as are male/female differences, and skin color. Many religious and secular philosophers after Plato supported his ideas and argued that "there exists an external and independent standard of morality" (Fieser, 2001, p. 76).

During the medieval times, religious philosophers considered more seriously whether God may be the creator of moral principles and also chose between one of two options introduced in the Euthyphro dilemma. All the medieval philosophers who discussed this issue were the adherents of the natural law view of moral philosophy. That is, they all roughly believed that God endorses specific moral principles and declares them as "law" by instilling them in human nature. For religious natural law philosophers, then, the moral laws that govern human conduct issue from God, which suggests that the nature of man reflects God's plan (Fieser, 2001).

Even though all the religious natural law philosophers were in agreement about these assumptions, "they disagreed about where God got moral standards to begin with" (Fieser, 2001, p. 76). Aquinas, for instance, argued that even though God endorses the moral standards of natural law, God does not literally create these moral standards. Instead, Aquinas, like Plato, believed that moral principles are objective and fixed features of the universe; they are universal, eternal, and rational laws that exist independently of God. God discovers these moral principles of natural law and simply adopts them because, as a perfectly rational being, "God has a kinship with rational

notions such as moral principles” (Fieser, 2001, p. 76). Because God created human beings as rational creatures, they also have the ability to rationally grasp these moral standards. This view has come to be known as “intellectualism” as it holds that moral principles issue from God’s intellect.

Other medieval philosophers, such as Scotus and Ockham, however, went with the first option of the Euthyphro dilemma, namely that “moral principles of natural law are not independent rational principles” (Fieser, 2001, p. 76) but creations of God’s unconstrained and free will. This position is called both “divine command theory” and “voluntarism.”

To summarize, intellectualists argue that humans have an essential rational nature established by God, who created humans for a purpose—to live and develop in prescribed ways. These ways of living called “Natural Laws” apply to and are discoverable by all people everywhere, regardless of whether they believe in God or not, through reason. The fundamental rule of natural laws is “to pursue good and avoid evil.” They are universal and unchangeable. In this perspective, then, what makes kindness, fairness, and justice good is the fact that they are admired or desired by God. “These things remain good even if no one has received any divine commands, indeed, even if no one has managed to discover what God prefers” (Garner, 1994, p. 210). People, according to this view, access moral principles through God’s intellect (Fieser, 2001).

Voluntarists, on the other hand, believe that the order of nature, including the natural moral laws that govern human behavior, stems from the will of almighty God, who was free to do things differently. Therefore, the structure of nature is contingent;

“reason” alone cannot discover them (Padgett, 2003). According to voluntarist philosophers, then, the content of morality (e.g., right and wrong, good and bad) depends directly and wholly on the commands and prohibitions of God (as revealed in divine law) (Idziak, 1979), and one is obligated to do whatever God commands. One deserves to be punished for stealing, adultery, and killing as these things are morally wrong, and they are morally wrong because God has forbidden them (Garner, 1994). In general, individuals supporting this position believe that they should do what God wills, because God will reward them if they do and punish them if they do not, if not in this life then in the hereafter (Frankena, 1973). This view has traditionally been held by the established organized religions of the world, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Taylor, 1978).

During the medieval ages, the argument between intellectualists and voluntarists became so central to moral philosophy “that virtually every moral philosopher felt compelled to weigh in on whether morality is a creation of God’s will” (Fieser, 2001, p. 79). Even though intellectualists and voluntarists disagreed about whether God authors moral principles, they both believed equally that God is an essential element in morality. Practically no philosopher publicly questioned God’s existence until the eighteenth century and, thus, morality was thought to have a divine origin. Since the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, however, there has been a turn toward secular moral thinking and theorizing (Fieser). According to Enlightenment thought, (a) the universe is basically rational, that is, it can be understood through the use of reason alone, (b) truth can be arrived at through empirical observation, and the use of reason, (c) human experience is

the foundation of human understanding of truth; authority is not to be preferred over experience, (d) religious doctrines have no place in the understanding of the physical and human worlds (Hooker, 1996).

These ideas made a strong impact on the moral philosophy of the eighteenth century. Scientifically-minded moral philosophers of the Enlightenment century tried to establish a science of morality, like the physical sciences, standing independently of religious beliefs and practices. God was no longer the only source of moral principles (Fieser, 2001). The most commonly argued foundation for secular morality was reason and human experience which laid the foundation for the view called rationalism (Gunasekara, 2000). Kant, the leading Enlightenment rationalist, held that God is not an object of human knowledge. He argued that natural moral law was nothing but a construct of the mind of man and, thus, he grounded natural law in human reason (Sandlin, 1999). In Kant's view, then, moral principles are commands of reason rather than commands of God. "He conceived of God not as willful, issuing decrees, but as a perfect lawgiver and judge who recognizes the same rational principles that human reason discovers" (Abelson & Friquegnon, 1991, p. 11). Today, most contemporary moral philosophers, including natural law theorists, favor secular-based morality over religious morality (Fieser, 2001).

Natural law tradition has had a profound and lasting effect in moral philosophy. Over the centuries, "natural law has provided the basis for explaining why certain actions are right or wrong, regardless of what human laws might say" (Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985, p. 34). According to contemporary natural law theory, (a) there are

certain basic moral principles (e.g., justice, the equality of human rights) that bind people of every nationality (Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985); (b) these principles are objective and external, hence natural; certain acts, such as starving a child to death, are wrong independent of any acknowledgment, cultural or religious (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1990); (c) all people are aware of these basic moral standards as “all normal adults come to know them through the use of their natural reasoning abilities. Once they start thinking about the value of human life, all human beings realize that it is wrong to destroy the lives of innocent people” (Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985, p. 34); (d) the fundamental moral principles are based on human nature. Human beings tend to value and protect the good by nature (Velasquez & Rostankowski).

Natural law tradition has also had a profound effect in moral psychology. In fact, natural moral law has been the central theme of Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental theory of moralization, the most influential approach to moral development (Shweder et al., 1990).

Psychological Approaches to Morality

Kohlberg’s Cognitive-Developmental Theory of Moralization

Motivated by the natural law tradition, Kohlberg (1974) proposed a moral development theory based on the assumption that there is a natural or universal moral form centering on principles of justice and that these moral principles can be arrived at through guidance of rational thinking independent of specific religious revelation.

Kohlberg's theory, then, was in opposition with the "Divine Command Theory (Voluntarism)," which bases morality on religious revelation, faith, or creed (Oser & Reich, 1996).

According to Kohlberg (1976), moral development represents a progression in reasoning about justice. He described "justice" in terms of what is the adequate or fair way of resolving conflicts between the rights or claims of different individuals in a moral conflict situation. The function of moral reasoning, in Kohlberg's theory, then, is to resolve competing claims among individuals. Kohlberg asserted that there are six stages that can be identified in problem-solving strategies that individuals use in their moral judgments across the course of development ["moral judgment refers to the process of deciding which course of action within a specific dilemma is the morally ideal one—that is, what ought the person to do?" (Rest & Narvaez, 1991, p. 233)]. These six stages in the development of moral (or justice) reasoning are divided into 3 levels: preconventional, conventional, and postconventional, with the final stage representing the most mature moral thinking (Kohlberg, 1976).

At the preconventional level, moral reasoning is based on self-interest (e.g., satisfaction of one's own needs) and the goodness or badness of actions is determined by their consequences; behaviors that cause punishment are seen as bad, whereas those that result in rewards are viewed as good. At the conventional level, morality is viewed as behaving according to what society defines as right. Therefore, moral reasoning is based on conforming to society's rules and norms. At the postconventional level, individuals move beyond unquestioning support for the laws and rules of their own society, and

define their moral options in terms of self-chosen abstract principles. In other words, at this level individuals base their moral decisions on the principles of universal justice (e.g., the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons) that apply to all situations and cultures (Kohlberg, 1976).

Based on his research findings both in the U.S. and in other countries, such as Turkey, Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico, Kohlberg claimed that the sequence of moral stages is culturally universal; the same stages always occur in the same order in every society. “Cultural factors may speed up, slow down, or stop development, but they do not change its sequence” (Colby, Kohlberg, & Kauffman 1987, p. 6).

To summarize, in Kohlberg’s theory, moral judgment emerges from separating moral from nonmoral processes. In his formulation, less developed moral judgments are grounded in conformity to conventionally determined rules, while more advanced judgments are grounded in principles distinct from conventional rules. Consequently, convention is viewed as part of moral development and relegated to early developmental levels. That is, “it is assumed that development progresses from a state of conformity to the conventions of the social system to a state of autonomous and principled moral reasoning” (Turiel, 1978, p. 58).

According to Kohlberg, younger children are directed by older people and do not have access to moral concepts and reasons. In other words, postconventional reasoning, which includes mutual respect and concepts of justice, rights, and welfare, does not emerge until early adulthood (Turiel, 1998), and only at the postconventional level of moral development can morality (concepts of justice) be distinguished from and displace

concepts of convention as the basis for moral reasoning (Nucci, 1989). Turiel (1983), however, opposed Kohlberg's ideas, claiming that children do have access to moral principles at an early age.

Turiel's Domain Theory (Moral, Conventional, and Personal Domains)

The distinction between morality and convention. Turiel (1983) does not agree with Kohlberg's claim that conventional morality precedes postconventional morality. He, instead, argues that morality and convention are separate, different, and parallel domains of development, rather than a single system as assumed by Kohlberg. According to Turiel (1978), then, moral considerations do not emerge from conventional considerations. Instead, "convention is part of the individual's conceptualization of nonmoral aspects of social interaction and develops alongside the development of moral concepts" during childhood (Turiel, 1978, p. 59).

Like Kohlberg, Turiel (1983) also believes that there are natural principles of justice that "ought" to guide all societies and that those principles can be achieved through reason. In Turiel's theory, then, morality also refers to the concepts of welfare, justice, and rights. More specifically, for Turiel, actions or events carry that moral quality if they "involve physical or psychological harm, personal or private property, promises or commitments, or the allocation of scarce resources" (Shweder et al., 1990, p. 153).

According to Turiel (1983), morality is not a product of conventional regulations. In other words, moral prescriptions are not defined by existing social arrangements and are not legitimated by agreement or consensus. Instead, they are nonarbitrary, unconditionally obligatory, universally applicable, and impersonal. That is, they apply to

everyone in similar situations, and are not based on personal preferences or individual inclinations. Conventions (e.g., forms of address, eating etiquette, sex-stereotyped behavior), on the other hand, are behavioral uniformities whose meanings are determined by the social system in which they are formed. “Therefore, the validity of conventions lies in their links to existing social systems” (Turiel, 2002, p. 110). For Turiel (1983), then, conventions are social rules that help to organize a society. They are arbitrary, validated by consensus, and are relative to the societal context. They may be changed by consensus or general usage within a social system. Conventions, according to Turiel, do not carry a moral quality as their rightness or wrongness is determined solely by virtue of social consensus.

According to Turiel (1983), events likely to produce moral concepts differ from those likely to produce conventional concepts. In other words, conventional and moral judgments result from qualitatively different types of social interactions. Conventional wrongs are “learned through exposure to group consensus via social transmission processes—commands, sanctions, instructions” (Shweder et al., 1990, p. 154). Moral wrongs, on the other hand, “are learned primarily through direct observation of the harm or injustice caused by a transgression” (Shweder et al., 1990, p. 154). In other words, moral concepts stem from one’s experiences bearing on others’ rights and welfare. For example, children might be involved (as observers or participants) in events “wherein one child hits another, destroys another’s property, or takes another’s turn. In attempting to make sense of these social experiences, children perceive the salient aspects of these events—the pain or injustice—and generate prescriptions about how people” should

behave toward others (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993, p. 212). These moral prescriptions, therefore, do not stem from given rules or adult teachings. Instead, children form these judgments by abstracting from their experiences (e.g., from the observation of the consequences of actions). Wainryb and Turiel argue that similar experiences with harm and injustice take place in every culture and, thus, it is likely that people all over the world will develop similar rules based on the features of such experiences.

Research on the moral and conventional domains in secular contexts. Extensive research has been conducted to examine whether or not morality and convention operate as separate domains as claimed by Turiel (1983). The way in which researchers have determined whether or not individuals distinguish between morality and convention has been by asking participants to evaluate various acts according to one or more of the following questions (Nucci, 2001): Does the wrongness of a given action depend upon the existence of a governing rule or social norm? Is it wrong or all right to remove or alter the existing norm or standard? Is it wrong or all right for members of another society or culture not to have a given rule or norm? Is it wrong or all right for a member of another society or culture to engage in the act if that society/culture does not have a rule about the act? How wrong (usually on a 5-point scale) is a given action? Apart from these questions, participants are also asked to give justifications for their answers. These justifications allow researchers to see which substantive reasons people use to make their judgments.

Today, there is a considerable amount of research indicating that children and adults differentiate between morality and convention on the basis of these questions

(Turiel, 1998). In brief, these studies have found the following: (a) Moral transgressions (e.g., hitting and hurting, slander) are seen as wrong independent of the existence of social rules, whereas conventional acts (e.g., women wearing pants) are seen as wrong only if they violate an existing norm; (b) people view conventional norms as culturally relative and alterable, whereas moral issues are seen as universal and unchangeable; (c) individuals, in general, see moral transgressions as more serious than conventional transgressions, and as deserving more severe punishment; (d) prosocial moral acts, generally, are considered better or more positive than adherence to conventions; (e) judgments of moral transgressions focus on features intrinsic to the acts such as harm and unfairness, whereas judgments of conventions are justified in terms of rules and the norms of authority (Nucci, 2001; Nucci, 1989); (f) the distinction between moral and conventional transgressions becomes more salient and consistent by the ages of 4 or 5 years. While 2-year-old children do not differentiate morality from convention, during their 3rd year, children view moral transgressions as wrong to a greater extent than conventional transgressions. 3-year-old children also evaluate moral transgressions independently of social rules and authority. Even though 6- or 7-year-old children are likely to make the distinction on several dimensions, “they apply it readily to familiar but not unfamiliar issues. By the ages of 9 or 10 years, children apply the distinction to both familiar and unfamiliar issues” (Turiel, 1998, p. 906).

Studies that have investigated whether morality and convention can be differentiated have not been limited to the United States. Several studies have been carried out across a wide range of different cultures (Nucci, 2001). Such studies have

been done with children and adolescents in northeastern Brazil (Nucci, Camino, & Sapiro, 1996); preschoolers in St. Croix, the Virgin Islands (Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983); children in Indonesia (Carey & Ford, 1983), Nigeria (Hollos, Leis, & Turiel, 1986), and Zambia (Zimba, 1987); and children and adults in Korea (Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987). In each of these studies, participants differentiated morality from convention (Nucci, 2001).

Research on the moral and conventional domains in religious contexts.

Researchers adopting the domain model of social development have also examined whether people make a distinction between moral issues and matters of religious convention. In other words, they examined whether individuals “make a distinction between the rules and practices specific to their religion, and those moral issues that ought to be common to religions other than their own and to secular society as well” (Nucci, 2001, p. 21). Religious frameworks supply a useful context for further research into individuals’ moral and conventional concepts. In the first place, some norms and practices specific to particular religions (nonmoral religious rules) are generally viewed as important and binding on their members. Secondly, moral prescriptions are usually closely tied to divine authority. It may be, therefore, that highly religious individuals do not differentiate between moral and nonmoral religious rules. That is, they may see both types of rules as prescriptive and universally binding. Nucci and Turiel (1993), on the other hand, hypothesized that nonmoral rules specific to particular religions would be distinguished from moral rules. Nucci (1989) found results consistent with his ideas.

Nucci (1989) asked 100 high school students and 100 undergraduates, devoted to Catholic beliefs, to make judgments about actions considered sins by the Catholic Church. Actions such as stealing, killing, rape, and slander were classified as matters of morality as they entail harm or injustice toward others. Actions such as failure to attend religious services on Easter or Christmas, fasting prior to communion, the use of contraceptives, masturbation, premarital sex between consenting adults, divorce, and ordaining women were classified as nonmoral as they entail violations of social norms determined by Catholicism, and were therefore similar to matters of social convention. Even though nonmoral religious prescriptions are not conventions, as they are based on scripture and not on social consensus, researchers thought such issues would not be viewed as matters of morality by Catholics (Nucci, 2001).

Results indicated that both the high school and college-age participants saw the moral transgressions as more serious compared to violations of Catholic conventions (Nucci, 2001). The majority of the participants considered nonmoral rules of their religion to be binding only upon Catholics and as alterable by the Pope, while they stated that rules pertaining to moral issues were unchangeable, and should be held by Catholics and non-Catholics alike. In other words, most of the participants universalized only the moral rules (Nucci & Turiel, 1993).

In a similar study, Nucci and Turiel (1993) interviewed Amish/Mennonite and Dutch Reform Calvinist Christian, and Conservative and Orthodox Jewish children and adolescents about their understanding of moral and nonmoral religious rules. The moral issues used with both Christian and Jewish participants were stealing, hitting, slander,

and, damaging another's personal property. The nonmoral religious issues used with Amish children were day of worship, work on the Sabbath, baptism, women wearing head coverings, women preaching, interfaith marriage, and premarital sex between consenting adults. The nonmoral religious issues used with Jewish children were modified versions of the issues used with Amish children: day of worship, work on the Sabbath, men wearing head coverings, male circumcision, women reading from the Torah, interfaith marriage, maintaining kosher dietary laws, and premarital sex between consenting adults (Nucci, 2001).

Results indicated that all the participants judged the nonmoral religious rules to be relative to the individual's own religion and contingent on God's word. Evaluations regarding the moral issues, however, were not tied to religions or to God in the same ways. "Members outside the religion were considered to be under the same obligations to follow the moral rules as adherents to their own religion. Moreover, evaluations of these acts were not judged as contingent on God's word" (Turiel & Neff, 2000, p. 281). For instance, behaviors, such as hitting others or stealing would be wrong even if God had not said anything about them. Such behaviors were viewed as wrong due to harm inflicted or their injustice. Similarly, all the participants stated that it would be wrong for religious authorities to abolish rules prohibiting behaviors in the moral domain (Nucci, 2001). There were no differences in reasoning about moral and nonmoral religious issues between genders. Based on these findings, Nucci and Turiel (1993) have concluded that the theoretical distinctions between moral and conventional judgments are not only evident in secular contexts, but evident in religious contexts as well. In Turiel's (1983)

theory, then, religion and morality are viewed as separate and distinct domains, which suggests that moral judgments are not determined by religious prescriptions.

Personal domain. According to Turiel (2002), children develop judgments about personal jurisdiction as well as they develop judgments in the moral and conventional domains. Personal issues include social behaviors whose import and effects are seen to be primarily upon the individual rather than other people or the social structure. “As such, the personal represents the circumscribed set of actions that define the private aspects of one’s life; the set of social actions for which the issue of right and wrong is one of preference rather than obligation or custom” (Nucci, 1981, p. 114). Examples of personal issues include one’s choice of friends, one’s free-time activities, and actions that are related to the state of one’s own body (e.g., smoking, aspects of physical appearance) (Nucci). According to Turiel (2002), the concepts of personal autonomy reflect a universal feature of human existence.

Research was conducted both in the U.S. and in other cultures to see whether children and adolescents make a conceptual distinction between personal issues and issues of morality and convention, as claimed by Turiel (2002). Nucci and Weber (1995) found that 3- and 4-year old children differentiate personal issues from moral and conventional issues at home, whereas Killen and Smetana (1999) observed that 3- to 5-year old children can make these same distinctions in the school. Similarly, Yau and Smetana (2003) found that Chinese preschoolers treated personal issues as distinct from conventional rules and moral obligations. Nucci, Camino, and Sapiro (1996) observed that Brazilian children and adolescents judged that certain activities should be up to

personal choice. In a different study conducted by Ardila-Rey and Killen (2001), Colombian 3-, 5-, and 7-year-old children were also observed to differentiate personal from conventional and moral acts in a school context and their judgments pertaining to personal choice increased with age. In each of these studies the participants viewed personal issues as up to the individual (rather than as behaviors that are right or wrong). These evaluations have been observed “to be based on justifications that the action’s consequences only affect the actor or that the acts are personal matters and should be the actor’s own business” (Yau & Smetana, 2003, p. 648).

Issues of domain overlap. To summarize, Turiel (1983) claims that social concepts are not all of one kind and that qualitatively different types of social interactions experienced by the child produce distinct domains of thinking. Consequently, children’s structuring of the social judgments revolves around three main categories. These are (a) concepts of personal autonomy (the personal domain), (b) “concepts of systems of social relations and organizations (the societal domain)—of which convention is but one component, and (c) prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare (the moral domain)” (Turiel, 1983, p. 4). The differentiation of these three domains emerges in early childhood, is maintained through adolescence, and into adulthood.

Turiel (2002) points out that even though many everyday issues are straightforward examples of either morality, convention, or personal autonomy, many others arise in the context of multifaceted social situations and, thus, include components from more than one domain. According to him, such multifaceted situations take three forms:

(a) those in which conventional concerns for social organization and coordination entail injustices (as in a caste system,); (b) second-order events in which violation of a convention results in “psychological harm” to persons who adhere to the convention (e.g., failure of a young white man to address an older black man by the title “Mister”); and (c) ambiguously multidimensional events, such as abortion, in which significant discrepancies exist in their domain attribution by different people. (Nucci, 1989, p. 188)

Reasoning about multifaceted situations involves the coordination (or failure of coordination) of the features of different domains (Nucci, 1989). Research shows that individuals use three basic ways in dealing with the instances of domain interaction and overlap. In one form “there is a predominant emphasis on one domain, with subordination of the other” (Nucci, 2001, p. 77). For instance, in the recent argument regarding the role of women in Catholic worship services, some women have viewed the situation as a moral matter of justice and rights. Pope John Paul II, on the other hand, stated in the 1970s that the ordination of women was an issue of custom and tradition, not of rights or fairness.

A second form “is characterized by conflict regarding how best to conceptualize a particular issue, with inconsistencies and the absence of resolution or reconciliation among components” (Nucci, 2001, p. 77). For example, in a study on women’s reasoning about abortion, it was observed that pregnant women contemplating abortion shifted between viewing abortion in terms of personal choice, and privacy, and viewing abortion as a matter of immoral act, taking of another person’s life. A third way “involves the coordination of the various domain components, so that each is taken into account in the solution of the problem” (Nucci, 2001, p. 78). An example of such domain coordination

might be the resolution of gender-based inequities stemming from traditional standards for the assignment of household tasks. This has involved reorganizing “family norms for how child care and other domestic responsibilities are distributed among family members so that both the husband and wife can fulfill career obligations while also maintaining an orderly and functioning household” (Nucci, 2001, p. 78).

Shweder’s Approach

Turiel’s (1983) theory has been criticized by social scientists who believe that moral values stem from religious beliefs or, more generally, from cultural traditions. Richard Shweder, for example, does not agree with Turiel that “social practices are conventional formations, deriving their authority from a culture-bound consensus” (Shweder et al., 1990, p. 132). He argues that a culture’s ideology plays a major role in shaping the child’s moral understandings and that not all cultures have a place in their worldview for the idea that social practices are conventions. Rather, in many parts of the world, customary practices (religious or social), such as menstrual seclusion, food taboos, arranged marriage, and kin avoidance are part of the natural moral order. According to Shweder, Turiel’s definitions of morality, based on justice, rights, and harm, are products of modern industrial democracies grounded in individualism and secularism.

In sum, the argument is that there are fundamental differences in human judgments and actions and that these can be explained in terms of cultural differences, which vary greatly over the world (Shweder et al., 1990). Because of cultural and religious diversity, Shweder insists, “each society ought to be regarded as ethically equivalent; morality is relative to whatever society in which one happens to be” (cited in

Rest et al., 1999, p. 176). Shweder (1990) supported his ideas with a cross-cultural study comparing moral and social judgments of American participants from Hyde Park, Illinois (180 children and 60 adults), and orthodox Hindus from the old temple town of Bhubaneswar, India (180 children and 60 adults).

Shweder et al. (1990) asked participants from both countries to judge how wrong each of 39 acts would be (e.g., a widow eating fish, the eldest son having a haircut the day after his father's death, eating beef, a twenty-five-year old son addressing his father by his first name, a man entering his temple and praying God the day after the birth of his first child, a husband beating his disobedient wife black and blue). Results indicated that compared to the American participants, Indian participants considered many of the conventional transgressions such as a widow eating fish to be unalterable or noncontingent, and more serious than the moral transgressions such as a husband beating his wife. In fact, the act rated as the most serious transgression was the eldest son having a haircut and eating chicken the day after his father's death. Rated thirty-fifth in seriousness among the thirty-nine actions was a husband beating his disobedient wife black and blue. Furthermore, the Indian participants did not make the distinction between moral and conventional domains that Turiel has argued is universal. Instead, the Indian participants, as opposed to the American participants, judged most issues regarding dress codes, food habits, and ritual practices to be morally wrong, and stated their social conventions should be obeyed universally.

According to Shweder et al. (1990), this research showed that morality and conventions are not universally distinct domains. It also showed that the emergence of

reasoning based on conventional obligations is a culture-specific development. In fact, the results indicated that the idea of convention (e.g., conventional obligations are consensus-based, relative to one's culture, and alterable) occurred almost exclusively in the reasoning of American adults and older American children (it did not exist among American children under age 10). However, as mentioned before, Indian participants did not reflect the idea of convention. Whereas Americans reflected the idea of convention and became more relativistic in their judgments as they aged, Indians showed a greater tendency to regard their practices as universally moral, binding, nonrelative, and unalterable. Based on these findings, Shweder et al. (1990) concluded that a significant difference exists between the moral understandings of the two cultures.

Turiel's Reply to Shweder—Informational Assumptions

Turiel, Killen, and Helwig (1987) agree with Shweder that there are fundamental differences in human judgments and behaviors. However, they think that the observed differences among individuals or cultures in their moral evaluation of an act may be due to diversity in informational assumptions, which entail beliefs about aspects of reality (e.g., what constitutes a human life, what causes diseases), rather than to differences in moral concepts (e.g., justice, rights, fairness, welfare). Turiel et al. pointed out that most of the cultural traditions examined in Shweder's study "were associated among the Indians (but not the Americans) with assumptions about unobserved entities (such as souls or deceased ancestors) who suffer harm from earthly actions or serve as intermediaries between an act and harmful earthly consequences" (cited in Wainryb, 1991, p. 841). For example, Indian participants held the belief that the father's soul would

not receive salvation if the eldest son got a haircut or ate chicken the day after his father died. Based on this information, Turiel et al. (1987) opposed Shweder's interpretation of his findings. They proposed that the obtained results are reflective of differences between American and Indian participants in their informational assumptions (regarding what causes harm or who is amenable to suffer from harm) and similarities in their moral understandings (that causing harm is wrong).

According to Turiel, Hildebrandt, and Wainryb (1991), some acts, such as rape and killing, represent clear-cut moral violations (e.g., such acts lead to violations of others' rights and they result in harmful consequences for others) and, thus, people make consistent and prescriptive moral judgments about these acts. Evaluations and judgments of some other acts (specifically nonprototypical issues), however, are associated with differing (informational) assumptions. And, thus, these acts or issues cause differences in reasoning among individuals and juxtapositions of judgments within individuals. This is most evident in evaluations of abortion and homosexuality. It has been observed, for instance, that people are divided in their opinions of abortion, with some viewing it as wrong and others as acceptable. These variations in evaluations of abortion have been associated with distinct assumptions regarding the beginning of life. In a study conducted by Turiel et al., participants having the assumption that the fetus is a life tended to consider abortion to be wrong, because they saw the act as comparable to murder. Participants making the assumption that the fetus is not a life, on the other hand, tended to view abortion as acceptable and dependent upon a personal choice that does not involve a moral transgression. The participants did not differ in their judgments regarding

the taking of a life in an issue other than the abortion. All participants agreed that it is wrong to kill (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993). According to Turiel et al. (1991), there may be also ambiguities in the understanding of these assumptions that contribute to inconsistencies within individuals' judgments. For example,

many who evaluate abortion negatively allow exceptions, most notably in the case of pregnancy due to rape or incest, or give priority to the physical welfare of the mother over the fetus. In turn, those who consider abortion acceptable on the grounds that it is a personal choice because the fetus is not a life also make exceptions based on the reasons motivating the decision to discontinue a pregnancy (e.g., if an abortion were sought merely as a method of birth control or to choose the sex of the child). These juxtapositions or inconsistencies suggest that there are uncertainties in assumptions about the start of life—uncertainties that do not seem to exist regarding the definition of life after birth, where the injunction against taking a life is usually not qualified. Moreover, after birth, lives are treated as equal, whereas, with regard to abortion, the lives of fetus and mother are often not treated as equal. Uncertainties in the assumption that the fetus is not yet a life, as held by those evaluating abortion positively, may be a source of their judgments that abortion is wrong when sought in lieu of birth control or to choose the sex of a child. (Turiel et al., 1991, p. 65-66)

According to Wainryb and Turiel (1993), these examples indicate that both moral concepts and informational assumptions are taken into consideration in moral judgments

and that moral concepts are held common among individuals, whereas there are variations in informational assumptions that affect the application of moral judgments in concrete situations.

Also, Wainryb and Turiel (1993) suggest that studies (especially the ones conducted in religious contexts) that examine individuals' moral evaluations of acts should be interpreted cautiously as religion is an important source in the acquisition of informational assumptions. According to Wainryb and Turiel, religion provides a different account of reality compared to science and other cultural sources. "Classic examples include different accounts of the causes of disease (viruses and germs vs. spirits and moral transgressions) and of the origins of humans (evolution vs. creationism). Moreover, religions may differ in their accounts, as do different schools of scientific thought" (Wainryb & Turiel, 1993, p. 214). Therefore, religions can be associated with different informational assumptions. For Wainryb and Turiel (1993), then, "assumptions about psychological reality are important to the decisions people arrive at when concretely applying their judgments regarding moral oughts" (p. 214).

Research in Psychology of Religion

There has been a dramatic increase in the study of psychology-religion relationships for the past twenty-five years. Consequently, the field of psychology of religion has expanded greatly and has increased in importance and visibility for the last two decades (Paloutzian, 1996). Research in this field has focused on such issues as how individuals become religious, what their religion means to them psychologically, what personal motives and social experiences are involved, how death influences religious

behavior, how religious beliefs change through the lifespan, how religious beliefs affect moral thinking and behavior, and how the concept of God emerges and develops during the lifespan. Especially religious development (the developmental change in religious beliefs) has drawn much attention from researchers and theoreticians “since the formative days of the psychology of religion, and a number of major books and articles summarizing theory and research in this area have been published in the past half century” (Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003, p. 74). However, as it is not directly relevant to this dissertation study, psychological research on religious development is not given in this section. The literature on the link between religion and morality, however, is directly related to the study and, thus, it is discussed in detail (for information on psychological research on religious development, see Appendix A).

Research on the Link between Religion and Moral Attitudes

Religion, for believers, involves a quest for ultimate truth. It helps them answer their deepest questions about life, death, and the purpose of existence. Religion also tends to be prescriptive, telling believers how they should live their lives. Therefore, it tends to make demands on them and to challenge their beliefs, thoughts, and actions (Exline, 2002). Consequently, religious rules and traditions, for believers, may continue to be a powerful source of moral guidance in their daily lives, even if they accept the general separability of morality from religion (Crittenden, 1990). In fact, there is evidence in the research literature indicating that different religious groups may hold different views about moral issues, possibly due to religious teachings (Spilka et al., 2003). Francis and Greer (1992), for example, found that Catholic adolescents approached moral issues (e.g.,

sexual intercourse before marriage, stealing, abortion) more conservatively compared to Protestant adolescents. In a different study, Simmons and Simmons (1994) observed that there were significant differences between English and Saudi Arabian adolescents in their moral values. In general, the Saudi Arabian participants gave prominence to Islamic moral principles, whereas the English participants expressed more material and fewer religious values.

Furthermore, research shows that high involvement in religion may have a strong influence on individuals' attitudes and actions (Scheepers & Slik, 1998). In fact, Scheepers and Slik, in their research with Roman Catholic participants from the Netherlands, found that the effects of high level of religiosity on moral issues, such as abortion, and euthanasia outweighed the effects of educational level and personal income, both for male and female participants. Indeed, in general people who are more religious display more opposition to such issues as abortion (Bryan & Freed, 1993), divorce (Hayes & Hornsby-Smith, 1994), homosexuality (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), pornography (Lottes, Weinberg, & Weller, 1993), premarital sexuality, feminism, nudity in advertising, suicide, and contraception (Spilka et al., 2003), consistent with their religious beliefs. Highly religious people have also been observed to be more likely to support traditional sex-roles (Larsen & Long, 1988), marriage (Hayes & Hornsby-Smith), conservative political parties, and capital punishment (Spilka et al.).

Based on these research findings it can be thought that religious beliefs may to some extent lead individuals to judge moral issues differently. "However, recent evidence suggests that the ways in which people reason about religious and moral conflicts are

quite similar” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 418). To examine the ways people reason about religious and moral transgressions, Cobb, Ong, and Tate (2001) presented Protestant and Roman Catholic college students “with a narrative account of a wrongdoing that could be perceived as a violation of a rule or a relationship, or of both, in which the offended party was either God (religious vignettes) or another person (moral vignette)” (p. 264). The results indicated that even though the participants tended to evaluate religious transgressions as more serious than the moral transgressions, they reasoned about both types of wrongdoing in similar ways. In other words, the participants characterized the wrongdoing in terms of having broken a rule regardless of whether the injured party was God or a person. In sum, both the Protestant and Catholic participants tended to evaluate the wrongdoing in terms of justice and rights considerations. According to Cobb et al. (2001), these findings are consistent with Nucci and Turiel’s research results that “individuals differing in religious affiliation nonetheless adopted similar positions when reasoning about religious or moral issues” (p. 273).

Moral Reasoning in Muslim Societies

Studies on Turkish Muslims’ Reasoning

Studies conducted in Turkey, a democratic Muslim society, indicate that religion has an important place in Turkish people’s lives. For example, Gard, Cavlak, Sunden, and Ozdincler (2005), in their comparison of Swedish and Turkish physiotherapy students, observed that religion had much more influence on Turkish participants than on Swedish participants (90% of the Turkish participants were religiously active) and that Turkish students compared to their Swedish counterparts showed more opposition to suicide and

ethanasia, consistent with Islamic teachings. Concerning priorities in moral questions, however, Turkish participants gave higher priorities to justice in healthcare than Swedish participants. In a different study Tufekci (2002), as a results of her interviews with Turkish families holding traditional and Western values, found that for Western-oriented Turkish families Islam was not more than a personal belief system, while for traditional Turkish families Islam was not just a personal belief system but also a set of principles that they wanted to follow in their daily life. Her study also showed that Western-oriented Turkish families display more opposition to traditional sex-roles and arranged marriages compared to traditional Turkish families. The researcher attributed this distinction between the families to differences in their religious beliefs. In 2000, Kusdil and Kagitcibasi administered Schwartz's Value Survey to 183 Turkish teachers. The results showed that the low religiosity group gave higher ratings to Openness to Change values and lower ratings to Conservation values than did the high religiosity group. This finding suggests that highly religious people in Turkey may tend to rely on traditional and conservative values in their judgments, consistent with Tufekci's results.

Turkey has been a secular and democratic country since 1923 (Arat, 1994). This suggests that the majority of Turkish people, as the government supports the separation of mosque and state, may tend to see religion as a personal belief system rather than a set of principles that they want to follow in their daily life. Therefore, even though Turkish people, especially those who are actively religious, tend to be influenced by Islamic values in their judgments, this may not mean that they view religion as the only source of socio-moral life. Recent research conducted in Turkey seems to confirm this assumption,

showing that Turkish people (regardless of their religiosity) may not tend to rely on religion (e.g., Islamic law) when solving a socio-moral issue. The findings of a nationwide representative random sample of 3053 face-to-face interviews conducted in 1999 (of the 3053 interviews 1120 were conducted in a total of 94 villages) indicate that the majority of highly religious, religious, and non-religious Turkish participants disapprove of the Islamic arrangements of marriage (polygamy), divorce, and inheritance. The results also show that more Turkish women disapprove of these arrangements compared to men. Moreover, the majority of the Turkish participants (67%) see religious guidance (Islamic law) in state affairs and politics as detrimental (Carkoglu, 2004).

Interestingly, the study indicates that even though 49% of the highly religious Turkish participants favor the establishment of an Islamic-law based religious state in Turkey, when confronted with a choice between the modern day civil code regulations as opposed to Shari'a rules, they prefer predominantly the modern day arrangements. In fact, 72% of those who favor Shari'a rule in Turkey are not supportive of marriage (polygamy) according to Islamic law. "Similarly, 68% of Shari'a supporters are against changing the present civil code concerning the inheritance arrangements and 57% of Shari'a supporters are against changing the present civil code's arrangement of divorces" (Carkoglu, 2004, p. 122). Furthermore, "54% of those who favor Shari'a rule in Turkey agree with the statement that religion as a guide in state affairs and politics is detrimental" (Carkoglu, 2004, p. 125). And nearly 60% of those who favor Shari'a rule agree with the statement that republican reforms have helped Turkey to progress.

Overall, Carkoglu's (2004) findings show that given a clear choice between secular and religious legal arrangements (in socio-moral matters), the majority of highly religious, religious, and non-religious Turkish participants prefer secular civil code and that Turkish women, significantly more than Turkish men, are supportive of the civil code. Moreover, even though highly religious Turkish participants do not tend to reject Islamic law as a whole, only a very small marginal group supports its implications. This finding, according to Carkoglu, suggests that the Turkish public's understanding of the term Shari'a is quite vague and self-contradictory.

Similarly, Arcan (2006), in her study with 20 males and 20 females, also observed that Turkish participants do not view religion as the source of socio-moral life. She reported that 68% of the Turkish participants (especially males) see either civil law or contract as the source of moral concepts (e.g., human rights), while 32% of the participants (especially females) see "conscience" as the source of moral concepts.

These research results might suggest that Turkish Muslims tend to disobey religious practices when they are in contradiction with individual freedoms and rights. Indeed, Carkoglu's (2004) findings show that the majority of people in Turkey (regardless of their religiosity) may not favor polygamy, even though it is acceptable according to the Islamic law. Turkish people might believe that polygamy is an outdated religious practice that does not apply to today's modern concept of marriage. More specifically, they might think that polygamy symbolizes the oppression of women and the violation of their rights, even though it is supposedly based on justice according to the

Islamic law. Indeed, Carkoglu (2004) has observed that more women tend to disapprove of polygamy compared to men in Turkey.

Most Turkish people can be expected to be sensitive and responsive to the issues related to justice, rights, and human welfare as the majority of people in Turkey come from lower-class and middle-class families. The Turkish government also aims to promote “human rights” in the country (Caha, 2003). Turkish students, for example, go through a compulsory human rights education in schools (Ayten, 2006). Moreover, there are several unions in the Turkish society which aim to promote human rights movement in the country. “Human Rights Union,” for example, holds press conferences and seminars in order to make certain issues in Turkey discussed in the public, such as children’s, women’s, and minority rights (Yalin, Tandacunes, & Gul, 2006). Furthermore, Turkish TV channels and newspapers are full of programs and articles highlighting the need for promoting individual rights, gender, social, and economic equality in the country (Turan & Mavnacioglu, 2006; Gunduz, 2006). These “human rights-related” movements and activities in the country might have made Turkish people conscious of the concepts of human rights and welfare over the years. Recent research conducted with 132 university students in Turkey (Turan & Mavnacioglu) seems to confirm this assumption showing that the majority of the participants (55%) see Turkish people as lacking individual rights.

Based on these explanations, it can be said that Turkish mentality is under the strong influence of individualistic and secular values (e.g., independent reasoning, individual rights) as well as Islamic principles.

Studies on the Reasoning of Muslims in Other Islamic Countries

Studies conducted in highly religious Islamic societies show that Muslims have a tendency to be influenced by Islamic teachings in their judgments. Simmons and Simmons (1994), for example, in their research with eighty nine Saudi Arabian adolescents (50 males—39 females) observed that for the Saudi Arabian male and female participants religion served as an ideal and irreligion as a least ideal. Furthermore, they saw religious people as preferred companions (e.g., people who do not commit sins and do good deeds), though strict religious leaders and teachers were the least preferred companions of some subjects. Serving God was the supreme good for over one-third of the subjects, whereas the best outcome was to be a good Muslim and the best thing about life was Islam (e.g., the love of God and the Prophet).

In a different study, Moore (1995), in her interviews with Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh men and women from a rural farming village in Rajasthan, India, found that men relied most heavily on a voice of authority—God, the state, or the dominant caste elders, whereas women were more likely to rely on reasoning based on personal interests. More specifically, the majority of men based their decisions on God and religion, while the majority of women’s responses referred primarily to the self and other. Furthermore, “when a reference to the rules of authority, God, state, or community was added to the notion of justice,” (Moore, 1995, p. 323) the male participants dominated the voice. When a care concern was drawn from the coding categories, however, the female participants dominated the voice. In other words, Moore observed that if the definition for justice relied on reference to rules and authority, men dominated, when justice

referred to fairness and reciprocity, women and men used it equally. Results also indicated that high-caste Hindus and Muslims tended to rely most heavily on the authority of God and religion, “low-caste Hindus on the concerns of self and other, and Sikhs on the community elders” (Moore, 1995, p. 290).

In a recent study, Hassan (2002) asked male and female Muslims from Indonesia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Egypt “the strategies they followed when they were confused or frustrated while facing an important problem, and the actions they took while making an important decision” (p. 69). Results indicated that a considerable amount of participants relied on religion to find solutions to life’s problems. However, the religious elite participants were more likely to rely on religion and God’s guidance when solving a socio-moral problem, whereas Muslim professionals and the public were more likely to rely on family discussions in the solution of the problem.

Studies examining the effect of religion on Muslims’ reasoning should be interpreted cautiously because these studies are few, often use small samples, and different methods to measure moral judgment. Also, these studies do not give information about the participants’ religious background which might have had a significant effect on the results. Like all faiths, Islam has developed divisions [(e.g., Sunni Islam, Shii Islam) (for information on Sunni-Shii Islam, see Appendix D)], sects (e.g., Druze), and schools of thought (e.g., Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali) over various issues. Whereas all Muslims are in agreement about certain beliefs and practices, such as belief in God, the Qur’an, and Prophet Muhammad, “divisions have arisen over questions of political and religious leadership, theology, interpretations of Islamic law, and responses to modernity

and the West” (Esposito, 2002, p. 39). Sects formed within the Islamic society, for example, have particular theological views that deviate from the general norm. Each of them interprets the Islamic doctrine differently and some of them are more conservative than others (Nasr, 2004). Therefore, researchers should get detailed information from Muslim participants regarding their religious affiliations before starting the interview or administering the survey. In today’s Islamic society, there is a great diversity among religious sects and divisions and generalizing the values of one sect or division upon those who are members of another sect or division is neither ethical nor fair.

Furthermore, because of the concerns with the role of fundamentalist Muslims in today’s world, researchers may tend to focus on the reasoning of very conservative or radical Muslims. These groups, however, are still a minority in the Islamic community and their beliefs are hotly debated by other Muslims (Pipes, 1989). Therefore, the results of the studies conducted with Islamic extremists should not be generalized to all Muslims. Future studies should study the groups that are said to represent the majority population within the Islamic society. Some writers, for example, argue that liberal Muslims are the majority (Masmoudi, 2003), whereas others claim that traditional Muslims represent the majority (Nasr, 2004). Future studies should focus on these populations to be able to better comprehend the factors underlying the moral understanding of contemporary Muslims.

Moreover, my literature review results show that researchers examining the effect of Islam on morality tend to study Muslims living in rural areas or places under the control of Islamic law. As a person who comes from an Islamic society, however, it is my

personal opinion that Muslims living in such environments may not feel comfortable or secure enough to express their thoughts freely and honestly. In addition, in some Islamic countries in which the Qur'an constitutes the basic law of the government, religion has a central place in the school curriculum. That is, a big proportion of school time is reserved for religion (e.g., reading aloud and chanting passages from the Qur'an and studying tracts and traditions on prayer, fasting, belief, good morals, and general conduct) (Simmons & Simmons, 1994). Therefore, it might be thought that as people in these societies are exposed to strict religious education beginning from childhood, they might not have enough opportunity to develop critical thinking or independent reasoning which is necessary for the development of secular considerations of right and wrong. And as these people might not have enough experiences with subjects such as logic, philosophy, sociology, and psychology, products of the secular-based education system, it might be considered to be natural for them to rely on religion rather than on secular sources in their moral judgments.

Also, some Islamic-law based or very conservative Muslim countries tend to consider education worthwhile and necessary for boys but somewhat less necessary for girls (Simmons & Simmons, 1994). Therefore, women in these societies may have limited access to both education and employment, which suggests that women in these societies might have much less chance or opportunity to develop independent thinking compared to men. If so, then they might be expected to tend to rely more on religion in their reasoning than on secular sources compared to men.

New evidence, however, contradicts this assumption indicating that self-interested goals and concerns with personal entitlements and rights, the bases for secular-based morality, are also part of the thinking of people from conservative Muslim societies. In fact, research shows that Muslims, especially women, living in highly religious Islamic societies do not always prefer to consult religious sources (e.g., Islamic law) in the solution of socio-moral issues. Rather, they tend to disobey and resist religious and cultural practices they consider unfair (Wainryb, 2006).

Multiple Social and Moral Concerns Within Cultures

From the viewpoint of cultural psychology, the psychology of individuals is presumed to be structured in accord to the culture's dominant orientation, and people are generally thought "to be predisposed to participate in culture and to accept and reproduce their culture's main features" (Wainryb, 2006, p. 212). The assumption of cultural psychologists is that a culture's dominant pattern "is explicitly or tacitly communicated to, and acquired by, the members of a culture through top-down processes of cultural transmission by 'local guardians of the moral order' or through participation in cultural practices and socially prescribed forms of behavior" (Wainryb, 2006, p. 212). As a result of these processes, members of cultures are thought to have a shared commitment to goals, beliefs, and developmental paths, indeed, a shared culture.

Cultural psychologists' assumption of coherent and consistent patterns of cultural organization is best exemplified by the idea that patterns of culture can be broadly classified into individualistic or collectivistic (Wainryb, 2006). According to this formulation, cultures based on an individualistic orientation (e.g., the U.S., Canada,

Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand) structure social experience around autonomous individuals, relatively detached from their relationships, and motivated to reach freedom and personal goals. Cultures with a collectivistic orientation (e.g., much of Asia, Africa, and South America), on the other hand, structure social experience around collectives (e.g., family, community). Members of collectivistic societies “are identified largely by their interdependent roles and by the duties prescribed to them by the collective social system” (Wainryb, 2006, p. 212). Within the moral development literature, individualistic and collectivistic societies have been defined as having fundamentally divergent conceptions of morality. More specifically, it has been argued that individualistic cultures have a moral orientation towards rights, equality, justice, and individual freedoms (rights-based morality), whereas collectivistic cultures have a moral orientation towards interdependence, social duty, and interpersonal responsibility (duty-based morality) (Miller, 1994; Shweder et al., 1990). Within this formulation, as people’s goals and beliefs are assumed to be shaped by their culture’s dominant orientation, the possibility that individuals in a culture may develop distinct perspectives or enter into significant conflict with each other is not a central consideration. Rather, it is believed that “people’s concerns mirror their culture’s orientation, with little substantial conflict among people within a culture” (Wainryb, 2006, p. 213).

This emphasis on cultural homogeneity, however, has been criticized by anthropologists and developmental psychologists, arguing that “autonomy and interdependence are not mutually exclusive but interwoven in development, coexisting in the thoughts and actions of people in Western and non-Western societies” (Wainryb,

2006, p. 213). A recent meta-analysis of cross-cultural research (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) confirmed that differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures are neither large nor systematic and that cultures and individuals cannot be accurately described in terms of a single orientation (for detailed information on individualism-collectivism literature, see Appendix B). This finding is consistent with studies conducted by the researchers adopting the domain model of social development in both Western and non-Western cultures, indicating that men and women in different societies have multiple social orientations, including concerns with social duties, the collective community, and interdependence, as well as independence, autonomy, rights, and freedoms (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000). Indeed, numerous studies showed that North American children and adults often uphold personal autonomy and rights, but also subordinate the concerns with autonomy and rights to concerns bearing on the prevention of harm to others, interpersonal obligations, friendship and mutuality, group goals, and even authority. Studies conducted in China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Middle East, Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Brazil, El Salvador, and Colombia also showed that children in traditional societies use a mixture of judgments on the dimensions of morality, social/religious convention, and interpersonal obligation, while also maintaining concepts of individuals as autonomous agents with choices, freedoms, and rights (Wainryb, 2006).

Contrary to expectations, then, people in traditional cultures draw boundaries on the jurisdiction of authority commands, and are aware of individual choice and rights as components of their social relations. “In exercising personal autonomy, they weigh their

freedoms against other social considerations, such as the goals of the group, the welfare of others, and the hierarchical roles in the cultural system, revealing a complex picture of priorities and preferences” (Wainryb, 2006, p. 218). The conceptualization of people in traditional cultures as autonomous agents, with individual choices and rights is of particular importance because of the common assumption that people of such societies develop sociocentric and interdependent values that override concerns with individual autonomy, freedom, rights, and independence (Wainryb).

According to the researchers adopting the domain model of social development, adults and children

live and develop in multifaceted social environments, try to make sense of their diverse social experiences, disagree with one another about the meanings of social practices and the norms and values that regulate them and, at times, assume critical attitudes toward aspects of their social environment and resist or even attempt to change them. Persons occupying social positions with more or less power often have different experiences and develop different goals and interests which, at times, come into conflict with each other. It is the diverse, and often conflict-ridden, social experiences of persons in culture—rather than dominant cultural configurations or templates—that influence social and moral development. (Wainryb, 2006, p. 215)

Turiel and Wainryb (2000) argue that in general groups in higher positions in the social hierarchy within a society are accorded greater independence, personal entitlements, rights, and freedoms than are those in lower or subordinate positions and that duties and interpersonal responsibilities are emphasized more for groups in

subordinate positions. This argument has been also made by Muslim writers. An-Na'im (1992), for example, claimed that dominant groups or classes within a society tend to hold or be open to "perceptions and interpretations that are helpful to their struggle to achieve justice for themselves" (p. 20). Indeed, studies from non-Western patriarchal cultures show that groups in dominant positions in the social hierarchy, generally males, are seen to be entitled to freedom of choice, independence, and autonomy, while groups in subordinate positions, generally females, are expected to meet others' needs and desires (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000).

People in subordinate positions within a culture, Turiel (2003) argues, are not simply content to accept the views and norms of those in positions of power. "The contested nature of cultural meanings and practices, and the ubiquity of discontent and conflict among individuals in subordinate positions in traditional societies have been amply documented in journalistic accounts and ethnographic studies" (Wainryb, 2006, p. 221). Research on women in traditional societies such as India and Morocco, for example, indicates that "women are aware of the burdens and injustices they experience as a consequence of cultural practices that accord men control over them" (Wainryb, 2006, p. 221). The research on the Druze in northern Israel also shows that the majority of women do not merely accept the hierarchy of roles and status common in their culture; rather they view the father's or husband's demands as unfair. Furthermore, Abu Lughod's research on Bedouin women in Egypt (cited in Wainryb, 2006) illustrates the many ways in which women intentionally disobey and subvert practices they consider unjust, such as arranged marriages and polygamy. Moreover, Chen's study in Bangladesh and India

(cited in Wainryb, 2006) documents defiant acts against customs limiting employment for women and people of lower social castes. Iranian women have been also observed to defy, in safe public places, the requirement to keep their faces covered (Turiel, 2003). Similarly, Kuyas (1982) in her research in Turkey observed that women from lower-class families are aware of the inequality of social power between males and females in the society and that they consider themselves to be under almost total male control.

Overall, the studies conducted in both secular and highly religious Islamic societies suggest that Muslims do not simply mirror their culture's belief system. Rather, they make sense of their diverse social experiences, develop distinct perspectives, and tend to resist cultural or religious practices they consider unfair. For Muslims, Charfi (2005) argues, Islam is a peaceful religion of the people. It is first and foremost a religion, in the sense that its teachings provide an answer to the question of life and death, an effective way of soothing the anguish of existence, and a dream of a life after death that is based on justice and happiness. Therefore, the results of the studies conducted in Islamic societies may not suggest that people in these societies resist religion itself as Islam has an important place in Muslims' lives. Instead, these results might mean that Muslims, especially women living in patriarchal societies, may tend to resist conservative Muslims' interpretations of Islam (which causes injustice and inequality between genders within the Islamic society). In other words, they may attempt to challenge the traditions and customs established by conservative male authorities.

'Resistance to oppression and injustice' is an important issue in Islam. In fact, the concept of justice is the central theme of the Qur'an and, thus, resistance to oppression is

an expected behavior in Islam. Indeed, Islam encourages Muslims to combat oppression, evildoing, and injustice. In other words, Muslims are expected to resist unjust human laws or unjust applications of just laws. In Islam, to accept oppression without reacting to establish justice is seen as worse than the original oppression and injustice. In Islam, Nasr (2004) points out, “fighting injustice, oppression, and evildoing is itself just and the means of establishing justice” (p. 254). And those who are unjust and commit oppression break their covenant with God: “My covenant shall not reach the oppressors (2:124)” (Nasr, 2004, p. 254). Furthermore, the Qur’an and Hadith make clear that “those who are unjust and evildoing wrong themselves and that it is not God who wrongs human beings” (Nasr, 2004, p. 255).

In the following sections, Islamic perspective on moral life, punishments and rewards will be summarized and political, social, and religious structure in Turkey will be given. This information is needed to be able to better comprehend the factors underlying the moral understanding of Turkish male and female Muslims.

Information on Islam and Turkey

Islamic Law (Shari’a) and Moral Life in Islam

In Islam, morality is based on Divine commandments (Durrany, 1981; Hamidullah, 1974). In fact, moral principles and rules in Islam are primarily grounded in the Islamic law, which is known as Shari’a. Islamic law representing the divine commandments supplies a comprehensive system of guidance for Muslims for all areas of life (Goddard, 1995), “including the most intimate aspects of life (such as personal

hygiene and sexual relations) and the most public (such as taxation and warfare)” (Pipes, 1989, p. 123).

The two primary sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an, and Hadith. Such matters as laws of inheritance, marriage and divorce, witnesses, and so on have been explicitly settled by the Qur’an and Hadith. There are, however, a number of social and moral issues not clearly addressed by these two sources. Also, as the time passes, human society undergoes new development. That, in turn, brings new socio-moral problems. In that case, to be able to respond to the changing conditions of human life and for the guidance in the uncovered areas, Islamic law turns to three juristic techniques: “Ijma, Qiyas, and Ijtihad.” These techniques constitute the secondary sources of the Islamic law. When there is no clear guidance in the Qur’an and Hadith on a given social or moral issue, first, Ijma is applied, which simply means “collecting” or “consensus.” In such situations, the consensus of highly credible and trustworthy Muslim scholars is sought (Ali, 2000). If the scholars come to a consensus on a given issue, then, that consensus becomes part of the structure of the Islamic law (Goddard, 1995). If there is no agreement among the scholars, however, Qiyas is applied, meaning “measuring” or “comparing.” In that case, “scholars look for a correlation with an already accepted norm” (Siddiqui, 1997, p. 426). For example, in the Qur’an, use of wine is prohibited because it is seen as intoxicating. It is left to the Qiyas of scholars to determine if cocaine or heroin is also intoxicating.

Ijtihad is also an important source of Islamic law which technically means “reasoned interpretation, independent judgment by a qualified scholar” (Fisher, 2002, p. 403). Ijtihad was meant to occupy a key role in juristic deduction. However, Muslim

authorities have viewed this original thinking as a threat to the Qur'an and Hadith and lost their interest in this juristic technique over the years, and Islamic law became rigid and less responsive to the changing needs of society with time (Ali, 2000). For those Muslim intellectuals who wish to keep their religious faith within the context of modern life, however, the process of Ijtihad is very critical (Fisher, 2002).

In Islam, then, moral norms and values are primarily derived from the Qur'an and Hadith (Thomas, 1997). And the consensus of the majority or the desires of Muslim community can never change a divine principle or law included in these two sources (Haneef, 1996).

According to Islamic belief, an act is good or bad simply because God has declared it to be such (Hameed, 1981; Muslehuddin, 1978; Brelvi, 1965). The fundamental principle underlying Islamic moral norms and actions is that God knows which acts are right and which acts are wrong and because He is perfectly good and loving, He always commands His worshippers to do right acts and to abstain from wrong ones (Haneef, 1996). "God's moral knowledge and moral goodness guarantee that what He commands His worshippers to do is always what they ought to do" (Taylor, 1978, p. 563). From the Islamic point of view, then, God's laws are neither whimsical nor arbitrary but rather the result of His absolute knowledge of right and wrong (Haneef, 1996).

Islam proclaims that acts are determined by their motives (Hamidullah, 1974; Brelvi, 1965). In fact, Prophet Muhammad has often declared: "Acts will be judged only according to intention" (Durrany, 1981, p. 55; Brelvi, 1965, p. 249). Furthermore, "good

intentions are not an excuse for doing what is unlawful; a good end does not justify a wrong means in Islam” (Haneef, 1996, p .101). However, Unlawful or prohibited things may be treated as lawful for a very short period of time and subject to extremely strict rules when there is a very urgent, compelling necessity. For example, even though the eating of pork is forbidden in Islam, “if one is without food of any kind to the point of starvation, he may resort to the consumption of pork, but only in that minimal amount which meets his bare needs and without any greed or desire for the prohibited thing” (Haneef, 1996, p. 101-102). In Islam, then, obeying the laws of God is regarded as a virtue, while doing what is prohibited is considered disobedience to God and a sin.

According to Islamic doctrine, the human nature, *fitra*, is unalterably good and people are entitled to self-respect and a healthy self-image (Smith, 1991). Therefore, the neonate is considered morally unmarred. In other words, as pointed out by Husain and Ashraf, in Islam, “every child is born in a state of innocence and if it succumbs to evil later, it is because of its failure to rise above temptation” (cited in Thomas, 1997, p. 194). Therefore, according to Islamic belief, the moral duty of all Muslims is to live in strict conformity with the law of God (Thomas, 1997; Muslehuddin, 1978). This will keep the individual away from the negative influences of the environment. In Islam, then, moral development, in other words, learning to abide by God’s commandments is the most basic concern of Islamic tradition, and acquiring righteousness is the Muslim’s main life-long goal (Obeid, 1988).

Justice is the core value of Islamic ethics (Hashmi, 2002). In other words, the goal of the divine law, according to the Islamic doctrine, is to establish justice in the society

and in order to form a just society, Muslims should live and act justly (Nasr, 2004): “O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor (4:135)” (Hashmi, 2002, p. 162-163). “O you who believe! Be ever steadfast in your devotion to God, bearing witness to the truth in all equity, and never let hatred of anyone lead you into the sin of deviating from justice. Be just: this is closest to piety (5:8)” (Hashmi, 2002, p. 163).

Punishments and Rewards in the Islamic Perspective

The dream of afterlife, for believers, constitutes an important incentive to lead a moral life. “In the polytheistic religion practiced by Arabs before Muhammad, the afterlife was only a shadow, without rewards or punishments. People had little religious incentive to be morally accountable” (Fisher, 2002, p. 373). By contrast, the Qur’an asserts that after a period of repose in the grave, all human beings will be bodily resurrected and assembled for a final accounting of their good and bad deeds.

Basically, Islam argues that what we deserve in the afterlife is a revealing of our tendencies in the material world (Fisher, 2002). According to Islamic belief,

obeying God’s commandments increases one’s chances of enjoying eternal life in Heaven after earthly death. However, good behavior on earth does not guarantee a place in Heaven. An assignment to Heaven still depends on the grace of God, a decision not necessarily based on the morality of the life a person led, but rather on divine wisdom that is beyond human comprehension. (Thomas, 1997, p. 177)

In Islam, hell is the grievous place of unrepentant non-believers (e.g., those who have rejected faith in and obedience to God, who are unjust, and who do not forbid evil).

Muslims believe that hell does not last forever for any believer. Only the non-believers will be left there; the others will eventually be lifted to heaven as God is far more merciful than wrathful (Fisher, 2002). In fact, God's compassion and mercy are mentioned 192 times in the Qur'an, whereas His wrath and vengeance are cited 17 times (Smith, 1991). The greatest sin in Islam "is shirk, or taking a partner unto God, which means denying the Oneness of God, or tawhid" (Nasr, 2004, p. 7).

"Qur'anic punishment, based on the concept that God is just and the reckoner of our deeds, involves acts forbidden in the Sacred Text; such acts are both illegal and a sin against God" (Nasr, 2004, p. 152). There are two kinds of punishments for crimes in Islamic tradition: hudud and tazir. Hudud refers to the "limits" or "prohibitions" of God that are explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an as punishments for particular crimes. "Strict regulations regarding evidence in cases involving hudud crimes have been established under Islamic law, and in such cases false accusations are seriously punished" (Esposito, 2002, p. 150). Tazir, on the other hand, are punishments that are at the discretion of a judge. These include a wide range of penalties such as fines or imprisonment. The hudud punishments are restricted to specific acts (Esposito): illicit sexual intercourse and false accusation of it, consumption of alcohol, theft, robbery, and murder. The punishment for murder, for example, is death unless the victim's family accepts blood money. Even though these acts are transgressions against God, repentance is accepted and the Hadith strongly restricts the application of hudud (Nasr, 2004).

Crimes punishable by hudud are seen as attacks against the established social order, threatening the harmony and morality of the Muslim society. Adultery and

fornication, for example, violate the order of marriage and the legal means for the procreation of children; theft violates the protection of property which is the right of each member of the society; the consumption of alcohol can cause aggressive or immoral acts; and false accusations of unchastity are acts of dishonesty that harm the reputations of innocent people (Esposito, 2002). Hudud representing Islam's most severe punishments can be said to be aimed at controlling the behavior of people who tend to violate others' rights and who tend to harm others in the society.

Political Culture, Social and Religious Structure, and Gender Equality in Turkey

The Republic in Turkey was founded in 1923. The founders of the new regime "aimed to establish a liberal Western society, secular as well as democratic, in Turkey" (Arat, 1994, p. 243). Therefore, development and modernization in Turkey were defined as Westernization (Arat). Before the Turkish revolution, the family and social law was based on Islam (Tufekci, 2002). The leaders of the new regime, however, were entirely anti-clerical (Esposito, 2002); they abolished the Caliphate (Carkoglu, 2004) and the Shari'a courts in 1924 (Böwering, 1994). Also, "tombs and shrines of saints were closed; all Islamic brotherhoods, their meeting places and cloisters, titles and offices were abolished; use of terms such as *haci*, *hafiz*, and *mollas* as religious titles in official life were banned" (Carkoglu, 2004, p. 116). Furthermore, the leaders of the new regime established a secular education system, abolishing *Madrassahs* based on the Islamic education system.

In 1926, the Republic of Turkey adopted the Swiss Civil Code as the basis of its Civil Law that included Family Law. The Civil Law abolished the religious traditions,

such as the penal code based on corporal punishment. The new Civil Law was also highly effective in promoting gender equality in Turkey. In fact, with the new Law Turkish women gained several legal rights, such as the right to choose their own spouses, initiate divorce, and demand child custody. Furthermore, the Civil Law abolished polygamy, prohibited child marriages by bringing a minimum age for marriage, and recognized women as legal equals of men in inheriting and maintaining property. As a result, “compared to their counterparts in other developing countries, especially those in the Muslim world, Turkish women have enjoyed considerable civil and political rights and been more visible in the public domain” (Arat, 1994, p. 57).

In 1930, women gained the right to vote and run in municipal elections, and in 1934, they gained the right to run in national elections. These new rights caused Turkish women to gain access to education and employment opportunities. “In fact, the statistical indicators of female representation among professionals in Turkey has been more impressive than those in many Western countries” (Arat, 1994, p. 58). In the 1970s, 1 in every 5 lawyers and 1 in every 6 doctors in Turkey was a woman, and “Turkey ranked third, following the United States and Canada, among all countries in the world in recruiting women into academia” (Arat, 1994, p. 58).

However, with the effect of conservative groups and Islamic tradition, these reforms made limited impact on rural areas. Furthermore, as the new reforms were not “aimed at liberating women, instead of promoting the development of female consciousness and feminine identity, they strove to equip Turkish women with the education and finer skills that would improve their contribution to the republican

patriarchy as better wives and mothers” (Arat, 1994, p. 59). The aim of these reforms was, then, to transform Turkey into a civilized nation acceptable to the West, not to provide women the opportunity to achieve individual goals. Consequently, in Turkey, the feminist movement has increasingly gained importance since the 1980s. The goal of this movement was to promote women’s respectability as individuals, rather than as mothers, wives, or sisters (Arat).

The women’s movement contributed significantly to the process of democratization in Turkey during the 1980s. “The movement did not merely give more women the opportunity to participate in politics, but also helped create the political milieu conducive to the establishment of a political democracy” (Arat, 1994, p. 241). In 2001, with the help of this movement, the articles that reflect male dominance in marriage were abolished from the Law (e.g., man is the head of the union of marriage; the right and responsibility of deciding the place of residence belongs to the husband; upon marriage, the wife has to use the husband’s family name). Despite all these new reforms and movements, however, in today’s Turkey, women still have limited interest to both education and employment compared to men. In fact, research shows the education level of women in Turkey is much below that of men (Kongar, 2005).

It can be said that women in Turkey are usually in subordinate and vulnerable positions relative to men. Indeed, male authority still exists in rural and somewhat in urban areas. Males are, in general, the decision-makers in the family, whereas females are expected to be inclined towards other-directedness and familism (Kuyas, 1982). Also, women working outside the home do so to contribute to the economic needs of the

family. Most of these working women do not have financial independence. Moreover, even though it is against the law, some people in rural or conservative areas still practice polygamy in Turkey. And women especially in conservative environments are subject to honor killings and domestic violence (Mengu, 2006). However, more and more women in Turkey are becoming financially and individually independent everyday, and during the last decade, the role of the Turkish woman has increased all the way to Prime Minister (Esposito, 2002).

Turkey is described as “the only secular, democratic, pro-Western country in the Islamic world” (Smith, 2005, p. 308). However, the November 2002 elections suggest that Turkey is rethinking its own secular model (Smith). Indeed, the November 2002 elections transformed Turkish politics by bringing a new political party to power with almost two-thirds of the seats in parliament. “The now dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged from a tradition of Islamically orientated political parties that have challenged the religious policies of the Turkish state” (Mecham, 2004, p. 339). The new party pledged to respect religious belief and support moral values, but within the context of a secular regime (Mecham).

The new government has a “moderate” type of modernization perspective, which is based on a synthesis of modern and traditional values. The priority in the government’s policy is given to such issues as human rights, liberties, economic development, and integration into the European Union (Caha, 2003). It can be said that even though it is not fully developed, “a new brand of liberal political Islam is emerging as an alternative to the staunchly secular state” in Turkey (Smith, 2005, p. 308). This frightens secular Turks

as they believe that the representatives of the new government are aiming to change the secular character of the Turkish state (Mecham, 2004), even though the leaders of the new government pledged to safeguard the country's secular traditions.

The new elections in Turkey (The July 2007 elections) show that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is still the strongest party in the country. In fact, the Justice and Development Party won 46.6% of the vote far more than the 34% the party had in the last election, in 2002. The secular state establishment anticipated that voters would punish the Justice and Development Party for fostering an Islamic agenda. However, the main secular party received just 20.9%, compared to 19% in the last election. Now secular Turks wonder whether an Islamic-oriented government that is popularly elected can be democratic and secular.

Today the political life in Turkey is divided into two general categories.

One is pro-nationalism and status-quo, and the other one is pro-globalization and liberty. Those who have high regard for centralized state and nationalism belong to the first group. On the other hand, those who demand integration with the West, liberalization, and democratization take part in the second camp. (Caha, 2003, p. 113)

The second group, Caha (2003) points out, constitutes a great majority of the Turkish society. The results of the World Values Survey conducted in Turkey in 1997 show that

variance in support for democracy is associated with older age, higher education, and greater confidence in the country's institutions of order, whereas variance in importance attached to political liberty is associated with younger age, less religiosity, an unfavorable assessment of government performance, and less confidence in institutions of order. Both profiles suggest that social circumstances are of critical importance. Individuals who are more established

and in a relatively favorable position, who benefit from the status quo, in other words, are more likely to express support for democracy. Alternatively those who more likely to attach importance to political liberty are young people with unfavorable views of both the modern and traditional sociopolitical system. They are youthful protestors who do not have confidence in institutions of order and judge government performance harshly. At the same time, they are not strongly connected to either religion or traditional society. (Tessler & Altinoglu, 2004, p. 43-44)

The results of the World Values Survey also show that religiosity among Turkish Muslims is not strongly and consistently associated with anti-democratic attitudes and that religious Turkish people are no less likely than others to be true democrats (Tessler & Altinoglu, 2004). Indeed, the July 2007 elections suggest that Turkish people do not see an Islamic-oriented government as a threat to Turkish democracy.

However, even though the majority of people in Turkey support liberal and democratic values (Caha, 2003), religion, Cagiltay and Bichelmeyer argue, still has a big influence on “the daily life in family and community including school in an informal way” (cited in Tufekci, 2002, p. 6). In fact, Islamic movement in Turkey has a big influence on young people who are future doctors, lawyers, engineers, and psychologists (Gole, 2001) and this situation causes secular Turkish citizens to be worried about the future political and social orientations of Turkey. Furthermore, there are still people in secular Turkey having the idea of applying the Islamic law as civil law (Carkoglu, 2004) and this creates a strong tension between highly religious and secular Turks in the society. [The majority of Muslims in Turkey are Sunni (Smith, 2005) (for information on Sunni Islam, see Appendix D).]

Turkey is a developing country (Tufekci, 2002). It is rapidly shifting from a traditional, agrarian culture into a modern, urbanized nation (Phalet & Claeys, 1993). Turkish society was known as collectivistic. “Many researchers conducted comparative studies to investigate Turkish cultural values based on the dichotomy of individualistic vs. collectivistic cultures. All of these researchers agree that Turkish culture is neither collectivistic nor individualistic” (Tufekci, 2002, p. 5). Rather, they argue that Turkey integrated individualistic characteristics with old collectivistic ones and exhibits different aspects of both individualism and collectivism at the same time.

Purpose of the Study

As mentioned before, Nucci and Turiel (1993) have demonstrated that conservative Christians and Jews judge moral issues in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, and do not solely rely on religious precepts in their moral reasoning. In a recent study, Cobb et al. (2001) found similar results indicating that both Protestant and Roman Catholics evaluate moral issues in terms of justice and welfare considerations. Given concerns with the role of highly religious Muslims in today’s world, it is important to determine if this population also focuses on universal moral principles in their reasoning, or if they focus exclusively on religious prescriptions.

Based on the existing literature, this study examined whether Turkish Muslims’ moral reasoning is also relatively independent of religious prescriptions. More specifically, using the theoretical model of Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983), the study investigated similarities and differences in the reasoning of more religious and less religious Turks on a variety of moral issues addressed by the Qur’an (a father forcing his

daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy). The study also investigated whether Turkish Muslims associate harmful and unjust behaviors [e.g., violating others' rights, hurting others (physically or psychologically)], which are considered grave sins in Islam (5:8) (Hashmi, 2002), with God's most severe punishment. As the results of this study were expected to show that Turkish Muslims tend to rely on justice, rights, and welfare in their moral judgments, it was reasonable to examine whether they view harmful and unjust behaviors as deserving God's most severe punishment. This was important to determine if there is consistency in Turkish Muslims' thinking.

The study focused on Turkish Muslims (both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims) for two main reasons: First, in non-Western patriarchal cultures, including traditional Muslim cultures, concerns with autonomy and individual rights, the bases for secular-based morality, are said to be "subordinated to the maintenance of social harmony, the preservation of hierarchy, and the upholding of traditional roles and duties" (Wainryb, 2006, 217). From this perspective, then, Muslims might be expected to rely more on religious sources (e.g., Islamic law, religious traditions) in their reasoning than on secular sources (e.g., concepts of justice, rights, harm, and welfare). Research, however, contradicts this assumption indicating that Muslims, living in secular and democratic Islamic societies such as Turkey, do not prefer to consult religious sources (Islamic law) in the solution of socio-moral issues (e.g., marriage, divorce, inheritance) (Carkoglu, 2004). This suggests that Turkish Muslims might tend to disobey religious practices when they are in contradiction with individual freedoms and rights.

Muslims, living in secular and democratic Islamic societies, then, can be said to be aware of the fact that there are certain basic moral principles (e.g., the equality of human rights) that bind people of every nationality and that these principles can be achieved through reason independent of the effects of religious rules. Indeed, Arcan (2006), in her study with 40 Turkish students, has observed that Turkish participants are aware of the fact that human rights are natural rights that apply to everybody everywhere. Arcan has concluded that Turkish people seem to have internalized the concept of human rights and that Turkish females have a greater tendency to internalize the concept of human rights compared to Turkish males.

[There is evidence that self-interested goals and concerns with personal entitlements and rights, the bases for secular-based morality, are also part of the thinking of people from conservative Muslim societies. In fact, research shows that Muslims, especially women living in highly religious Islamic societies, do not always prefer to consult religious sources (e.g., Islamic law) in the solution of socio-moral issues. Rather, they tend to disobey and resist religious and cultural practices they consider unfair, such as polygamy and arranged marriages (Wainryb, 2006). These findings, however, may not apply to all Muslims. Some Muslims especially those living in Islamic-law based countries may still tend to focus exclusively on religious rules (Islamic law) in their reasoning. However, this may not mean that their thinking is bound to be restricted to religious rules and traditions. As a person who comes from a Muslim society it is my personal opinion that if these people, like people living in secular and democratic societies in which the legal system is strong in protecting individual rights and in which

personal rational choice is fostered, are given the opportunity to develop independent reasoning and if they are provided with a secure environment for freedom of speech, they too will realize or freely acknowledge that religion is not the only source of socio-moral life. Therefore, in studies aiming to examine the reasoning of Muslims living in small places or societies under the control of Islamic law, it is important to provide the participants with a secure environment to express their thoughts freely and honestly. It is also important to ask them questions that will challenge their current thought process. This will give the participants an opportunity to approach a socio-moral problem from a different perspective or source.]

A second rationale for this study stemmed from the fact that there are more than 1 billion Muslims living all over the world today. Even though Muslims in different nations share some common beliefs and values, “their socioeconomic, political, and cultural realities vary considerably. These variations have given rise to different Islams, different interpretations, and different practices” (Mashhour, 2005, p. 564). Some Muslims (seculars), for example, argue that modernity requires the separation of religion and the state, while others (Islamic modernists) believe that Islam and modernity (science and technology) are compatible, “so that Islam should inform public life without necessarily dominating it” (Esposito, 2002, p. 44). There are also Muslims (fundamentalists) maintaining that religion (Islamic law) should play a key role in government (for information on Muslims, see Appendix F).

As a secular and democratic country, Turkey includes all kinds of Muslims in its social structure. Secular and highly religious Muslims in Turkey exist side by side in the

neighborhoods and in the professions. Their opposing views regarding the connection between religious beliefs and politics, however, do give rise to conflict. Secular Turks, for example, believe that religious groups in the country are aiming to change the secular character of the Turkish state (Mecham, 2004), whereas highly religious Turks think that the Turkish laws, as they are secular-based, limit their religious rights and practices [e.g., female students in Turkey are not allowed to use Islamic-style headscarves in universities (Esposito, 2002) as veiling is believed to transmit political messages].

As a Turkish citizen, I observe that the conflict between secular and highly religious Turks causes hostility and prejudice between the two groups and, thus, it threatens the peace and harmony within the country. Each group of Muslims, for example, tends to believe that its own moral values represent the valid and true moral values of the contemporary society. For this reason, both secular and highly religious Turks tend to think that they do not have anything in common and, thus, each group tends to isolate the other group from its own communities. Indeed, today secular and highly religious Turks tend to socialize with the members of their own groups.

However, as there is no clear “dialogue” between secular and highly religious Turks within the society, these two groups lose the opportunity to see the similarities in each other’s lives and values as well as the differences. If both groups can get the opportunity to realize that their moral values may be more similar than different (even if they hold different political and religious views), then, they can easily sympathize with

each other's feelings and thoughts. This may help reduce prejudice in the society that is one of the most important factors that hinders people from being tolerant to each other's beliefs.

Indeed, Carkoglu's (2004) findings, as mentioned before, indicate that the majority of highly religious, religious, and non-religious Turkish participants do not prefer to rely on religious sources (Islamic law) in the solution of socio-moral issues, such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. This suggests that these three groups' moral values may be more similar than different. The results of this dissertation study were also expected to show that more religious and less religious Turks may share a secular-based morality. That is, morality for more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims may focus on the same fundamental principles (concepts of justice, rights, and human welfare). Indeed, most Turkish people (regardless of their religiosity) can be expected to be sensitive and responsive to the issues related to justice, rights, and human welfare as the majority of people in Turkey come from lower-class and middle-class families. Therefore, even though religious groups in Turkey claim that they are more oppressed compared to secular or liberal groups in social life, as a person who grew up in the Turkish culture I think that experiences with injustice and harm are at least as salient for secular or liberal Turks as for highly religious Turks. In fact, more religious and less religious Muslims in Turkey have been subject to the same experiences for years, such as poverty, unemployment, growing class differences, and economic inequality. Gender inequality is another common problem for both more religious and less religious Turkish people, especially for women. As mentioned before, male authority (in Turkey) still

exists in rural and somewhat in urban areas (Kuyas, 1982) and some women, especially the ones from lower-class families, are subject to domestic violence (Mengu, 2006).

Experiences with injustice and harm (e.g., economic and gender inequality), I believe, might have sensitized both more religious and less religious Turkish people to the issues of human rights, liberty, and welfare over the years. Recent research conducted with 132 university students in Turkey (Turan & Mavnacioglu, 2006) seems to confirm this assumption showing that the majority of the participants (55%) (regardless of their religiosity) see Turkish people as lacking individual rights.

To show that both more religious and less religious Turks' source of morality is consistent with the political structure of Turkey (e.g., secularism) is important to highlight that both groups are faithful to the country's secular traditions. The results of this dissertation study are thought to contribute to the efforts to start a "dialogue" and "social bond" between different Muslim groups (e.g., conservatives, seculars) in Turkey, which is important for the welfare of the society.

CHAPTER 3

Pilot Study

Using the theoretical model of Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983), a pilot study was conducted that examined similarities and differences in the reasoning of more religious and less religious Turks on six issues addressed by the Qur'an: parents forcing their daughters to use head-covering, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy. These are among the most debated issues in Turkey as well as in other Muslim countries.

The Qur'an commands both males and females to dress modestly and not show their bodies, and the Prophet stated that modesty is a central character trait of Islam. The Qur'an also tells women to cover their "ornaments," which is usually interpreted to mean their hair and, of course, their bodies (Nasr, 2004). Therefore, in the Islamic law-based countries women are required to use head coverings. Some conservative parents in democratic Muslim countries in which veiling is seen as a personal choice might also expect (or even force) their daughters to cover their heads at an early age (after elementary school). According to the findings of a nation-wide representative random sample of 3053 face-to-face interviews conducted in 1999 in Turkey, for example, 59% of the Turkish participants agree with the statement that "all Muslim women should cover their heads" (Carkoglu, 2004, p. 125). This finding might suggest that some Turkish girls and women might be using head coverings out of social or family pressure (even though women are not required to use head coverings in Turkey). The Qur'an, however, declares that "There is no compulsion in religion" (2:256) (Nasr, 2004, p. 49), suggesting that

Muslims are responsible for their own choices. Therefore, some Muslims, especially Muslim women living in both highly religious and democratic Islamic societies, might think that “veiling” should be up to the individual and that women’s covering their heads out of family or social pressure symbolizes the oppression of women and the violation of their rights. Indeed, Iranian women have been observed to defy, in safe public places, the requirement to keep their faces covered (Turiel, 2003). “Veiling” is, indeed, one of the controversial issues that causes conflict and tension among different groups (e.g., seculars, conservatives) within the Islamic world and, thus, Islamic countries need to investigate if Muslims, in general, see “veiling” as a personal choice or as a “requirement” imposed by the society. If some Muslim women cover their heads out of social pressure, then, this is an issue that needs to be discussed in terms of individual rights and freedom (because it represents a clear-cut moral violation).

Procreation, in Islamic doctrine, is seen as one of the most important aspects of marriage. “The Qur’an places a high value on life and its preservation. The Qur’an (17:31) says that neither poverty nor hunger should cause one to kill one’s offspring. Punishment for the unlawful killing of a human being is imposed both in this life and in the next (4:93)” (Esposito, 2002, p. 146). Based on this verse, Muslim authorities argue that after the “ensoulment” (infusion of the soul) of the fetus (thought by some to take place at fertilization and by others after four months), abortion is a homicide and should be punished (in the case of therapeutic abortions for severe medical conditions, a general rule of Islamic law, applying the lesser of the two evils, has often been practiced. Rather than losing two lives, preference is given to the mother’s life, who is the pillar of the

whole family with important duties and responsibilities) (Esposito, 2002). However, abortion is acceptable according to Turkish laws. In fact, a woman in Turkey is allowed to have an abortion before the tenth week of her pregnancy (Mengu, 2006). Even though it is acceptable according to Turkish laws, Turkish people might still be expected to disapprove of abortion as abortion seems to be an issue that represents a clear-cut moral violation. However, as mentioned before, research conducted in the U.S. (Turiel et al., 1991) shows that there is much more disagreement about the issue of abortion because people have different assumptions about whether harm is being done by this act. In other words, research indicates that the evaluations and judgments of abortion are associated with differing (informational) assumptions (e.g., some people think that the fetus is a life and, thus, they view abortion as wrong, whereas others think that the fetus is not a life and, thus, they view abortion as not wrong). And there are often ambiguities in people's assumptions regarding abortion (e.g., people who view abortion as not wrong might also think that a woman should not terminate a pregnancy for the purpose of choosing the sex of the child because it ends the life or potential life of the fetus). Therefore, abortion is said to be one of the issues that causes differences in reasoning among individuals and juxtapositions of judgments within individuals in the U.S. It is important to determine if the same situation holds true in Turkey.

Homosexuality, in Islam, is viewed as abnormal. In some Islamic societies it is treated as a crime punishable under Islamic law, while in others it is tolerated but homosexual people are still set apart socially (Esposito, 2002). Even in Turkey, a democratic and secular Muslim country, for example, most people tend to disapprove of

homosexuality, even though highly educated and modern Turkish youth tends to respect the rights of homosexual people. Therefore, “today a small minority of gay Muslims in some countries have pressed for recognition of their rights within the community” (Esposito, 2002, p. 146).

As mentioned before, research conducted in the U.S. (Turiel et al., 1991) shows that there is much more disagreement about the issue of homosexuality because people have different assumptions about whether harm is being done by this act. In other words, research indicates that the evaluations and judgments of homosexuality are associated with differing (informational) assumptions (e.g., some people think that homosexuality does not harm others and is, thereby, a matter of personal choice, whereas others think that homosexuality is abnormal and, thus, it is harmful for the society). And there are often ambiguities in people’s assumptions regarding homosexuality (e.g., people who think that homosexuality is not wrong might also think that it would be wrong for their children to get into a homosexual relationship because this would result in harmful consequences for the family). Therefore, homosexuality is said to be one of the issues that causes differences in reasoning among individuals and juxtapositions of judgments within individuals in the U.S. It is important to determine if the same situation holds true in Turkey.

Adultery is considered a grave sin in Islam, and in some Islamic nations it is treated as a crime punishable under Islamic law (Charfi, 2005). Adultery is also against the Turkish laws and culture. Indeed, adultery can be considered an issue that represents a clear-cut moral violation and, thus, Turkish people (regardless of their religiosity) can be

expected to strongly disapprove of adultery (Turkish people can be expected to make consistent and prescriptive moral judgments about the act of adultery). Adultery is an especially sensitive issue for Turkish people as TV channels and newspapers are full of programs and articles drawing attention to the adulterous acts which result in family disturbances (e.g., suicides, murders). Turkish public needs to clearly see that people in Turkey (e.g., conservatives, liberals) make similar moral judgments regarding adultery.

Testifying falsely in court (perjury) is forbidden in Islam. In fact, the Qur'an clearly states that Muslims should live and act justly (Nasr, 2004): "O you who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be against rich or poor (4:135)" (Hashmi, 2002, p. 162-163). Perjury is also against Turkish laws. Indeed, perjury can be considered an issue that represents a clear-cut moral violation and, thus, Turkish people (regardless of their religiosity) can be expected to strongly disapprove of perjury (Turkish people can be expected to make consistent and prescriptive moral judgments about the act of testifying falsely in court). Telling the truth in court, however, might be still a problem for some people, especially for those living in conservative places or rural areas in traditional societies. People in these societies, as mentioned before, "are identified largely by their interdependent roles and by the duties prescribed to them by the collective social system" (Wainryb, 2006, p. 212). Based on this information, one might argue that for some people in traditional societies, keeping the family's honor might be more important than telling the truth in court. Or, some people in these societies might have to testify falsely in court out of fear or family pressure, even though they might not approve of perjury.

Some people living in conservative or rural areas in some traditional societies might be the victims of blood feuds or financial feuds. Also, many girls in some conservative traditional societies, including some Muslim societies, are subject to “honor killings” and these crimes are committed mostly by the girls’ own families. It might be that when a person commits a murder (e.g., honor killings, blood or financial feuds), the people in her/his family might not notify her/him to the authorities or they might testify falsely in court to save her/him from going to prison. People, however, should be aware of the fact that testifying falsely in court encourages more crimes and human rights violations in the society. And the societies with high levels of crimes and human rights violations are bound to stay underdeveloped. Turkish public needs to clearly see what people (e.g., conservatives, liberals) in Turkey think about perjury in general. This is important to determine if perjury might be one of the factors encouraging crimes or human right violations within the Turkish society.

Polygamy is one of the most critical issues for traditional Muslim societies, especially for Muslim women living in Islamic law-based countries. Even though the Qur’an declares that the ideal marriage consists of a man and a wife, it allows a man to marry up to four women if he is able to support and treat them equally. Therefore, even though the vast majority of Muslims today are monogamous (Esposito, 2002), some Muslim countries especially those following Islamic law tend to practice polygamy. However, there is evidence that women in highly religious Islamic societies tend to resist polygamy (Wainryb, 2006). In fact, research indicates that Muslim women from polygamous marriages experience more mental health problems, such as depression,

anxiety, and psychosis compared to women from monogamous marriages (Al-Krenawi, 2005). These findings might suggest that these women (women from polygamous marriages) might be subject to unequal and unjust treatment.

Polygamy, then, seems to be an issue that represents a clear-cut moral violation and, thus, Turkish people might be expected to strongly disapprove of polygamy. Indeed, new research conducted in Turkey shows that the majority of highly religious, religious, and non-religious Turkish participants (especially females) disapprove of the Islamic arrangements of marriage (polygamy) (Carkoglu, 2004). However, some people in Turkey (especially those living in rural areas) still practice polygamy (even though it is against the civil law). This suggests that Turkish people might have differing assumptions about whether polygamy involves harm or not. In other words, the evaluations and judgments of polygamy (in Turkey) might be associated with differing (informational) assumptions (e.g., some Turkish people, especially women, might think that polygamy symbolizes the oppression of women and the violation of their rights, even though polygamy is supposedly based on justice according to the Islamic law, whereas others, especially men, might not associate polygamy with the oppression of women). Polygamy, then, may be one of the issues that causes differences in reasoning among individuals in Turkey. And it is important to determine if “the issue of polygamy” creates moral conflict within the Turkish society.

Even though I based this pilot study on Nucci and Turiel’s (1993) previous research, I did not totally duplicate the methods of their study. Nucci and Turiel used the interview method in their research, while I used a self-report questionnaire in this study.

The use of a questionnaire in this study had special advantages for reaching the project's research objectives. For example, it allowed me to collect data from a larger number of subjects than by oral interview methods, ensuring better representativeness and enabling me to do more extensive comparisons among the groups (A total of 82 Turkish undergraduate students participated in this pilot study—15 males and 67 females. The participants were recruited from College of Divinity and College of Education at Ankara University). Also, as I mentioned before, religion is a very sensitive issue in Turkey right now and, thus, neither Turkish researchers nor students are willing to get involved in studies examining religion (as they do not want to disclose their religious identities). Therefore, I believe that the use of a questionnaire might have increased the chance for the participation in this study. Furthermore, as the participants were not asked to give their names in this study, they may have expressed their thoughts more freely and honestly on the research questions than they might have in face-to-face interviews (Helwig, Arnold, Tan, & Boyd, 2003).

Nucci and Turiel (1993), as I mentioned before, examined whether Jews and Christians make a distinction between moral rules common to all religions and non-moral rules specific to their own religions. Therefore, they determined a set of actions considered sins by Judaism and Christianity for the interview and classified some of these acts as matters of morality and others as matters of social (religious) convention. All the participants in their research were asked four main sets of questions. The first asked about the participants' evaluations of the wrongness/rightness of the acts and their justifications for their judgments. The second asked about the alterability of religious

rules. The third question asked about the participants' views of the universality of the status of the behaviors as transgressions. And the fourth set of questions aimed to examine whether the participants view morality as independent of God's word/law. The questionnaire I used in this pilot study, however, only included the first set of questions in Nucci and Turiel's (1993) study which asked about the participants' evaluations of the wrongness/rightness of the acts and their justifications for their judgments. During the data collection process, I observed that the other three questions were threatening for the participants. Therefore, I had to exclude them from the questionnaire. Also, instead of classifying some acts as matters of morality and others as matters of religious convention and of examining whether Muslims make a distinction between the two, I, in this study, aimed to examine from which perspective (e.g., religious, moral, conventional, personal) more religious and less religious Turks tend to look at particular issues addressed by the Qur'an. In other words, I aimed to examine whether both groups tend to see each of the six issues (e.g., parents forcing their daughters to use head-covering, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy) as a religious, personal, moral, or conventional issue. As I mentioned before, there is a big tension between highly religious and secular people in Turkey right now (Carkoglu, 2004). Both groups, for example, tend to believe that they have different moral values as they hold different political and religious views. Therefore, the comparison of the moral reasoning of more religious and less religious Turks on controversial issues within the Islamic world, such as polygamy, was important to determine whether there is a moral unity between these two groups.

Results of the pilot study indicated that the majority in both groups tended to view all the acts as wrong. Also, more religious participants (N = 48—7 males and 41 females) tended to view abortion, homosexuality, and testifying falsely in court as more wrong compared to less religious participants, whereas less religious participants (N = 34—8 males and 26 females) tended to view polygamy as more wrong compared to more religious participants. Moreover, the majority in both groups tended to justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations, consistent with expectations. In other words, the majority in both groups tended to view the acts as a moral issue not a conventional or religious issue. However, more religious participants were more likely to use God's law justification in abortion, homosexuality, and adultery than less religious participants, while less religious participants were more likely to use moral and/or personal justifications (for the same issues) than more religious participants. Furthermore, female participants within each group had a greater tendency to justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations compared to male participants.

Overall, the results of the pilot study may suggest that while religious beliefs influence moral reasoning, both conservative and liberal Muslim students in Turkey might still tend to base their moral judgments on principles of justice, rights, and welfare.

CHAPTER 4

Current Study

The dissertation study consisted of two parts. The first part duplicated the methods of the pilot study using a more balanced distribution of more religious and less religious Turkish university students. Therefore, more religious and less religious Turkish participants, in the first part, were asked to complete the self-report questionnaire used in the pilot study dealing with six issues addressed by the Qur'an: a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy. [Note that the first story in the questionnaire used in the pilot study was about "parents forcing their daughters to use head covering." As I mentioned before, "veiling" is a very sensitive issue in Turkey right now. In fact, female students in Turkey are not allowed to use Islamic-style headscarves in classes (Esposito, 2002) and this creates a tension between the Turkish government and students (Gole, 2001). Therefore, I thought that this issue would disturb the participants and I excluded it from the questionnaire I used in the dissertation study. Some parents living in rural areas or conservative places in Turkey tend to force their young daughters (below 18 years old) to marry men without their express approval. And as a result, such young daughters sometimes commit suicide. Therefore, I decided to include this issue (instead of "veiling") in the dissertation study]. More specifically, the participants, in the first part, were asked to evaluate the wrongness/rightness of the six acts, indicate the degree of wrongness of the acts, and provide their justifications for their evaluations (the detailed information on the self-report questionnaire is given in the

methods section). In the second part, the participants were asked to answer the following question: “Whom do you think God punishes most?”

Hypotheses

Hypotheses related to group comparisons

The first group of hypotheses deals with the evaluation of the acts.

Hypothesis 1a: The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims will view the acts of abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy as wrong.

Hypothesis 1b: More religious Turkish Muslims will be more likely to view the acts of abortion and homosexuality as “wrong” than less religious Turkish Muslims, whereas less religious Turkish Muslims will be more likely to view the act of polygamy as “wrong” than more religious Turkish Muslims.

Hypothesis 2a: The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims will view the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court as wrong.

Hypothesis 2b: For the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, there will be no significant relation between group type (more religious/less religious) and wrongness/rightness preference.

The second group of hypotheses deals with the degree of wrongness of the acts.

Hypothesis 3a: More religious Turkish Muslims will tend to view the acts of abortion and homosexuality as more wrong compared to less religious Turkish Muslims, while less

religious Turkish Muslims will tend to view the act of polygamy as more wrong compared to more religious Turkish Muslims.

Hypothesis 3b: More religious and less religious Turkish Muslims will not differ in the degree of wrongness they attribute to the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court.

The third group of hypotheses deals with the justifications for the evaluations of the acts.

Hypothesis 4a: The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who view the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” will justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations (concepts of justice, rights, harm, and welfare). Also, the majority of more religious Turkish Muslims who view the act of homosexuality as “wrong” will justify their judgments with reference to God’s law (for the same issue), whereas the majority of less religious Turkish Muslims who view the act of homosexuality as “wrong” will justify their judgments with reference to social consensus (for the same issue).

Hypothesis 4b: The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who view the act of homosexuality as “not wrong” will justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations (for the same issue).

Hypothesis 4c: For abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy, more religious Turkish Muslims will be more likely to use God’s law justification than less religious Turkish Muslims who will be more likely to use moral justifications. For the acts of a father

forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, the relation between group type (more religious/less religious) and (justification) category preference will not be significant.

Rationale for hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, and 4c: Almost all the participants in both groups in this study were expected to view the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court as “wrong.” These acts were thought to represent clear-cut moral violations and, thus, it was expected that the participants in both groups would tend to strongly disapprove of these acts (in other words, the participants in both groups were expected to make consistent and prescriptive moral judgments regarding these issues).

The two groups, however, were expected to differ in the evaluation of the acts of abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy. In other words, based on Turiel et al.’s (1991) research findings, the participants were expected to have different beliefs and assumptions about the acts of abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy and, thus, it was thought that there would be less consistency about these issues. For example, less religious participants were expected to be more likely to view the act of polygamy as “wrong” than more religious participants. Less religious participants might believe that polygamy is an outdated religious practice that does not apply to today’s modern concept of marriage. More specifically, they might think that polygamy symbolizes the oppression of women and the violation of their rights, even though it is supposedly based on justice according to the Islamic law. More religious participants, on the other hand, might not associate polygamy with the oppression of women.

Rationale for hypotheses 4a, and 4b: The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who view the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” were expected to justify their judgments with reference moral considerations (in other words, the majority in both groups were expected to rely on secular sources in their moral reasoning). The majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who view the act of homosexuality as “not wrong” were also expected to justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations. The rationale behind these hypotheses might be explained as follows: Turkey has been a secular and democratic country since 1923 (Arat, 1994). This suggests that the majority of Turkish people, as the government supports the separation of mosque and state, may tend to see religion as a personal belief system rather than a set of principles that they want to follow in their daily life. Therefore, even though Turkish people, especially those who are actively religious, tend to be influenced by Islamic values in their judgments, this may not mean that they view religion as the source of socio-moral life. In fact, a new study conducted in Turkey (Carkoglu, 2004) indicates that Turkish people (regardless of their religiosity) do not tend to rely on religion (e.g., Islamic law) when solving a socio-moral issue.

Most Turkish people can be expected to be sensitive and responsive to the issues related to justice, rights, and human welfare as the majority of people in Turkey come from lower class and middle-class families. Also, Turkish students go through a secular education system in which philosophy, logic, sociology, psychology, and human rights

have an important place in the school curriculum. This implies that Turkish people are encouraged to develop critical thinking or independent reasoning which is necessary for the development of secular considerations of right and wrong. Furthermore, Turkish TV channels and newspapers are full of programs and articles highlighting the need for promoting individual rights, gender, social, and economic equality in the country (Turan & Mavnacioglu, 2006; Gunduz, 2006). These “human rights-related” movements and activities in the country might have made Turkish people conscious of the concepts of human rights and welfare over the years.

Hypotheses related to gender comparisons

Hypothesis 5a: More religious female participants will be more likely to view the act of polygamy as “wrong” than more religious male participants.

Hypothesis 5b: More religious female participants will tend to view the act of polygamy as more wrong compared to more religious male participants.

Hypothesis 5c: For polygamy, more religious male participants will be more likely to use God’s law justification than more religious female participants who will be more likely to use moral justifications.

Rationale for hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c: One possible explanation for the difference in the evaluation of the act of polygamy between more religious male and female participants might be as follows: As mentioned in the literature review section, Abu Lughod’s research on Bedouin women in Egypt (cited in Wainryb, 2006) shows that these women intentionally disobey and subvert practices they consider unjust, such as arranged marriages and polygamy. Similarly, survey studies recently conducted in

Turkey on Islamic law also show that the majority of the Turkish participants, especially women, disapprove of the Islamic arrangements of marriage (polygamy) (Carkoglu, 2004). Some Muslim women, then, might think that some cultural or religious practices, such as polygamy, symbolize the oppression of women and the violation of their rights, even though polygamy is supposedly based on justice according to the Islamic law. In fact, research indicates that Muslim women from polygamous marriages experience more mental health problems, such as depression, anxiety, and psychosis compared to women from monogamous marriages (Al-Krenawi, 2005). This finding might suggest that these women might be subject to unequal and unjust treatment. Based on these explanations, more religious female participants in this study were expected to be more likely to view the act of polygamy as “wrong” than more religious male participants. For polygamy, more religious female participants were also expected to be more likely to use moral justifications than more religious male participants.

The fourth group of hypotheses deals with the God’s punishment question.

Hypothesis 6a: The majority of the participants will indicate that God punishes most those who violate others’ rights and who harm others.

Hypothesis 6b: There will be no significant difference in answers to the God’s punishment question between more religious and less religious participants.

Rationale for hypotheses 6a and 6b: As mentioned previously, Islam’s most severe punishments aim to control the behavior of people who tend to violate others’ rights and who tend to harm others in the society. Therefore, the majority of the

participants were expected to indicate that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others.

Methods

Participants

A total of 160 Turkish Muslims were recruited for this study, but 12 of these participants were excluded because they indicated that they were non-Muslims (10 participants were atheists, 1 was a theist, and 1 was a spiritualist). Therefore, 148 participants were included in the current study. During the process of the classification of the participants into more religious and less religious groups, another 50 participants were excluded from the study. As a result, a total of 98 (more religious and less religious) Turkish Muslims were included in the study.

All the participants were recruited from Ankara University. Ankara University includes students from different regions of Turkey and, thus, it constitutes an environment in which both highly religious and secular Muslims are likely to be seen. For this reason, it was thought to provide a useful context for the goal of this research. Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 1.

Table 1

Demographic Information

	Less religious participants (<i>N</i> = 49)	More religious participants (<i>N</i> = 49)
Gender	41% male, 59% female	47% male, 53% female
Age	<i>M</i> = 21.65, <i>S.D.</i> = 2.97 Range: 18-33 years	<i>M</i> = 21.47, <i>S.D.</i> = 2.28 Range: 18-27 years
Where do they come from?	79% urban area 10% town 10% rural area	71% urban area 22% town 6% rural area
Father's education level	2% did not go to school 27% elementary 16% junior high 25% high school 31% college degree	4% did not go to school 31% elementary 12% junior high 25% high school 27% college degree 2% graduate school
Father's employment status	77% employed 23% not employed	79% employed 21% not employed
Mother's education level	10% did not go to school 46% elementary 6% junior high 31% high school 6% college degree	14% did not go to school 53% elementary 8% junior high 10% high school 14% college degree
Mother's employment status	6% employed 94% not employed	10% employed 90% not employed
Approximate (monthly) family income	34% less than \$600 37% \$600 - \$1199 15% \$1200 - \$1800 15% over \$1800	29% less than \$600 44% \$600-\$1199 15% \$1200-1800 12% over \$1800

Measures

Instruments for this study included self-report and demographic questionnaires, and Religiousness Measure (Sethi & Seligman, 1993).

Self-report questionnaire. The self-report questionnaire consists of six stories: A father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, a woman wanting to have an abortion to be able to continue her fun-focused life, two men having sexual relationship, a married man having an affair with a female co-worker, a son testifying falsely in court to save his father from going to prison, and a man marrying a second wife to have a child (for the entire self-report questionnaire, see Appendix J).

Evaluations of the acts and degree of wrongness of the acts. After reading each story, the participants were asked to categorize the act as wrong or not wrong. If the participant marked “wrong,” s/he was asked to indicate the degree of wrongness of the act (wrong negligible, a little wrong, quite wrong, very wrong). Responses to “degree of wrongness” questions were assigned a value of 0 for “not wrong,” 1 for “wrong negligible,” 2 for “a little wrong,” 3 for “quite wrong,” and 4 for “very wrong.”

Justifications. For each story, the questionnaire includes several item statements that show the possible reasons why the act might be wrong or not wrong. Each item represents one of the following four categories: (1) God’s law justification, (2) moral justifications, (3) social justification (social consensus), and (4) other justifications. These items (justifications) were developed based on Nucci and Turiel’s (1993) previous research. The God’s law justification category refers to nonhuman authority (e.g., the word of God). The items referring to intrinsic features of human relations (e.g., harmful

effects, unfair consequences) are grouped into a “moral justifications” category. The social justification category refers to aspects of the social system (e.g., social norms, rules). And the remaining items (e.g., personal choice, prudence) are grouped into an “other justifications” category (for the definition of justification categories, see Appendix G).

Participants were expected to rank the three most important item statements in terms of their degree of importance evaluating a moral act. Even though the participants were allowed to provide more than one justification for their evaluations, only the item ranked as most important was included in the analyses as the first justification was the main focus of this study.

After completing the self-report questionnaire, the students were expected to answer the following question: “Whom do you think God punishes most?”

Demographic questionnaire. In the demographic questionnaire the participants were asked to fill out basic demographic information including school, year in college, age, sex, marital status, family income, religious inclination, parents’ occupation, and level of education (for the demographic questionnaire, see Appendix H).

Religiousness measure. The Religiousness Measure includes six questions to assess religious influence (e.g., How much influence do your religious beliefs have on the important decisions of your life?). These questions are evaluated through a 7-point Likert format (Seybold, 1999) (for the religious influence subtest, see Appendix I).

The religious influence subtest was translated into Turkish by the principal investigator of this study. The back-translation (of the subtest) was done by a Turkish teacher who is specialized in American language and literature.

Analyses of the religious influence subtest. The participants in this study were classified into more religious and less religious groups based on the following procedure: As mentioned before, religious influence subtest consists of 6 questions and responses on the religious influence questions are scored on a scale of 1 to 7, with the higher number indicating greater religious influence. First, a mean religious influence score was computed for each subject (the sample consisted of 148 Turkish Muslims. However, 1 participant did not complete religious influence test and, thus, he was excluded from the study. As a result, a total of 147 mean scores were calculated). Then, the sample ($N=147$) was divided into three equal groups (three equal percentiles). Participants who were in the top 33.33 percentile (participants who were above the score of 4.84) were labeled as more religious ($N=49$), whereas participants in the bottom 33.33 percentile (participants who were below the score of 3.17) were labeled as less religious ($N=49$). Participants in the middle (participants between the scores of 3.18 and 4.83) ($N=49$) were excluded from the study.

The internal consistency of the religious influence subtest was high (Cronbach's alpha coefficient = .95). Therefore, the subtest was thought to be reliable with the sample.

Procedure

The UT Austin Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved all instruments and questionnaires utilized in this study prior to the beginning of data collection.

All the participants were collected through contacts with instructors. Following approval of course instructors, the participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they may refuse to respond to any question. Then, they were given a set of general instructions by the Investigator explaining what was to be asked of them while completing the questionnaires. For example, participants were asked to circle either wrong or not wrong when responding to the “evaluation of the acts” questions in the self-report questionnaire. After the instructions, participants were asked to complete the questionnaires during the regular class session (the participants completed the questionnaires in approximately 50 minutes). No individual results were made available to participants in this project, school administrators, or instructors. All completed questionnaires were retained by the investigator. Participants were not asked to give their names. Also, because of the sensitivity of the questions included in the questionnaires, the participants were not asked to sign consent forms.

CHAPTER 5

Results

All statistical analyses were done using SPSS for Windows. For all the analyses, alpha was set at 0.05.

Analyses of Act Evaluations

My hypotheses in this section indicated that the “majority” of both more religious and less religious participants would view the acts as wrong. Therefore, it was critical for this study to assess whether a statistically significant majority existed in the analyses.

For two-category analyses (wrong/not wrong), it is relatively straightforward to use the chi-square goodness of fit test. For these two-category analyses, I conducted the chi-square goodness of fit test to determine if the observed frequencies were significantly different from the expected frequencies. In other words, I conducted the chi-square goodness of fit test to determine if there was any preference between the “wrong” and “not wrong” categories. For a chi-square test using two categories, the expected frequency is 50%; therefore, any significant deviation from the expected frequency automatically implies one majority and one minority.

Group Analyses

Evaluations of the stories are presented in Table 2. It was expected (see Hypothesis 1a) that the majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims would view the acts of abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy as “wrong.” This hypothesis was confirmed for the more religious group, $\chi^2 (1, N = 47) = .43.09$, $p < .001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 27.94$, $p < .001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 46) = 19.57$, $p < .001$, respectively.

However, findings were more mixed for the less religious group. The majority of less religious participants did view the act of polygamy as “wrong,” $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 41.33$, $p < .001$. For abortion and homosexuality, however, the results were non-significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .02$, $p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 48) = .08$, $p > .05$, respectively. The proportion of less religious participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality as “wrong” did not differ significantly from the proportion of less religious participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality as “not wrong.” Also, it was expected (see Hypothesis 2a) that the majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims would view the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court as “wrong.” This hypothesis was confirmed for both groups (all p 's $< .05$).

Gender Analyses

I also determined whether results differed according to gender (within each group). Results indicated that the majority of less religious male and female participants viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” (all p 's $< .05$). For abortion and homosexuality, however, the results were non-significant for both genders. The proportion of less religious male participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality as “wrong” did not differ significantly from the proportion of less religious male participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality as “not wrong,” $\chi^2 (1, N = 20) = .80$, $p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 19) = 1.32$, $p > .05$, respectively. Similarly, the proportion of less religious female participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality

as “wrong” did not differ significantly from the proportion of less religious female participants who viewed abortion and homosexuality as “not wrong,” $\chi^2 (1, N = 29) = .86, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 29) = 1.69, p > .05$, respectively.

As for more religious participants, the results showed that more religious female participants viewed all the acts “as “wrong” (all p 's $< .05$). More religious male participants also viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, and testifying falsely in court as “wrong” (all p 's $< .05$). For polygamy, however, the results were non-significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 22) = 2.91, p > .05$. The proportion of more religious male participants who viewed polygamy as “wrong” did not differ significantly from the proportion of more religious male participants who viewed polygamy as “not wrong” (for evaluations of the stories, see Table 2).

Table 2

Act Evaluations

Act Evaluations	More religious Muslims		Less religious Muslims	
	Wrong	Not Wrong	Wrong	Not Wrong
Story 1 (A father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval)				
Male	100% (23)	--	100% (20)	--
Female	100% (26)	--	100% (29)	--
Combined	100% (49)	--	100% (49)	--
Story 2 (Abortion)				
Male	96% (21)	5% (1)	60% (12)	40% (8)
Female	100% (25)	--	41% (12)	59% (17)
Combined	98% (46)	2% (1)	49% (24)	51% (25)
Story 3 (Homosexuality)				
Male	100% (23)	--	63% (12)	37% (7)
Female	77% (20)	23% (6)	38% (11)	62% (18)
Combined	88% (43)	12% (6)	48% (23)	52% (25)
Story 4 (Adultery)				
Male	100% (23)	--	95% (19)	5% (1)
Female	100% (26)	--	97 (28)	3% (1)
Combined	100% (49)	--	96% (47)	4% (2)
Story 5 (Testifying falsely in court)				
Male	100% (22)	--	95% (19)	5% (1)
Female	100% (25)	--	93% (27)	7% (2)
Combined	100% (47)	--	94% (46)	6% (3)
Story 6 (Polygamy)				
Male	68% (15)	32% (7)	95% (19)	5% (1)
Female	96% (23)	4% (1)	97% (28)	3% (1)
Combined	83% (38)	17% (8)	96% (47)	4% (2)

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses.

The chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there were significant group differences in evaluations of the acts. Adjusted standardized residual values were examined to determine the source of the group differences, with all values of 1.96 ($p < .05$) considered significant. Fisher's exact test indicated that more religious Turkish participants were more likely to view the acts of abortion and homosexuality as "wrong" than less religious Turkish participants, consistent with expectations: $\chi^2 (1, N = 96) = 29.04, p < .001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 97) = 17.70, p < .001$, respectively. And, less religious participants were more likely to view the act of polygamy as "wrong" than more religious participants, consistent with expectations: $\chi^2 (1, N = 95) = 4.46, p < .05$ (see Hypothesis 1b).

However, Fisher's exact test indicated no significant relation between group type (more religious/less religious) and wrongness/rightness preference for the acts of adultery and testifying falsely in court, consistent with expectations: $\chi^2 (1, N = 98) = 2.04, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 96) = 2.97, p > .05$, respectively (see Hypothesis 2b). [Note that for the act of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, the chi-square test of independence was not conducted because all the participants in both groups viewed the act as "wrong."]

It was also determined if results differed according to gender (within each group). Fisher's exact test indicated that more religious female participants were more likely to view the act of polygamy as "wrong" than more religious male participants, consistent with expectations: $\chi^2 (1, N = 46) = 6.11, p < .05$ (see Hypothesis 5a). Fisher's exact test also indicated that more religious female participants were more likely to view the act of

homosexuality as “not wrong” than more religious male participants: $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 6.05, p < .05$. For abortion, however, Fisher’s exact test indicated no significant relation between gender (male/female) and wrongness/rightness preference for more religious group: $\chi^2 (1, N = 47) = 1.16, p > .05$. [Note that for the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, the chi-square test of independence was not conducted as all the more religious participants viewed the three acts as “wrong.”]

For the less religious group, Fisher’s exact test indicated no significant relation between gender (male/female) and wrongness/rightness preference in abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy: $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 1.64, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 48) = 2.93, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .07, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .07, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .07, p > .05$, respectively. [Note that for the act of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, the chi-square test of independence was not conducted as all the less religious participants viewed the act as “wrong.”]

Analyses of the Degree of Wrongness of the Acts

Participants were also asked to indicate how wrong the act was, ranging from not wrong (0) to very wrong (4). For the six stories, a 2 (group) X 2 (gender) ANOVA was used to determine if the degree of wrongness scores differed significantly according to group (more religious/less religious) or gender (male/female).

For Story 1 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval), results indicated no significant main effects (for the degree of wrongness) for

gender (male/female) ($F[1, 94] = .90, p > .05$) and group (more religious/less religious) ($F[1, 94] = .20, p > .05$), consistent with expectations (see Hypothesis 3b). The interaction effect was also not significant, $F(1, 94) = .53, p > .05$ (see Table 3). For Story 2 (abortion), results indicated a significant main effect in the degree of wrongness based on group ($F[1, 92] = 58.78, p < .001$). As expected, more religious participants viewed the act of abortion as more wrong compared to less religious participants (see Hypothesis 3a). However, there was no significant main effect for gender, $F(1, 92) = 1.44, p > .05$. The interaction effect was also not significant, $F(1, 92) = .90, p > .05$ (see Table 4). For Story 3 (homosexuality), results indicated a significant main effect in the degree of wrongness based on group ($F[1, 93] = 32.92, p < .001$) and gender ($F[1, 93] = 15.85, p < .001$). More religious participants viewed the act of homosexuality as more wrong compared to less religious participants, consistent with expectations (see Hypothesis 3a). And male participants viewed the act of homosexuality as more wrong compared to female participants. However, the interaction effect was not significant, $F(1, 93) = .00, p > .05$ (see Table 5).

To better examine differences in the degree of wrongness for Story 3 as a function of group and gender in this sample, post hoc analyses were conducted comparing mean (degree of wrongness) scores among more religious males, more religious females, less religious males, and less religious females. Results of a Oneway ANOVA indicated an overall significant ($p < .001$) difference in the degree of wrongness. Results of the Tukey planned comparisons indicated the following: less religious male participants ($M = 2.21, SD = 1.84$) viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly ($p < .05$) more wrong

compared to less religious female participants ($M = 1.03, SD = 1.48$). More religious male participants ($M = 3.91, SD = .29$) viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly ($p=.001$) more wrong compared to less religious male participants ($M = 2.21, SD = 1.84$). However, there was no significant ($p>.05$) difference in the degree of wrongness between less religious male participants ($M = 2.21, SD = 1.84$) and more religious female participants ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.66$). Moreover, more religious male participants ($M = 3.91, SD = .29$) viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly ($p<.001$) more wrong compared to less religious female participants ($M = 1.03, SD = 1.48$). More religious female participants ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.66$) also viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly ($p<.001$) more wrong compared to less religious female participants ($M = 1.03, SD = 1.48$). Furthermore, more religious male participants ($M = 3.91, SD = .29$) viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly ($p<.05$) more wrong compared to more religious female participants ($M = 2.73, SD = 1.66$).

For Story 4 (adultery), results indicated a significant main effect in the degree of wrongness for group ($F[1, 92] = 10.48, p<.05$), but not for gender ($F[1, 92] = 2.33, p>.05$). More religious participants viewed the act of adultery as more wrong compared to less religious participants, contrary to expectations (see Hypothesis 3b). The interaction effect, however, was not significant, $F(1, 92) = .15, p>.05$ (see Table 6). Similarly, for Story 5 (testifying falsely in court), results indicated a significant main effect in the degree of wrongness for group ($F[1, 92] = 4.22, p<.05$), but not for gender ($F[1, 92] = .19, p>.05$). More religious participants viewed the act of testifying falsely in court as more wrong compared to less religious participants, contrary to expectations (see

Hypothesis 3b). The interaction effect, however, was not significant, $F(1, 92) = 1.5$, $p > .05$ (see Table 7). For Story 6 (polygamy), results indicated a significant main effect in the degree of wrongness based on group ($F[1, 91] = 6.28$, $p < .05$) and gender ($F[1, 91] = 10.37$, $p < .05$). Less religious participants viewed the act of polygamy as more wrong compared to more religious participants, consistent with expectations (see Hypothesis 3a). And female participants viewed the act of polygamy as more wrong compared to male participants. The interaction effect was also significant, $F(1, 91) = 6.53$, $p < .05$ (see Table 8).

To better examine differences in the degree of wrongness for Story 6 as a function of group and gender in this sample, post hoc analyses were conducted comparing mean (degree of wrongness) scores among more religious males, more religious females, less religious males, and less religious females. Results of a Oneway ANOVA indicated an overall significant ($p < .001$) difference in the degree of wrongness. Results of the Tukey planned comparisons indicated the following: less religious male participants ($M = 3.50$, $SD = .95$) viewed the act of polygamy as significantly ($p < .05$) more wrong compared to more religious male participants ($M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.73$). However, there was no significant ($p > .05$) difference in the degree of wrongness between less religious male participants ($M = 3.50$, $SD = .95$) and less religious female participants ($M = 3.66$, $SD = .81$). There was also no significant ($p > .05$) difference in the degree of wrongness between less religious male participants ($M = 3.50$, $SD = .95$) and more religious female participants ($M = 3.67$, $SD = .87$). Moreover, less religious female participants ($M = 3.66$, $SD = .81$) viewed the act of polygamy as significantly ($p < .001$) more wrong compared to

more religious male participants ($M = 2.32, SD = 1.73$). However, there was no significant ($p > .05$) difference in the degree of wrongness between less religious female participants ($M = 3.66, SD = .81$) and more religious female participants ($M = 3.67, SD = .87$). Furthermore, more religious female participants ($M = 3.67, SD = .87$) viewed the act of polygamy as significantly ($p = .001$) more wrong compared to more religious male participants ($M = 2.32, SD = 1.73$), consistent with expectations (see Hypothesis 5b).

Table 3

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 1—A father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	3.85	20
	More religious	3.87	23
	Total	3.86	43
Female	Less religious	3.97	29
	More religious	3.88	26
	Total	3.93	55
Total	Less religious	3.92	49
	More religious	3.88	49
	Total	3.90	98

Table 4

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 2—Abortion)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	1.80	20
	More religious	3.55	22
	Total	2.71	42
Female	Less religious	1.24	29
	More religious	3.48	25
	Total	2.28	54
Total	Less religious	1.47	49
	More religious	3.51	47
	Total	2.47	96

Table 5

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 3—Homosexuality)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	2.21	19
	More religious	3.91	23
	Total	3.14	42
Female	Less religious	1.03	29
	More religious	2.73	26
	Total	1.83	55
Total	Less religious	1.50	48
	More religious	3.29	49
	Total	2.40	97

Table 6

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 4—Adultery)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	3.16	19
	More religious	3.74	23
	Total	3.48	42
Female	Less religious	3.46	28
	More religious	3.92	26
	Total	3.69	54
Total	Less religious	3.34	47
	More religious	3.84	49
	Total	3.59	96

Table 7

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 5—Testifying falsely in court)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	3.35	20
	More religious	3.50	22
	Total	3.43	42
Female	Less religious	3.21	29
	More religious	3.80	25
	Total	3.48	54
Total	Less religious	3.27	49
	More religious	3.66	47
	Total	3.46	96

Table 8

Mean Degree of Wrongness Scores by Group and Gender (Story 6—Polygamy)

Gender	Group	Mean	<i>n</i>
Male	Less religious	3.50	20
	More religious	2.32	22
	Total	2.88	42
Female	Less religious	3.66	29
	More religious	3.67	24
	Total	3.66	53
Total	Less religious	3.59	49
	More religious	3.02	46
	Total	3.32	95

Analyses of Justifications

Some of the hypotheses in this section require an analysis using three or more (justification) categories. My hypotheses in this section indicated that the majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims would justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations (concepts of justice, rights, harm, and welfare). Therefore, it was critical for this study to assess whether a statistically significant majority existed in the analyses.

For the hypotheses in this section, I used the chi-square goodness of fit test to determine whether there were any preferences among the different (justification) categories. This test assesses whether or not the observed frequencies differ significantly from the expected frequencies. Standardized residuals show which cells (categories) are the major contributors to a significant chi-square value. And any (standardized) residual with an absolute value that is equal to or greater than $z = 1.96$ is considered significant at the .05 level (Sheskin, 2007). However, neither chi-square value nor standardized residuals show whether there is a significant majority in a test using more than two categories. To fully appreciate this, one can assume a (chi-square goodness of fit) test using ten categories and hundred responses, with the expected frequency of 10% for each category. Assume that categories 1 and 2 got 45 and 47 responses, respectively and categories 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 got only 1 response. In this case, the chi-square goodness of fit test will show that the observed frequencies differ significantly from the expected frequencies. Standardized residuals will also show that the observed frequencies

differ significantly from the expected frequencies for all the 10 categories. In reality, however, there is no significant majority between the categories 1 and 2. But chi-square value does not explicitly show this.

My approach on finding if a majority exists in a chi-square goodness of fit test using more than two categories was as follows: First, a chi-square goodness of fit test was conducted among all (justification) categories. If a significant deviation from expected frequencies was found, the test continued as follows: The category with the highest standardized residual was picked because this category was the most likely candidate to be the majority. Then, this category was compared with the category having the second highest standardized residual. For this comparison, a chi-square goodness of fit test using two categories with 50% of expected frequency was conducted. If a significant (positive) deviation from the 50% of expected frequency was observed, then, the first category was considered to be the “majority.”

A concrete example of the logic I used in the analyses in this section is as follows: I expected that the majority of more religious participants who viewed the act of testifying falsely in court as “wrong” would justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations. For this hypothesis, I first conducted the chi-square goodness of fit test using all the (justification) categories for this story to determine if the observed frequencies differed significantly from the expected frequencies. The results were as follows:

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual	Standardized residual
God's law	24	11.8	12.3	3.58
Moral	21	11.8	9.3	2.70
Social consensus	1	11.8	-10.8	-3.14
Other	1	11.8	-10.8	-3.14

Differences were significant in this example: $\chi^2 (3, N = 47) = 39.72, p < .001$. Then, I did a follow up test using the God's law and moral (justifications) categories (because these were the ones having the highest frequencies). The results of the follow up test were non-significant, suggesting that there was no preference between the two categories, $\chi^2 (1, N = 45) = .20, p > .05$.

Group Analyses

Reports of justifications are presented in Tables 9 and 10. It was expected (see Hypothesis 4a) that the majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” would justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations. Results showed that the majority of more religious participants justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations in the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry

someone without her express approval and polygamy, $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 25.00, p < .001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 38) = 23.68, p < .001$, respectively. For abortion, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, however, the results were non-significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 45) = .20, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .02, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 45) = .20, p > .05$, respectively. The proportion of more religious participants who justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations did not differ significantly from the proportion of more religious participants who justified their judgments with reference to religious considerations (God's law) (for abortion, adultery, and testifying falsely in court). The majority of less religious participants who viewed all the five acts as "wrong," on the other hand, justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations (all p 's $< .05$).

It was expected (see Hypothesis 4a) that the majority of more religious Turkish Muslims who viewed the act of homosexuality as "wrong" would justify their judgments with reference to God's law (for the same issue), whereas the majority of less religious Turkish Muslims who viewed the act of homosexuality as "wrong" would justify their judgments with reference to social consensus (for the same issue). This hypothesis was confirmed for the more religious group, $\chi^2 (1, N = 40) = 32.40, p < .001$. However, results were non-significant for the less religious group, suggesting that there was no preference among the different (justification) categories, $\chi^2 (3, N = 23) = .83, p > .05$.

It was predicted (see Hypothesis 4b) that the majority of both more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims who viewed the act of homosexuality as "not wrong" would justify their judgments with reference to moral considerations (for the same issue). This hypothesis was confirmed for the less religious group, $\chi^2 (1, N = 25) = 11.56,$

$p=.001$. However, as there were only six participants in the more religious group viewing the act of homosexuality as “not wrong,” the chi-square goodness of fit test was not conducted.

Table 9

Justifications of “wrong” judgments for Stories 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy) by group

	God’s law	Moral	Social	Other
More religious				
Story 1	14% (7)	86% (42)	--	--
Story 2	46% (21)	52% (24)	--	2% (1)
Story 4	51% (25)	49% (24)	--	--
Story 5	51% (24)	45% (21)	2% (1)	2% (1)
Story 6	11% (4)	90% (34)	--	--
Less religious				
Story 1	--	98% (48)	--	2% (1)
Story 2	4% (1)	92% (22)	--	4% (1)
Story 4	6% (3)	92% (43)	--	2% (1)
Story 5	4% (2)	91% (42)	2% (1)	2% (1)
Story 6	--	100% (47)	--	--

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses.

Table 10

Justifications of “wrong” and “not wrong” judgments for Story 3 (homosexuality) by group

	God’s law	Moral	Social	Other
<i>Wrong</i>				
More religious	88% (38)	5% (2)	2% (1)	5% (2)
Less religious	26% (6)	17% (4)	26% (6)	30% (7)
<i>Not Wrong</i>				
More religious	--	50% (3)	--	50% (3)
Less religious	--	84% (21)	--	16% (4)

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses.

The chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there were significant group differences in justifications. Adjusted standardized residual values were examined to determine the source of the group differences, with all values of 1.96 ($p < .05$) considered significant. (Note that both participants who viewed the acts as “wrong” and who viewed the acts as “not wrong” were included in these analyses).

It was expected (see Hypothesis 4c) that for abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy, more religious Turkish Muslims would be more likely to use God’s law justification than less religious Turkish Muslims who would be more likely to use moral justifications. For the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her

express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, however, no significant relation between group type (more religious/less religious) and (justification) category preference was expected.

Results indicated that more religious participants were more likely to use God's law justification than less religious participants, while less religious participants were more likely to use moral justifications than more religious participants in Stories 1, 4, 5, and 6 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy): $\chi^2 (2, N = 98) = 8.40, p < .05$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 97) = 24.67, p < .001$; $\chi^2 (3, N = 97) = 26.28, p < .001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 95) = 7.74, p = .006$, respectively. Also more religious participants were more likely to use God's law justification than less religious participants, while less religious participants were more likely to use other justifications than more religious participants in Story 2 (abortion): $\chi^2 (2, N = 93) = 31.88, p < .001$. Furthermore, more religious participants were more likely to use God's law justification than less religious participants, while less religious participants were more likely to use moral and social justifications than more religious participants in Story 3 (homosexuality): $\chi^2 (3, N = 97) = 42.42, p < .001$.

Gender Analyses

I also determined if the results differed according to gender (within each group). Results indicated that the majority of more religious male participants who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as "wrong" justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations in the acts of a father forcing his

daughter to marry someone without her express approval and polygamy, $\chi^2 (1, N = 23) = 9.78, p=.002$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 15) = 8.07, p=.005$, respectively. For abortion and adultery, the results were non-significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 20) = .20, p>.05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 23) = 1.09, p>.05$, respectively. The proportion of more religious male participants who justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations did not differ significantly from the proportion of more religious male participants who justified their judgments with reference to religious considerations (God's law) (for abortion and adultery). For testifying falsely in court, the majority of more religious male participants justified their judgments with reference to religious considerations (God's law), $\chi^2 (1, N = 21) = 3.86, p=.050$.

The majority of more religious female participants who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations in the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval and polygamy, $\chi^2 (1, N = 26) = 15.39, p<.001$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 23) = 15.70, p<.001$, respectively. For abortion, adultery, and testifying falsely in court, however, the results were non-significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 25) = 1.00, p>.05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 26) = .62, p>.05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 24) = 1.50, p>.05$, respectively. The proportion of more religious female participants who justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations did not differ significantly from the proportion of more religious female participants who justified their judgments with reference to religious considerations (God's law) (for abortion, adultery, and testifying falsely in court).

The majority of less religious male and female participants who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations (all p 's<.05).

Furthermore, the majority of more religious male and female participants who viewed the act of homosexuality as “wrong” justified their judgments with reference to God’s law (all p 's<.05). The results, however, were non-significant for the less religious male and female participants, $\chi^2 (3, N = 12) = .67, p>.05$; $\chi^2 (3, N = 11) = .27, p>.05$, respectively. Moreover, all the less religious male participants who viewed the act of homosexuality as “not wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations. Similarly, the majority of less religious female participants who viewed homosexuality as “not wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations, $\chi^2 (1, N = 18) = 5.56, p<.05$. As there were only six more religious female participants viewing the act of homosexuality as “not wrong,” the chi-square goodness of fit test was not conducted (see Tables 11 and 12). [Note that all the more religious male participants viewed the act of homosexuality as “wrong” and, thus, they were not included in these analyses either.]

Table 11

Justifications of “wrong” judgments for Stories 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy) by gender

	God’s law		Moral		Social		Other	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
More religious								
Story 1	17% (4)	12% (3)	83% (19)	89% (23)	--	--	--	--
Story 2	52% (11)	40% (10)	43% (9)	60% (15)	--	--	5% (1)	--
Story 4	61% (14)	42% (11)	39% (9)	58% (15)	--	--	--	--
Story 5	68% (15)	36% (9)	27% (6)	60% (15)	--	4% (1)	5% (1)	--
Story 6	13% (2)	9% (2)	87% (13)	91% (21)	--	--	--	--
Less religious								
Story 1	--	--	95% (19)	100% (29)	--	--	5% (1)	--
Story 2	8% (1)	--	83% (10)	100% (12)	--	--	8% (1)	--
Story 4	11% (2)	4% (1)	90% (17)	93% (26)	--	--	--	4% (1)
Story 5	5% (1)	4% (1)	84% (16)	96% (26)	5% (1)	--	5% (1)	--
Story 6	--	--	100% (19)	100% (28)	--	--	--	--

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses.

Table 12

Justifications of “wrong” and “not wrong” judgments for Story 3 (homosexuality) by gender

	God’s law		Moral		Social		Other	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Wrong</i>								
More relig.	91% (21)	85% (17)	4% (1)	5% (1)	--	5% (1)	4% (1)	5% (1)
Less relig.	25% (3)	27% (3)	17% (2)	18% (2)	25% (3)	27% (3)	33% (4)	27% (3)
<i>Not Wrong</i>								
More relig.	--	--	--	50% (3)	--	--	--	50% (3)
Less relig.	--	--	100% (7)	78% (14)	--	--	--	22% (4)

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses

The chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there were significant gender differences in justifications. Adjusted standardized residual values were examined to determine the source of the gender differences, with all values of 1.96 ($p < .05$) considered significant. (Note that both male and female participants who viewed the acts as “wrong” and who viewed the acts as “not wrong” were included in these analyses).

Results for the more religious group indicated that for Stories 1, 2, 3, and 4 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion,

homosexuality, adultery), the relation between gender (male/female) and (justification) category preference was not significant: $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .34, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 48) = 2.97, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (3, N = 49) = 4.86, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 1.68, p > .05$, respectively. For Stories 5 and 6 (testifying falsely in court, polygamy), however, more religious male participants were more likely to use God's law justification than more religious female participants, while more religious female participants were more likely to use moral justifications than more religious male participants, consistent with expectations (see Hypothesis 5c): $\chi^2 (3, N = 48) = 8.29, p < .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 46) = 4.65, p < .05$, respectively.

Results for the less religious group, on the other hand, indicated that for Stories 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy), the relation between gender (male/female) and (justification) category preference was not significant: $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = 1.48, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 45) = 1.58, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (3, N = 48) = .73, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 48) = .91, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (3, N = 49) = 1.79, p > .05$; $\chi^2 (1, N = 49) = .70, p > .05$, respectively.

Analyses of the God's Punishment Question

The majority of the participants were expected (see Hypothesis 6a) to indicate that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others. Results confirmed this hypothesis. 71% of the participants ($N=41$) indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others, 17% of the participants ($N=10$) stated that God punishes most those who deny the Oneness of God or deny God's existence and 12% of the participants ($N=7$) indicated that God punishes most those who

violate socio-moral rules (e.g., people who lie, steal). The results of the chi-square goodness of fit test were significant, suggesting that the observed frequencies were significantly different from the expected frequencies, $\chi^2 (2, N = 58) = 36.66, p < .001$. The results of a follow up test comparing the participants who indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others with the participants who stated that God punishes most those who deny the Oneness of God or deny the existence of God were also significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 51) = 18.84, p < .001$. The majority of the participants did indicate that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others.

I also determined if the results differed according to group and gender (within each group). For the less religious group, the results of the chi-square goodness of fit test were significant, suggesting that the observed frequencies were significantly different from the expected frequencies, $\chi^2 (2, N = 28) = 26.00, p < .001$. The results of a follow up test comparing the less religious participants who indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others with the less religious participants who stated that God punishes most those who violate socio-moral rules were also significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 26) = 12.46, p < .001$. The majority of the less religious participants did indicate that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others (for frequencies, see Table 13).

For the more religious group, the results of the chi-square goodness of fit test were significant, suggesting that the observed frequencies were significantly different from the expected frequencies, $\chi^2 (2, N = 30) = 13.40, p = .001$. The results of a follow up

test comparing those who indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others with those who stated that God punishes most those who deny the Oneness of God or deny the existence of God were also significant, $\chi^2 (1, N = 27) = 4.48, p < .05$. The majority of the more religious participants did indicate that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others (for frequencies, see Table 13).

In terms of gender differences, for the more religious male participants, the results of the chi-square goodness of fit test were non-significant, suggesting that there was no preference among the categories, $\chi^2 (2, N = 15) = 5.20, p > .05$. For the less religious male and female participants and the more religious female participants, however, the results were significant, suggesting that the observed frequencies were significantly different from the expected frequencies, $\chi^2 (2, N = 13) = 8.00, p < .05$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 15) = 19.20, p < .001$; $\chi^2 (2, N = 15) = 8.40, p < .05$, respectively. The results of the follow up tests indicated the following: The proportion of less religious male participants who indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others did not differ significantly from the proportion of less religious male participants who reported that God punishes most those who violate socio-moral rules, $\chi^2 (1, N = 12) = 3.00, p > .05$. The majority of less religious female participants indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others, $\chi^2 (1, N = 14) = 10.29, p = .001$. And the proportion of more religious female participants who indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others did not

differ significantly from the proportion of those who indicated that God punishes most those who deny the Oneness of God or deny the existence of God, $\chi^2 (1, N = 14) = 2.57$, $p > .05$ (for frequencies, see Table 13).

Table 13
Analyses of Answers to the God's Punishment Question

	Rights/Harm	Violating rules	Denying God
More religious			
Male	60% (9)	13% (2)	27% (4)
Female	67% (10)	7% (1)	27% (4)
Combined	63% (19)	10% (3)	27% (8)
Less religious			
Male	69% (9)	23% (3)	8% (1)
Female	87% (13)	7% (1)	7% (1)
Combined	79% (22)	14% (4)	7% (2)

Note. Frequencies are presented in parentheses.

It was also expected (Hypothesis 6b) that there would be no significant difference in the answers to the God's punishment question between more religious and less religious participants. The chi-square test of independence was conducted to determine if there were significant group differences in the answers to the God's punishment question. Adjusted standardized residual values were examined to determine the source of the group differences, with all values of 1.96 ($p < .05$) considered significant. Findings confirmed this hypothesis, $\chi^2 (2, N = 58) = 3.90$, $p > .05$.

CHAPTER 6

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion

This study examined whether more religious and less religious Turkish university students tend to judge moral issues (a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, homosexuality, adultery, testifying falsely in court, polygamy) in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, rather than on religious precepts. Turiel's (1983) Domain Theory predicts that there are certain similarities in the reasoning of all people, regardless of religious orientation, and this study was designed to examine this proposition among more religious and less religious Turkish Muslims. This study can also be considered a significant contribution to the scientific world given the fact that there is very little research on the moral reasoning of Muslims.

Results indicated that the majority in both groups tended to view the issues as “wrong,” even though there were also group differences depending on specific issues. In other words, the data demonstrated stronger convergence between the two groups than divergence with regard to the evaluations of the issues.

As expected, almost all the participants in both the more religious and less religious groups viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, adultery, and testifying falsely in court as “wrong.” These acts represent clear-cut moral violations (e.g., they lead to violation of others' rights and they result in harmful consequences for others) and, thus, it is reasonable that both

conservative and liberal (male and female) students in Turkey strongly disapprove of these acts (the participants made consistent and prescriptive moral judgments about the acts representing clear-cut moral violations), consistent with Turiel et al.'s (1991) argument.

As mentioned before, in the U.S. it has been found that there is much more disagreement about issues such as abortion and homosexuality because people have different assumptions about whether harm is being done by these acts (Turiel et al., 1991). The results of this study are consistent with the U.S. studies. Indeed, there was disagreement between more religious and less religious Turkish participants on the issues of abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy, most likely because it is less clear if harm is being done in these situations (e.g., some participants might believe that the fetus is a life, whereas others might believe that the fetus is not a life). More religious Turkish participants were more likely to view the acts of abortion and homosexuality as “wrong” than less religious Turkish participants. More religious Turkish participants also viewed the acts of abortion and homosexuality as significantly more wrong compared to less religious Turkish participants. These findings suggest that support for abortion and homosexuality among Turkish students may be associated with low involvement in religion.

As mentioned before, “the Qur’an places a high value on life and its preservation. The Qur’an (17:31) says that neither poverty nor hunger should cause one to kill one’s offspring. Punishment for the unlawful killing of a human being is imposed both in this life and in the next (4:93)” (Esposito, 2002, p. 146). Based on this verse, some Muslim

authorities argue that after the “ensoulment” (infusion of the soul) of the fetus (thought by some to take place at fertilization and by others after four months), abortion is a homicide and should be punished. It might be that more religious participants in this study viewed abortion as wrong because they believed that life begins at fertilization. These results support Wainryb and Turiel’s (1993) suggestion that studies (especially the ones conducted in religious contexts) that examine individuals’ moral evaluations of acts should be interpreted cautiously as religion is an important source in the acquisition of informational assumptions.

When the results were qualified by gender, it was observed that both less religious male and female participants’ evaluations of the acts of abortion and homosexuality were about equally split between “wrong” and “not wrong” categories. This finding indicates that the effects of low level of religiosity on moral issues, such as abortion and homosexuality, might outweigh the effects of gender in Turkish students. Many modern and highly educated Turkish women today work outside the home and some of them have an active social life. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that liberal and highly educated people (or couples) might have a greater tendency to favor abortion compared to other populations in Turkey.

However, it should be noted that less religious Turkish male participants in this study viewed the act of homosexuality as significantly more wrong compared to less religious Turkish female participants. This suggests that less religious female students in Turkey may still tend to be more flexible in their thinking compared to less religious male students. It should be also noted that even though the majority of both more

religious male and female participants viewed the act of homosexuality as “wrong,” more religious female participants were less likely to view the same act as “wrong” than more religious male participants. These findings suggest that if there is support for homosexuality among conservative Turkish students, this support may be more likely to come from females, suggesting that conservative female students in Turkey may be more flexible in their thinking compared to conservative male students.

Muslim women in patriarchal societies are usually in subordinate positions relative to men, and they have been observed to be very sensitive and responsive to the issues related to justice, rights, and welfare (Wainryb, 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that female students in Turkey (regardless of religious orientation) might have a greater tendency to recognize the rights of minority groups (e.g., homosexuals) within the society compared to male students.

More religious Turkish participants were more likely to view the act of polygamy as “not wrong” and also “less wrong” than less religious Turkish participants, who mostly viewed the act as “wrong.” This finding suggests that support for polygamy among Turkish students may be associated with high involvement in religion. When the results were qualified by gender, however, it was observed that it was mainly more religious Turkish male participants who judged the act of polygamy as acceptable. The majority of more religious Turkish female participants saw the act of polygamy as “very wrong,” similar to the less religious Turkish participants. This finding is consistent with Carkoglu’s (2004) observation that Turkish females (regardless of their religiosity) are more likely to disapprove of polygamy than Turkish males. However, it should be

remembered that even though some highly religious Turkish participants in this study favored polygamy, the majority of highly religious participants still viewed polygamy as “wrong.” This finding is consistent with Carkoglu’s (2004) observation that even though support for polygamy is higher among highly religious Turkish participants compared to religious and non-religious Turkish participants, the majority of highly religious, religious, and non-religious Turkish participants disapprove of the act.

Studies from non-Western patriarchal cultures show that groups in dominant positions in the social hierarchy, generally males, are seen to be entitled to freedom of choice, independence, and autonomy, while groups in subordinate positions, generally females, are expected to meet others’ needs and desires (Turiel & Wainryb, 2000). In this study, male participants’ tendency to support polygamy could be due to their desire to maintain their power position. Similarly, female participants’ tendency to disapprove of polygamy could be due to rejection of their subordinate position in the social hierarchy.

As expected, the majority of less religious Turkish (male and female) participants who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval, abortion, adultery, testifying falsely in court, and polygamy as “wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations. This finding suggests that less religious male and female students in Turkey tend to rely on secular sources (e.g., concepts of justice, rights, harm, and welfare) in their thinking about these issues. Among more religious participants, the majority of males and females who viewed the acts of a father forcing his daughter to marry someone without her express approval and polygamy as “wrong” also justified their judgments with reference to moral

considerations. However, justifications for negative judgments of abortion, adultery, and testifying falsely in court were about equally split between moral and religious considerations. These findings suggest that highly religious male and female students in Turkey also tend to heavily rely on secular sources in their moral reasoning for certain issues.

As expected, the majority of both more religious Turkish male and female participants who viewed the act of homosexuality as “wrong” justified their judgments with reference to God’s law. The results, however, were non-significant for less religious male and female participants. This finding indicates that less religious Turkish students (who view homosexuality as “wrong”) draw on a variety of reasoning categories when thinking about homosexuality. It might be that in cases where the issue of harm is ambiguous, as in homosexuality, people may be more likely to rely upon religion for guidance than moral principles.

Furthermore, the majority of less religious Turkish (male and female) participants who viewed the act of homosexuality as “not wrong” justified their judgments with reference to moral considerations (specifically justice and rights considerations), consistent with expectations. This suggests that less religious (male and female) students in Turkey tend to recognize the rights of homosexual people.

To summarize, results of the current study indicated that the majority of Turkish participants, regardless of gender or religious orientation, tended to view the acts included in this project as wrong. For instance, even religiously conservative participants judged the act of polygamy as wrong, despite the fact that it is acceptable according to

the Islamic law. The majority of less religious participants judged the issues in terms of justice, rights, and human welfare considerations, rather than on religious precepts. The reasoning of more religious participants was mixed between moral and religious concerns. Religious considerations dominated their reasoning for the issue of homosexuality only. In addition, the majority of all Turkish Muslims participating in this study indicated that God punishes most those who violate others' rights and who harm others.

Overall, the results of the dissertation study indicate that while religious beliefs influence moral reasoning, it appears that concepts of justice, rights, and welfare still reflect the dominant mode of reasoning among both conservative and liberal Muslim students in Turkey. This suggests that conservative and liberal Turkish students' moral values may be more similar than different (even if they hold different political and religious views). In other words, given a clear choice between secular and religious sources in the solution of socio-moral matters, such as polygamy, both liberal and conservative Turkish students tend to prefer secular sources (liberal and conservative students in Turkey may share a secular-based moral view). The results of this study are thought to provide important information for moral education or conflict resolution programs that are aimed at starting a "dialogue" and "social bond" between different Muslim groups (e.g., conservatives, seculars) in Turkey.

The findings of this study, then, support Domain Theory's (Turiel, 1983) main thesis that moral principles (concepts of justice, rights, and welfare) can be achieved through reason independent of the effects of social and religious rules. This thesis carries

a significant importance for societies in which concerns with autonomy and individual rights, the bases for secular-based morality, are said to be “subordinated to the maintenance of social harmony, the preservation of hierarchy, and the upholding of traditional roles and duties” (Wainryb, 2006, 217). With such theories, it can easily be tested whether the traditional societies do indeed give priority to maintenance of social and religious rules over individualistic concerns, such as individual rights, freedoms, and autonomy. Contrary to common assumptions, studies conducted in non-Western patriarchal cultures (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994) indicate that people in these societies endorse individual freedoms and rights even when in contradiction with cultural practices or religious rules. Furthermore, women in these societies, as they are usually in subordinate positions relative to men, have been observed to be very sensitive and responsive to the issues related to justice, rights, and welfare (Wainryb, 2006). People in traditional societies, including Muslim societies, then, do not simply copy or reflect their culture’s belief system. Rather, they develop distinct perspectives and tend to resist cultural or religious practices they consider unfair, consistent with the ideas of the researchers adopting the domain model of social development. The results of this dissertation study support the findings of the previous studies conducted in non-Western patriarchal cultures.

Showing that traditional societies have also individualistic concerns enables us to understand those societies better, avoiding stereotyping. It also enables us to see that people in these societies have the ability to think outside the conventions which in turn means that if there is something wrong with the current cultural or religious practices

(e.g., if the current cultural or religious practices are not consistent with human rights), the society has the potential to fix it.

The world is changing rapidly. Nations have become increasingly interdependent over the years. Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and many other believers are living together all over the world (Anderson, 1992). Such a world in which millions of people are living in a foreign country needs prejudice-free, and morally mature individuals who can embrace the differences among cultures and religions. In today's world, however, there are still people who judge acts based on beliefs different from their own to be wrong (Wainryb & Ford, 1998). The media is full of hate crimes and violence caused by those who cannot tolerate others' religious beliefs, moral values, and life styles. These types of events made it obvious that societies should reevaluate their educational programs and renew their moral cultures.

In such a globalized world, then, nations have a significant responsibility for providing their citizens with moral education programs that are aimed at fostering moral development in individuals from different religious backgrounds. Therefore, there is a need for studies examining the relationship between morality and religious beliefs as these studies help shape the direction of future moral education programs. However, the fact that today's society includes people of different religious beliefs is a problem to moral education for some educators (Lickona, 1991). Indeed, there is a great diversity among religious belief systems and imposing the values of one religion upon those who are members of another religion is neither ethical nor fair. Therefore, it might be wiser to develop moral education programs that provide people from different religious beliefs

with a common ground for moral principles. This might be achieved through education policies supporting the general separability of morality from religious norms. In this way no religion will be used as a unique source of moral knowledge. This might help develop moral education programs that contributes to the moral growth of people from different religious backgrounds alike in a manner that does not favor or overlook the non-moral beliefs of any of the groups. In today's globalized world, this might be the only ethical way to promote simultaneously the moral development of all groups of students.

Domain Theory (Turiel, 1983) is important to show that morality consists of secular considerations of right and wrong and does not include the idea of divine commands. In fact, Nucci and Turiel (1993) have demonstrated that both highly religious Christians and Jews tend to rely on secular sources (concepts of justice, rights, harm, and welfare) in their moral reasoning. The results of this dissertation study also suggest that both highly religious and liberal Turkish Muslims tend to rely on secular sources in the solution of socio-moral issues. These findings might suggest that “public schools can engage in moral education consistent with the moral aspects of any religion without also promoting the precepts of religious belief” (Nucci, 2003, p. 269-270). Such moral education would concentrate on the development of students' conceptions of justice, fairness, and concern for others' welfare. The education of the precepts of religious faith, as pointed out by Nucci, is something that should be left to the family and religious institutions (e.g., churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples).

Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research

There are several limitations to note in the study. First, a relatively small sample was used in this research and this might have affected the results. Second, college students are not representative of the adult population in general; therefore, the results of this study cannot be generalized to all ages and populations in Turkey. In fact, students in Turkey, as mentioned before, go through a secular education system, in which philosophy, logic, sociology, psychology, and human rights have an important place in the school curriculum. This implies that Turkish students have the opportunity to develop critical thinking or independent reasoning which is necessary for the development of secular-based morality. However, some people in Turkey, especially those living in rural areas, are not sent to school, even though it is against the law. Therefore, they might have much less chance or opportunity to develop independent thinking compared to Turkish citizens who go through formal education. This study's results, then, should be considered to be specific to university students in Turkey or, probably, to the faculties which the participants were recruited from.

Similarly, as Turkey is a secular country in which the civil law constitutes the basic law of the government, the results of this study cannot be generalized to other Muslim countries, especially Islamic law-based countries.

Finally, this is one of the first studies to examine the moral reasoning of Muslims; therefore, results are very preliminary. Future research should rely on differing populations from Turkey, as well as those of other Muslim countries (including Islamic

law-based countries), in order to more clearly comprehend the influence of religion on the moral reasoning of Muslims.

Suggestions for Future Application

Studies on moral reasoning of people from different cultures and religions can make a significant impact on moral education. Results of such studies can be used in increasing the effectiveness of existing moral education models on people from different cultural and religious backgrounds. These results can also be used in developing new moral education programs.

We are living in a globalized world and, thus, nations have a significant responsibility for providing their citizens with moral education programs that are aimed at fostering moral development in individuals from different cultural and religious backgrounds. Indeed, today, many religious leaders and interfaith organizations are in agreement about the necessity “to define and then use as a global standard for behavior the central ethical principles common to all religions” (Fisher, 2002, p. 472). The results of the current study support Nucci’s (2003) suggestion that in such a globalized world public schools should “engage in moral education consistent with the moral aspects of any religion without also promoting the precepts of religious belief” (p. 269-270).

The results of this study are specific to university students and cannot be generalized to all ages. Moral education, however, can be considered most effective at early ages; therefore, a study focusing on Muslim children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning can be more beneficial to moral education than the results of this study. On the

other hand, the findings of this study can be used to improve the content of a moral education program offered to university students.

Conclusion

Overall, the results of this dissertation study are consistent with previous studies that indicate individualistic concerns, such as rights, freedoms, and autonomy, the bases for secular-based morality, are also present in the thought and behavior of people in (non-Western) traditional societies, including Muslim societies (Wainryb, 2006). More specifically, the results of this study suggest that Turkish Muslims tend to endorse individual freedoms and rights even when in contradiction with cultural practices or religious traditions. In fact, even the majority of religiously conservative Turkish Muslims participating in this study viewed the act of polygamy as “wrong,” despite the fact that it is acceptable according to the Islamic law. Turkish people, then, can be said to have the ability to think outside the conventions, meaning that when cultural or religious practices (e.g., polygamy) are not consistent with human rights, the Turkish society may tend to disobey them.

Also, Turkish female participants in this study have been observed to be more sensitive to the issues related to justice, rights, and welfare compared to Turkish male participants. This finding can be said to be consistent with Turiel’s (2003) argument that “resistance and subversion are common among people in positions of little power in the social hierarchy—especially on the part of women in patriarchal societies” (p. 115).

APPENDIX A

Psychological Research on Religious Development

Children's religious behavior, as pointed out by Paloutzian (1996), is regulated through a series of interwoven processes. One of these processes is social learning and imitation (e.g., imitation of parents, and religious instructors). Another important set of processes is "social psychological forces such as group conformity expectations, coupled with the child's personal needs for approval and belonging, plus the power of the parents and secondary reference groups to dispense rewards and punishments" (Paloutzian, 1996, p. 95). A final important process involves passing through a sequence of cognitive stages. During each stage, the belief that was initially formed in a simple way becomes more complex. This occurs as the child's reasoning matures.

The general argument is that children seem to progress through a sequence of developmental stages, and religious development should logically parallel these stages. Therefore, most of the theories of religious development that exist today are intellectual descendants of Piaget's notion of general human development (Paloutzian, 1996).

Elkind's Research

Elkind's research supported a Piagetian kind of development as religious understanding emerges in children (Spilka et al., 2003). Elkind, in three separate studies, posed a series of questions to Jewish and Christian children, respectively, concerning their understanding of their religious identity and opinions. As a result of his studies, he observed that children between 5 and 7 years of age (comparable to Piaget's late preoperational stage) tended to think that their denominational affiliation was absolute,

having been ordained by God, and thus it could not be changed. A few years later (ages 7-9, comparable to Piaget's early concrete operational stage) children's religious ideas became very concrete. Religious affiliation in this stage was seen to be determined by the family into which one was born. If a Protestant family had a pet dog, for example, it was thought to be a Protestant dog. At the final stage of religious development (ages 10-14, comparable to Piaget's late concrete and early formal operational stages), children started to comprehend "some of the complexities of religious practices and rituals, and they could conceive of a person's changing his or her religion because they understood religion to come from within the person rather than being determined externally" (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 78). Abstract and differentiated religious reasoning was starting to appear. In the end, Elkind stated that abstract "adult" understanding of religion does not emerge until the age of 11 or 12 (e.g., the beginning of Piaget's formal operational stage).

Elkind's approach had some influence on religious education. In fact, based on his ideas, some authors suggested that children should not be taught basic concepts about God until they are capable of understanding them, at about age 6. Also, it has been found that it may be possible to accelerate the transition from concrete to abstract religious reasoning by deliberately creating cognitive conflict in religious education instructional materials at the sixth-grade level (Spilka et al., 2003).

The Work of Goldman

Following Elkind, Ronald Goldman applied Piaget's stages to religious reasoning, asserting that religious reasoning is not different in mode and method from non-religious reasoning (Spilka et al., 2003). As a result of his research with children between 5 and 15

years of age, Goldman proposed that there were three stages of religious development. His first stage (up to 7-8 years) was called “preoperational intuitive thought.” It was described by unsystematic and fragmentary religious reasoning, illustrated by lack of understanding of religious material due to not being able to consider all the evidence included in a religious story. “For example, when asked: Why was Moses afraid to look at God? (Exodus 3:6), the answer is of the form: Because God had a funny face” (Paloutzian, 1996, p. 99). The second stage (ages 7-8 to 13-14) was called “concrete operational thought” and was typified by the children concentrating on specific details of pictures and stories. “When asked why Moses was afraid to look at God, children at this stage referred to aspects of the story itself but in a concrete way: Because it was a ball of fire. He thought it might burn him.” (Paloutzian, 1996, p. 99). The third stage (ages 13-14 and up) was labeled “formal or abstract operational thought.” Children at this age displayed hypothetical and abstract religious thought. For instance, “Moses was said to be afraid to look at God because God is holy and the world is sinful.” (Paloutzian, 1996, p. 99).

Even though a number of studies have supported these general conclusions regarding cognitive stages, especially the claim that children are capable of more abstract religious reasoning as they grow older, it has been argued that the religiosity of children does not depend on cognitive development. Even so, however, the studies of Elkind, Goldman and others can be said to have demonstrated the utility of a Piagetian approach for understanding the development of religious reasoning. These scholars also set the

stage for much subsequent research in related fields, such as moral development, faith development, and the emergence of the God concept and prayer (Spilka et al., 2003).

Fowler's Stages of Faith Development

James Fowler has claimed that personal religious faith unfolds in a stage sequence similar to that defined by Piaget for cognitive development and Kohlberg for moral growth (Spilka et al., 2003). According to Fowler (1991), faith is a dynamic and generic human experience. Even though Fowler's use of the term "faith" overlaps with institutionalized religion, the two concepts are also independent to some extent. Faith, in his theory, "is seen as a deep core of the individual, the center of values, images and realities of power, and master stories (myths) involving both conscious and unconscious motivations" (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 82). More specifically, "faith" represents centers of values that change from one person to the next, but that are foci of primary life importance (e.g., religion, family, nation, power, money, and sexuality).

Fowler has carried out extensive interviews with hundreds of people. And as a result of his interviews, he has concluded that there are seven stages in faith development, even though some individuals never progress very far through these stages (Spilka et al., 2003). The first stage (primal faith—infancy) includes the beginnings of emotional trust based on physical contact, care, early play, and the like. In the second stage (intuitive/projective faith—early childhood), imagination is combined with perception and feelings to form long-lasting faith images. The child, in this stage, is aware of the sacred, of death, and of the existence of morality. In the third stage (mythical/literal faith—elementary school years), the child can differentiate between fantasy and the

reality, and can appreciate others' perspectives. Religious beliefs and symbols are accepted literally. The fourth stage (synthetic/conventional faith—early adolescence) is based on abstract ideas of formal operational thinking. Therefore, adolescents, in this stage, feel the need for a more personal relationship with God. “Reflections on past experiences, and concerns about the future and personal relationships, contribute to the development of mutual perspective taking and the shaping of a world view and its values” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 83).

The fifth stage (individuating/reflective faith—late adolescence or young adulthood) represents a critical reexamination and reconstitution of values and beliefs. This includes a change from dependence on external authorities to authority within the self. In the sixth stage (conjunctive faith—midlife or beyond), individuals are capable of integrating opposites. In other words, they realize that each person is both young and old, masculine and feminine, and constructive and destructive. This generates a hunger for a deeper relationship to the reality that symbols mediate. In this stage, “dialogical knowing” also emerges, meaning that the person is open to the multiple perspectives of a complex world. “This enables the person to go beyond the faith boundaries developed in the previous individuating/reflective stage, and to appreciate that truth is both multidimensional and organically interdependent” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 83). The seventh stage (universalizing faith—unspecified age), which is relatively rare, “involves a oneness with the power of being or God, as well as commitment to love, justice, and overcoming oppression and violence” (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 83).

Even though Fowler's theory is rich in ideas and provides a framework for empirical research, it has been argued that his conceptualization is complex and difficult to understand and, thus, it has failed to produce rigorous empirical research. Also, Fowler has generally refused to analyze his own findings statistically and ignored related studies in the psychology of religion (Spilka et al., 2003).

Oser's Stages of Development of Religious Judgment

Fritz Oser and his colleagues have focused their studies on a related aspect of religious development called "religious judgment." Oser (1994) identified five stages in the development of religious judgment. In his theory, people

move from a stage of believing that God intervenes unexpectedly in the world and that God's power guides human beings (Stage 1), through belief in a still external and all-powerful God who punishes or rewards depending on good or bad deeds "Give so that you may receive" (Stage 2). Individuals in Stage 3 begin to think of God as somewhat detached from their world and as wielding less influence, with people generally responsible for their own lives, since they can now distinguish between transcendence (God's existence outside the created world) and immanence (God's presence and action from within). In Stage 4, people come to realize both the necessity and the limits of autonomy, recognizing that freedom and life stem from an Ultimate Being, who is often perceived to have a "divine plan" that gives meaning to life. Finally, in Stage 5, the Ultimate Being is realized through human action via care and love. There is universal and unconditional religiosity. (Spilka et al., 2003, p. 84)

Oser has showed limited empirical evidence for his theory. Some recent studies, however, have found results supporting his claims. It has been argued that it is important to match the technique of measurement to the objectives of an examination in this area and that combinations of methods may be appropriate (Spilka et al., 2003).

APPENDIX B

Research on Individualism and Collectivism (I-C)

Some researchers have argued that the I-C framework does not clearly and thoroughly explain cultural variations. Therefore, it has been suggested that the variability of individualism and collectivism should not only be examined at the cross-cultural or interindividual level: People may be individualist and collectivist at the same time (Green, Deschamps, & Paez, 2005). Indeed, research indicates that individualist and collectivist attitudes can coexist on the individual level. Singelis (1994), for example, showed that people have both independent and interdependent self-construals. Moreover, it has been suggested that “individualist and collectivist attitudes can also be activated as a function of social contexts and social relations” (Green et al., 2005, p. 322). In fact, it has been demonstrated that individualist relations are common with some people or in particular contexts, for instance, in business relations, while with other people the relationship is collectivist, for example, with family members. These findings suggest that people may be characterized by specific combinations of individualist and collectivist behaviors. Some individuals may be high on individualism and low on collectivism or vice versa. Other people, in turn, may be high or low on both (Green et al.).

Many cultural psychologists “use nations or ethnic groups as cultural entities, thereby neglecting sources of variation within cultural contexts and treating national cultures as homogeneous and territorially defined units” (Green et al., 2005, p. 322). As pointed out by Green et al., however, failure to consider within-country variation may

cause an overgeneralization of personality attributes as nations include people with very diverse backgrounds and positions in the social structure. The most frequently reported findings of within-country variation of individualism and collectivism concern gender differences. In general, individualistic characteristics have been linked to masculinity, whereas collectivistic attitudes have been associated with femininity. Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, Gelfand, and Yuki (cited in Green et al., 2005) examined simultaneously between-country and within country gender differences on individualistic, relational, and collectivistic dimensions of the self. Their results indicate “that between-country variation emerged most strongly on individualist self-dimensions, whereas gender differences were predominantly detected for the relational component of the self, women presenting themselves as more emotionally related to others than men” (Green et al., 2005, p. 323). Within-country differences of individualistic and collectivistic behaviors have also been examined by comparing distinct ethnic groups (Oyserman et al., 2002; Singelis, 1994), regions, generations, “and groups defined by social class, such that people from higher classes are frequently more individualist than people from lower classes” (Green et al., 2005, p. 323).

In comparative research, several subdimensions of individualism and collectivism have been identified (Kagitcibasi, 2005; Oyserman et al., 2002). A study, for instance, “distinguished distance from ingroups and self-reliance with competition as dimensions measuring individualism” (Green et al., 2005, p. 323). Another study further separated self-reliance from competition. Individualism and collectivism have also been subdivided into horizontal and vertical types, where the horizontal aspect represents equality between

group members and the vertical aspect represents hierarchy and competition. Schwartz (cited in Green et al., 2005) has proposed a finer subdivision by distinguishing “both individual-and culture-level motivational value types that are associated with individualism and collectivism. Individualism is related to intellectual and affective autonomy at the cultural level and to self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism on the individual level” (p. 323). And collectivism is related to conservatism at the cultural level and to tradition, conformity, and security on the individual level.

Kagitcibasi (1996) has divided the concept of independence into two different dimensions: autonomy as agency versus control, and autonomy as separateness versus relatedness. And based on this distinction, she identified three prototypical family interaction patterns: (a) the traditional family, defined by interdependence between generations in both material and emotional realms; (b) the individualistic model, based on independence; and (c) a dialectical synthesis of the two models, representing material independence but emotional (psychological) interdependence between generations (Kagitcibasi, 2005).

In Kagitcibasi’s (2005) approach, parenting orientations differ among these three models and so do the distinctive characteristics of the developing selves. The traditional family, for example, emphasizes obedience and close relationships with family members. A person growing up in a traditional family structure tends to develop the “heteronomous-related self,” which is high in relatedness but low in autonomy. This model “is prevalent in rural agrarian society with low levels of affluence but is also seen in urban low SES contexts, where intergenerational interdependence is necessary for

family livelihood. It is found in large areas of the majority world,” for instance, in Asia (Kagitcibasi, 2005, p. 410). The autonomous-separate self, which is high in autonomy but low in relatedness, is a product of the family model of independence. This model is based on self-reliance orientation and is characteristic of the Western industrial culture, particularly the American middle-class nuclear family, at least in its professed ideals, representing the individualistic perspective. The family model of psychological interdependence is based on both (order-setting) control and autonomy orientation. A person growing up in this family structure tends to develop the “autonomous-related self,” which is high in both relatedness and autonomy.

Kagitcibasi’s (1996) model is important to show that a dimension of independence (agency) may develop alongside a dimension of interdependence (relatedness) (the autonomous-related self). Today, there is a considerable amount of research indicating that the model of autonomous-related self is preferred by upper-middle SES parents in affluent and modern cities of industrialized, non-Western societies (e.g., Turkey, Greece, Hong Kong) (Koutrelakos, 2004; Stewart, Bond, Deeds, & Chung, 1999; Kagitcibasi, 1996). Some cross-cultural studies also provide support to the family model of psychological interdependence. For example, a study comparing Chinese parents in Taiwan, immigrant Chinese parents in the U.S., and Anglo-American parents found Chinese groups to be high on both control in child rearing and encouragement of autonomy and achievement (Lin & Fu, 1990). Another study examining five ethnic minorities in the Netherlands found the coexistence of strong parental control and relatedness. Furthermore, research shows that there is compatibility between autonomy

and relatedness as suggested by Kagitcibasi (1996). In fact, it has been demonstrated that there is a more positive link between autonomy and relatedness than between autonomy and separateness in the U.S., endorsing the independence of the agency and interpersonal distance dimensions and supporting the development of autonomous-related self (Kagitcibasi, 2005). Similarly, in a review of research on immigrants in the U.S., it has been observed that autonomy and family relatedness are among the most preferred values in adolescents (Kwak, 2003).

Based on these research results, Kagitcibasi (2005) points out that autonomy and relatedness are two basic human needs and that they can and do coexist. According to Kagitcibasi (2005), individualistic cultures have recognized and fostered the need for “autonomy at the cost of ignoring, even suppressing, the equally basic need for relatedness; collectivistic societies have done the reverse. Recognizing the importance of both autonomy and relatedness would point to the autonomous-related self as a healthy developmental model” (p. 417).

APPENDIX C

Background Information on Islam

“Islam” is “derived from the root s-l-m, which means primarily peace but in a secondary sense surrender” (Smith, 1991, p. 222). Islam’s full connotation is “the peace that comes when one’s life is surrendered to God” (Smith, 1991, p. 222). Islam, then, means submission to the will of God (Esposito, 2002) and those who follow Islam are known as Muslims (Smith).

Muslims represent the majority population in fifty-six nations worldwide, including Indonesia, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Nigeria. Moreover, a considerable amount of Muslim populations live in India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Russia as well as Europe and the U.S (Esposito, 2002). Islam is the second largest world religion (after Christianity), and currently, there are an estimated 1.2 billion followers of the Islamic doctrine constituting about 20 percent of the world population (Hassan, 2002).

Muslims believe Islam was launched over 1300 years ago to reform the deviant practices into which Judaism and Christianity supposedly had fallen (Thomas, 1997). From a Muslim point of view, then, Islam is not a new religion presenting a new scripture but is the oldest of the major monotheistic world religions as “it represents the original as well as the final revelation of the God of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad” (Esposito, 2002, p. 5).

According to the Islamic sources, the Prophet Muhammad was born around the year 570 A.D. in Mecca, Northwestern Arabia. He had a poor but noble family. He was

orphaned at age five. As a youth he became a shepherd, then later a merchant. “At age 40, during one of his frequent solitary visits to Mount Hira to meditate, Muhammad was visited by the Angel Gabriel who instructed him to memorize the messages that would be transmitted to him in the name of Allah, the God” (Obeid, 1988, p. 155). During the next 23 years, Muhammad periodically got secret messages from Allah to recite to his people and assumed the role of Allah’s chief prophet. These revelations comprised the 114 chapters (called surahs) that formed the Qur’an.

At the beginning, Meccan leaders’ reactions to Muhammad’s message were violently hostile. According to Smith (1991), the reasons for the hostility can be summarized as follows: (1) Islam’s monotheistic beliefs threatened polytheism and the considerable revenue that was coming to Mecca from pilgrimages to its 360 shrines; (2) its moral content demanded an end to the licentiousness that people clung to; and (3) its social teachings challenged an unjust society. In a society based on class distinctions, the new Prophet was giving a message that was intensely democratic. He was preaching that in the sight of his Lord all people were equal.

In A.D. 632, Muhammad died having unified Arabia, ended the prevalent violence, and established peace among tribes that had been in conflict with each other since time immemorial (Nasr, 2004). After Muhammad’s death, however, “resentments over the issue of his succession began to divide the unity of the Muslim community into factions” (Fisher, 2002, p. 375).

APPENDIX D

The Sunni—Shii Split

The division of opinion regarding political and religious leadership after the death of Prophet Muhammad led to the division of Muslim world into two major branches: Sunnis and Shiis (Esposito, 2002). Today, about 87 percent of all Muslims are Sunnis and about 13 percent are Shiis. The majority Shii populations live in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Islamic Lebanon. India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, and East Africa, on the other hand, have notable Shii minorities (Nasr, 2004).

Sunnis

The word Sunni comes from the word sunna, which means the tradition of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (Wikipedia, 2006). The word sunni, then, refers to Muslims following the Sunna of the Prophet (the sayings and practices of the Prophet, as collected under the Sunni caliphs). Sunnis view themselves as traditionalists, and they stress the authority of the Qur'an and the Hadith and Sunna. They argue that Muhammad died without appointing a successor and left the issue of successors to the ummah, the Muslim community (Fisher, 2002). Therefore, Sunni Muslims believe that as "Muhammad did not designate a successor, the best or most qualified person should be either selected or elected as leader (caliph). Because the Qur'an declared Muhammad to be the last of the prophets, this caliph was to succeed Muhammad as the political leader only" (Esposito, 2002, p. 39). Sunni Muslims look to the time of the first four "rightly guided caliphs" (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali) as the golden age of Islam. They see

the caliph as the leader of worship and the administrator of the Shari'a, the sacred law of Islam (Fisher, 2002), but he does not enjoy any special religious status or inspiration (Esposito, 2002).

Sunnis believe that as life conditions change, rules “in the Qur'an, Hadith, and Sunna should be continually interpreted by a consensus of opinion and the wisdom of learned men and jurists” (Fisher, 2002, p. 376). For example, Muslims in today's modern world face new moral questions not specifically addressed by the Qur'an and Hadith, such as whether or not test-tube fertilization is appropriate. The Shari'a has always dealt with divorce; however, the conditions under which a woman may petition for divorce have been closely examined in recent years.

Shiis

Shiis argue that “succession to the leadership of the Muslim community should be hereditary, passed down to Muhammad's male descendants (descended from Muhammad's daughter Fatima and her husband Ali), who are known as Imams and who are to serve as both religious and political leaders” (Esposito, 2002, p. 40). Shii Muslims view the Imam as religiously inspired, sinless, and the interpreter of God's will as included in Islamic law, but not a prophet. Shiis see the sayings, deeds, and writings of their Imams as authoritative religious texts, in addition to the Qur'an and Sunna.

The Imam, unlike the Sunni caliph, combines political leadership (if possible) with continuing the transmission of Divine Guidance. “This esoteric religious knowledge was given by God to Muhammad, from him to Ali, and thence from each Imam to the successor he designated from Ali's lineage” (Fisher, 2002, p. 377). It contains both the

outer and inner meanings of the Qur'an. Therefore, the Shari'a (Islamic law) is interpreted for each generation by the Imam as he is closest to the divine knowledge.

Aside from the issue of succession to Muhammad, both Sunnis and Shiis follow the same essential practices (Fisher, 2002). Differences of opinion regarding political and religious leadership, however, have led Sunnis and Shiis to develop distinct views of sacred history. Sunni Muslims had a "glorious and victorious history under the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and the expansion and development of Muslim empires under the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties" (Esposito, 2002, p. 41). Sunni Muslims can therefore claim a golden age in which they had a great world power and civilization, which they view as evidence of God's assistance and the truth of the mission of Islam. Shii Muslims, on the other hand, became unsuccessful "during the same time period against Sunni rule in the attempt to restore the imamate they believed God had appointed. Therefore, Shiis see in this time period the illegitimate usurpation of power by the Sunnis at the expense of creating a just society" (Esposito, 2002, p. 41). Shii historical memory, then, stresses the suffering and oppression of the righteous, the need to resist injustice, and the necessity that Muslims be willing to sacrifice everything, even their lives, in the struggle with the overwhelming forces of evil (Satan) to be able to restore God's righteous rule.

APPENDIX E

The Straight Path (Islam's Guidelines for the Interaction between Humans and God)

The Five Pillars of Islam

The principles that regulate the private life of Muslims in their dealings with God are known as “the Five Pillars of Islam” (Smith, 1991).

The Declaration of Faith (Shahadah)

It consists of a single sentence: There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is the messenger of God (Smith, 1991). This declaration is called the “shahada” (witness, testimony). To become a Muslim, the person needs only to make this simple proclamation. The first half of the proclamation stresses Islam's cardinal principle of monotheism, the firm belief in the oneness of God, as well as the principle that association of anything else with God means idolatry and the one unforgivable sin. The second half “asserts that Muhammad is not only a prophet but also a messenger of God.....For Muslims, Muhammad is the vehicle for the last and final revelation. In accepting Muhammad as the seal of the prophets, they believe that his prophecy confirms and completes all of the revealed messages, beginning with Adam's” (Esposito, 2002, p. 18).

Prayer

Muslims pray five times during the day: at daybreak, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and evening. Even though the times for prayer and the ritual actions were not indicated in the Qur'an, Muhammad established them (Esposito, 2002).

The prayers include recitations from the Qur'an in Arabic and glorification of God. Muslims also perform a sequence of movements during the prayers: "standing, bowing, kneeling, touching the ground with one's forehead, and sitting" (Esposito, 2002, p. 19). Both the recitations and movements signify submission, humility, and adoration of God. Muslims can pray in any clean environment, at home or in a mosque, at work or on the road. They can pray alone or with others, which is considered preferable as it demonstrates discipline, brotherhood, equality, and solidarity (Esposito). Muslims wash their body to purify the body and symbolically the soul before each prayer (Smith, 1991).

The Fast of Ramadan

Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar (Esposito, 2002). It is considered Islam's holy month because during it Muhammad received the first revelation of the Qur'an (Smith, 1991). During Ramadan, Muslims who are not ill or involved in crises, such as unavoidable journeys abstain from food and drink from dawn to sunset. According to the Islamic doctrine, the discipline of the Ramadan fast stimulates "reflection on human frailty and dependence upon God, focus on spiritual goals and values, and identification with and response to the less fortunate" (Esposito, 2002, p. 20).

Zakat

Zakat, meaning "purification" (Esposito, 2002), refers to a tax for relief of the poor and needy (Haneef, 1996). According to the Islamic doctrine, people in the middle and upper income brackets should annually give the poor one-fortieth of the value of all they possess (Smith, 1991). Zakat "expresses a Muslim's worship of and thanksgiving to God by supporting the poor" (Esposito, 2002, p. 20).

Zakat serves as a form of social security in a Muslim society. In Islam, the true owner of things is God and people are given their wealth as a trust from God. Therefore, zakat is not considered charity. Rather, it is viewed as an obligation for those who have received their wealth from God to meet the needs of less fortunate members of their community. According to the Qur'an and Islamic law, the alms should "be used to support the poor, orphans, and widows, to free slaves and debtors, and to support those working in the cause of God (e.g., construction of mosques and hospitals)" (Esposito, 2002, p. 20).

Pilgrimage or Hajj to Mecca in Saudi Arabia

At least once in her/his lifetime, every adult Muslim who is physically and financially able is expected to visit Mecca, where God's climactic revelation was first revealed. The basic goal of the pilgrimage is to increase the pilgrim's devotion to God and his revealed will (Smith, 1991). The practice, however, has other benefits as well. For instance, it is a reminder of human equality. Upon reaching Mecca, pilgrims take off their normal clothes, which carry marks of social status, and put on two simple sheet-like garments. Therefore, everyone, on approaching Islam's earthly emphasis, wears the same thing. "Distinctions of rank and hierarchy are removed, and prince and pauper stand before God in their undivided humanity" (Smith, 1991, p. 246). Pilgrimage also functions as a useful service in international relations. It brings together people from different cultures, showing thereby that they share a loyalty that transcends loyalty to their countries and racial groupings. Pilgrims get information about other nations and cultures, and return to their homes with better understanding of one another.

APPENDIX F

Differences among Secularist, Reformist, and Fundamentalist Muslims

In all Muslim countries over the past centuries, Islam provided a comprehensive guidance for living. Behavior in every aspect of life was directed by Islamic law based on the Qur'an and the Hadith. In recent times, however, the science, technology, and social conventions of the West have greatly influenced this tradition (Obeid & Thomas, 1988), resulting in “three new approaches to Islam: The secularist, reformist, and fundamentalist” (Pipes, 1989, p. 124).

Secularization refers to “the separation between religion and the rest of society, including politics” (Esposito, 2002, p. 44). Secularist Muslims are Western oriented (Esposito). They believe that success in the modern world depends on rejecting the things that stand in the way of keeping up with the Western world; they, therefore, support the complete withdrawal of religion from the public life. And, instead of obeying the commands of the divine law, they follow the directives of secular law derived from European codes; “for example, they do not allow a man to marry more than one wife, nor do they object to interest on loans” (Pipes, 1989, p. 124).

Islamic reformists, however, do not push away Shari'a entirely. Instead, they try to incorporate Western traditions and the principles of the Islamic law (Pipes, 1989). They believe that Muslim societies need an Islamic reformation, a wide-ranging program of reinterpretation (e.g., Ijtihad-the use of human reason to reinterpret Islamic principles and values and to meet the new needs of society) “and reform urging fresh approaches to Qur'anic interpretation as well as to issues of gender, human rights, democratization, and

legal reform” (Esposito, 2002, p. 45). Islamic reformists, then, interpret the Islamic law in such a way that its dictates become compatible with Western practices. This facilitates the acceptance of whatever Western traditions they would like to see adopted. For example, they transform Islam into a religious doctrine that prohibits polygamy, encourages science, and demands democracy (Pipes, 1989).

Islamic fundamentalists, on the other hand, reject completely the standards of the Western world (Pipes, 1989). They fully reflect the traditional Islamic world-view and wish to keep it intact (the idealization of Prophet Muhammad and of early Islam) (Watt, 1988). Even though they live in different parts of the world, fundamentalist Muslims everywhere work for the same objectives (Pipes). These include “the establishment of the Shari’a as the explicit, comprehensive, and exclusive legal base of society” (Hassan, 2002, p. 11); “a penal code based on corporal punishment; schools stressing Islamic subjects; taxes in accordance with levies; and separation of the sexes” (Pipes, 1989, p. 125).

Even though Islamic fundamentalism has been on the rise since the 1970s (Obeid & Thomas, 1988), fundamentalist Muslims are still a minority in the Islamic community and their beliefs are hotly debated by other Muslims (Pipes, 1989).

APPENDIX G

Definitions of Justification Categories

God's law justification

The status of the behavior is determined by the word of God.

Moral justifications

justice and rights considerations: Act results in unfair consequences for others.

harm/welfare concerns: Act has consequences for the well-being of others. Act results in harmful or negative consequences for others and, thus, it is contradictory to the dictates of conscience.

Social justification

social consensus: Act is contradictory to social consensus and, thus, it is not approved of by the society.

Other justifications

personal issue: The action is a matter of individual choice.

prudential concern: Act leads to negative/harmful outcome for the actor.

Note: The justification categories are formed based on Nucci and Turiel's (1993) previous work.

APPENDIX H

Demographic Questionnaire

Please complete the information below.

School: _____

Major: _____

Please circle your classification: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior

Age: _____

Gender (circle one): Female Male

Where are you from? Region: City: Town: Village:

Marital status (circle one): Married Single Divorced Widowed

Family income (monthly): _____

Father's level of education (circle highest grad completed):

did not go to school completed elementary school

completed junior high school completed high school

completed a Bachelors degree completed a graduate degree

Father's occupation: _____

Mother's level of education (circle highest grad completed):

did not go to school completed elementary school

completed junior high school completed high school

completed a Bachelors degree completed a graduate degree

Mother's occupation: _____

Parents' marital status (circle one): Married Divorced Widowed

Please circle one of the following items below.

(a) I do not believe in God (I am an atheist).

(b) I believe in God, but I do not practice my religion.

(c) I believe in God and I somewhat practice my religion (e.g., I sometimes pray, I sometimes fast during Ramadan, I sometimes cover my head...).

(d) I believe in God and I completely practice my religion (e.g., I pray five times a day, I always fast during Ramadan, I always cover my head...).

(e) I am not a Muslim. The religious faith I belong to: _____

APPENDIX J

Part I

Self-Report Questionnaire

A FATHER FORCING HIS DAUGHTER TO MARRY SOMEONE WITHOUT HER EXPRESS APPROVAL

Hasan is the richest person of a town. His son, Ali, falls in love with Ahmet's daughter, Asli, and wants to marry her. But, Asli tells her father (Ahmet) that she does not want to marry Ali because she does not love him. Despite the fact that Asli does not want to marry Ali, her father, Ahmet, disregards what she has told him and tells Ali's father, Hasan, that he is going to make his daughter marry Ali if he (Hasan) gives him a lot of money for his daughter's marriage.

Please circle either "Wrong" or "Not wrong" about Ahmet's forcing his daughter to marry Ali without her express approval.

(a) Wrong

(b) Not wrong

If you think Ahmet's behavior is wrong, please indicate the degree of wrongness of the act (choose one of the items below):

(a) Wrong negligible (b) A little wrong (c) Quite Wrong (d) Very wrong

[Use the item statements below in providing justifications for your evaluation (rank the numbers assigned to the items in terms of their degree of importance— from the first most important to second most important to third most important—evaluating the act)]:

- (a) Forcing a daughter to marry someone without her express approval is against the teachings of Islam. So, Ahmet's acts should not be contradictory to the Islamic law. **(God's law justification)**
- (b) Ahmet violates his daughter's (personal) rights and restricts her freedom if he acts against her will. As a person, Asli has a right to choose her own husband. **[justice and rights concerns (moral justification)]**
- (c) Ahmet devastates his daughter's life and harm her by making decisions about her own life. Forcing someone to do something that s/he does not want to do is contradictory to the dictates of conscience. **[harm and welfare concerns (moral justification)]**

[Use the item statements below in providing justifications for your evaluation (rank the numbers assigned to the items in terms of their degree of importance— from the first most important to second most important to third most important—evaluating the act)]:

- (a) Homosexuality is against the teachings of Islam. So, a Muslim's acts should not be contradictory to the Islamic law.
- (b) Like heterosexuals, homosexuals should have a right to lead a life according to their sexual preferences and they should be free in their choice.
- (c) Instead of being critical of homosexuals, people should try to understand them. Condemning homosexuals is nothing but harming them and their families. And harming people is contradictory to the dictates of conscience.
- (d) Homosexuality is generally not approved of and sympathized with by the society in which we live. So, a person's acts should not be contradictory to the norms (or expectations) of the society.
- (e) A person does not harm anybody when he has a homosexual relationship. He does not violate others' rights, either. Whether or not he has a homosexual relationship concerns only that person himself. This is a personal matter and should be the person's own business.
- (f) The person may be condemned and isolated by his family and the people around him if he gets into a homosexual relationship. So, the person should refrain from behaving in such a way that will cause him to lose his prestige.
- (g) If a person gets into a homosexual relationship, he may develop a fatal illness and die.

The first justification.....The second justification.....The third justification.....

ADULTERY

Dogan is a married man with two children. He has some problems in his married life. Even though he is not happy, he is reluctant to divorce his wife. After a while, he starts to have an affair with a woman working in the same company and he commits adultery.

Please circle either "Wrong" or "Not wrong" about Dogan's committing adultery.

(a) Wrong

(b) Not wrong

If you think adultery is wrong, please indicate the degree of wrongness of the act (choose one of the items below):

- (a) Wrong negligible (b) A little wrong (c) Quite Wrong (d) Very wrong

[Use the item statements below in providing justifications for your evaluation (rank the numbers assigned to the items in terms of their degree of importance— from the first most important to second most important to third most important—evaluating the act)]:

- (a) Adultery is against the teachings of Islam. So, Dogan's acts should not be contradictory to the Islamic law.
- (b) This situation is not fair for Dogan's wife. Dogan is violating her wife's rights by committing adultery.
- (c) Marriage is based on mutual trust and honesty. Whether Dogan is happy or not in his married life, it is completely wrong and against conscience to commit adultery without his wife's knowing about it. He should not be with other women before he divorces his wife.
- (d) Adultery is not approved of by the society in which we live. So, Dogan's acts should not be contradictory to the norms (or expectations) of the society.
- (e) Dogan does not harm anybody when he commits adultery. So, whether or not Dogan commits adultery concerns only himself. This is a personal matter and it should be Dogan's own business.
- (f) If Dogan's wife learns about her husband's cheating on her, she may leave home taking the children with her. So, Dogan should not behave in the way that will end with his own loneliness.
- (g) If Dogan's committing adultery is revealed, he may be condemned and isolated by the people around him. So, Dogan should refrain from behaving in such a way that will cause him to lose his prestige.

The first justification.....The second justification.....The third justification.....

TESTIFYING FALSELY IN COURT (PERJURY)

Arda owes great sums of money to Salih. Sometime later, Salih wants his money back saying that he needs the money himself. But, Arda refuses to pay the money back to Salih and kills him with his gun. Arda's son, Murat, witnesses the murder, but in the court, he gives false evidence and says he was fishing with his father at the time of the murder.

Please circle either "Wrong" or "Not wrong" about Murat's testifying falsely in court to save his father (Arda) from going to prison..

(a) Wrong

(b) Not wrong

If you think Murat's testifying falsely in court is wrong, please indicate the degree of wrongness of the act (choose one of the items below):

(a) Wrong negligible (b) A little wrong (c) Quite Wrong (d) Very wrong

[Use the item statements below in providing justifications for your evaluation (rank the numbers assigned to the items in terms of their degree of importance— from the first most important to second most important to third most important—evaluating the act)]:

- (a) Testifying falsely in court is against the teachings of Islam. So, Murat's acts should not be contradictory to the Islamic law.
- (b) Murat should not testify falsely in court, even for the sake of protecting his father from being sent to jail because, Arda, who is the actual murderer, may be set free due to Murat's perjury and as a result, justice has not been served.
- (c) Salih's family may never learn his murderer due to Murat's testifying falsely in court. Perjury always results in harm to others, which is contradictory to the dictates of conscience.
- (d) Perjury is not approved of by the society in which we live and also it is against the law. So, Murat's acts should not be contradictory to the norms (or expectations) of the society.
- (e) As a son, it is quite normal for Murat to try to protect his father in the court. Whether or not Murat testifies falsely in court does not concern anyone else except him. This is a personal matter and it should be Murat's own business.
- (f) Murat may be sent to prison if his testifying falsely in court is revealed. So, Murat should not do something that might put him in a difficult situation.

- (g) Murat may be condemned and isolated by his family and relatives if he tells the truth in the court. So, Murat should not behave in the way that will end with his own loneliness.

The first justification.....The second justification.....The third justification.....

POLYGAMY

Erdinc and Arzu fall in love with each other and get married. Despite the fact that they do their best to have a baby, they still cannot have one and so they go to the doctor. The results of several tests show that Arzu is infertile. So, Erdinc marries a second time when he is already married to his first wife to have children for the continuation of his family. His second wife gets pregnant in the six month of their marriage.

Please circle either "Wrong" or "Not wrong" about Erdinc's second marriage.

- (a) Wrong (b) Not wrong

If you think Erdinc's having second wife is wrong, please indicate the degree of wrongness of the act (choose one of the items below):

- (a) Wrong negligible (b) A little wrong (c) Quite Wrong (d) Very wrong

[Use the item statements below in providing justifications for your evaluation (rank the numbers assigned to the items in terms of their degree of importance— from the first most important to second most important to third most important—evaluating the act)]:

- (a) Even though the Qur'an declares that the ideal marriage consists of a man and a wife, it allows a man to marry up to four women under specified conditions. So, if such a valid condition exists, second marriage may not be wrong.
- (b) Men's being able to marry more than one woman is not fair for women. Polygamy symbolizes the oppression of women and the violation of their rights.
- (c) Arzu is probably very sad because Erdinc has brought home another woman. No matter how strongly Erdinc wants to have children, he should not behave in the way that Arzu's feelings may be hurt. He should also consider Arzu's feelings before making family decisions. Hurting people's feelings is contradictory to the dictates of conscience.
- (d) Polygamy is not approved of by the society in which we live. So, Erdinc's acts should not be contradictory to the norms (or expectations) of the society.

- (e) Erdinc does not harm anybody when he marries another woman. He does not violate anybody's rights, either. Whether or not he brings home another wife concerns only Erdinc himself. This is a personal matter and should be Erdinc's own business.
- (f) Due to his second marriage, Erdinc may be condemned and isolated by his relatives and friends. So, Erdinc should not do something that will cause him to lose his prestige.
- (g) Due to his second marriage, Erdinc may be sent to jail. Erdinc should not do something that might put him in a difficult situation.

The first justification.....The second justification.....The third justification.....

Part II

Please answer the question below (Keep your explanations short and clear).

Whom do you think God punishes most?

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