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**Press Coverage of the Enlargement of the European Union and Public
Opinion in the United Kingdom and France: A Cross-National
Comparative Study of the First- and Second-Level Agenda-Setting and
Priming Effects**

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Priming Effects**

by

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Dedication

To Mom and Dad.

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**Press Coverage of the Enlargement of the European Union and Public
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Comparative Study of the First- and Second-Level Agenda-Setting and
Priming Effects**

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Co-Supervisors: Terri E. Givens and Maxwell E. McCombs

While the relationship between public opinion, mass media, and political elites in the United States is well documented, less is known about this topic in Europe. I argue that the way the media covers a European Union (EU) affair is more prevalent and relevant than often considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public opinion and policymaking. Expanding the traditional focus of political communication theories to the European context, I show that the media effects are pertinent in this geography as well.

In doing so, I conduct four empirical investigations. First, I ask if the press coverage affects how people perceive the importance of the Eastern enlargement of the

EU which occurred in May 2004. I find that the media's coverage of EU enlargement fluctuates across the course of the time frame of this research along with the public salience of the issue. Second, I ask what role the media play in shaping public perceptions and evaluations of EU enlargement. I find that the aspects of the issues that are emphasized more frequently by the media attract more attention from the European public. My findings further suggest that with the increasing exposure to enlargement-related coverage in the press, more people form negative opinion about EU enlargement. Third, through an individual-level analysis, I test if the effects of print media content on the people are contingent on other factors such as the socioeconomic status, political sophistication, issue interest, media exposure, or expectations of various consequences of EU enlargement. Ultimately, I place the EU enlargement debate in political context to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between the people, the media and official policies of Britain and France on EU enlargement.

The result of this dissertation is a clearer understanding of the role of the news media in shaping the public agenda on EU affairs. In addition, the findings broaden our understanding of the flow of information and the critical linkages between the media, political elites and the masses, the center of the democratic process.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Although the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and policy has been investigated extensively in the US context, to date, it remains a relatively overlooked area in the European context. This dissertation seeks to provide a reliable conceptualization of the relationship between media coverage, public opinion, and policymaking.

Expanding the traditional focus of political communication theories to the European context, I show that the media effects are pertinent in this geography as well. I argue that the way the media covers an EU event is more prevalent and relevant than often considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public opinion, media outlets, and policymakers.

The existing knowledge about how the media covers European political affairs and how citizens in different EU Member States react to news about European affairs and processes of integration is very limited. Moreover, there is a lack of integrating theoretical frameworks in studies on the visibility of European issues in the media (Semetko *et al.* 2000). Furthermore, what scholarship exists has focused primarily on the determinants of public support for EU membership and European integration, leaving aside the support for EU enlargement. Consequently, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the determinants of public support for EU enlargement.

While the European integration (deepening) is the most frequently studied issue regarding the EU, enlargement (widening) is far from irrelevant. What makes the current project unique is its innovative focus on the policymaking, media coverage, and public

support for EU enlargement, which is central to the success or failure of the European project. Hence, the present study explores the relationship between policy, public opinion, and the media in Britain and France on the issue of the “Big Bang” – the fifth and largest round of European Union (EU) enlargement, which occurred in May 2004. This round of enlargement represents a historic achievement by the EU, since it led to the reunification of the European continent that was divided throughout the Cold War.

For the vast majority of citizens, information regarding politics comes from the media (Graber 2002). Studying EU enlargement-related media coverage is relevant to understanding public attitudes towards this topic. Since ordinary people have little motivation to seek out information about European affairs on their own, they are essentially captive to the media’s portrayal of these issues. If the media ignores political issues, they are unlikely to reach a large audience. As such, the success of European elites in promoting an issue agenda depends on the way the media cover those issues. In other words, if European elites want to shape the public’s perspective on a European issue, they must rely on the media to pass this issue along. French and Dutch rejections of the European Constitution referenda in 2005 are the latest illustrations of the significance of studying the effects of the news media in persuading the European citizens on EU-related issues.

Although there were no direct referenda held in EU15 countries for the latest round of EU enlargement, this is not to mean that the public opinion on EU enlargement is not worthy of attention. Popular attitudes within existing Member States are significant for the success of EU enlargement (*e.g.*, Jones and van der Bijl 2004). In the end, the quality of democratic decision-making within the EU rests on the quality of information

flowing to European citizens from the media, which makes it imperative that scholars understand the factors that shape the content of European affairs, as well as its effects. This project seeks to promote that endeavor.

When studying the media effects, single-country studies run the risk of generating findings that are idiosyncratic to a context or country (Blumler *et al.* 1992). A cross-national comparative perspective, on the other hand, provides an opportunity to escape from the ethnocentrism and premature generalizations common in most political communication research (see Prezworski and Teune 1970; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Swanson and Mancini 1996; Semetko and Mandelli 1997). It enables one to examine how those involved in the political communication process – publics, political parties, and media – act when operating under different institutional constraints (see Semetko and Borquez 1991).

As such, following the methodological principles of cross-nationally comparative analysis of political communication systems and behaviors formulated by Blumler (1983), this dissertation examines the political communication processes on EU enlargement “in the round.” In other words, it treats the process of communication on Eastern enlargement of the EU as a system of interconnected elements, including its origins in the policies of media and politicians, its actual message features, as well as its corresponding public opinion impact.

As suggested by Semetko *et al.* (2000), theories concerning media agenda-setting, priming and framing provide a basis for theory-building research on media and European integration. Since this project attempts to investigate the link between the media, public

opinion and policymakers in the European context, it makes use of these influential political communication theories.

Consequently, this dissertation contributes to the political communication literature through an examination of the agenda-setting and priming functions of the print media in Britain and France on the issue of the biggest round of EU enlargement in May 2004. It describes how the newspapers in Britain and France presented the issue of EU enlargement and its subtopics to their readers, and analyzes how these presentations affected public opinion. In other words, the current project asks: What kinds of messages did major newspapers in Britain and France produce about EU enlargement? Who received them, and how did they respond? What were their main effects – on what people learned about enlargement, on their awareness of the consequences of enlargement, and on their readiness to support the latest round of EU enlargement?

THE PUZZLE: THE GAP BETWEEN EUROPEAN ELITES AND MASSES

Studying the media effects on public opinion towards EU enlargement is relevant to understanding the gap between European elites and masses. While the French government has taken an ambivalent attitude on the Eastern enlargement of the EU, the British government has generally been in favor of it. However, the majority of both the British and French publics were against the fifth round of EU enlargement. As the legitimacy of elite actions depends upon the level of public support for European integration processes (see Rohrschneider 2000; Meyer 1999), it is important to study the formation and change of public opinion on these issues.

I argue that the explanation for the gap between public opinion and official policy regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU largely lies in the way the media covered the topic in these countries. Cross-national comparative methodology employed in this project enables us to test for the effect of the media in France and Britain in urging similar impulses to a major policy debate in the EU.

The Eastern round of EU enlargement has been one of the most ambitious projects that the EU has undertaken: internal reorganization of the Union through accession of ten new Member States stirred discussion and caused distress in European publics about its repercussions on their everyday lives. While the opponents of enlargement feared the arrival of cheap labor from the new Member States or that enlargement would increase drug trafficking and organized crime in their countries, the proponents of enlargement argued that an enlarged EU would be better off economically and would play a stronger political role on the international scene. Since the funding of this initiative was mostly dependent upon the former EU15 Member States, informing public opinion about enlargement and gaining public support in these countries was essential.

The media is the principal means by which the majority of people receive information about policy issues in general, and EU affairs in particular (see *Eurobarometer 61*; Page and Shapiro 1992; Graber 2002; De Vreese 2002). According to *Eurobarometer 61*, 50% of the British people and 51.6% of the French people prefer to get information about the EU from daily newspapers as compared to television, radio and other sources.

Not only do people acquire factual information about public affairs from the news media, readers and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news (McCombs 2004; Dalton 1996; Norris 2000). Since much of the public's knowledge and information about public affairs is mediated rather than received directly, people's opinions about political issues may be substantially shaped by the selection and presentation of information (see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

Although EU topics generally receive low attention in the news in many European countries (Gleissner and De Vreese 2005; De Vreese 2002; Gavin 2000; Meyer 1999, 2005; Norris 2000), the Eastern round of enlargement in May 2004 has been one of the most highly visible issues concerning the Union throughout different media outlets across Europe. Since it has generated substantial press coverage in the EU Member States, this historic event provides an excellent opportunity for a case study of the media effects on public opinion in Europe.

Furthermore, EU enlargement, especially in the beginning of the time frame of this study, was an "unobtrusive issue," in the sense that personal experience on enlargement was greatly limited, if not non-existent. For such issues, the need for orientation is largely satisfied through the use of the mass media and the degree of media influence increases with greater exposure (McCombs 2005, 64).

The relatively limited presence of EU-related topics in the media and the fact that most citizens rely on the news media for cues about the EU make it important to assess how the Eastern enlargement of the EU is portrayed in the media. In addition, the EU is generally presented in a negative tone in the European media (Norris 2000). This

coverage tone might be said to have contributed to the gap between European elites and citizens.

Regarding the gap between the elites and mass public, Jones and Baumgartner (2004, 1) ask the following question: “Do the policy priorities of the public and the government correspond?” and suggest that attention allocation is a direct indicator of priorities. Consequently, this dissertation primarily looks in the way major British and French newspapers treat the issue of EU enlargement in order to explain the gap between British and French public opinion and official policies of these key European countries on the issue.

Research in the current project is primarily contextualized in agenda setting theory. As Semetko and Mandelli (1997, 206) succinctly state, “agenda setting and the related concepts of priming and framing are important bases for more coordinated cross-national research efforts.” They advise that studies in this realm should explore: first, how the media agenda is formed and the relative contributions of politicians and journalists to the process; and second, how the media agendas influence public opinions about the salience of issues, urgency of problems and the responsibility for solving them. This study follows their advice.

Because of the prevalence and relevance of enlargement-related press coverage, and the relative paucity of scholarship on the topic, this dissertation seeks to make theoretical and empirical headway in understanding certain features of the media’s coverage of EU enlargement and their role in influencing public attitudes. The design of this dissertation allows for a test of the validity of agenda-setting and priming hypotheses in a non-US context.

Put more specifically, this dissertation examines both the first- and second-level agenda-setting effects as well as the priming functions of the media in Britain and France through exclusive focus on the news coverage of enlargement in *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mail*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération* from January 1, 2002 to May 1, 2004. The goal is to examine if these political communication theories provide overarching explanations that are valid across different national contexts. Understanding the way this important EU event has been covered in the major European countries could provide further insight into the actual and potential cohesiveness of the EU.

By attending to *how* an issue is covered, this research considers the political context in which issues exist and the struggle over how issues are constructed by the media and conveyed to the public. Accordingly, while examining the press coverage on EU enlargement, this dissertation also places the Eastern enlargement debate in political context through case studies of British and French official positions on the issue.

Greater insight into the effects of media on public opinion has significant implications for the ongoing “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” debates in European circles. The findings of this research have profound implications for European policymakers regarding actions to be taken on both future referenda concerning the adoption of the European Constitution and on possible referenda on subsequent rounds of EU enlargement including the prospective Turkish membership.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

I begin in Chapter 2 with an overview of the existing literature on media and public opinion, discussing the predominant political communication theories of agenda setting, framing and priming. I show how the issue of the biggest round of EU enlargement provides a good test case for these theories. In addition, I discuss why there is reason to expect media effects on people's opinions towards enlargement. I then briefly survey the political communication scholarship in the European context, as well as the "democratic deficit" and "communication deficit" arguments. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of my research questions and hypotheses.

In Chapter 3 I provide an overview of the various data sources and methods I use to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage in Britain and France. To examine the news, I rely on a large-scale quantitative content analysis of enlargement coverage in newspapers from 2002 to 2004. I explain in Chapter 3 a content analysis of enlargement-related newspaper articles. I also describe the data from the *Eurobarometer* surveys that will serve as the basis for my study of public opinion towards EU enlargement.

I begin the empirical work in Chapter 4, which examines the extent to which public agenda reflects the media agenda. Chapter 4, in other words, conducts a first-level agenda-setting analysis in Britain and France. It asks to what extent the frequency of the print media coverage of enlargement influences how important people consider it to be. It further seeks to determine if an analysis of the media coverage in Britain and France on enlargement reveals some possible national differences in the way this key European event is covered in these major European powers. Conducting a systematic quantitative

content analysis on the British and French print media coverage on EU enlargement enables the testing of news effects and contents cross-nationally. I find temporal variation in the level of media-public agenda convergence. However, the patterns are consistent with the argument that the media coverage shapes the public agenda.

My focus in Chapter 5 is on the second-level agenda-setting effects in these two major European countries. In other words, Chapter 5 extends the analysis to explore if the media coverage of enlargement tells people “*how* to think about” enlargement, besides telling them “*what* to think about.” After identifying the predominant attributes in the print media coverage of EU enlargement, I conduct a rank order correlation in order to see whether the attributes the media apply translate into attributes the British and French publics use to evaluate the latest round of EU enlargement. I find that the media analyzed in this project exert moderate second-level agenda-setting effects. The findings suggest a strong, positive, and statistically significant correlation between the media framings and the public framings on three general consequences of EU enlargement.

I turn next to an investigation of consequences of agenda-setting and priming on public opinion regarding the EU enlargement in Chapter 6. Seeking to fill a gap in the existing literature on agenda setting, I conduct both bivariate and multivariate analyses using individual-level public opinion data to test for the effects of a number of possible independent variables on the public support for EU enlargement. Specifically, I attempt to examine attitudes towards European enlargement as a result of media exposure, political sophistication, political interest, attitudes on several different consequences of EU enlargement, and demographic variables. The results of these analyses provide a

better understanding of what other factors are involved in the process of formation of opinions towards EU enlargement.

Chapter 7 incorporates a discussion of the political context in Britain and France during the time of the enlargement debates to illustrate the interaction between the media coverage, public opinion, and the political elites. It places the debate over EU Eastern expansion in political context through case studies of British and French governments' positions on enlargement. It examines the specific positions the governments of France and Britain staked out with regards to Eastern enlargement during the period under focus. The analysis draws especially on the British and French official responses to the immigration and unemployment related consequences of EU enlargement.

Finally, this dissertation concludes with an assessment of the influence of the media in shaping public agenda, framings, and attitudes, as well as official policymaking on EU enlargement. I summarize my findings in Chapter 8 and discuss avenues of future research suggested by the project. I further concentrate on the implications of my empirical results and draw lessons for European media outlets and policymakers.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Background

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Eastern round of enlargement in May 2004 has been one of the most highly visible issues concerning the Union throughout different media outlets across Europe. Since it has generated substantial press coverage in the EU Member States, this historic event provides an excellent opportunity for a case study of the media effects on public opinion in Europe.

As such, this chapter starts by providing a succinct survey of the media effects literature. It pays special attention to the agenda setting, framing and priming literatures. It then offers an overview of the comparative political communication literature in the European context. Any analysis of an EU-related topic and European public opinion deserves a discussion of “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” literatures. As such, this chapter combines the political communication research scholarship with the “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” literatures. It concludes with a statement of research questions and hypotheses derived from the review of relevant scholarship.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF MEDIA RESEARCH

“Minimal Effects” Thesis

Political communication scholars have long been interested in the role media play in the political process. The literature, however, is inconsistent on whether the relationship between media coverage and public opinion is negative, positive, or non-existent.

Early research by political scientists investigated attitude change through sample surveys and controlled experiments; this research seemed to detect that mass communications had “minimal consequences” on voting and public opinion (*e.g.*, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Klapper 1960; Campbell *et al.* 1960). The main justification for this minimal effects hypothesis, Zaller (1996, 17) notes, was the fact that scholars found it “impossible to measure and identify substantial persuasion effects that are the outcome of the mass media and the campaign.” In other words, voters were pictured as largely impervious to the influence of the media. Proponents of this “limited effects” or “minimal consequences” model of political communication maintained that people heard what they wanted to hear via processes of selective exposure and interpretation (see Klapper 1960).

Nevertheless, as the subfield of political communication has developed, the “minimal effects” hypothesis started to lose its dominant position. Two robust findings emerged in the study of news media’s influence on political attitudes: agenda setting and priming (see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Iyengar, Kinder, Peters, and Krosnick 1984; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Page and Shapiro 1992; Miller and Krosnick 2000).

First Level (Traditional) Agenda Setting Theory

The idea of an agenda-setting role of the press has its origins in a seminal work – Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* – which begins with a chapter titled “The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads.” Lippmann (1922) argues that the press is a major contributor to the pictures in our heads. The term “agenda setting” in relation to the

media was first coined by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw to describe the correspondence between the ranking of major issues on the press and public agendas in their pioneering work. Studying the 1968 US presidential campaign, McCombs and Shaw (1972, 177) hypothesized that “the mass media set the agenda for political campaigns, influencing the salience of attitudes toward political issues.” They found that the media is enforcing upon people what news is “important” and what news is “non-important.” They showed a strong correlation between the degree of issue salience with voters and the extent to which the issue was covered by the mass media.

In 1977, McCombs and Shaw published their study of the 1972 US presidential election campaign. By interviewing the respondents several times during the presidential campaigns, McCombs and Shaw (1977) demonstrated that the public agenda followed the media agenda. Since the 1970s, the agenda-setting influence of the media has been widely replicated.

First level or traditional agenda setting theory emphasizes how mass media, elites, and the public interact and influence one another to affect issue salience (see McCombs and Shaw 1972; Shaw and McCombs 1977; Funkhouser 1973; Weaver, Graber, McCombs, and Eyal 1981; Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Rogers, Dearing, and Bregman 1993; McCombs and Reynolds 2002). It focuses on the transmission of object salience from the media to the public, and hence, points to the visibility and perceived importance of a problem or an issue due to its visibility or salience in the media.

As Bernard Cohen (1963, 13) notes in his seminal work *The Press and Foreign Policy*, the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” McCombs (2004,

2) argues that “Cues repeated day after day effectively communicate the importance of each topic.” The more coverage an issue receives, the more concern individuals have with the issue. In other words, individuals learn how concerned they should be through the amount of coverage the issue receives (Wanta 1997a and 1997b; McCombs 2004; Iyengar and Adam 1993). The first level of agenda setting theory emphasizes the news media’s role in generating awareness of issues that should concern the public.

Second Level (Attribute) Agenda Setting Theory

Agenda-setting effects are not only limited to affecting issue salience (*i.e.* first-level agenda-setting effects). As McCombs (2004) puts it, the agenda setting effects operate at two sequential levels in the communication process: attention and comprehension. The second level agenda setting deals with the “transmission of attribute salience” (McCombs and Estrada 1997, 240) and holds that the prominence of an issue’s attributes in the “pictures in our heads” is influenced by the pattern of attributes in the press coverage for that issue.

When the media talk about an “object” (the thing on which the attention of the media and the public are focused), some “attributes” (characteristics and traits that describe the object) are emphasized, others are given less attention, and many receive no attention at all (McCombs 2004, 6). Second level or attribute agenda setting theory argues that media not only shape the salience of “objects” in public opinion (*e.g.*, issues, candidates, etc.), but “attributes” of those objects as well (*e.g.*, subissues, candidate traits, etc.). In short, agenda setting theory posits that elements that are prominent on the media agenda, both “objects” and their “attributes,” become prominent on the public agenda.

In that sense, second level of agenda setting theory expands the scope of the previous agenda-setting research by examining a much more complex digestion of media content. It examines how media organizations select and present certain characteristics and properties of an object and how that selection and presentation subsequently influence the public's perception of an object and its attributes (Ghanem 1997; McCombs and Reynolds 2002).

For instance, McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey (1997) conducted a detailed attribute agenda-setting research in the Spanish regional and municipal elections. They analyzed the “substantive” and “affective” dimensions of voters' image descriptions and concluded the existence of second-level agenda-setting effects. Benton and Frazier (1976) similarly found that agenda setting not only shapes the salience of broad issues but also the salience of proposed solutions to those issues and the rationales behind those solutions. A common way of dealing with the second level of agenda setting is by dividing the issues into their sub-issues (see Takeshita and Mikami 1995, for an illustration). At this point, a brief discussion of the relationship between the second level of agenda setting and framing is called for.

The Connection between the Second Level of Agenda Setting and Framing

When comparing framing and agenda setting, Patterson (1994, 70) suggested that framing “expands beyond what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk.” This argument is fundamentally at odds with the views of others. For instance, according to McCombs (1997), framing constitutes a second-level agenda-setting effect.

It deals with story presentation and is the “ability of media reports to alter the kinds of considerations people use in forming their opinions” (Price and Tewksbury 1996, 121).

Entman (1993, 52) defines framing as “*select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation* for the item described” (original emphasis). Agenda setting theory uses Entman’s definition of framing in identifying the kinds of attributes selected to describe a particular object, with emphasis serving as the primary determinant of framing power (Reese 2001).

As Hsiang and McCombs (2004, 24) note, “thinking of frames as attributes of an object provides the theoretical link between agenda-setting and framing research.” McCombs (2005, 546) defines a frame as “an attribute of the object under consideration because it describes the object.” However, he also adds that not all attributes are frames.

Regarding the difference between agenda setting and framing, Ghanem (1997, 6) states that the literature on the second level of agenda setting “examines the impact of news frames on the public agenda, whereas many framing studies have focused solely on the frames themselves.” According to the assumptions of the second level of agenda setting theory; depending on how an issue is presented in the media, the public is expected to think about that issue in a particular way. The link between attribute agenda setting and framing raises stimulating questions about the influence that various patterns of description have on how the public thinks about public affairs topics (McCombs 2005, 547).

Consequently, how issues are framed in the media affects people's decision making on the issue. Research suggests that if a situation is presented to a person in terms of losses, the decision is very different than if it is presented to that person in terms of gains (Elster 1990). Additionally, framing economic and foreign policy questions in terms of gains versus losses (Quattrone and Tversky 1988) or framing affirmative action in terms of unfair advantage versus just compensation (Kinder and Sanders 1990) can change the basis of political judgment. When the focus is on the effects of media coverage on political evaluations or judgments, priming thesis makes a very important theoretical contribution to the political communication literature.

Priming

As Willnat (1997, 51) maintains, "researchers often ignored effects the media might have on links between political cognition and attitude formation." While several agenda setting studies have tried to include behavioral measures as dependent variables, little progress was made in terms of theoretical explanations of this process initially (Rogers and Dearing 1988).

But, more recently, attitudinal consequences of agenda setting gained interest (Page *et al.* 1987; Ansolabehere *et al.* 1993; Bartels 1993; Zaller 1996; Dalton *et al.* 1998; Kinder 1998; Schmitt-Beck 2004; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2002). By framing issues in certain ways, "the media influence the way people perceive a problem or issue and its consequences, possibly altering their final evaluation of the issue" (Jasperson *et al.* 1998, 206; see also Capella and Jamieson 1997; Graber 1988, 1993; Iyengar 1987,

1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Adam 1993; Neuman *et al.* 1992; Norris 1995; Patterson 1994).

There are three distinct consequences of agenda setting for attitudes and opinions: “forming an opinion, priming opinions about public figures through an emphasis on particular issues and shaping an opinion through an emphasis on particular attributes” (McCombs 2005, 549). Priming is an extension of agenda setting. It addresses the impact of media coverage on the weight assigned to specific issues in making political judgments or evaluations. Priming effects can best be interpreted as the consequence of agenda setting.

The priming thesis holds that “the more prominent an issue is in the information system, the greater its weight in political judgments of public” (Iyengar and Adam 1993, 368). As Price and Tewksbury (1995, 5) succinctly summarize, priming is “the tendency of audience members to evaluate their political leaders on the basis of those particular events and issues given attention in recent news reports.” As such, agenda setting theory is an important precursor to priming effects (Miller and Krosnick 2000).

The notion of priming is built on the assumption that people are most likely to retrieve information that has been recently activated. In other words, it assumes that a stimulus can activate previously learned cognitive structures, thereby influencing the judgment process (Fiske and Taylor 1984).

According to Iyengar and Kinder (1987), priming is a psychological process whereby media emphasis on particular issues activates in people’s memories previously acquired information. Priming suggests that individuals use “shortcuts” or recall

information that comes to mind easily to make evaluations of issues and leaders (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

As Iyengar (1987) points out, individuals are not passive consumers of media messages, but they interpret, elaborate on, and evaluate information within an existing network of knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and personal experiences. The priming phenomenon (weighting issues in accordance with their perceived salience) has been documented in a series of experimental and non-experimental studies (for reviews of priming research, see Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Miller and Krosnick 2000).

Through a series of experiments, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) demonstrate that news coverage of an issue can prime viewers to give that issue more weight in their overall evaluations of public officials and political candidates. The experiments show, for example, that exposure to media coverage of national problems such as energy, defense, and inflation boosted the weight that Americans assigned to US President Jimmy Carter's performance on these particular issues in forming their general evaluations of his performance.

Iyengar and Kinder (1987) explain these effects by arguing that ordinary people, when facing complex political issues or events, do not base their judgments on all of the relevant knowledge stored in their memories. Instead, they adopt a shortcut strategy, making evaluations based on the pieces of information most easily retrieved from memory (see also Krosnick and Brannon 1993). Since people typically rely on the mass media for information about political events, the accessibility of such information is determined partly by which stories the media choose to cover (Iyengar and Kinder 1987;

Krosnick and Kinder 1990). This aspect provides the theoretical link between agenda setting and priming.

After noting that “almost all media priming studies have analyzed the effects of television news,” Willnat (1997, 63) maintains that the analysis of print media priming effects has been an “underdeveloped area” in priming research. This project fills in this deficiency in the political communication literature by testing the priming hypothesis using newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement in selected British and French print media outlets.

Consequently, this research project applies widely accepted political communication theories – agenda-setting and priming – for explaining the relationship between print media coverage and public opinion in Britain and France on the issue of Eastern enlargement of the EU. This chapter now turns to a review of the relatively underdeveloped political communication scholarship in the European context.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT

In Western democracies, political communication occurs primarily through the mass media. The media select, shape, and interpret political issues. The provision of information is the key ingredient of a political process of democratic debate and opinion formation. Accordingly, the media are becoming a political actor in their own right.

Nevertheless, the existing knowledge about how the media covers European political affairs and how citizens in different EU Member States react to news about European affairs and processes of integration is very limited. Moreover, there is a lack of

integrating theoretical frameworks in studies on the visibility of European issues in the media (Semetko *et al.* 2000).

Despite these deficiencies in the political communication literature, there are several studies conducted on the role of the media in the European context. For instance, Blumler (1983) discussed the influential role of television in covering the first direct European Parliamentary elections in 1979.

Several studies pointed to the fact that European citizens' knowledge of European level politics is limited when compared with their knowledge of national political affairs (Schoenbach 1983). They argued that "since many people are ill-informed about international affairs and slow to see their relevance for their own lives, it would require a communication effort of considerable scope and complexity to overcome electoral unfamiliarity with EEC institutions, candidates, and issues" (Blumler 1983, 4).

Prior scholarship on EU-related news coverage identified several distinct features in the way the EU, its institutions and policies are presented by the media. In their analysis of the news media in Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, Gleissner and De Vreese (2005) noted that the overall tone of the media's coverage of EU Constitution was negative and that the issue was reported from a European angle, rather than a domestic perspective.

Many scholars attracted attention to the fact that EU topics generally receive low attention in the news in many European countries (Gleissner and De Vreese 2005; De Vreese 2002; Gavin 2000; Meyer 1999, 2005; Norris 2000). Meyer (1999) called this a "legitimacy deficit," and argued that it is embedded in the EU's inability to generate public support among European citizens due to the lack of media attention. He noted that

the role of political communication in legitimating governance is often disregarded in the democratic deficit literature.

A number of studies concluded that media representations of Europe may affect public attitudes towards the EU and its policies (Geddes 2004; Franklin 1999; Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Curtice 1999). For instance, Thoveron and Sauerberg (1983) tested the agenda setting theory in the context of the first European Parliamentary elections in nine European countries; Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands, and for the most part, found significant convergence between the agenda of the people and the TV coverage.

Additionally, there were a number of studies that concentrated on the effects of media framing on public opinion on EU-related matters. They identified the “conflict frame” as a commonly occurring element of the EU-related media coverage (De Vreese 2002; Norris 2000; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). For instance, in a study of news frames in the coverage of the 1997 Amsterdam summit, the “conflict frame” was found to be the second most common frame in the Dutch news media (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). Similarly, using surveys and content analysis, Norris (2000) noted that the EU is generally presented in a negative tone in the European media.

Since the media coverage has important implications on future European integration, there have been quite a few academic studies that concentrated on the emergence of a European public sphere (see, Schlesinger 1999; Koopmans 2007, for detailed review of these studies). The majority of these studies have concluded that the “Europeanization” of national spheres – most commonly measured as an increase in the reporting of EU topics – is still too early to be observed. They found out that journalists

reporting on EU issues tend to refer more often to their own country than to other EU member states or to the EU as an institution (see, for instance, McQuail and Bergsma 1983).

While it is an established fact in the literature that the degree of Europeanization of national public spheres rises steeply at the time of special occasions or events, even in the case of EU-wide events, it is still not possible to talk about a complete cross-national synchronization of European debates (Machill *et al.* 2006; Gramberger 1994, quoted in Meyer 1999).

In his analysis of Brussels news correspondents, Morgan (1995, 338) put this observation more precisely by describing the way in which the British media cover EU decisions. He maintained that the EU news have been “nationalized and treated accordingly.” This finding illustrates that the news correspondents still cover EU affairs from a nationalized perspective rather than a European perspective.

Similarly, the previous scholarship that focused on the coverage of European Parliament elections by the media of EU member states concluded that these elections were reported using the same reporting conventions that are used for national elections (Blumler 1983; Leroy and Siune 1994; Wober 1987). After having reviewed the media research in general, and the relatively limited political communication literature in Europe, this chapter proceeds with a discussion of the “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” literatures.

“DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” AND “COMMUNICATION DEFICIT” LITERATURE REVIEW

This dissertation is primarily interested in diagnosing the relationship between the media, public opinion, and elites in the context of EU enlargement. For such an endeavor, it is crucial to identify the nature of the relationship between policymakers and European citizens. This brings the “democratic deficit” debate in the EU to the forefront.

In democratic theory, the capacity of a political system to respond to the preferences of its citizens is considered to be vital. This project aims at studying the nature of the relationship between elite positions and public opinion on a rather understudied area of European affairs: the issue of Eastern enlargement.

There are several competing arguments in the European integration literature regarding the relationship between European elites and people. Furthermore, there is little consensus among scholars and practitioners concerning what “democratic deficit” is and whether or not it exists in the EU policymaking.

In the European context, “democratic deficit” implies that the EU and its institutions suffer from lack of democracy or legitimacy, and therefore, are perceived by ordinary EU citizens as inaccessible. Robert Dahl (1999), for instance, maintains that international organizations are inherently unable to support direct democratic deliberation and decision. The EU, as perceived by many journalists and academicians, is no exception.

A significant number of scholars that study the EU have suggested that the “democratic deficit” is inherent in the EU’s policymaking processes and institutions (see Follesdal and Hix 2005 for a survey of democratic deficit arguments). They maintain that since the European project was founded as a result of the agreement between sovereign

states, represented by political elites, “democratic deficit is inherent in the EEC’s political arrangements since its inception” (Marquand 1979, 64). The underlying logic of this criticism is that the public “input” is not permitted in EU decision-making processes. In other words, these accounts suggest that EU policymaking is not responsive to public opinion. Before a discussion of the “democratic deficit” theory – a theory of non-responsiveness – it is beneficial to summarize what the earlier scholarship concluded regarding the elite-public relationship in the European context.

Early work on European public opinion noted emergence of a “permissive consensus” on European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Inglehart 1970; Slater 1982) and a “post-materialist” value shift in attitudes toward a united Europe (Inglehart 1977). For Inglehart, post-materialists are more inclined to support European integration. “Post-materialists” give priority to things that are more directed to the fulfillment of a person’s intellectual needs (Inglehart 1977).

The “permissive consensus” theory holds that an ill-informed and disinterested European public has been generally positively predisposed toward European integration and has allowed political elites a free hand or a blank check in deciding about the EU matters. In other words, this “permissive consensus” was due to both the technical nature of the EU topics and minimal consequences of European policies on people’s lives. It survived so long as European integration was widely perceived to be delivering the economic goods and peace to people and so long as the effects of integration remained limited (*i.e.* distant from the daily lives of the European citizens).

Nevertheless, as recently illustrated by the results of the referenda on European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the “permissive consensus” among the

European citizens cannot be taken for granted. This has very important implications for the nature of democracy in the EU.

As the EU starts influencing the daily lives of the European citizens, European integration became increasingly conducive to opposition from public (Eichenberg and Dalton 2003; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). This led to the emergence of an opposing thesis called “constraining dissensus,” implying the potential constraining role of public opinion on European integration matters (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Hix 1999).

Another competing argument – “policy mood,” developed by Stimson (1991) – suggests that public disinterest is a sign that elites are “sticking close enough to public preference.” Stimson and his colleagues maintain that “politicians are keen to pick up the faintest signals in their political environment” (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995, 559). The “policy mood” argument suggests the primacy of public opinion on policymakers and maintains that elites respond to electoral pressure. There are several other studies that conclude substantial policy responsiveness to public opinion (Page and Shapiro 1983; Jacobs 1993; Geer 1996).

Alternatively, several analysts reject the idea that public opinion influences policymaking. The “cue-taking” argument developed by Carruba (2001) claims that political elites shape weakly held public preferences through their policy position. Carruba (2001) concludes that cues presented by political elites provide citizens with cognitive short-cuts that help them decide what is in their interest (for a discussion of the “cue-taking” and “policy mood” arguments in the European context, see Carrubba 2001).

On the other hand, there are increasing concerns about a disconnection between the European elites and citizens. The gap between the European project and its citizens is

well documented in the literature. Many political scientists argue that the European elites make decisions on the EU independent of the popular feedback and that the EU suffers from a severe “democratic deficit” (Beetham and Lord 1998; Meyer 1999; Scharpf 1999; Hooghe 2003). They maintain that the EU decisions are not sufficiently responsive to public preferences and scrutiny.

Proponents of the “democratic deficit” argument note that only one branch of the EU – the European Parliament (EP) – is directly elected by European citizens. They also contend that there is little public discussion of European issues, let alone an ideal transnational deliberation; the Council of Ministers meetings are conducted in secret, behind closed doors. To them, the link between the EU and its citizens is too tenuous and the mode of interaction within the EU is too diplomatic or technocratic.

Even in the case of the EP, a number of scholars point to steadily declining turnout levels in EP elections. The voter turnout level has continuously fallen since direct elections began in 1979 (63% turnout level), reaching its lowest point in the latest EP elections in 2004 (46% turnout level).

However, a number of scholars like the ones at the Centre for European Reform think that maintain that the EU has a “delivery deficit”:

The EU has a problem of legitimacy. The main cause is not a “democratic deficit” – there are plenty of checks and balances on the exercise of power within the EU system – but rather a delivery deficit. Too often there has been a gap between rhetoric and reality. EU leaders often promise great things ... but fail to deliver (Barysch *et al.* 2006, 2).

Some, on the other hand, argue that the criticism of the EU as democratically illegitimate is unsupported by the existing empirical evidence (see Majone 2000; Moravcsik 2002, for a critique of the democratic deficit argument). This group of scholars argues that the EU decision-making is effective, transparent, and responsive to the public opinion. According to Majone (2000), for instance, the EU is not suffering from democratic deficit, but from a “credibility crisis.” He maintains that the EU should operate through “non-majoritarian” institutions rather than through popular democracy.

Finally, several political communication scholars who study the EU noted that the “democratic deficit” literature has devoted trivial attention to the role of political communication in legitimating governance (Meyer 1999, 2005; Ward 2001, 2004). They maintain that there is too little public communication in Europe (Weiler 1999; Meyer 1999, 2005; Ward 2001, 2004). Meyer (1999), among others, highlights the public communication deficiencies – “communicative weakness” – of the EU (see also Risse-Kappen 1996; Ward 2001, 2004).

After noting that the solutions to democratic deficit have been overwhelmingly framed in terms of an institutional reform of the EU (such as the empowerment of the EP, the creation of a directly elected and more accountable Commission), Ward (2001, 77) notes that the European elites also need “to engage with the imagination of its citizens.” He analyzes European Commission’s decisions on State aid and competition policy, in order to assess how EU media policy forms a comprehensive approach to media regulation. This clearly indicates the key role Ward (2001) assigns to political communication, in dealing with democratic deficit and the lack of public identification with the EU.

The “communication deficit” argument is also contested. Trenz (2004) analyzes news coverage of European governance and policy-making in 2000 through a content analysis of eleven daily newspapers from six EU member states. Testing the assumption that there is a “communication deficit” in Europe, Trenz (2004, 297) concludes that there is “a considerable degree of European political communication to be found in the quality press of the selected EU member states.” His findings contradict the expectations of the “communication deficit” argument and point to the emergence of a European public sphere.

We are at a crossroads as regards the future formation of the EU, with the future of the European Constitution and further rounds of enlargement at stake. The results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands on European Constitution have brought the democratic deficit argument back into the agenda of the EU. 55% of the French and 61.5% of the Dutch voted “no” in the referenda. Yet, it remains unclear how EU elites will go about the European Constitution ratification process.

As illustrated by this literature review, scholars from different backgrounds are in disagreement with one another about the nature of the relationship between the elites and the public in general, and about whether there is a “democratic” or “communication deficit” in Europe, in particular. Accordingly, this research aims to shed light on this pertinent debate and grasp the dynamics of the media-public-policy relationship in the European political context.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Following a review of literatures on agenda setting, framing, and priming theories, as well as on “democratic” and “communication deficit” arguments, this chapter continues with the statement of research questions and hypotheses derived from the relevant research literatures. For an explanation of the operationalization process, please refer to Chapter 3.

First-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis


An initial scanning of European public opinion data, as presented by Figure 2-1, attracts attention to an interesting phenomenon – *i.e.*, the presence of substantially different levels of salience of Eastern enlargement topic among the British and French respondents.

While, in France, the EU enlargement issue is more salient than in Britain, the percentage of people who have already heard of enlargement in Britain is well below the EU15 and French averages. One question that is warranted by this observation is: To what extent does this cross-national difference in public salience reflect different levels of salience of enlargement in French and British media? In other words, this research analyzes the public salience of EU enlargement as a result of the media salience of the issue.

Agenda-setting studies have focused on how frequently an issue is mentioned in the media. To test for media’s first-level agenda-setting functions, this project poses the

following research question: to what extent does the frequency of the press coverage of EU enlargement influence the significance people assign to this issue?

Figure 2-1. British and French Public Attention to Eastern EU Enlargement, 2002-2003



Source: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2, and 140

Following the agenda setting theory's expectations, I hypothesize that the higher the frequency of enlargement-related press coverage, the higher the perceived importance of this issue will be on the public agenda. Consequently, the following hypothesis is generated to test for the first-level agenda-setting effects of the print media:

Hypothesis 1: Media salience of EU enlargement is positively correlated with its public salience – *i.e.*, the proportion of the public who recognize the EU enlargement.

Second-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis

De Vreese *et al.* (2001, 108) attract attention to an important deficiency in the political communication literature; and note that “little attention has been paid to framing in a cross-nationally comparative fashion.” This project studies frames or “attributes” in a cross-national comparative fashion.

Regarding the second-level agenda-setting effects, this project investigates if the media coverage of Eastern enlargement tells British and French people “*how* to think about” enlargement, besides telling them “*what* to think about.” It deals with both the “substantive” and “affective” attributes of the enlargement topic.

The main research questions at the second-level analysis are: To what extent do the print media frame EU enlargement topic in terms of its political, economic and social consequences? Do the frames the print media apply to EU enlargement translate into patterns the public uses to interpret this issue? Did the “substantive” and “affective” dimensions of press reporting on Eastern enlargement influence public opinion on the topic?

An assessment of the second-level agenda-setting effects requires an identification of the predominant frames in the coverage of EU enlargement. In the political communication literature, there are two different types of frames – “issue-specific” frames and “generic” frames (see De Vreese *et al.* 2001 for further discussion). Studies of frames have often been carried out in relation to a specific event (*e.g.* Entman 1991; Mendelsohn 1993) or specific issue (*e.g.* Nelson *et al.* 1997; Norris 1995). Due to the nature of its research topic, this project employs “issue-specific” frames.

For a systematic study of attribute (or second-level) agenda-setting, Takeshita (1997, 25) suggests that “operationalization should be conducted in a way to be applicable both to analysis of the media content and to measurement of cognitions of the audience members,” so that we are able to compare the media data with the audience data. Following this advice, the current study constructs exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of the enlargement issue based on the previously collected *Flash Eurobarometer on Enlargement* public opinion data and applies them to content analysis.

Also, following a careful review of the literature on public support for the EU projects, this dissertation makes the assertion that the public support for enlargement is dependent on the perceived consequences of enlargement by people. In other words, this project expects the media to have a great potential in influencing public opinion on Eastern enlargement through manipulation of relative saliencies of various consequences of Eastern enlargement. Consequently, this research conducts a content analysis of “substantive attributes” of EU enlargement: the “political,” “economic,” and “socio-cultural” consequences of enlargement.

Besides analyzing the above-mentioned “substantive” attributes of the enlargement topic, this study also constructs “affective” attributes of the issue, following a review of previous research on second level of agenda setting (see McCombs 1992, for a discussion of “substantive” vs. “affective” attributes). Since the media coverage communicates much more than facts about issues, the “affective” attributes of the press coverage on Eastern enlargement are also analyzed.

The “affective” dimension is interested in the public’s emotional response that could result from media coverage. It is only intuitive to hypothesize that the “affective”

tone of the print media coverage (positive, neutral, negative) on Eastern enlargement will have an effect on people's attitudes towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU. As such, the affective tone of the press coverage – *i.e.* negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, or positive – is coded in the content analyses of the British and French newspapers.

Consequently, the following hypotheses are developed in order to test for the second-level agenda-setting effects:

Hypothesis 2: The more salient a substantive attribute (political, economic, and social consequences) is in the press coverage of EU enlargement, the more likely the people are to describe Eastern enlargement topic in terms of that substantive attribute (*i.e.*, substantive attributes of EU enlargement emphasized by the media correlate with enlargement's substantive attributes salient to public).

Hypothesis 3: The more positive a substantive attribute of Eastern enlargement is presented in the press coverage, the more likely the people are to think of that attribute in a positive way (*i.e.* the affective tone of the media coverage on enlargement's different consequences correlates with the people's support for various consequences of enlargement).

Priming Analysis

As noted in the literature review section, priming deals with the consequences of agenda setting. Put more specifically, it addresses the impact of media coverage on the weight assigned to specific issues in making political judgments.

If a subtopic of an issue becomes more important in the news, citizens are primed to evaluate that issue on the basis of their attitudes toward that particular subtopic. This, in turn, has significant implications on how people evaluate certain public policy issues. Consequently, this study examines if the weight assigned by the press to a certain consequence of EU enlargement affects its weight in people's minds when they make judgments about the EU enlargement issue.

Research questions at this level of analysis are: Whether and to what extent does the predominance of various attributes of enlargement influence the overall evaluation of the enlargement of the EU by citizens? Which aspect of the issue do people assign the most significance to (*i.e.* political, economic, or social consequences) when they make judgments about EU enlargement?

Hypothesis 4: If a certain consequence of EU enlargement is made more prominent in the press coverage on EU enlargement, the weight assigned to that particular consequence by people will be greater when they form their opinions on the EU enlargement issue.

Following the formulation of hypotheses derived from a thorough review of the literature, the subsequent chapter focuses on various data and methods used in testing these hypotheses.

Chapter 3: Data and Methods

The current chapter explains the data and the methodological approaches utilized in this project for testing the hypotheses stated in the preceding chapter. It starts with providing the logic for using a cross-national comparative methodology and a selection of cases. It then continues with providing an overview of the various data sources and methods used to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage in Britain and France.

RESEARCH DESIGN: CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

A great deal can be learned by comparisons of media effects across countries. Political communication cannot be properly examined without comparative research, since only comparative research can render the validity of the results (Meyer 2005). Comparing cases and explanations forces us to think in a rigorous way.

As Swanson (2004, 59) notes, comparative political communication is an “essential supplement to the nationally focused studies on which most of our knowledge of the subject has been built.” It sheds light to transnational trends that otherwise would be difficult to notice (Swanson 2000; Dogan and Pelassy 1984).

Furthermore, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 3) highlight the fact that comparative analysis forces scholars to clarify the “scope” and “applicability” of the concepts and theories employed. Similarly, Esser and Pfetsch (2004, 384) suggest that “comparative analysis can be used as a key to discern general findings from culture-specific ones by

rendering visible the specific identity of political communication arrangements within a given system”:

Comparative research contributes to theory building in two important ways. First, it helps us to assess the general validity and geographic range of a theory (or hypothesis) by testing it in different social-cultural and systemic settings. Second, it helps us to contextualize middle-range theories by discerning those system factors in the presence of which a theory is mainly valid (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, 385).

Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch (1975) were among the first to note that comparative cross-national political communication research is a “field in its infancy” deserving serious theoretical and empirical attention. Research on media effects is often based on national studies, suffering somewhat from “naïve universalism” by offering general theoretical propositions based on single-country data (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, 308).

In their more recent work, Gurevitch and Blumler (2004, 333) outlined several criteria for the “maturity” of comparative political communication research. One standard for “maturity” is proper explanation of the “purpose of going comparative.” The other sign of “maturity” is the placement of the research in a theoretical or conceptual perspective. Finally, a “mature” comparative political communication research, according to Gurevitch and Blumler (2004, 333), should state its “expectations about comparative similarities and differences in light of the results of the empirical research.”

There are many obstacles to comparing countries that differ in language, size, culture, and organization. Comparative political communication literature suffers most from the lack of sufficient numbers of scholars that are proficient in conducting

comparative research in different languages. This study overcomes this obstacle through the recruitment of four research assistants that are native speakers of British English and French for coding the media content.

One purpose of this research is to explain cross-national differences in media coverage and support for EU enlargement in Britain and France. To do that, this project utilizes a cross-national comparative political communication framework to assess the “scope” and “applicability” of the agenda setting and priming theories in the European context. The upcoming sections in this chapter concentrate on the satisfaction of the criteria for “maturity” of comparative political communication research developed by Gurevitch and Blumler (2004).

CASE SELECTION

Przeworski and Teune (1970) suggest two opposing approaches to select the countries or cultures in a systematic way: the “most similar systems design” and the “most different systems design.” While the former stresses cultural differences, the latter focuses on cultural similarities. The similarity of the objects compared is central to the analysis.

Britain and France constitute ideal cases for a cross-national media effects study. This study employs “the most different systems design.” The choice of countries is motivated primarily by their importance in political decision-making and economic performance in the EU. France and the United Kingdom are both Western European states with a long tradition of consolidated democracy and with similar levels of

economic development. They are both considered as “liberal democracies” in which free debate of public issues are encouraged (Freeman 1995). The people represent the ultimate authority in democracies. As such, it is crucial to study public’s attitudes and opinions on political matters.

Despite their similarities, however, France and the UK are two major actors within the EU with traditionally different approaches towards the processes of European integration. While the United Kingdom is renowned for its Euro-skepticism, France is famous for its Euro-enthusiasm. In other words, while France has traditionally been the most ardent supporter of further European integration, the United Kingdom has been the “awkward partner” of the EU (George 1994). When compared with France, in the British context, the debate about the future of Europe is received with remarkable unease.

On the issue of Eastern enlargement, the French government has surprisingly taken an ambivalent attitude. French policy on Eastern enlargement has shifted several times, depending on the government’s projected calculation of national interest. The calculations of the tradeoff between further integration and expansion played a key role. Additionally, in the beginning of the enlargement process, the French government thought of enlargement as a way to strengthen the political influence of the EU vis-à-vis the US. However, later on, the debates regarding a possible intervention in Iraq made it clear that the Central and Eastern European countries would change the internal balance of power of the enlarged Union to the disadvantage of France.

The British government, on the other hand, has generally been in favor of the Eastern enlargement. “Widening” was considered to be in Britain’s national interest. In other words, the British government regarded the expansion of the Union to include new

members as a way out from further “deepening.” In that sense, traditional Euro-skepticism of UK official policy is absent on the issue of Eastern enlargement. In a way, Britain and France swapped their traditional positions on the issue of Eastern enlargement of the EU: while France was more reluctant, Britain was more enthusiastic about this particular EU initiative. A detailed discussion about the British and French positions on the Eastern enlargement of the EU can be found in Chapter 7.

France and Britain fall under different “media system models” introduced by Hallin and Mancini (2004). While Britain is categorized as a “liberal media system model,” in which there is a relative dominance of market mechanisms and of commercial media; France is generally identified as a “democratic corporatist media system model,” where there is a historical coexistence of commercial media and media tied to organized social and political groups. The French model is characterized by a relatively active but legally limited role of the state.

As Albert (1983) puts it: “French Journalism has always been more a journalism of expression than a journalism of observation: it gives precedence to the chronicle and the commentary over summary and reportage. As much as in the presentation of facts, it has always been interested in the exposition of ideas ...” (quoted in Hallin and Mancini 2004). In this, Hallin and Mancini (2004, 98) maintains, French journalism is fundamentally different from Anglo-Saxon journalism, for which news always has priority over commentary.


Finally, these two countries differed from each other in terms of their newspaper readership. According to the World Association of Newspapers’ World Press Trends

data, in the year 2000, “in the UK, newspaper sales per 1,000 population is 408.5, whereas in France the number is 190” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 23).

Given these differences in media systems, French and British publics could be expected to have diverged in their attitudes towards the European enlargement project. However, both publics were thinking about the EU enlargement topic in a very similar way: the majority of both the British and French publics were against the upcoming EU enlargement to include ten new member states from the Central and Eastern Europe.


In other words, the publics of these two major Western European countries shared similar negative attitudes (although with varying intensities) toward the fifth and the largest round of enlargement in EU history. To illustrate, Figure 3-1 demonstrates that in both countries, people perceived the EU enlargement as a very costly enterprise. Figure 3-2 indicates that the majority of people in both countries thought that the enlargement would make it more difficult to take decisions in the EU.

Figure 3-1. British and French Public Attitudes on the Cost of Enlargement, 2002-2003



Source: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* – 132.1, 132.2, and 140

Figure 3-2. British and French Public Attitudes on the Impact of Enlargement on the Complexity of EU Decision-making, 2002-2003



Source: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* – 132.1, 132.2, and 140

Consequently, this study is interested in explaining the similarities between the British and French public opinions toward Eastern EU enlargement, while, for the most part, their governments were in favor of this EU policy. It particularly deals with the role played by the print media in influencing the public opinion in these influential European countries.

TIME FRAME

A 28-month period from January 2002 to the May 1 2004 is deemed appropriate as the time frame for this study. January 2002 is chosen to be the starting date of the time frame for analysis since on 14th and 15th December 2001, the Laeken European Council declared that the accession process was “irreversible” and stressed the EU’s determination to bring the negotiations with those countries ready to join to a close by the end of 2002.

In October 2002, the Commission recommended concluding the accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia by the end of 2002. The Copenhagen European Council, held on December 2002, concluded negotiations with the ten candidate countries listed above, and set May 1, 2004 as their accession date.

On April 9, 2003, the European Parliament gave its assent to the accession of the ten acceding states. The Treaty of Accession was signed on April 16, 2003. May 1, 2004

marked a historic moment as Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU.

Besides its chronological importance, another rationale for selecting this time frame is the availability of more frequently conducted public opinion surveys by *Eurobarometer* (*Standard, Special, and Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement*). Please refer to Appendix C for the information on the dates of fieldwork of the *Eurobarometer* surveys used in this analysis. Under ideal circumstances, this study would also examine the period after the enlargement day, in order to measure the impact of increased media coverage of enlargement on public opinion. But the latest of a series of *Eurobarometer* surveys assessing European public opinion on Eastern enlargement were conducted on March 2004. Hence this limits the time frame of this study.

During the period under study, ten public opinion surveys were conducted on enlargement. This enables a closer comparison of news coverage and survey results, and increases the validity of the results in this study. Having the polling data from surveys conducted frequently during the period of approximately two-and-a-half years is appropriate to account for changes in people's attitudes towards enlargement in time.

SOURCES OF DATA TO ASSESS MEDIA EFFECTS

The framework used in this study is useful in avoiding a “common mistake” of many studies in the political communication literature identified by Jacobs and Shapiro (1996). The analyses on media information properties and public opinion have remained

on independent tracks (Jacobs and Shapiro 1996). This study integrates these two different areas.

Put more specifically, following the traditional methodological scheme in agenda setting research, this analysis draws on two different sources of data in connection with each other: public opinion polls and media content analysis, to identify if a relationship exists between print media coverage and public opinion. The following section provides a detailed description of public opinion and media data utilized in this research.

Public Opinion Data

Comparative public opinion research is usually subject to a host of problems involving the measurement of citizen opinions: variations in question wording across independent studies; irregularity in the timing or frequency of surveys; or changes in sampling frame or survey procedures. The unparalleled resources of the *Eurobarometer* (EB) surveys enable this research to avoid these common problems.

As such, this study utilizes several EB – both the *Standard* and *Flash EB* – survey data conducted between 2002 and 2004, to measure people’s attitudes towards the biggest round of EU enlargement. The *Standard EB* series conducts interviews across EU countries on a wide variety of communication-relevant topics as well. These surveys are usually conducted twice a year. All *EB* survey polls employed in this analysis used a probability sampling procedure and were based on face-to-face interviews with approximately 1,000 respondents in each country.

In testing the first-level agenda setting hypothesis, I relied on a number of survey items taken from the *Standard EB* surveys. In testing the second-level agenda setting hypotheses, I relied on a number of survey items taken from the *Flash EB Surveys on EU Enlargement*. *Flash EB* surveys usually provide more specialized questions on specific EU policies. The EU enlargement has been an issue tackled by three separate *Flash EB* surveys. Unlike the *Standard EB* surveys, *Flash EB* surveys are conducted over the phone. *Flash EB* surveys were also based on approximately 1,000 respondents in each country.

Media Data: Newspaper Coverage Content Analysis, 2002-2004

For a systematic analysis of the media data, this project conducts a quantitative content analysis on major print media outlets in Britain and France, focusing exclusively on the coverage of *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération* on EU enlargement. In all content analysis projects, there are several important decision points. Selection of appropriate message units is one of them.

To study the media data, this dissertation analyzes the newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement of the EU. It does not attempt to analyze television news coverage because of the unavailability of a systematic collection of TV news transcripts in Britain and France. Besides, for agenda-setting effects, “a rough rule of thumb is that about half the time, there is no discernible difference in the influence agenda-setting roles of newspapers and television news; for the other half of the time, newspapers have the edge

by a ratio of about 2 to 1” (McCombs 2004, 49; McClure and Patterson 1976; Tipton *et al.* 1975).

Furthermore, memory research has found that brain activity is greater for reading than for watching television (Weinstein, Appel and Weinstein 1980). Accordingly, the processing of messages from television differs significantly from information processed through reading. Information derived from the print media might be encoded, stored, and retrieved more efficiently than visual information coming from television (Willnat 1997, 63). When compared with the broadcast media, newspapers are a more permanent source of information and are readily available for use at any time of day (Wanta 1997a).

Moreover, the print media coverage generally provides more information for each issue than television news and provides more complex coverage of news stories (Graber 1993). Readers can stop and contemplate the significance of a story at their own pace (Wanta 1997a). Due to the greater “channel capacity,” newspapers perform an initiating role in the public opinion process and play an important role early in an issue’s life cycle because of their ability to begin tracking and reporting public issues earlier than television (McCombs 1977).

Consequently, this project examines the computerized media contents of leading press outlets using the *Lexis-Nexis* database and compares the trends in *EB* public opinion polls to the ones in the Eastern enlargement-related news coverage in Britain and France in order to analyze print media effects.

DATA AND THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

Exposure is an important variable in the agenda-setting process (Wanta 1997b). According to the *Standard EB* surveys analyzed in this study, daily newspapers comes second to the TV in being the most popular sources of information on the EU, chosen by 50 % of the UK sample and 51,6 % of the French sample (*Eurobarometer* 61).

Hallin and Mancini (2004, 303) point to a need for comparative data on media content that would show “differences or similarities in news selection criteria, conventions of presentation, and the representation of different social groups and interests.” Accordingly, the six newspapers analyzed in this research have the largest circulations of any newspapers in Britain and France. Furthermore, in the selection of the media content, I aimed for both elite newspapers and tabloid press, from both sides of the left-right divide, with high circulation rates and considerable influence on other types of media as well as on the political system.

One purpose of this project is to test if the nature of the outlet has an effect on the way the EU enlargement topic is covered. In the original research design of this study, *The Sun* and *France-Soir* were also planned to be included in the content analysis to represent the tabloid outlets; however, due to unavailability of these tabloids at the *Lexis-Nexis* database, other popular news outlets, *The Daily Mail* and *Libération*, were used as substitutes.

There is a methodological issue that needs to be addressed here. There is no guarantee that the media coverage was actually seen and processed by the respondents to the *EB* polls. To help shed light on this phenomenon, I run descriptive analysis for the *EB* 56 public opinion survey in Britain, which included questions about media consumption

habits of the respondents. Question 2b asked, “Which daily newspapers do you read daily?” Since the numbers of respondents reading the main newspapers content analyzed in this analysis were low, the answers to this question are recoded to include if the British respondents read another newspaper in addition to one of interest (*The Daily Mail*, *The Sun*, *The Times*, and *The Guardian*). Table 3-1 demonstrates the frequency distributions of daily newspaper readership among EB 56 respondents in Britain.

Table 3-1. Daily Newspaper Readership Distribution among the British Respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
<i>The Sun</i>	270	13.6	27.5	27.5
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	171	6.1	12.3	39.9
<i>The Times</i>	30	1.5	3.1	42.9
<i>The Guardian</i>	27	1.4	2.8	45.7
Other Newspaper	398	20	40.6	86.2
Multiple Newspapers	50	2.5	5.1	91.3
No Daily Newspaper	85	4.3	8.7	100
Total	981	49.3	100	
System missing	1007	50.7		
Total	1988	100		

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56*

Table 3-1 shows that among the British respondents to the *EB 56*, there was a significant amount of people who read other newspapers (40.6%). It also indicates that *The Daily Mail*, *The Times* and *The Guardian* readers cumulatively constituted only approximately 18% of the British sample.

Nevertheless, previous research suggests that large newspapers can set the agenda of smaller papers. As McCombs (2005, 549) puts it, “journalists routinely look over their shoulders to validate their sense of news by observing the work of their colleagues, especially the work of elite members of the press.” Thus, the agenda in these papers could have been filtered down to smaller papers and other media, making the media agenda accessible to all respondents throughout the country. The “homogeneity of agendas” thesis further supports this argument.

For instance, the inaugural Chapel Hill study, which included elite media, local newspapers, and news magazines, found “homogeneity of agendas” among the media (McCombs and Shaw 1968). Another study on the comparison of British and American media effects on the formation of election campaign agendas also concluded the homogeneity of press agendas between tabloids and broadsheets (Semetko *et al.* 1991). Yet, in order to test for the effect of differences in tabloids and elite newspapers, *Libération* and *The Daily Mail* are also added in the content analysis (see Esser 1999, for a discussion of the division in the British press between quality and tabloid newspapers).

As Seymour-Ure (1996, 214) puts it, “between 1945 and 1995, the [British] press became less predictable and manageable for the parties.” That is to say, British newspapers became less consistent in their support for one party or another and less inclined to follow the agenda set by party leaders. Nevertheless, there have been

variations in this trend. Despite the general trend toward diminishing political parallelism, however, the “political orientations of British newspapers today are as distinct as anywhere in Europe” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 210). One of the most distinguishing features of the British politics is the presence of a highly partisan press (Curtice 1999; Newton and Brynin 2001). Hallin and Mancini (2004, 211) too maintain that “within the limits of the British political spectrum, strong, distinct political orientations are clearly manifested in news content.” Take, for instance, the most commonly cited headline *The Sun* had used for claiming credit for the Conservative victory in Britain, “It’s the Sun Wot Won It!” (April 11, 1992).

The British national newspaper system provides numerous opportunities for right-of-center journalists but relatively few for those on the left (Curtice 1999; Brynin and Newton 2003). *The Guardian* and *The Mirror* are among the few national newspapers on the political left, while the *Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Sun*, *Express*, or *Star* are among the many on the right (see Kriesi 2004).

Strong political orientations are especially typical of the tabloid press. Tabloids “reject the constraints of objective reporting” and present the newspaper as speaking for the common citizen and “common sense,” often “mobilizing a tone of outrage” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 211). In Britain, this generally takes the form of a right-wing populist stance, emphasizing nationalism, anticommunism, and hostility to the EU (Baker 2001). Furthermore, British tabloids often market themselves by launching campaigns around causes they expect to be popular (Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

The quality papers in Britain are more subtle in their style and they generally provide more neutral coverage on political issues, when compared with their tabloid

counterparts (Baker 2001). But, even then, the “British broadsheets do employ a more interpretive style of writing than is typical in North American papers” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 211). They have distinct political orientations, which can be seen in the political affinities of their readers. “In 1997, for instance, 57% of *Daily Telegraph* and 42% of *Times* readers supported the Conservatives, as compared with 16% *Independent* and 8% of *Guardian* readers” (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 212). Semetko *et al.* (1991) in a comparative study of election coverage in the UK and the US in the late 1980s, describe British election coverage as “more ample, more varied, more substantive, more party-oriented, less free with unidirectional comment and more respectful” than American coverage (quoted in Hallin and Mancini 2004, 215).

The Guardian is one of Britain’s oldest newspapers with a well-respected national and international reputation. It maintains a radical, left-of-center editorial stance. *The Times*, owned by Rupert Murdoch, represents the conservative voice in the British press. The popular press, especially in Britain, is quite powerful through its immense circulation rates among British people. As such, including *The Daily Mail* in analysis enables us to test for the homogeneity of press agendas between tabloids and broadsheets. It is Britain’s most popular paper after *The Sun*. Like *The Sun*, it maintains a right-wing perspective.

The combined readership of quality broadsheets is “dwarfed” by that of the Euro-skeptic press, since the number of tabloid readers is larger than the broadsheet readers (Baker 2001). In the British electoral context, many studies concluded that the highly partisan British press is quite effective in not only setting the agenda or framing issues, but also in determining electoral outcomes (Curtice 1999; Brynin and Newton 2003).

The political identification of French newspapers varies, from clearly ideological papers such as *L'Humanité* and *La Croix* to relatively apolitical regional papers. The major Paris dailies reflect broad political tendencies, *Le Monde* and *Libération* representing the left-of-center, and *Le Figaro* and *France-Soir* the right-of-center (see Hallin and Mancini 2004).

Le Monde remains to date, a highly unusual example of journalistic autonomy, since journalists retain the right to elect the director. *Le Monde* has until recently followed a policy of limiting the percent of revenue derived from advertising, which was seen as protecting the newspaper from outside influence. At *Libération* the nonhierarchical culture of its early years as a radical alternative paper was institutionalized in a *Societe Civil des Personels* similar to that of *Le Monde*. In 1996 most of the shares of the paper were sold to a commercial company, Chargeurs S.A., with the employees retaining 20% ownership and the right to veto the appointment of a new director (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 117).

Le Monde, which maintains a left-of-center editorial stance, has a diffusion of approximately 400,000 issues a day. It is read by an average of more than two million people every day in France. *Le Figaro* has a similar distribution rate to *Le Monde*, but it has a conservative editorial line. Its electronic version is the most visited French site for general news. *Libération* is one of France's leading newspapers with a distribution of 170,000 issues a day. It is left-wing and in favor of anti-racism and worker's rights.

This selection consists of press outlets that are considered influential sources of information for other media outlets and contains a good cross-section of national press coverage on social, economic, and political issues in Britain and France. Since the time

frame of this project is relatively short and the coverage of enlargement is limited when compared to other political issues, we content analyze the population of all Eastern EU enlargement-related newspaper articles in *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Mail*, *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro*, and *Libération*.

Observation of three different news media in each of the two countries provides six replications of the analysis testing each hypothesis. The unit of analysis in this project is the entire text of newspaper articles on Eastern EU enlargement. The next section explains another important decision point in a content analysis study: the category formation and operationalization processes.

CATEGORIES AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS

The categories that are created in a content analysis research should be not only sensitive to the message content, but also exhaustive and mutually exclusive. In addition, the distribution of these categories should not be skewed. Keeping these considerations in mind, the following section provides a detailed account of the category formation and operationalization processes for both levels of agenda setting theory.

First-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis

Regarding first-level agenda-setting effects, a keyword search is conducted to identify the volume of media attention devoted to enlargement. As has been the case in most agenda-setting studies, the salience in the media of the issue is defined in terms of

the number of stories (see Kioussis and McCombs 2004; King 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Rogers and Chang 1991).

Articles that contain keywords – European Union enlargement, EU enlargement, accession, *Elargissement de l'Union européenne*, and *adhésion* – in the headline or the lead paragraphs are included in the analysis. In a second step, all the articles in the selection which were either duplicates (due to the different editions of newspapers) or were not sufficiently relevant (if the keyword appeared just as a passing remark in one sentence or in an irrelevant context) are eliminated. The selection included editorials and opinion pieces as well as news stories of more than two paragraphs. The final dataset contained 344 newspaper articles for the British press and 778 for the French press.

Due to limitations in the public opinion survey data, for measuring public salience, this study employs an indirect measure – *i.e.* name recognition of EU enlargement. As illustrated by Kioussis and McCombs (2004), name recognition is a necessary condition for and can serve as an indirect measure of salience when other options are unavailable. The assumption is that people must be able to recognize enlargement in order to consider it salient.

The public agenda is usually measured through survey research. As such, the first-level agenda-setting analysis here focuses on name recognition or awareness of EU enlargement by the British and French publics, which is a measure available in the *EB* survey data. Both the *Standard EB* survey and *Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement* ask the following question to determine the salience of the enlargement for people: “Before this

interview, had you already heard of the enlargement of the European Union?” The answers to this question are used in measuring the public agenda.¹

As a test of first-level agenda-setting effects, this project plots the average amount of EU enlargement-related press coverage per month against the percentage of *EB* respondents in France and Britain who indicated their awareness of enlargement. Put more precisely, the frequencies of EU enlargement-related articles are counted and then matched with the level of public salience in Britain and France.

This analysis relies on simple correlation to test the statistical significance of the relationship between enlargement coverage and the proportion of respondents in Britain and France who expressed that they are aware of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. The results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis are presented in Chapter 4.

Second-Level Agenda-Setting Analysis

As discussed in Chapter 2, to test for the second-level agenda-setting effects, the agenda of “substantive” attributes to be analyzed includes three main categories: political, economic, and socio-cultural consequences of enlargement. For the construction of the “political,” “economic,” and “socio-cultural” consequences of enlargement frames, I draw largely on framework developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).

Regarding the analysis of major frames, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) employ an “economic consequences” frame, which they argue reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the consequences it will have economically on an individual, group,

¹ The available answers to this question were: yes (1) and no (2).

institution, region, or country. Neuman *et al.* (1992), Graber (1993), and Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) all identify “economic consequences” as a common frame in the news. To the “economic consequences” frame, this study adds the “political” and “socio-cultural” consequences of EU enlargement to investigate the extent to which these frames are mirrored in public support for EU enlargement. Please refer to Appendix B as well as Appendix D for a definition of variables and categories used in this analysis.

Predominant attributes in the coverage of EU enlargement – *i.e.*, political, economic, and social consequences of enlargement – over time are examined through rank order correlation in order to see whether the attributes the media apply translate into attributes the British and French publics use to evaluate the largest round of EU enlargement. Rankings on press and public agenda are compared to determine the strength of the press’s second-level agenda-setting effects on the British and French publics. Please refer to Appendix B for a definition of categories and subcategories used in coding.

Each category is coded as a dichotomous variable. To test whether second-level agenda-setting effects resulted from the newspapers’ framing of enlargement, the content analysis data were compared with several questions asked by the *Flash EB* polls.

Initially, the “affective” tones in the press coverage of Eastern enlargement’s different consequences were included in the content analysis. The frequency of “affective” tones of enlargement was going to be correlated with the public opinion survey results. But due to low levels of intercoder reliability measures in both Britain and France, this aspect of second level of agenda setting analysis is eliminated during the pretests. As such, *Hypothesis 3* outlined in Chapter 2 is not quantitatively analyzed.

Consequently, using the *Flash EB* survey data, the correspondence between the news agenda of substantive attributes and the public agenda of substantive attributes on Eastern enlargement is calculated. Then, using *Spearman's rho*, the results of content analysis are compared with the survey data on public's attitudes on the consequences of enlargement. The results of the second-level agenda-setting analysis are presented in Chapter 5.

RELIABILITY

Reliability is the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials (Carmines and Zeller 1979). The reliability of coding is important for conducting scientifically valid research. Reliability addresses the issue of consistency and is a necessary condition for validity of results. Intercoder reliability is the amount of agreement or correspondence among two or more coders (Neuendorf 2002).

Four coders, who are native speakers of British English and French, respectively, were recruited for the coding of the British and French newspapers. They were trained before the coding and supervised during the coding stage. Written coding instructions, a copy of the codebook, copies of newspaper articles, and coding spreadsheet were provided to coders. The training sessions familiarized coders with the purpose of the research, the content that would be coded, and the codebook that would be used. Ethical standards of content analysis research were also emphasized during the training sessions. After repeated pretesting of the codebook to determine the reliability of coding decisions, a sample of articles from each newspaper was coded for all variables.

Besides the date and the newspaper in which the article appeared, newspaper stories on Eastern enlargement of the EU were coded in terms of topic, and affective and substantive attributes. Please refer to Appendix A for the coding scheme and the master codebook employed in this research.

To ensure intercoder reliability, several pretests were conducted till *Scott's pi* reached 0.86 across all the variables of content analysis. *Scott's pi* is a reliability index takes into account the extent of inter-coder agreement that results from chance and is a very conservative measure of reliability (see Holsti 1969, 140-141). The research included a more leveled measurement design at first, but since the intercoder reliability was not reached, the categories were coded as dichotomous variables.

Once the final version of the codebook was drafted, coders started coding each article directly onto SPSS spreadsheets. Following the advice of Neuendorf (2002), intercoder reliability tests were conducted on a randomly selected subsample of 10% of the news stories in Britain and France – 34 and 78 articles, respectively. Since the content that was coded was “manifest,” objectivity in coding the substantive attributes was not difficult to achieve. As such, measuring substantive attributes was fairly straightforward.

Nevertheless, a similar argument could not be made regarding the coding of the affective attributes of enlargement. The coding of such attributes was problematic. As mentioned earlier, coders were asked to code the newspaper articles according to the following affective attributes: negative, somewhat negative, neutral, somewhat positive, or positive. These affective attribute categories were not as clear-cut as the substantive attribute categories. Consequently, since the intercoder reliability measures were very low regarding the affective tone of the enlargement-related newspaper stories, this aspect

of the analysis was abolished. For the explanation of coding categories employed in this research, please refer to Appendix B.

QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES

Finally, since this project also deals with the policymaking side of the picture, aside from quantitative analysis, I employ qualitative methodology in order to evaluate the interaction between policymakers, public opinion and the media coverage on the issue of EU's Eastern enlargement. More specifically, I conduct qualitative case studies of how the British and French governments have actually come up with their policy positions with regards to the issue of EU enlargement.

This approach should provide an improved dialogue between data and theory. A thorough analysis of each case helps me formulate and refine the causal mechanisms between the official governmental positions, public opinion, and the media coverage on enlargement, as well as track the process of policymaking in these two leading European countries. Chapter 7 deals with this type of in-depth analysis in the British and French political contexts. Following a discussion of methodology, this project now presents the empirical results from the first-level agenda-setting analysis.

Chapter 4: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis of Print Media's First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects

This chapter first conducts a cross-national comparative study of the news coverage of the Eastern enlargement of the EU in Britain and France from January 2002 to May 2004. It scrutinizes the general patterns of media coverage to gain an overall perspective of the enlargement-related stories distribution in Britain and France. It then conducts statistical analysis to investigate the first-level agenda setting effects of press in these countries.

A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENLARGEMENT COVERAGE

Before testing the first-level agenda-setting effects, it is useful to conduct a cross-national comparative analysis of press coverage on Eastern enlargement of the EU to detect the converging or diverging patterns in the enlargement-related press coverage in Britain and France. Accordingly, the following section first examines total distribution of the enlargement-related newspaper articles across different press outlets content analyzed in this project. Next, it displays the monthly distribution of press coverage of enlargement in these two European countries over time.

The Distribution of Enlargement-Related Newspaper Articles across Press Outlets

As explained in Chapter 3, for examining the distribution of the enlargement-related newspaper articles in Britain and France, I have conducted a *Lexis-Nexis* database search with the main keywords to determine the articles to be included in content

analysis. The total amount of newspaper articles content analyzed in this research is 1,122, 778 of which comes from the French press outlets and 344 from the British ones.

Table 4-1 below presents the cross-national distribution of enlargement-related newspaper articles across different press outlets in Britain and France. As Table 4-1 demonstrates, in the British case, the number of articles allotted to the Eastern enlargement issue in *The Guardian* and *The Times* were several times larger than in *The Daily Mail*. *The Daily Mail*'s coverage on enlargement was the lowest in the British context. Throughout the time frame of this project, *The Daily Mail* has only published 71 newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement. While the numbers of enlargement-related articles in *The Guardian* and *The Times* were almost comparable; *The Guardian* has published 27 more newspaper articles (N = 150) than *The Times* did (N = 123).

Table 4-1. Number of Enlargement-Related Articles in British and French Newspapers

Number of Enlargement-Related Newspaper Articles	
Britain (N = 344)	
<i>The Guardian</i>	150
<i>The Times</i>	123
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	71
France (N = 778)	
<i>Le Figaro</i>	324
<i>Le Monde</i>	242
<i>Libération</i>	212

Source: Content Analysis Data

Overall, as shown in Table 4-1, the amount of French press coverage of Eastern enlargement was more than twice as much as the British coverage of the topic. In the French case, *Le Figaro* has published 324 articles on Eastern enlargement from 2002 to 2004. Its coverage of enlargement was substantially higher than the other two French newspapers' reporting. *Le Figaro's* total coverage of EU enlargement-related articles was almost as high as the coverage of all of the three British press outlets combined.


Le Monde came second with 82 less articles than what *Le Figaro* has published (N = 242). Finally, *Libération* came last with 212 articles published on the topic. This number is still substantially higher than the number of articles *The Guardian* has published on enlargement.

Consequently, the descriptive analysis in this part shows that in France, the issue of EU enlargement attracted more media attention than in Britain. These results speak tentatively to *Hypothesis 1* outlined in Chapter 2. For one, this difference in the amount of media coverage in both countries is certainly reflected on enlargement topic's salience levels in respective European publics. That is to say, the topic of EU enlargement was better recognized by the French public, when compared with the British public.

After looking at the aggregate figures for the number of EU enlargement-related newspaper articles published by different press outlets in Britain and France, this chapter now proceeds with a cross-national comparative examination of the monthly distribution of enlargement-related press coverage across time. Figure 4-1 shows the enlargement coverage distribution over time in Britain and France and gives an idea about the monthly distribution of Eastern enlargement-related newspaper coverage to the reader during the time frame of this project.

Figure 4-1 is descriptively interesting, demonstrating the variation in the number of enlargement-related newspaper stories in each country. As shown in Figure 4-1, the enlargement press coverage trends in Britain and France display a marked relationship. The distribution of monthly press coverage on EU enlargement follows almost an identical trend in both countries.

Figure 4-1. Monthly Distribution of British and French Press Coverage on Eastern Enlargement, 2002-2004



To test for the statistical significance of these cross-national press coverage trends, I conduct a simple correlation analysis. The results of the correlation analysis between the number of print news stories about enlargement in Britain and France each month show that the *Pearson's r* is positive, significant, and high ($r = 0.814$; $p < 0.005$; please refer to Table 4-2). This finding illustrates the fact that trends in the monthly

distributions of enlargement-related media coverage in both countries are in sync with each other.

Although the pattern of monthly press coverage of enlargement is similar in both cases, the French print media apparently covers the issue of EU enlargement more extensively than the British print media. Take, for instance, one of the peak points in the distribution of monthly press coverage of Eastern enlargement in these two countries. Throughout October 2002, while the British press has in total published approximately 40 articles on enlargement, the French newspapers have published approximately 100 articles on this subject. Furthermore, there has been only a single instance in which the British newspaper articles on enlargement have outnumbered the French newspaper coverage (during February 2004). Even in that occasion, the British press outlets have published only four more articles on EU enlargement than the French press outlets have done. At all other times, the French newspapers have covered enlargement-related stories relatively more extensively.

Furthermore, while the monthly average number of enlargement-related articles in Britain was 12; on average, in France, this figure was 28 articles, which amounts to 16 articles more than average number of articles published by the British newspapers monthly. The cross-national difference between Britain and France in monthly coverage is especially noticeable during October 2002 and April 2004 (53 and 93 articles published, respectively).

Consequently, a cross-national descriptive analysis of the distribution of the enlargement-related newspaper articles demonstrates that the monthly volume of press coverage on enlargement is higher in France than in Britain. This finding is in line with

the results of previous research, which concluded that the French media typically devote themselves with moderate frequency to EU topics and that there is little reporting on EU topics in the UK (Machill *et al.* 2006).

The higher amount of press coverage in France results in better salience records among the French public when compared with the British public. As Figure 2-1 presented in Chapter 2 illustrates, there is approximately 30% difference in the enlargement's salience between the French and the British people at any given time throughout the time frame of this project.

Furthermore, the latest *Standard EB* 61 conducted just before the Eastern enlargement in March 2004, illustrates the exceptionally low level of trust (20%) the British public has for the press. This was approximately one third of the level of trust the French citizens had for the press at the time. Accordingly, one would expect the media priming effects to be stronger in the case of France.

I conduct correlation analysis for the awareness measures to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between the British and French awareness of enlargement over time (Please refer to Table 4-2). As in the case of the monthly distribution of enlargement-related press coverage, *Pearson's r* is again positive, significant, and high ($r = 0.907$; $p < 0.005$).

As such, the results of this preliminary cross-national comparative analysis of EU enlargement newspaper coverage and public salience over time seem to confirm the expectations of the first level of agenda setting theory. To be precise, the analysis in this part validates the first-level agenda-setting hypothesis: the more coverage the Eastern

enlargement topic receives in the media, the more salient it becomes in people's agenda. It is the goal of the following section to statistically confirm these preliminary findings.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST-LEVEL AGENDA-SETTING ANALYSIS

The remainder of this chapter presents the results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis in Britain and France, attained through the application of methodological steps outlined in Chapter 3.

The First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain

Daily newspapers are one of the most popular sources of information on EU enlargement for the British citizens. 45% of the British people prefer to receive information on EU enlargement through daily newspapers (*Standard EB* 56.3).

Does exposure to the media agenda on enlargement affect the agenda of the British people? Analysis in this section seeks to provide an answer to this important question. Figure 4-2 combines the results of the content analysis with the public awareness measures attained from the *EB* survey data.

Figure 4-2. First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain, 2002-2004




Figure 4-2 effectively displays a transfer of issue salience from the media to the public. As shown in Figure 4-2, the British newspaper coverage of EU enlargement was very low in the beginning of the time frame of this study. For instance, in January 2002, only three articles were published on the issue of EU enlargement by the British press outlets analyzed in this study. This low coverage was accompanied with low awareness score (only 43%) in the British public. Furthermore, according to *Standard EB 56.3* conducted in early 2002, British people were quite badly informed about the enlargement

issue. Nearly half the British sample (49%) said they were “not at all well informed.” The British people have an extraordinarily low level of information on EU enlargement: the UK figure for those who had “neither read,” “seen” nor “been told anything about enlargement” was more than three-quarters of the sample (76%) compared with an EU15 average of 56%.

In March 2002, the British press coverage on EU enlargement gradually started to increase, reaching a total of 18 articles published by three press outlets in June 2002. However, this trend was discontinued in August 2002, when the British coverage of enlargement reached one of its lowest points of the time frame of this study with only six articles published. It was followed with one of the lowest measures of British awareness of enlargement (51%) two months later, in October 2002.

By August of 2002, the coverage of EU enlargement in the British newspapers started to increase tremendously, reaching the second highest point of the whole time frame of this study in October 2002. In September, the British press published 17 more articles than in the previous month. In October 2002, the number of Eastern enlargement-related newspaper articles almost quadrupled (43 articles), when compared with the press coverage of the preceding month (11 articles).

The especially high number of enlargement-related newspaper coverage during October 2002 was related to the fact that the European Commission has given a green light to the accession of 10 new member states from the Central and Eastern European countries and recommended the European Council’s approval of May 2004 as the enlargement date. Later in October 2002, the Brussels European Council (24-25 October 2002) endorsed the recommendation of the European Commission that Cyprus, the Czech

Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia will be able to assume the obligations of the EU membership in 2004.

This increase in coverage was followed by one of the highest measures of public salience of enlargement in Britain from October to November 2002 (with a 15% increase in public salience). Even then, there appears to be a low level of attention paid to news about EU in the UK with 41% paying no attention at all. This is the largest figure among the Member States of the EU and is substantially higher than the EU15 average of 30%.

In *Standard EB 57* (conducted in October 2002), all respondents were asked “which sources of information on the EU” they used “to get information about the EU” (Question 11). 37% of the British people said that they did “not look for such information” and/or they were “not interested.” This answer was given by 21% of those surveyed overall in the EU15. This lack of interest in EU affairs by a large proportion of the UK sample is in line with general trends identified by various scholars in the past.

In October 2002, the people surveyed in Britain were only marginally in support of enlargement with 38% agreeing, 35% disapproving, and 27% in the “don’t know” camp (*Standard EB 57*). The number of “don’t knows” decreased by 8% since *Standard EB 56* survey in the UK. This may be due to the increased newspaper coverage on EU enlargement in Britain. With the increased exposure to the media coverage of EU enlargement, more people have started to form opinions on the topic.

According to *Standard EB 58* conducted between October and November 2002, there was a low level of involvement in enlargement debate, with only 21% of those polled across Europe feeling they were contributing either a “great deal” or “somewhat” to the debate. This figure is even lower in Britain (9%). When compared with the rest of

the EU Member States, the highest percentage of people (45%) considering themselves “not at all well informed” about the EU enlargement was from Britain. This is a very effective illustration of the typically apathetic nature of the British public opinion on EU-related issues.

From December 2002 to February 2003, the number of enlargement-related articles in the British press has decreased by more than half (from 19 to 7 articles). As shown by Figure 4-2, this decrease is also reflected in the level of awareness of the British public on enlargement between February and April 2003. While the British public salience of EU enlargement in February was 66%, in the following month there has been a 3% decrease in public salience. In April 2003, there has been an additional 10% decrease in public salience measures, resulting in 53% salience. However, the British people still did not feel “well-informed” about the new countries joining the EU (*Standard EB 59*). 79% of British people said that they were “not very well-informed” or “not at all well informed” about enlargement.

Finally, from December 2003 to February 2004, the British press coverage on enlargement has tripled and this has resulted in a very steep increase in the British public’s awareness of enlargement from February 2004 to April 2004. According to *Eurobarometer 61* conducted between February and March 2004, 42% of UK citizens felt that there is still “too little media coverage” of the EU, while only 13% consider it to be “too much.”

Regarding the level of knowledge on enlargement, we observe a sharp decline in the level of “don’t know” responses that used to characterize the British people. That

observation may be attributed to the considerable increase in the print media coverage on EU enlargement during the preceding time period.

All in all, for the British case, despite the fact that the percentage of people who have already heard of EU enlargement in the UK is well below the EU15 average according to the *EB* survey data, the results of this analysis show that issue salience increases among people with an increase in the enlargement-related press coverage in the British press.


Moreover, the relationship between the coverage of the British press and British public's awareness of enlargement is statistically significant ($r = 0.603$; $p < 0.05$). The *Pearson correlation coefficient* points out to a strong relationship and signals a positive direction, confirming the expectations of the first level of agenda setting theory. This correlation takes into consideration one month time-lag between the press coverage and its effects on public opinion. Hence, whenever the British coverage increases, we expect a similar increase in British people's salience of enlargement.

The First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France

After confirming the existence of the first-level agenda-setting effects in Britain, this chapter now proceeds with the results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis in France. As described in the cross-national analysis of the enlargement coverage trends in the beginning of this chapter, the French newspapers published more extensively than the British newspapers in this study. As such, we expect the first-level agenda-setting effects to be stronger in the French context.

Combining the content analysis data with the public awareness scores attained from the *EB* surveys; Figure 4-3 displays the results of the first-level agenda-setting effects in France. It presents similar tendencies to the British case (as illustrated by Figure 4-2) in terms of the interaction between public opinion and news coverage.

Figure 4-3. First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France, 2002-2004



In general, what Figure 4-3 indicates is that the salience of enlargement in both the French public agenda and the newspaper agenda fluctuated over time. In the

beginning of the time frame of this project, the French press outlets did not pay much attention to the issue of Eastern enlargement. Put more specifically, during the first four months since January 2002, the press coverage of enlargement was more or less constant, with approximately 13 articles published monthly on the topic. Likewise, the level of information about enlargement in France was very low; even though, unlike in Britain, it was still close to the EU15 level (*Standard EB 56.3*). For instance, according to *EB 56.3*, more than 80% of the French sample did not feel “well informed” about the Eastern enlargement. More than 60% of the French people declared that they have “not heard,” “read” or “seen anything about the enlargement.”

Following August 2002 up until October 2002, the French press coverage on enlargement increased tremendously (by 90 articles), reaching its second highest point on October 2002, with approximately 100 articles published on the issue. Similar to the British case, this increase in the French press coverage on EU enlargement during October 2002 was due to the fact that the European Council has decided on the names of the accession countries and the deadline for their accession to the EU.

Subsequent to this major increase in press coverage, the French public’s awareness of EU enlargement reached its zenith in November 2002, with approximately 90% of the French respondents expressing their awareness of the topic. The level of information significantly improved in November 2002. As such, information regarding the topic of EU enlargement became increasingly widespread among the French public through the media.

From December 2002 to January 2003, there was a rather major decline by more than half (from 67 to 26 articles) in the number of articles devoted to enlargement by the

French press. This decline was followed by a similar decline in public awareness until March 2003. As Figure 4-3 clearly depicts, following this decline in the media coverage, the steepest decline in French public salience of enlargement occurred between March and April 2003, a decrease of almost 20%. Furthermore, three in four French respondents did “not feel informed” about the enlargement process (*Standard EB 59*). As a response, the French government launched a big information campaign on Eastern enlargement through millions of brochures and posters in public places.

Despite this information campaign by the French government, there has been no corresponding increase in the media coverage of the topic. From April to August 2003, there was a continuous decrease in the monthly press coverage of enlargement, hitting one of its lowest points in August 2003 with only five articles devoted to enlargement.

Nevertheless, starting with August, the French press coverage of EU enlargement gained back its momentum and reached another peak point in November 2003. The three French press outlets analyzed in this research published 21 more newspaper articles on enlargement ($N = 40$), when compared with the total coverage of the previous month ($N = 29$). This increase in the number of enlargement-related newspaper articles was once again followed by an increase in public salience from January to February 2004.

Furthermore, as the scheduled date for EU enlargement approached, the French press outlets have begun to publish extensively on the enlargement topic and tackle this issue through numerous reports and articles. For instance, the amount of enlargement-related press coverage has steadily increased, from 18 articles in January 2004 to an all-time record of 138 articles in April 2004.

As Table 4-2 presents, the *Pearson's r* measuring the relationship between public awareness and press coverage of enlargement in France is 0.481 ($p < 0.05$). It signifies a positive and fairly strong relationship between public salience and the press coverage of enlargement in the French case. As in the British case, this relationship is statistically significant. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between the amount of French press coverage and the public awareness of the EU enlargement.

As such, as in the British case, the results of this analysis provide a strong evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-setting effects. *Hypothesis 1* is confirmed in both the British and French cases. A positive correlation is found between the total number of enlargement-related stories in the media and percentage of people who recognize enlargement of the EU. The results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis for both the French and the British contexts solidly concur with the existence of a transfer of issue salience from the media to the public.

The media's first-level agenda-setting influence is stronger in the British context. This observation may be attributable to the relatively lower levels of salience of the EU enlargement topic in both the press and public during the initial stages of the time frame of this study. As such public's learning curve was steep in the case of Britain. This particular finding suggests that engaging in a cross-national first-level agenda-setting analysis has proven to be useful since it illustrates the extent to which media effects vary across borders. Since Figure 4-4 combines the first-level effects in Britain and France together, it enables us to spot the cross-national comparative media effects more clearly.

The first thing to notice about Figure 4-4 is that the numbers of enlargement-related articles in both countries fluctuate over time. Also, the above comparative statistics demonstrate that the press coverage on EU enlargement hit the highest points during European Council meetings and increased significantly in both countries as the date of enlargement approached. This trend is more evident in the French case than in the British one.

Figure 4-4. Comparative First-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain and France, 2002-2004




Table 4-2. Correlation Coefficients for the Cross-National Comparison of Media Effects

N = 28	French Press Coverage	French Public Awareness	British Press Coverage	British Public Awareness
French Press Coverage <i>Pearson r</i>	1	.481*	.814**	.382*
French Public Awareness <i>Pearson r</i>	.481*	1	.369	.907**
British Press Coverage <i>Pearson r</i>	.814**	.369	1	.603*
British Public Awareness <i>Pearson r</i>	.382*	.907**	.603*	1

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed)

In general, the visibility of the Eastern enlargement topic was limited to several time points. In both France and Britain, it failed to keep the media's constant attention during the time frame of this project. In both countries, the enlargement-related newspaper coverage reached one of its peak points during October 2002. This is mainly due to the fact that the Brussels European Council has confirmed the names of the accession countries to be admitted to the EU in 2004.

Starting from mid-2002 up until the start of the military operation in Iraq in March 2003, the transatlantic disputes regarding a possible intervention in Iraq distracted both the media's and public's attention from the issue of Eastern enlargement of the EU. During this time period, there was a considerable decline in the number of newspaper

articles devoted to the issue of enlargement in both countries. Hence, we can argue that the Iraq topic hijacked both the media's and the public's attention from the EU enlargement.

In addition, the analysis here makes clear that there was a considerable increase in enlargement reporting shortly before the scheduled date for this event. This is in line with the trends outlined by several previous studies that have concentrated on the media coverage of major EU events (see Machill *et al.* 2006; De Vreese 2001, 2003). For instance, a cross-national comparative study of television coverage of major EU issues in Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands concluded that “‘Europe’ was only marginally visible on the television news agenda prior to the [EU] events and vanished almost completely after a peak of varying intensity” (De Vreese 2001, 299).

In both France and Britain, the awareness measures fluctuate correspondingly with the coverage on enlargement by the media. Early in 2002, enlargement had low salience on both the media agenda and the public agenda in both countries.

The newspaper coverage of EU enlargement was particularly low until mid-July 2002, with a monthly average of approximately 15 newspaper articles in France, and six newspaper articles in Britain. This low coverage was accompanied with low enlargement awareness scores among the French and British publics.

But a rapid rise between September and November 2002 on the media agenda was followed within a month by a similarly steep rise on the public agenda from November 2002 to January 2003. Levels of information on enlargement too improved considerably in November 2002: this rate increased from 80% to 88% in France; while in Britain, it increased from 51% to 65%. These figures signify that the information on EU

enlargement became increasingly widespread among people through the media. Similarly, there was a decrease in the number of “don’t know”s over time in both countries.

CONCLUSION

Wanta (1997a, 147) asserts that “the time frame is one of the most important considerations agenda-setting researchers must address in their analyses” and points to the fact that “a message transmitted through the news media needs some sort of repetition before it can fully influence an individual.” As Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 indicate, the first-level agenda-setting effects become prevalent among public with only one (or sometimes two) month-lag from September to October 2002 in both France and Britain. Furthermore, a relative decrease in both French and British media’s coverage of enlargement from January to February 2003 was followed by a similar decrease in the salience of enlargement among people in Britain and France.

Since the media agenda examined over the two-year period were published *prior* to the public agenda, this evidence on time-order further supports agenda-setting’s causal assertion that the public agenda *results*, to a considerable degree, from the media agenda. Hence, the public agenda not only *correlates with* the media agenda, but it *results from* the media agenda. This serves as a strong evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-setting effects.

In other words, as the issue of enlargement receives more coverage in the newspapers, both the British and the French publics become more familiar with the issue.

The cross-national first-level agenda-setting analysis in this chapter demonstrates a strong connection between the salience of enlargement in the media and the salience of enlargement for people in Britain and France. Results in this chapter point to stronger first-level agenda-setting influence of the media in the British context.

Consequently, regarding first-level agenda-setting effects, the analysis in this chapter reveals strong supporting evidence that the media transfers issue salience to the public in Britain and France. The findings of this level of analysis clearly demonstrate that both the British and the French publics learned how concerned they should be about EU enlargement through the amount of coverage the topic received in the press. After confirming the existence of strong traditional agenda-setting effects of the print media in both Britain and France, this research can now proceed with exploring the second-level agenda-setting effects.

Chapter 5: A Cross-National Comparative Analysis of Print Media's Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects

The data presented in the previous chapter visibly point to a transfer of “issue” salience from the press to the public. The analysis in this chapter goes one step further and examines whether “attributes” in media coverage of EU enlargement can influence how individuals view enlargement.

Did the aspects most recalled by citizens on the issue of EU enlargement correspond to the themes mentioned most often by newspapers in Britain and France? To answer this question, the present chapter compares the subjects that people felt to be at the center of the Eastern enlargement debate with those that appeared most often in the analysis of newspaper content.

Substantive attributes involve specific information about the EU enlargement issue. Along the expectations of the second level of agenda setting theory, this research anticipates that the aspects most recalled by citizens on the issue of EU enlargement would correspond to the enlargement themes mentioned most often by newspapers in Britain and France.

Accordingly, this chapter examines several aspects of the second-level of agenda setting: (1) Did newspapers link enlargement to certain sub-issues (or, substantive attributes)? Did the public learn substantive attributes from media coverage? (2) Did newspapers link affective attributes to enlargement? Did the newspapers cover enlargement more positively on these issues? Did the public learn affective attributes from media coverage?

While the first group of questions is analyzed quantitatively, the second group of questions is analyzed qualitatively, due to the low levels of intercoder reliability on the affective attributes of enlargement. The qualitative analysis of affective attributes is interspersed with the descriptive analysis of substantive attributes of EU enlargement coverage throughout this chapter.

As explained in Chapter 3, analysis of how EU enlargement is framed in the press and by the public establishes a ranking of enlargement's attributes. Before proceeding with the results of the rank order correlation analysis conducted on the substantive attributes of enlargement, this chapter descriptively analyzes the amount of attention the different press outlets in Britain and France accorded to the three main consequences of EU enlargement.

A CROSS-NATIONAL DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF DIFFERENT ENLARGEMENT FRAMES IN THE MEDIA

This section presents the content analysis results regarding the use of different substantial attributes (*i.e.* political, economic, and social consequences of enlargement) by British and French newspapers in their coverage of the issue of Eastern enlargement. Such an endeavor helps give the readers a better idea about the distribution of different frames cross-nationally as well as their distribution across different press outlets in a given country. Please refer to Table 5-1 for a summary of the findings in this part of the analysis.

Table 5-1. The Distribution of Substantive Attributes of EU Enlargement across the British and French Press Outlets, 2002-2004

	Political Consequences	Economic Consequences	Social Consequences
<i>The Times</i>	62%	63.3%	37.3%
<i>The Guardian</i>	57.7%	62.6%	33.3%
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	52.1%	67.6%	57.7%
British Press (N=344 Articles)	58.4%	64%	40.1%
<i>Libération</i>	77.4%	46.7%	44.3%
<i>Le Figaro</i>	67.6%	52.5%	36.1%
<i>Le Monde</i>	80.6%	48.3%	38%
French Press (N=778 Articles)	74.3%	49.6%	38.9%

Source: Content Analysis Data

British Print Media Framing Trends

In Table 5-1, it is clear that, among the British press outlets, the economic consequences of Eastern enlargement were by and large given more emphasis than any other main consequences of EU enlargement. Also, as shown in Table 5-1, the economic consequences of enlargement were covered almost equally highly by the British newspapers content analyzed in this project. These consequences included the effects of

the enlargement on the expansion of the European markets, the investment opportunities in a bigger market, and employment/unemployment in the country.

While the social consequences of enlargement were only covered by 40% of the 344 British newspaper articles on enlargement (N = 137), the political and economic consequences were covered by 58.4% (N = 200) and 64% (N = 220) of the newspaper articles on enlargement, respectively.

In the content analysis of individual British press outlets, the distribution of the use of different frames in the coverage of *The Times* and *The Guardian* were almost identical. The reports on enlargement in both of these quality newspapers emphasized the economic consequences of Eastern enlargement the most, followed by political consequences and social consequences, respectively. These broadsheets reported on the social consequences of enlargement in their stories only approximately half of the time they mentioned the economic and political consequences.

By contrast, the emphasis in the enlargement-related coverage of *The Daily Mail* was quite different from the two broadsheets. As Table 5-1 depicts, when compared with the other newspapers' coverage, the social consequences of enlargement were more extensively dealt with by *The Daily Mail*. This finding is most probably due to the tabloid format and the populist framing of this particular paper. Nevertheless, as the two broadsheets, *The Daily Mail's* articles put the highest emphasis on the economic implications of the Eastern enlargement.

In terms of the tone of the coverage, the coverage in *The Daily Mail* was both more negative towards the effects of Eastern enlargement and more critical of the government's policies on the issue. Especially during six months before the Eastern

enlargement, *The Daily Mail* constantly fought to highlight the expected problems that would come with EU expansion. This was especially apparent on the issue of immigration. *The Daily Mail* has criticized the way the British government has treated the issue of free movement of labor and warned its readers with a heavily critical language that the Eastern enlargement would cause many problems ranging from negative consequences on the welfare and the education systems of Britain, as well as on unemployment in Britain. It has mainly portrayed migrant workers as a “conquering army of mainly poor and uneducated people, unable to speak English, who will work for virtually nothing, and drive down [the British] wages.” Take, for instance, the following excerpt from a *Daily Mail* article:

Britain, already densely populated, with inadequate infrastructure and housing, and not in need of labour (there are, for heaven’s sake, still 1.4 million people unemployed [in Britain]) will be a magnet for those who live in poverty in these [accession] countries. If they cannot get work, they will not be deported, and they know we will not let them starve. Meanwhile, those who have paid taxes and have a claim on this country will have to support them. And there is very little the Government can do to prevent it. (*The Daily Mail*, “A Pounds 50 Fare to Britain and No Return,” February 25, 2004)

The issue of immigration was not always covered with a predominantly negative tone in the British press. The following paragraph is an excerpt from *The Guardian* emphasizing the advantages of the EU enlargement on the labor market in the UK:

There are lessons from this [EU] expansion for us all. Rather than worry about the influx of people from Eastern Europe, we should focus more on the potential benefits of an enlarged Europe. Migrants from Eastern Europe will help free bottlenecks in the labour market, and past experience of immigration in the UK suggests that they will be highly skilled and entrepreneurial. (*The Guardian*, “UK

Manufacturing Has Everything to Gain from an Enlarged Europe,” April 19, 2004)

The results of the qualitative analysis of newspaper content indicate that, among the British press outlets analyzed in this study, *The Guardian*'s coverage on enlargement emphasized the positive effects of enlargement more frequently. By contrast, the coverage of *The Daily Mail* was overwhelmingly negative. *The Times* covered the issue quite neutrally.

Finally, regarding the coverage of enlargement's three main consequences, *The Times* is better recognizable for its more frequent coverage of the political consequences of enlargement. Among the three press outlets in Britain, emphasis on political consequences was the heaviest in the coverage of *The Times*: the political implications of EU enlargement were covered 62% of the time. Nearly 58% of the articles published by *The Guardian* were devoted to the political consequences of enlargement. This figure was relatively lower in the case of *The Daily Mail* (52%).

To investigate the statistical significance of the relationship between the use of different enlargement media frames and different press outlets, this chapter now conducts chi-square tests on content analysis data. The chi-square tests conducted on each frame and each newspaper reveal statistically significant results for the social consequences frame.²

² Since content analysis examines the census instead of a random sample, the differences that are found are real, which makes it unnecessary to run statistics that report significant differences or project to the population. Even so, the statistical tests are conducted.

Table 5-2. Cross-tabulation of the Social Consequences Frame and *The Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Daily Mail*

		<i>The Times</i>			<i>The Guardian</i>			<i>The Daily Mail</i>		
		0	1		0	1		0	1	
Social Consequences	0	98	63	161	98	62	160	125	35	160
	1	131	51	182	130	52	182	103	79	182
Total		229	114	343	228	114	342	228	114	342
<i>Pearson r</i>		- 0.118*			- 0.108*			0.228**		

*p < 0.05; **p < 0.005

Table 5-2 indicates statistically significant relationships between the coverage of all three British newspapers and the use of the social consequences of enlargement frame. The directions of these relationships differ across these outlets: while for *The Times* and *The Guardian*, the relationship points to a negative direction; for *The Daily Mail*, it implies a positive direction. As illustrated by the *Pearson's r* measure, the relationship is stronger in the case of *Daily Mail's* coverage ($r = 0.23$). This finding confirms the expectations of this study: as the format of the media changes from broadsheet to tabloid, the emphasis on social consequences increases.

This finding is in line with the results of another study which content analyzed 2,601 newspaper stories to investigate the prevalence of five news frames identified in earlier studies: attribution of “responsibility,” “conflict,” “human interest,” “economic consequences,” and “morality” (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000). It has found out that serious newspapers and television news programs more often used the “responsibility”

and “conflict” frames in the presentation of news, whereas sensationalist outlets, like *The Daily Mail*, more often used the “human interest” frame.

The specific press outlet coverage was further compared with the poll results through chi-square tests. These tests examined second-level agenda setting through 17 substantive attributes. When I conducted chi-square tests on the specific consequences of enlargement and each of the newspapers under study, I have found several statistically significant relationships. For instance, *The Guardian* mostly emphasized the peaceful consequences of enlargement in the European continent ($r = 0.11$; $p < 0.05$). Or when I analyze the cross-tabulation of peaceful consequences of enlargement and the coverage of *The Daily Mail*, I found that there is a significant negative relationship between these two variables ($r = 0.16$; $p < 0.05$), which means that it did not cover the peace implications of the EU enlargement extensively, when compared with the other two British press outlets. This may imply that *The Daily Mail* has been more skeptical about the peace and stability implications of enlargement.

Also, while there is a significant positive relationship between the coverage of *The Guardian* and the moral implications of enlargement in terms of the reuniting of European continent for the first time after the end of the Cold War ($r = 0.16$; $p < 0.001$); there is a negative significant relationship between the coverage of *The Daily Mail* and the moral duties of reuniting Europe ($r = - 0.20$; $p < 0.005$). Here again, the skeptical attitude of *The Daily Mail* is evident.

Most importantly, on the issue of immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement in Britain, *The Daily Mail* framed enlargement as leading to a large number of immigrants settling in Britain ($r = 0.15$; $p < 0.001$). Similar observations hold valid for

the issue of illegal immigration as well. Its coverage made frequent references to the negatively biased arguments of the experts from Migration Watch UK.

Last but not the least, on the issue of illegal immigration, the results of the chi-square tests point to very important empirical findings that are again statistically significant. While the relationship between the coverage of *The Guardian* and illegal immigration related consequences of EU enlargement was negative ($r = - 0.16$; $p < 0.001$), this relationship was positive for *The Daily Mail*'s coverage ($r = 0.23$; $p < 0.005$). Although causal relationships between variables cannot be concluded from chi-square results, the results of this analysis show trends based on the logic of the second level of agenda setting.

French Print Media Framing Trends

While the British press focuses mostly on the economic consequences of enlargement (*e.g.* unemployment, immigration, and illegal immigration, *etc.*), as shown in Table 5-1, the French press focuses more frequently on the political consequences of enlargement (*e.g.* its impact on the international influence of the EU, peace and stability in the European continent, and EU's power vis-à-vis the US, *etc.*). This finding contradicts the results of a previous study, which compared the British media coverage of EU-related issues with the coverage of several other European media outlets. Put more specifically, Machill *et al.* (2006) concluded that when EU reporting occurs, the UK media place a political emphasis much more frequently than the media of other European states, in which the EU is mostly an economic topic.

The general trends illustrated in Table 5-1 indicate that in both the French and the British press outlets, the social consequences were covered the least among the three main consequences of enlargement (with approximately 40% in each case). The frequency with which the political consequences of enlargement were covered in the French press (74.3%) was almost twice as much as the frequency with which the social consequences were covered (38.9%). Political consequences of EU enlargement were followed by the economic consequences frame, covered approximately by 50% of all enlargement-related French newspaper articles. These results support the finding of a previous research that examined the Europe-related newspaper coverage in six European countries (see Trenz 2004).

Among three French newspapers analyzed in this dissertation, *Le Monde* was the one that emphasized the political consequences of enlargement the most. Approximately 81% of all enlargement-related articles published by *Le Monde* mentioned the political implications of EU enlargement one way or the other. *Le Monde* covered the political consequences of EU enlargement (80.6%) approximately twice as much as it covered the social consequences (38%). *Le Monde's* coverage utilized the economic consequences frame in approximately half (48.3%) of the articles it has published on the Eastern enlargement.

Among the three French newspapers, *Le Figaro* is the one that put the heaviest emphasis on the economic consequences of EU enlargement. More than half of the stories it has published on enlargement contained the economic consequences frame. However, as in *Le Monde* and *Libération*, among the three consequences of enlargement, *Le Figaro's* coverage contained the political consequences the most.

Among the three French newspapers analyzed here, *Libération* distinguished itself with its strong emphasis on the social consequences of enlargement (44.3%). With its tabloid format and emphasis on the social consequences of Eastern enlargement, the coverage of *Libération* was comparable to the one of *The Daily Mail*. This finding provides evidence to the hypothesis that the format of the newspapers has an impact on the ways issues are covered. All in all, Europe was frequently framed as a vehicle of influence in world politics by French newspapers analyzed in this project.

The results of the qualitative analysis indicate that while *Le Figaro* and *Libération* reported more negatively on the issue of EU enlargement; *Le Monde's* coverage was more neutral on the issue. This finding confirms the results of a previous qualitative content analysis of *Le Monde's* articles on Europe (see Le 2002). The more neutral characterization of the EU enlargement issue may be due to the fact that *Le Monde's* political orientation is closer to the center, while the other two French newspapers' political orientations are more radical, albeit located at the opposing ends of the political spectrum.

Le Figaro's portrayal of EU enlargement frequently focused on several negative political and cultural implications of EU enlargement. For instance, it criticized the fact the English language is going to dominate the enlarged Union. It generally praised the way the enlargement would help the EU to act stronger in world politics and applauded the peace-related implications of enlargement in the continent.

Libération touched upon the social consequences of EU enlargement to a great extent. Its reportage on EU enlargement was quite negative. This may be related to the tabloid format of this particular outlet. It especially preferred representations on EU

enlargement that were more anxiety-driven. Concerns about increased unemployment, companies moving their production sites to Eastern Europe dominated the coverage of enlargement in this newspaper. In that sense, we can argue that the coverage patterns in *Libération* showed similarities to the patterns in the enlargement-related coverage patterns in *The Daily Mail*.

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND-LEVEL AGENDA-SETTING ANALYSIS

After explaining several significant differences observed in the coverage of different press outlets content analyzed in this study, the remainder of this chapter proceeds with the empirical tests. It conducts an analysis on the second-level agenda-setting effects and presents the results for the British and French cases, respectively.

The Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in Britain

Following a descriptive discussion of the coverage patterns of different consequences of enlargement by the British and French press, this chapter now proceeds with the results of the rank order correlation analysis in Britain. It first conducts rank order correlation for 17 different subcategories of the three main consequences of EU enlargement. It then conducts rank order analysis for the three main consequences of EU enlargement. Please refer to Appendix B for the definitions of categories used in coding.

As explained in Chapter 3, various consequences of enlargement named in the *Flash Eurobarometer* surveys on enlargement are ranked according to the percentage of people naming each one to yield a description of the public agenda. In turn, these

rankings on each agenda are compared to determine the strength of the press' attribute agenda-setting influence on British and French publics. The correlations between the ranking of issues on the media agenda and the ranking accorded those issues on the subsequent public agenda on European Union are calculated using *Spearman's rho*. This rank ordering of the issues is considerably more precise than simply grouping sets of issues into those receiving high, moderate or low attention among the public.

The null hypothesis for the rank order correlation is that the variables do not have a rank-order relationship in the population represented by the sample. To reject the null hypothesis is to say that there is a rank-order relationship between the variables in the population.

Our null hypothesis here is that British press framings and the British public framings on enlargement do not have a rank-order relationship. The results of this rank order analysis are displayed in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3. British Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on 17 Subcategories

Consequences of EU Enlargement	British Press Coverage		British Public Opinion	
	Rankings	Newspaper Articles (%)	Rankings	Survey Data (%)
Environment	1	4.6	14	70.1
Drugs and Crime	2	9.3	5	46.7
Illegal Immigration	15	60.5	4	45.2
Moral Duty to Unite Europe	8	27.9	15	71.8
Culture	3	11.6	13	66.7
Legal Immigration	17	69.8	7	57.8
Unemployment	13	48.8	2	36.1
Welfare System	14	53.4	3	37.2
Cost of Enlargement	9	32.6	11	66.0
Closeness to Citizens	5	16.2	6	51.4
Historically Natural to Enlarge	7	23.2	10	65.3
Expansion of Markets	4	13.9	17	90.1
EU's power in the World	6	20.9	16	72.4
Agriculture	10	34.9	9	63.8
Country's Power within EU	12	44.1	1	25.3
Difficult to take Decisions	16	62.4	12	66.4
Peace	11	37.2	8	59.4
		N=43		N=1000
Critical r ($N = 17$, $p < 0.05$) = 0.488				
<i>Spearman's r</i> = - 0.495				

Sources: Content Analysis Data (December 1, 2002-March 30, 2003) and *Flash Eurobarometer Survey* 140

Table 5-3 illustrates the rank order correlation between the British press coverage and British public opinion on 17 subcategories of consequences of EU enlargement. While the issues of immigration, welfare, and illegal immigration as related to the enlargement of the EU rank high in the British press, we cannot observe the same level of

salience among the British public. The British public ranks the expansion of markets, EU's power in the world arena, and cultural and environmental implications of enlargement the highest. In Britain, people seem to have been more conscious of the expansion of economic markets, the implications of EU's power in world politics, moral duty to unite Europe, environmental and cultural implications of EU expansion, and the cost of the EU enlargement than the press coverage of enlargement warranted. The British press coverage mainly focused on the impact of the Eastern enlargement on immigration, EU's decision-making process, unemployment, and welfare system.

Since the absolute value of the *Spearman's rho* is greater than the critical r ($N = 17$, $p < 0.05$), we can reject the null hypothesis. But *Spearman's rho* is -0.495 , which indicates a negative direction for this relationship. Since the direction of the rank order relationship disagrees with the direction of the research hypothesis, the research hypothesis is not supported in the British case. Put more specifically, the results of this analysis do not support the existence of second-level agenda-setting effects in the British context. They actually point out to a disconnection between the British people and the major press outlets in Britain on the salience of 17 consequences of enlargement.

One reasonable explanation for this finding may be the low level of trust the British people have towards the British press. People's opinions are conventionally based upon information and their analysis of that information. In a country, such as the UK, where the level of knowledge on the EU is relatively low, the public perception of mass media channels is critical in the delivery of information. It is therefore relevant to look at the level of trust the British people have in the press outlets.

The confidence British people have in these channels of communication directly affects their perception and interpretation of the information that is delivered. Only 44% of EU citizens said that they viewed the press positively when asked if they tended to trust information obtained from the press (*Standard EB 57*). While this figure was more than 50% among the French sample, it was less than half of the French levels in Britain. Consequently, this high level of mistrust in the British press may be one reason for the difference between the British press and public opinion rankings of the salience of the consequences of the Eastern enlargement.

Furthermore, since the coverage of enlargement was limited in Britain, this study could not work with a large N. This small N may be another reason for the empirical results attained here. Moreover, the British coverage of EU enlargement reached its peak only in April 2004, and even then only a total of 45 newspaper articles have been published a month. This low coverage may be another reason for the non-significance of the hypothesized relationship.

Finally, the source for analyzing the second-level agenda-setting effects of press on public opinion is derived from the *Flash EB Survey 140*, which is conducted approximately one year prior to the actual date of enlargement. This was the latest *Flash EB* public opinion data collected on enlargement topic specifically.

Nevertheless, the results of the content analysis of press coverage in Britain show that the number of articles allocated to the issue of EU enlargement has significantly increased starting from the end of 2003. As such, this latest available in-depth public opinion data on EU enlargement may not have accounted for the up-to-the-minute changes in people's attitudes, since many people would be expected to change their

opinions as a result of increasingly intense coverage of the topic of enlargement by media outlets during the year 2004. The findings here are restricted due to the unavailability of a follow-up *Flash EB* survey data.

Subsequent to a discussion of the 17 subcategories of EU enlargement, the next section regroups certain themes and issues together, reducing them to the major and tolerably comparable categories that appear in Table 5-4. Analysis in the following section conducts rank order correlation on three main consequences of enlargement to test the second-level agenda-setting effects of the British press on British public opinion.

Table 5-4. British Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on Three Main Consequences of EU Enlargement

Main Consequences of EU Enlargement	British Press Coverage		British Public Opinion	
	Ranking	Newspaper Articles (%)	Ranking	Survey Data (%)
Political Consequences	2	35.6	2	59.9
Economic Consequences	3	37.8	3	61.3
Social Consequences	1	22.6	1	50.5

Sources: Content Analysis Data and *Flash Eurobarometer Survey 140*

The results in this section of analysis, as illustrated by Table 5-4, are certainly more promising than the ones in the previous section. The relationship between the British public and media salencies of three main consequences of enlargement is statistically significant (with $r = 1$). This points out to very strong evidence of strong second-level agenda-setting effects regarding the three substantive attributes of


enlargement. As such, *Hypothesis 2* as outlined in Chapter 2 is confirmed in the British context.

Economic consequences of enlargement are the most salient consequences in both the British public and the press agenda. Economic consequences are followed by political and social consequences respectively in both press and public agendas. In other words, there is an exact correspondence between framings of the print media and British people on the three main consequences of Eastern enlargement of the EU.

After concluding on the strong relationship between press and public attention to three general consequences of EU enlargement, the analysis in the subsequent section concentrates on the development of British public and press agenda on specific consequences of EU enlargement.

For the sake of illustrating the interaction of British press coverage and public opinion over time, Figures 5-1-5-5 plot the development of British public opinion (using *Flash EB Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2, and 140) and newspaper coverage (through the use of cumulative press coverage one month before each survey) on several consequences of enlargement.

Figure 5-1. Public and Press Attention to the Costs of Enlargement to Britain, 2002-2003



Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2 and 140


As illustrated by Figure 5-1, there have been increasing concerns in the British newspaper coverage on EU enlargement regarding the cost of enlargement for Britain. This trend was accompanied with an identical trend in the concerns in the British public opinion regarding the cost of enlargement for Britain. These figures show similar trends in the print media and public opinion regarding the cost of enlargement.

While in August 2002, concerns regarding the cost of EU enlargement were only emphasized by one fourth of the enlargement-related coverage in the British press; it was emphasized 3% more in the press coverage during October 2002. In February 2003, this consequence of enlargement was emphasized by almost one thirds of the enlargement-related newspaper articles in Britain.

One month after exposure to each of these cumulative press coverage figures, there were similarly increasing concerns among the British public regarding the enlargement's economic burden for Britain. These concerns in the public opinion started with approximately 55% in September 2002 and increased to 62% in November 2002. In March 2003, these concerns were shared by more than 65% of the respondents in the British sample.

These findings further support the common assumption in the agenda setting research regarding the one month rule for the media effects on public opinion. In other words, this relationship not only shows the identical patterns in the relationship between the print media coverage and the public opinion on the cost of enlargement, it also points out to a one month-lag between the newspaper coverage exposure and the public opinion

Figure 5-2. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on the Complexity of Decision-Making in the EU, 2002-2003



Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2 and 140


Figure 5-2 too demonstrates a similar trend between the developments in the British newspaper coverage and public opinion regarding the effects of enlargement on EU decision-making. While in August 2002, one fourth of all newspaper articles published on enlargement emphasized the effects of enlargement on EU decision-making, in October 2002, 40% of all British newspapers analyzed in this research mentioned the effects of enlargement on EU decision-making. The press emphasis on this particular consequence of EU enlargement decreased in February 2003 to 67%.

One month later, these tendencies in the press coverage were followed very closely by the British public opinion. In September 2002, only 61% of the people were concerned about the effects of enlargement on the decision-making processes in the EU. This measure has increased by 9% in November 2002, and from its November 2002 levels it decreased by about 3% in March 2003.

Figure 5-2 shows that the trends in the print media coverage and public opinion over time are again proportional to each other. Additionally, as in the previous figure, they point out to a strong time order between the media framings and the public framings of this particular aspect of enlargement.

However, not all trends in the press coverage and public opinion are identical. As shown by Figure 5-3, there may be contradictory trends between the media coverage and public opinion regarding some other consequences of enlargement. For instance, Figure 5-3 indicates that the British newspaper coverage on unemployment related consequences of enlargement decreased over time.

Figure 5-3. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on Unemployment, 2002-2003




Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2 and 140

However, the developments in the public opinion did not follow the media trends on this particular issue. As such, our hypothesis that the media salience of a certain subtopic would have an important consequence for public salience of this subtopic is not supported in this specific case.

On the other hand, as shown by Figure 5-4, there has been a considerable relationship between the British newspaper attention to the effects of illegal immigration and the public salience of this particular consequence of enlargement. Over time, the British press attention to the illegal immigration consequences of enlargement has fluctuated very strangely. This unusual increase from August 2002 to February 2003 was followed by a similar increase in the public attention to the effects of enlargement on illegal immigration.

Figure 5-4. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on Illegal Immigration, 2002-2003




Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2 and 140

However, there were no enlargement articles that emphasized the illegal immigration consequences of enlargement in October 2002. This trend did not correspond to a decline in the public salience of illegal immigration consequences of enlargement. Consequently, the results presented in this figure point to inconsistent results on the relationship between the media and the public salience of illegal immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement.

Figure 5-5 illustrates the press and public attention to the effects of enlargement on immigration. These trends are similar to the ones identified for the effects of enlargement on illegal immigration (as presented by Figure 5-4). This figure indicates that there has been a major decline in the press attention allocated to the immigration consequences of enlargement from August 2002 to October. This decline did not match up with the trend in the public attention to that consequence observed from September to

November 2002. While the British newspaper attention to immigration consequences of enlargement fluctuated over time, the public attention to immigration underwent a constant increase.

Figure 5-5. Public and Press Attention to the Effects of EU Enlargement on Immigration, 2002-2003



Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Enlargement* 132.1, 132.2 and 140

As noted earlier, however, these figures do not reflect the most up-to-date trends in the media and public opinion coverage of different consequences of enlargement. This is due to the fact that the latest public opinion survey presented in these figures was conducted in March 2003, more than one year prior to the enlargement date.

In early 2002, the British public opinion was divided within itself about the benefits of EU enlargement (*Standard EB 56*). The benefits of enlargement for the British sample were that the EU would work better and that companies in the UK would benefit.

However, negative viewpoints were believed to be that the EU would be more distant from its citizens and it would still be weaker than the US.


According to *Standard EB 56*, nearly half the British sample (46%) believed that the Eastern enlargement of the EU would lead to a significant number of people moving from the accession countries to the UK. Of this group, 73% believed some new arrivals would “abuse the social welfare system” and 70% believed that unemployment would increase. Within this same sample, two-thirds believed that there were already “too many” immigrants and that with enlargement there would be a shortage of housing in Britain.

Most strikingly, in the final *Standard EB* survey conducted just before the Eastern enlargement, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defense and foreign affairs (*Standard EB 60*). As a side effect, there was a parallel concern that immigration would lead to a rise in the unemployment levels in Britain.

These alterations in the media and public attention to different consequences of enlargement bring us to the issue of frame-changing. “During any news event’s life span,” Hsiang and McCombs (2004, 22) note, “the news media often reframe the event by emphasizing different attributes of the event – consciously or unconsciously – in order to keep the story alive and fresh.” This is referred to as “frame-changing.” In order to reveal the existence of “frame-changing,” Figure 5-6 plots the changes in frames in the British press coverage of the consequences of enlargement over time. It better accounts for the changes in the way the newspapers covered the enlargement topic with regards to

its specific consequences. Different from the previous figures, Figure 5-6 also includes the January-February 2004 newspaper coverage to demonstrate the developments during that time period in the print media attention to different consequences of enlargement. However, due to the lack of a *Flash EB* survey conducted shortly before the enlargement in May 2004, this chapter cannot account for more recent media effects on public opinion.

Figure 5-6. Frame Changes in the British Press Coverage of the Consequences of EU Enlargement, 2002-2004



Source: Content Analysis Data

As Figure 5-6 indicates, while the positive aspects of EU enlargement (arguments such as the effects of enlargement on peace, moral duty to unite, historically natural to enlarge) were covered during the initial stages in the time frame of this analysis; towards the end of the time period under study, the negative aspects of enlargement (such as the effects on unemployment, drugs, illegal immigration, and the welfare system) were emphasized increasingly by the British press. These negative aspects might be said to have contributed to the increasing concerns about the impact of EU enlargement on the daily lives of British citizens. This leads us to the concept of “compelling arguments.”

Some attributes of an issue are more likely to be noticed and remembered by the people when compared with other attributes. Certain characteristics of an object may resonate with the public in such a way that they become especially “compelling arguments” for the salience of the issue, person or topic under consideration (McCombs 2005, 547; Ghanem 1997).

Implications of Eastern enlargement on immigration, illegal immigration, and on the abuse of the welfare system all provided “compelling arguments” for the salience of the EU enlargement issue in the British public agenda. In the British context, my examination of the various ways in which enlargement was framed in the British print media revealed that the salience of enlargement on the public agenda was related especially to the frequency of news stories about immigration (legal or illegal) in which the average British citizen would feel somehow threatened.

The biggest change in the enlargement framings of the British press outlets has been observed on the issue of the implications on the British welfare system. From June to September 2002, the welfare implications of enlargement were covered by slightly


more than 10% of the British newspaper articles. In the following two months, its coverage increased by 2%. While for a brief time period there was a decrease by 5%; from January to February 2004, it was covered by more than 60% of all British newspapers published on the issue of Eastern enlargement.

Another major change over time in British press coverage was observed on the issue of illegal immigration. To illustrate, between June and September 2002, less than 20% of the British newspaper articles devoted attention to the illegal immigration-related consequences of enlargement. This figure reached 20% between December and March 2003. And finally, from January to February 2004, more than 55% of the British articles covered the implications of Eastern enlargement on illegal immigration to the UK. More and more newspaper articles started to attract attention to the possibility of illegal immigration becoming a problem in Britain with the Eastern enlargement. The majority of the newspaper articles criticized the government's "soft touch" on asylum and immigration. As illustrated elsewhere in this chapter, this type of framing was mainly apparent in *The Daily Mail's* coverage.

Focusing on the willingness of the people to attribute negative traits to EU enlargement allows for a test of a common criticism of media coverage of the issue of enlargement. As suggested by the previous figure, news coverage in Britain became more concentrated on the negative aspects of enlargement as the time of the enlargement approached. This suggests that, all else being equal, more media exposure should produce negative assessments of the issue of EU enlargement and decrease the likelihood of a person attributing positive traits to the issue. These expectations were confirmed by the results presented in both the following section and Chapter 6.

This project hypothesizes that with an increase in the frequency of negative consequences of enlargement in the media coverage, the support level for enlargement will decrease. This is an argument mainly tested by the priming analysis presented in the end of Chapter 6. But the next section deals with the developments in public framings on EU enlargement's different consequences over time, and then compares the results with the results from the content analysis section.

Figure 5-7. Changes in the British Public Framings of the Consequences of EU Enlargement, 2002-2003



Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer* 132.1, 132.2, and 140.

When we compare the public opinion surveys and news coverage from 2002 to 2003 through Figures 5-6 and 5-7, we can see that in both the media coverage and the

public agenda there were increasing concerns about an increase with EU enlargement in the number of Eastern European citizens coming to Britain.

Even in 2001, more than a majority (approximately 53%) of the British people disagreed with the statement that after the enlargement, there would be better employment. Nearly 60% of the Brits believed that there would be increased levels of unemployment after the enlargement. 75% thought that there would be more organized crime and 65% thought that there would be more drug trafficking after ten new countries acceded to the EU. 55% projected that there would be more illegal immigration after the enlargement. As such, predominantly, the economic concerns regarding the negative impact of EU enlargement has led to decreased support among the British public.

Furthermore, according to the *Standard EB 61* survey conducted from February to March 2004, immigration was “the most important issue facing UK citizens” in the spring of 2004 and was cited by 41% of the British sample. In autumn 2003, immigration was the second most important issue facing UK citizens, following crime (*Standard EB 60*). It was cited as the most important problem by 32% of those polled in Britain.

But in spring 2004, due to increased print media coverage, immigration concerns of the British people overtook crime, which moved from first to second place. Terrorism was rated the third most important issue by the British sample, and healthcare system received the fourth place. The issue of enlargement was covered by references to two of these important topics identified by the British public: immigration and healthcare system.

As such, Chapter 7 elaborates on the way the British official policy on immigration is “reviewed” subsequent to a major increase in the number of alarming

reports from the media regarding the prospects of increased legal and illegal immigration to Britain. It seeks to demonstrate how the print media's increased emphasis on enlargement's potential impact on immigration and welfare system abuse contributed to the development of strong public concerns regarding immigration and exploitation of the British welfare system by immigrants, and hence, caused several changes in the British government's immigration policy.

The Second-Level Agenda-Setting Effects in France

Subsequent to a discussion of the second-level agenda-setting effects in Britain, this chapter proceeds with an analysis of the French case. The 17 subtopics on the media agenda and those on the public agenda were again rank-ordered respectively, according to the frequency of the codes assigned to each subtopic category. Table 5-5 displays the comparison of the rankings of the French press and public salience of 17 different consequences of Eastern enlargement.

Table 5-5. French Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on 17 Subcategories

Consequences of EU Enlargement	French Press Coverage		French Public Opinion	
	Rankings	Newspaper Articles (%)	Rankings	Survey Data (%)
Environment	1	7.4	8.5	60.6
Drugs and Crime	2	11.9	6	53.4
Illegal Immigration	3.5	23.1	2	31.1
Moral Duty to Unite Europe	3.5	23.8	13	73.5
Culture	5	44.8	17	84.5
Legal Immigration	6	50.7	8.5	60.8
Unemployment	7	57.5	4	44.9
Welfare System	8	59.7	5	45.5
Cost of Enlargement	9	61.9	12	72.9
Closeness to Citizens	10.5	65.6	3	43.6
Historically Natural to Enlarge	10.5	67.2	11	69.6
Expansion of Markets	12	70.8	16	82.6
EU's power in the World	13.5	74.6	14	76.1
Agriculture	13.5	74.6	7	55.2
Country's Role in the EU	15	83.6	1	27.1
Difficult to take Decisions	16	85.8	15	78.5
Peace	17	87.3	10	61.4
		N=134		N=1000
Critical r (N = 17, $p < 0.05$) = 0.488				
<i>Spearman's r</i> = 0.14				

Sources: Content Analysis Data (December 1, 2002-March 30, 2003) and *Flash Eurobarometer* 140

As Table 5-5 illustrates, the direction of the relationship between rankings of the salience of the consequences of enlargement in the French press and public is positive. The media rankings are positively correlated with the public rankings of different

consequences of enlargement in France (*Spearman's rho* = 0.14). But this relationship is not statistically significant. The non-significant relationship may be due to the small population size or to the large number of subcategories employed in this analysis.

While the French press emphasized the implications of EU enlargement on peace, security and stability in Europe, decision-making processes in the EU, and relative weight of France within an enlarged Union; the French public was mostly interested in the cultural implications of enlargement, market expansion, the effect of enlargement on decision-making processes, and on the strength of the EU in the world arena.


For instance, the starkest difference between the French press coverage and public opinion on different consequences of EU enlargement is observed on the issue of France's role in the Union. While this aspect was identified as a priority by the French people, French press coverage on EU enlargement did not grant this aspect precedence.

Despite the statistical insignificance of the findings, one can conclude that, when compared with the British case, there is a better rate of correspondence between the press and the public agendas in the French case. In other words, the rankings of the salience of different consequences of enlargement between the public and the media were not disjointed like the ones in Britain. This is illustrated by a positive *Spearman's rho* measure attained as a result of this analysis.

Figure 5-8 displays the change over time of people's attention to different consequences of EU enlargement. When compared with the previous *Flash EB*, the negative consequences of EU enlargement have been deemphasized by the French people in the more recent *Flash EB* conducted on EU enlargement. This may be said to have

contributed to the decreased opposition to EU enlargement from autumn 2003 to spring 2004 (Please refer to Figure 6-2).

Figure 5-8. Changes in the French Public Framings of the Consequences of EU Enlargement, 2002-2003



Sources: *Flash Eurobarometer* 132.1, 132.2, and 140.

Figure 5-8 effectively shows that in the French public agenda, there was an increasing attention to the positive aspects of EU enlargement that are predominantly political, such as the moral duty to enlarge the EU, the impact of enlargement on EU's power in the world and on market expansion. This is very much in line with our expectations from content analysis, which illustrated the substantial emphasis in the

French press coverage allocated to the political consequences of enlargement (Please refer to Table 5-1).

Increasing French public attention to the predominantly positive political consequences of enlargement is accompanied with a decreasing public attention to the negative effects of EU enlargement. To illustrate, when compared with the public opinion measures in the *Flash EB* survey (November 2002), the latest *Flash EB* on enlargement conducted before enlargement (March 2003) shows that there has been a decline in the public attention to the cost of enlargement, as well as to the impact of enlargement on the French power within the enlarged EU, EU decision-making, unemployment in France, immigration to France, and on the French welfare system.

One striking finding from Figure 5-8 is that there has been an extensive public attention on the effect of EU enlargement on French culture towards the end of the time frame of this study. This emphasis was paralleled by the media coverage on the negative effects of enlargement on the French language and culture. For a detailed discussion of the effects of these changes in public attitudes towards EU enlargement, please refer to Chapter 6.

This chapter concludes with the results of the rank order correlation analysis for three main consequences of enlargement in France, since the rank order correlation analysis on 17 subcategories did not yield statistically significant results. Table 5-6 summarizes the relative emphasis placed on each general subtopic by the media and the public. As in the British case, the results in this section are more promising as illustrated by Table 5-6.

Table 5-6. French Press Coverage and Public Opinion Rank Order Correlation on Three Main Consequences of EU Enlargement

Main Consequences of EU Enlargement	French Press Coverage		French Public Opinion	
	Rankings	Newspaper Articles (%)	Rankings	Survey Data (%)
Political Consequences	3	70.3	3	64.4
Economic Consequences	2	49.4	2	58.3
Social Consequences	1	45.5	1	56.7

Sources: Content Analysis Data and *Flash Eurobarometer Survey 140*

As demonstrated by Table 5-6, both the French people and the French press rank the salience of political, economic and social consequences of EU enlargement identically. As such, when the large numbers of categories are regrouped under three general headings, the significant correspondence between the press coverage salience of these general consequences and the public framing of enlargement becomes clearly evident.

As shown in Table 5-6, when the French print media and the public talk about the enlargement topic, they both emphasize the political consequences of enlargement the most, then the economic and social consequences, respectively. Similar to the results of the British second-level agenda-setting analysis concerning three general consequences of enlargement, the findings in the French case also suggest a sturdy correlation between the media framings and the public framings. Accordingly, *Hypothesis 2* is confirmed in the French case as well.

CONCLUSION

The results of these second-level agenda-setting analyses clearly demonstrate the benefits of engaging in a cross-national comparative analysis to assess media effects. In each country, both the media and the public paid the least attention to the social consequences of enlargement. This is a cross-national similarity suggested by the findings of this analysis.

An explanation for this similarity may be that the nature of the enlargement topic is not so much conducive to concerns about social consequences. In other words, the economic and political consequences of enlargement are more likely to gain precedence in both the press coverage and the general public. They are more likely to receive more attention, since they present relatively more difficult challenges for people. Both the economic consequences and the political consequences aspects are very closely related to the well-being of the people in these countries.

There is also a very significant cross-national difference in the way the enlargement topic is considered in Britain and France. While the British print media and the British public put the heaviest emphasis on the economic consequences of enlargement; the French press and the French public most intensely emphasized the political consequences of EU enlargement towards the end of the time frame of this study. This cross-national difference in emphases placed on different attributes of enlargement demonstrates that there are clear differences between the ways the French and the British people think about the enlargement issue.

Most importantly, the results of the rankings in both Britain and France confirm the time order assumption in the agenda setting research. As explained in Chapter 3, the content analysis data utilized in the second-level agenda-setting analysis used the newspaper articles that were published one month prior to the *Flash EB* survey field research dates. As such, the statistically significant rankings between the press framings and the public framings not only demonstrate that the press attribute-agendas and the public attribute-agendas were highly correlated, but also suggest that the press framings *led* to different public framings on enlargement.

Consequently, the results in this chapter successfully confirm *Hypothesis 2* outlined in Chapter 2: the more salient a substantive attribute (political, economic, and social consequences) is in the press coverage of EU enlargement, the more likely the people are to describe Eastern enlargement topic in terms of that substantive attribute. In other words, this chapter confirms that the substantive attributes of EU enlargement emphasized by the media determine enlargement's substantive attributes salient to the public in both countries.

Although this analysis presented strong, positive, and statistically significant findings on the second-level agenda-setting effects regarding three main consequences of EU enlargement; it did not point to strong second-level effects on public opinion with regards to 17 consequences of enlargement. In other words, the results of the second-level agenda-setting analyses on 17 subcategories of enlargement in both Britain and France were not statistically significant. Future studies may try to decrease the number of 17 subtopics to 5 or 6 subcategories for making the rank order correlation analysis more manageable.

Due to the statistically insignificant results from the rank order correlation analyses of 17 subcategories of enlargement, this chapter cautiously concludes that the “pictures in our heads” regarding the EU enlargement are influenced by the prominence of EU enlargement’s attributes in the press coverage.

Furthermore, the trend public opinion analyses conducted by the *Flash EB* surveys on enlargement discontinued in March 2003. This means that we do not have a detailed analysis of public opinion on enlargement in the final year before the enlargement date. It limits the findings of the current analysis since we cannot account for the effects of the recent trends in print media framings on more up to date attitudes on different consequences of enlargement.

This limitation becomes especially significant in the British case, since the results of the first-level agenda-setting data presented in Chapter 4 indicate a tremendous increase in the British print media salience of enlargement towards the end of the time frame of this study. With increased exposure to press coverage on enlargement, people are expected to have a better idea about what aspects they will give priority to when they think about enlargement.

DISCUSSION

All in all, both the British and the French publics accorded similar attention to various consequences of enlargement. In both countries, the citizens were predominantly concerned with market expansion, strength of the EU after enlargement, moral and cultural implications of enlargement.

Due to the lack of a more recent public opinion survey conducted to measure people's opinions regarding the EU enlargement, the findings in this chapter does not account for the development of public opinion during the final year before the EU enlargement. On the other hand, though, as Figure 4-1 shows, starting with August 2003, EU enlargement-related coverage has tremendously increased in both countries. As such, the agenda setting theory would expect an enhanced rate of convergence between the public and press attribute agendas with an increased coverage of the issue.

While the British press mostly focused on immigration, complication of decision making processes, illegal immigration, welfare, unemployment, and the relative weight of Britain in an enlarged Union; the French press focused on peace, stability and security implications of enlargement, complication of EU decision-making processes, the relative weight of France after the enlargement, agriculture, and strength of the Union in the world arena.

One observation that is extremely noteworthy is that the attributes emphasized by the British press coverage on enlargement concentrate more on the bread-and-butter type of concerns regarding enlargement's consequences on the daily lives of people. By contrast, the aspects of enlargement emphasized by the French press coverage underline the broader and more abstract consequences of EU enlargement. These types of consequences are less likely to affect the daily lives of people concretely.

People are more likely to remember and attach greater value to more concrete issues, in which the problems of daily life are closely involved. Put differently, problems that are critical to their domestic well-being are more likely to attract people's attention, rather than subjects like Europe and international relations.

However, it is important to be more precise about these relationships and to look at the details of this rather multifaceted and complex picture. Therefore, the following chapter investigates the dynamics of the public attitudes towards the EU enlargement topic.

Chapter 6: Consequences of Agenda-Setting or Other Factors? Analyzing the Determinants of Public Support for EU Enlargement

The literature on EU public opinion has mostly concentrated on analyzing the determinants of public support for EU integration, generally ignoring the determinants of public support for EU enlargement. Since the Eastern enlargement of the EU has been one of the most vital developments shaping both the nature and the composition of the EU, public attitudes towards this issue command special attention. Public support for enlargement has important implications for the democratic deficit debate, as will be illustrated in Chapter 7. As such, this chapter delves into the factors that may have an effect on people's attitudes towards EU enlargement.

Findings from Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the significance of the print media's attention to and framings of the enlargement issue in determining people's awareness of this issue and its substantive attributes. The previous analyses, however, did not deal with testing the impact of the EU enlargement-related newspaper coverage on public attitudes towards the issue. In light of the recent developments in agenda setting theory, the present chapter analyzes the consequences of the media's agenda-setting and priming effects on public attitudes towards EU enlargement.

Although the influence of the media is substantial, arguably, it may not be the only factor determining the public attitudes towards enlargement. Therefore, this chapter also analyzes the effects of other independent variables on people's attitudes towards EU enlargement. It tests the determinants of people's support for EU enlargement through bivariate and multivariate analyses at the individual level. In short, this chapter seeks to find an answer to the following questions: Why do some Europeans support the idea of

EU enlargement while others don't? Is it because of their exposure to enlargement-related media coverage or due to some other factors?

DATA

Agenda setting research generally conducts aggregate-level analyses of public opinion (Willnat 1997). Chapters 4 and 5, and the analysis in the beginning of this chapter followed that common trend and conducted aggregate-level agenda-setting research combining the results of the content analysis with the public opinion data.

Even though the aggregate-level and descriptive data are useful to a point, an individual-level multivariate analysis of data is essential for getting a better sense of the true influence of various factors that affect people's attitudes toward EU enlargement. Consequently, this project's character has somewhat differed from previous attempts to study the media effects and EU public opinion. This chapter mainly analyzes the individual-level public opinion data.

At first, it utilizes the *Standard Eurobarometer 56* survey data to find out about the factors that are influential in determining the attitudes toward EU enlargement. This is the only *EB* survey data that measures people's media consumption habits and their attitudes toward the Eastern enlargement of the EU simultaneously.

However, since the fieldwork for this survey was conducted from October to November 2001, it does not account for more recent developments in public opinion on enlargement. As such, although the findings presented in this chapter are useful to display the interaction between different factors and the support for EU enlargement, they may be

limited in terms of their implications to more recent developments in European public opinion.

The final part of this chapter runs statistical analyses on a later survey – *Flash Eurobarometer on EU Enlargement* 132.2. Even though this survey did not ask questions measuring people’s media consumption habits, it asked many questions to specifically determine people’s attitudes toward various consequences of EU enlargement. More importantly, this survey is conducted at the end of 2002. As such, it accounts for more recent developments in public opinion on enlargement, when compared with *Standard Eurobarometer* 56.

CONSEQUENCES OF AGENDA-SETTING AND PRIMING

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the previous empirical chapters did not deal with testing the impact of the EU enlargement-related newspaper coverage on public attitudes towards the issue. Therefore, the goal in the first part of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of media’s agenda-setting and priming effects on public attitudes towards the EU enlargement.

Accordingly, the next section provides an analysis of the consequences of agenda-setting in Britain. This type of analysis could not be conducted on the French sample in the *Standard EB* 56 dataset due to the unavailability of information regarding the names of the daily newspapers read by the French respondents.

An analysis of the Consequences of Agenda-Setting in Britain

This analysis focuses on the consequences of the British print media's agenda-setting effects for the British public attitudes towards enlargement. It expects to find the enlargement-related print media coverage to serve as a catalyst for changes in or development of opinions.

Unlike the previous chapters in this research, the present analysis concentrates on exploring the impact of people's regular exposure to daily newspapers on their attitudes towards the EU enlargement. Doing so should free us from considerations about whether the respondents have actually been regularly exposed to newspaper coverage.

Question 2b in *Standard EB 56* asks people which daily newspapers they read regularly. The answers to this question are recoded in a way to construct the daily newspaper readership categories of *The Sun*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Guardian*, *The Times*, another daily newspaper, multiple daily newspapers, and no daily newspapers. The daily newspaper readership variable constitutes our independent variable in the current analysis.

Question 38 of *Standard EB 56* asks the respondents which options they tend to support regarding the EU enlargement. The available answers are: "the EU should be enlarged to include all," "the EU should be enlarged to include some," and "the EU should not be enlarged." The attitude towards enlargement is the dependent variable in this analysis.

Following the consequences of agenda-setting argument, this analysis expects respondents' regular consumption of daily newspapers to have an important effect on

their attitudes towards enlargement. The relationship between the daily newspaper readership on EU affairs and the answers to Question 38 is displayed in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes towards the EU Enlargement (with three options)

Q. 38. Which Options Do You Tend to Support?					
Daily Newspaper Readership	The EU should be enlarged to include all	The EU should be enlarged to include some	The EU should not be enlarged	None of these (Spontaneous)	Total N
<i>The Sun</i>	32%	41.8%	17.5%	8.8%	194
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	26.2%	43.7%	26.2%	3.9%	103
<i>The Times</i>	17.9%	57.1%	14.3%	10.7%	28
<i>The Guardian</i>	25.9%	55.6%	11.1%	7.4%	27
Other Newspaper	33.9%	43.1%	15%	8%	313
Multiple Newspapers	48.8%	36.6%	9.8%	4.9%	41
No Daily Paper	36.2%	43.5%	17.4%	2.9%	69
Total N = 775	32.5%	43.5%	16.9%	7.1%	775

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are row percentages)

The results presented in Table 6-1 confirm our expectations that the regular exposure to the coverage of different press outlets has an impact on attitudes towards EU enlargement. These results also indirectly support our hypothesis that the tone of press coverage affects public opinion. While this analysis provides some useful findings; due to small sample sizes, the results were not statistically significant.

Put more specifically, the readers of *The Daily Mail* had the most negative attitudes on enlargement (with approximately 26% of its readers against enlargement), followed by the readers of *The Sun*. These observations confirm the expectations from our content analysis, and suggest that the readers who were exposed to negative coverage on a topic were more likely to develop negative views of the topic.

Again, validating our expectations from the content analysis of *The Guardian* and *The Times* in Chapter 5, opposition to EU enlargement was the weakest among the readers of *The Guardian*, followed by the readers of *The Times*. Overall, these tendencies support the expectations of the “consequences of agenda-setting” thesis.

Another significant observation emerging from Table 6-1 is that among the respondents who were exposed to multiple newspapers, support for EU enlargement “to include all” was higher than the support for other options. This finding signifies that people who were exposed to different points of view on enlargement were more likely to support enlargement than not. Also, among the same group, the enlargement opposition percentage was the lowest when compared with the enlargement opposition percentages of the other groups. To sum up, people who were exposed to multiple daily newspaper coverage were less likely to oppose enlargement.

Among the people who did not read any newspaper, the support level for enlarging the Union to “include all members” was the second highest following the support level of the multiple newspaper readers. This suggests that exposure to the coverage of a single source had a negative impact on the support for EU enlargement.

Question 40a of *Standard EB 56* asks people whether they think their lives will be “better,” “worse,” or “about the same,” after the new countries have joined the EU in

2004. This question enables us to detect the level of optimism or pessimism of the British respondents about the effects of EU enlargement on their living standards.

Table 6-2. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes towards the Effects of Enlargement on the Quality of Life

Q. 40a. After new countries have joined your life will be...				
Daily Newspaper Readership	Better	Worse	About the Same	Total N
<i>The Sun</i>	5.7%	19.6%	74.6%	209
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	11.3%	16.5%	72.2%	97
<i>The Times</i>	15.4%	19.2%	65.4%	26
<i>The Guardian</i>	29.6%	7.4%	63%	27
Other Newspaper	11.7%	11%	77.3%	326
Multiple Newspapers	21.4%	11.9%	66.7%	42
No Daily Paper	14.3%	12.9%	72.9%	70
Total N = 797	11.5%	14.3%	74.2%	797

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are row percentages)

This analysis helps us draw conclusions about the tone of the newspaper coverage in each press outlet on enlargement. The results should again support British content analysis findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As depicted in Table 6-2, the readers of *The Sun* were the most pessimistic ones among the British respondents about the possible effect of enlargement on their lives. To illustrate, 19.6% of *The Sun* readers thought that their lives would be worse after new countries have joined the EU. Furthermore, *The Daily Mail* readers very closely followed the readers of *The Sun* in their pessimistic

expectations about the impact of enlargement on their daily lives. Consequently, in line with our expectations from the findings in the previous chapters, the regular readers of the tabloid newspapers developed pessimism about the effects of EU enlargement on their quality of life. This supports the previous findings that these press outlets tend to cover the enlargement topic with a predominantly negative tone.

On the other hand, among the British respondents, *The Guardian* readers were the most optimistic ones regarding their expectations of the impact of the Eastern enlargement on their daily lives. Since the enlargement-related coverage of *The Guardian* was mostly positive, this finding again confirms expectations emerged from the content analysis data presented in Chapter 5. The *chi-square* test result indicates a highly significant relationship for the relationship summarized in Table 6-2 ($p < 0.005$).

Another important finding that emerges from Table 6-2 is that a significant majority (74.2%) of the British respondents thought that enlargement would not have any impact on their lives. However, one should keep in mind that this survey was conducted in 2001. This tendency has probably changed when enlargement has become an “obtrusive issue” with an increased exposure to the enlargement-related press coverage over time. Individuals who did not hold opinions about enlargement were expected to form opinions as a result of increased exposure to information about enlargement. This hypothesis could not be tested due to the unavailability of trend data on this question.

Finally, Question 49-4 of *Standard EB 56* asks a more direct question to its respondents; it inquires if they are “for” or “against” EU enlargement. As Table 6-3 displays, the highest opposition to EU enlargement again comes from *The Daily Mail*

readers. This observation again supports the previous findings suggested by Chapter 5 regarding the attitudes of *The Daily Mail* readers towards enlargement.

Table 6-3. Cross-tabulation of British Daily Newspaper Readership and Attitudes towards the EU Enlargement (with two options)

Q. 49-4. What is your Opinion on EU Enlargement			
Daily Newspaper Readership	For	Against	Total N
<i>The Sun</i>	59%	41%	178
<i>The Daily Mail</i>	55.7%	44.3%	88
<i>The Times</i>	68%	32%	25
<i>The Guardian</i>	76.2%	23.8%	21
Other Newspaper	63.5%	36.5%	271
Multiple Newspapers	69.4%	30.6%	36
No Daily Paper	71.9%	28.1%	64
Total N = 683	63%	37%	683

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are row percentages)

As shown in Table 6-3, *The Guardian* readers have the highest levels of support for EU enlargement among the British respondents. Similar to the findings in Table 6-1, this finding also points to the positive impact of the predominantly positive coverage of this broadsheet on the public support for enlargement. This once again confirms the expectations emerged from the content analysis results in Chapter 5.

As Table 6-3 suggests, the most enlargement-skeptic portion of the public is *The Daily Mail* readers (44.3% opposition), followed by *The Sun* readers (41% opposition).

The most enlargement-friendly portions of the British public come from the readers of *The Guardian* with 76.2% supporting the enlargement and the readers of *The Times* with 68% support level.

More interestingly, similar to the findings suggested in Table 6-1, Table 6-3 demonstrates that the non-readers of daily newspapers have the highest support levels for EU enlargement. Accordingly, one may argue that exposure to newspaper coverage decreases the support for enlargement since the most popular print media outlets in Britain cover the issue from a skeptical point of view. As such, we may conclude that there is a negative relationship between the exposure to newspaper coverage and the support for EU enlargement. However, one should also note that the relationship summarized in Table 6-3 is not statistically significant.

A Discussion of the Consequences of Agenda-Setting

Findings presented here are not surprising when we consider the content of the enlargement-related press coverage in different newspapers. Generally, the coverage of *The Guardian* and *The Times* were positive on the issue of EU enlargement. On the other hand, the coverage of the tabloids like *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail* were much more critical on EU enlargement, especially attracting attention to the negative impacts of enlargement, such as an increase in illegal and legal immigration and unemployment levels. These findings are in line with the results of a previous study that concluded strong effects of newspaper readership on the support for the Euro in Britain (Mortimore *et al.* 2000).

When compared with the British quality newspaper circulation levels, the readership levels of the British tabloid newspapers are significantly higher. As such, we expect the tabloid coverage effects on public opinion to be stronger than the effects of the broadsheets. In other words, we expect the tabloids to more strongly affect British public opinion. This may explain the high opposition levels to enlargement in the British public (Please refer to Figure 6-2).

What is more striking is that the second largest pro-enlargement group of the British society came from non-readers. This suggests that the consumers of newspaper articles on EU enlargement tend to adopt a more pessimistic viewpoint towards the topic, which in a way confirms the expected outcome that the media in Britain is Euro-skeptic and that it affects readers' opinions in a negative way. This finding again supports the previous point made in this discussion: tabloid newspapers may have a better likelihood of affecting the overall public opinion on enlargement since they are more widely consumed by the British people.

These results suggest that people are more sensitive to the salience of negative information than to that of non-negative information in the mass media (see Schoenbach and Semetko 1992). This is called the thesis of "negativity-effectiveness," and the findings presented in this section support this argument.

The Guardian readers are the most optimistic ones about the effect of the enlargement on their daily lives, whereas *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail* readers are among the most pessimistic ones. The results of the *chi-square* test display a statistically significant relationship between the readership of different British newspapers and people's opinions about the effect of enlargement on living standards ($p < 0.005$).

The results presented here consistently point to strong agenda-setting consequences of the media on public opinion. They suggest that the daily newspaper readership has a strong influence on the attitudes toward enlargement. In sum, the evidence presented in Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 lead us to confirm the strong attitudinal effects of daily newspaper readership in Britain. Having analyzed the consequences of daily newspaper readership on attitudes towards the EU enlargement, the remainder of this part of the chapter tests the priming hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2.

Priming Analysis


Priming deals with the consequences of agenda-setting as well. With regards to recent improvements in the agenda setting theory, one interesting question to ask is whether and to what extent the predominance of political, economic, and socio-cultural consequences of enlargement covered in the press has influenced the overall evaluation of the enlargement of the EU in Britain and France. This link between the prominence of an object and public opinion is called priming, a process whose psychological basis is the selective attention of the public.

The present section explores whether people were primed by the media coverage when they formed their attitudes on EU enlargement. In other words, it asks which aspect of the enlargement issue people assign the most significance to when they evaluate this issue. As hypothesized in Chapter 3, when a certain consequence of enlargement is made more prominent in the press coverage, the weight assigned to that particular consequence by people would be greater when they form their opinions on EU enlargement.

The current analysis seeks to link the framing changes in the print media and public (as displayed in Chapter 5) with the changes in the overall public attitudes towards the EU enlargement. Figures 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate the changes in public attitudes towards EU enlargement over time.


Immigration has been one of the highly salient issues vis-à-vis the enlargement debate: both the British and the French people felt strongly about it. For instance, in November 2003, one thirds of the British people identified immigration (only second to crime) as the most important problem facing the country. This figure was more than twice as high as the EU15 average of 14% (*Standard EB 60*). Only two months before the enlargement day, in the spring of 2004, immigration became the most important issue facing UK citizens overtaking crime and was cited by 41% of the British sample (*Standard EB 61*).

Figure 6-1. British and French Public Support for Enlargement, 2001-2004



Source: *Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61*

Figure 6-2. British and French Public Opposition to Enlargement, 2001-2004



Source: *Standard Eurobarometer Surveys 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61*

The rising popular concerns about immigration corresponded to a decline in the popular support for EU enlargement. As can be seen in Figure 6-1, from autumn 2003 to spring 2004, there has been a noticeable decrease from approximately 40% to 30% in the support of UK citizens for enlargement. This decrease led to the lowest point in the British support levels for enlargement. It is very important for the purposes of this study that this all-time low level of support came just before the enlargement date. British people's preoccupation with the immigration-related consequences of enlargement may be the primary reason for this substantial decline in the popular support levels.

Moreover, as Figure 6-2 indicates, starting from autumn 2002, there has been a constant increase in the British opposition levels to enlargement up until spring 2004. This trend is probably related to the fact that there has been a tremendous increase in the British press coverage of the predominantly negative consequences of enlargement towards the end of this time frame (Please refer to Figure 5-6 for observing the British print media frame changes).

Moreover, in the first survey conducted after 1 May 2004 (*Standard EB 62*), immigration was still cited as the most important issue facing the UK and was cited by 29% of the respondents. While this figure still represented the highest concern recorded for this issue anywhere in the EU, it was substantially lower than the 41% noted just before the enlargement date.

This evidence further suggests the negative effects of the increased hysteria in the print media about the possible immigration-related consequences of enlargement in the spring of 2004, just before the enlargement day. British newspapers started to increasingly publish on the issue of enlargement especially in the last four months before

the enlargement date (Please refer to Figure 4-1). As such, the print media coverage of the immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement was a very important factor in determining the public attitudes towards EU enlargement.

These patterns in the British public opinion on enlargement were generally paralleled in the French public opinion. As displayed by Figures 6-1 and 6-2, throughout the time frame of this study, public opinion on enlargement underwent a considerable degree of variation in both countries.

In spring 2001, both Britain and France had identical levels of support for EU enlargement. In both countries, the support level was 35% (*Standard EB 55*). Figure 6-1 shows that while the support for enlargement remained fairly constant (around 40%) from 2001 to 2002 in both France and Britain, these support levels were well below the EU15 average (by at least 10%).

As displayed by Figure 6-2, opposition to EU enlargement too remained somewhat stable from 2001 to 2002 in both countries. During that time frame, the main foreseen consequences of enlargement were a stronger EU, the unification of the continent and a means for new members to increase their economic and political development.

Starting in autumn 2002, support for enlargement started to decrease and opposition started to increase in both countries, but more so in France. French public opinion on enlargement particularly became more negative. As indicated by the results of public opinion analysis, this is due to the fact that more and more people became conscious of the negative consequences of enlargement towards the end of the time frame of this study (Please refer to Figures 5-7 and 5-8).

While the support levels were more or less identical in both countries, strikingly, the level of opposition to enlargement differed significantly in France and Britain. For instance, in spring 2001, the opposition to enlargement in France (47%) was the highest among the EU15 while in Britain it was relatively lower (34%) (*Standard EB 55*).

These differences in opposition levels continued until the end of the time frame of this study (Please refer to Figure 6-2). British opposition trends closely followed the EU15 average opposition trends over time, but were always slightly higher than the EU15 average. In autumn 2001, while in Britain, approximately 33% of people were against enlargement during that time frame, in France, the opposition levels were around 46% and followed an upward trend.

This cross-national difference in attitudes towards enlargement was probably due to the sizeable number of “don’t know” answers in Britain. In other words, the relatively smaller size of opposition in Britain was due to the significant number of people who did not know whether they support the enlargement. To illustrate, in spring 2001, one fourth of the British population said that they had not decided about their position on enlargement (*Standard EB 56*). The number of “don’t know”s was generally much lower (about 10% lower) in France. As suggested by the results of the first-level agenda-setting analysis in Chapter 4, this may be attributable to the fact that, in France, people were exposed to higher numbers of enlargement-related press articles than in Britain.

British support levels over time noticeably followed a declining pattern. Starting from autumn 2002, there was a movement in attitudes towards enlargement in Britain, involving a major net shift from “don’t know” to “no.” A simple explanation for what happened between 2002 and 2004 would be that those who were initially unsure of their

position were largely mobilized against enlargement, due to their increased exposure to enlargement-related media coverage. It can be argued that the print media coverage on enlargement led people to realize that the European project was developing in ways they were not prepared to support, particularly those people who had little prior information about developments.

The trend in France was somewhat different. From autumn 2002 to spring 2003, support for enlargement reached its lowest point in France. The gap between supporters and opponents of enlargement widened tremendously. Just before this decline in support, there was a major surge in the French press coverage of the EU enlargement (Please refer to Figure 4-1).

At the time there were increasing references in the French press about a possible reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU and disagreements regarding the EU budget between France and Germany. In other words, the accession countries were presented as the source of French people's problems, rather than a cure for Europe. This increase in the salience of enlargement's economic subtopics is probably the cause of the decrease in the support for EU enlargement among the French public opinion.

For instance, according to *Standard EB 60*, conducted from October to November 2003, French respondents believed that the most important problems facing the country were unemployment (54%), crime (30%), and the economic situation (29%). It is no coincidence that these were also the most frequently covered subtopics of the French press coverage on the EU enlargement topic. There was a lot of pessimism in the French newspaper coverage towards the economic consequences of enlargement. This pessimism was reflected in the public attitudes towards the EU enlargement.

Following the all-time low figure in support levels, popular support for enlargement gradually increased by 7% from spring 2003 up until spring 2004. In autumn 2003, the French opposition level reached its zenith. This all-time high figure was 15% higher than the opposition levels in Britain, and 18% more than the EU15 opposition levels.

As illustrated by Figure 4-1, the print media salience of EU enlargement has once again increased preceding this change in public opinion. This time, there were frequent references in the French press to various negative consequences of enlargement, ranging from the possible outsourcing of French companies to immigration, the welfare system, and unemployment-related consequences of EU enlargement. This explains why the opposition levels reached their all-time high point during this time period.

Finally, from autumn 2003 to spring 2004, there was a very remarkable change in the direction of the attitudes towards enlargement in France. While the opposition levels in Britain and in EU15 followed an upward pattern under this time period, the French opposition level followed a downward pattern.

This trend was accompanied by a decreasing attention among the French public to the negative effects of EU enlargement. As illustrated in Figure 5-8, just before the enlargement date, there was an increasing attention allocated to the positive aspects of EU enlargement, such as the moral duty to enlarge the EU, the impact of enlargement on EU's power in the world and the positive effects of enlargement on market expansion.

However, this did not mean that the French public opposition to enlargement was totally eliminated in the spring of 2004. Even then, the opposition levels in France were about 7% higher than the EU15 average and 6% higher than the British average. This can

still be explained by the ongoing pessimistic evaluations of the economic consequences of enlargement by the French press. As such, even in March 2004, French people's concerns regarding unemployment have increased by 4% when compared with the results of *Standard EB 60*. Unemployment was still identified as the most important problem facing the country by 58% of French respondents (*Standard EB 61*).

On the other hand, in Britain, from autumn 2002 to spring 2004, opposition was following a continuously upward pattern. As demonstrated by Figure 6-1, support levels in Britain were in a major decline. The decrease in British support is particularly vivid from autumn 2003 to spring 2004. This, again, does not come as a surprise, when one considers the changes in the media and public frames noted prior to May 2004.

As illustrated by Figure 5-6, the negative aspects of enlargement, such as the effects on unemployment, drug trafficking and organized crime, illegal immigration, and welfare system have been increasingly mentioned by the British press. These negative aspects might have contributed to the increasing concerns about the impact of EU enlargement on the daily lives of British citizens, as depicted in Figure 5-7.

Implications of enlargement on immigration, illegal immigration, and on the abuse of the welfare system all provided "compelling arguments" for the salience of the EU enlargement issue in the British public agenda. This analysis suggests that public attitudes towards enlargement changed depending on the changes in the public attention to different consequences of enlargement. This finding confirms the existence of media's priming effects in both the British and the French contexts.

When the public attention is on the predominantly positive political consequences of enlargement, enlargement is more likely to attract support from the public. By contrast,

when the public attention is on the predominantly negative economic consequences of enlargement, public opposition to enlargement becomes more likely. In conclusion, anecdotal public opinion data and scattered evidence from content analysis appears to support the existence of priming effects of the media. Nevertheless, the priming thesis should be subjected to further quantitative testing.

Even though the consequences of print media's agenda-setting and priming effects on public opinion are substantial, print media may not be the only determinant of the public support for enlargement. Some scholars challenge the media effects argument and maintain that the relationship between the media coverage and public opinion is spurious to some alternate correlate of media coverage. To test these claims, this chapter now turns to an examination of the impact of several independent variables on the support for EU enlargement.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF EU ENLARGEMENT

Newton (2006) claims that the powers of the mass media are weak because they are often "diluted" by more powerful mediating forces of social class, religion, age, education, gender, social networks and discussions, trust in the media, personal values, and personal knowledge and experience. Any true test of the relationship between the media and public opinion on enlargement needs to take these other factors into account.

As such, this part of the chapter tests the effects of a number of alternative independent variables (besides the media exposure) on the public attitudes towards enlargement. In what follows, this chapter examines attitudes towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU as a result of a number of variables such as demographic

variables, the media consumption habits, perceptions of specific consequences of EU enlargement, political sophistication and political interest. To achieve this, the remainder of this chapter employs two different methods: it first conducts an individual-level bivariate analysis, and then an individual-level multivariate analysis.

Individual-Level Bivariate Data Analyses

This analysis illustrates the individual-level bivariate relationships between a number of independent variables, such as demographic variables, interest in enlargement, political sophistication, exposure to different media (TV or press), or the predominance of various consequences of enlargement and the public support for EU enlargement. It utilizes cross-tabulations, *chi-square* tests, and binary correlations on the *Standard EB 56* survey data to display the effects of several independent variables on the support for EU enlargement at the individual-level analysis.

The purpose in cross-tabulations is to examine the relationship between two (or more) variables by breaking down the variables into subgroups and subcategories. *Chi-square* test determines relationship between two variables, and evaluates whether frequencies that are empirically obtained differ significantly from those which would be expected under our assumptions. The majority of cross-tabulation tables are shown in Appendix E, but for the sake of illustrating several important relationships I present a limited set here.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the support for EU enlargement. The *Standard EB 56* survey asks the following question: “Are you, personally, in favor of or against the enlargement of the European Union?” Support for EU enlargement is a dichotomous variable, with support coded as 1 and no support coded as 0.

The Independent Variables

Demographic characteristics, such as gender and age, are used as independent variables in many studies projecting the support for EU membership (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Palmer 1995; McLaren 2002; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005). Based on the literature on public attitudes towards European integration, one might expect a gender gap in the attitudes toward the EU enlargement (Givens 2004; Inglehart 1990; Liebert 1999; Nelsen and Guth 2000). Accordingly, women are expected to be more skeptical towards the EU enlargement.

Some may argue that all media are not the same. The study then measures the impact of TV exposure on enlargement support. Hence, this section also tests the hypothesis that exposure to television news has a different impact on people’s perceptions of enlargement than does exposure to newspaper coverage. It also explores the hypothesis that due to the negative tone of political news coverage, higher levels of media exposure should lead to more negative evaluations of EU enlargement.

This chapter further examines the effect of “cognitive mobilization” – or, involvement in politics – on the support for the EU enlargement. Inglehart (1970) and Janssen (1991) note that the more information one receives about the EU, the less threatening the EU becomes. Accordingly, I expect the people with higher levels of political sophistication to support the EU enlargement.

In sum, in addition to testing the relationship between the print media exposure of people and public support for EU enlargement, this chapter also examines the relationship between age, gender, TV exposure, political sophistication, as well as attitudes regarding different consequences of EU enlargement and the individual-level public support for EU enlargement. All of the above-mentioned variables are dummied and entered into cross-tabulation procedure, which was conducted separately for Britain and France. These relationships were also analyzed through *chi-square* tests. The results below present the individual-level findings for the British and French cases together.

Results

The Effects of the Attitudes towards Specific Consequences of EU Enlargement

In Britain, an overwhelming majority of those who thought that enlargement would make their lives better tended to support enlargement. The same trend is true for those who thought that enlargement would make no difference in their lives. Among those who opposed to enlargement in Britain, people who thought that enlargement would make their lives worse had a higher proportion, when compared with their counterparts among the supporters of EU enlargement (Please refer to Table E-1 in Appendix E). These findings indicate a positive and a statistically significant relationship

between the perceived impact of enlargement on people's lives and support for EU enlargement ($p < 0.001$).

The French sample follows a similar pattern on the relationship between the support for EU enlargement and the enlargement's effects on people's lives. A significant majority (80%) of the French people thought that their lives would remain about the same after the enlargement. 65% of those who opposed enlargement believed that their lives would be worse after the expansion of the EU. 93% of those who thought that their lives would become better supported enlargement (Please refer to Table E-2 in Appendix E). These findings are again statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) but are not surprising since it is natural for people to engage in cost-benefit analyses when making decisions about such policy issues that may potentially affect their daily lives.

As such, we can conclude that citizens' considerations about the effects of enlargement on their daily lives played a major role in determining their attitudes toward enlargement. Those who thought that enlargement would make their lives worse tended to oppose enlargement; whereas, those who thought that it would make their lives better tended to support the issue. This was true for both the British and the French people.

Next, this analysis continues with the cross-tabulations of several perceived consequences of EU enlargement and support for EU enlargement (Please refer to Table 6-4). One significant result of these cross-tabulation analyses is that in the French case, there have been major concerns about the unemployment-related consequences of EU enlargement. As shown in Table 6-4, 76% of those who thought that enlargement would increase the unemployment levels in the country opposed the EU enlargement in France.

Table 6-4. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on Unemployment in France

Attitudes towards Enlargement	Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more unemployment		Total N
	Disagree	Agree	
Opposition to Enlargement	41.9%	75.8%	63
Support for Enlargement	58.1%	24.2%	34
Total N	31	66	97

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Additionally, among those who disagreed with the statement that enlargement would increase unemployment, 58% supported the EU enlargement. These findings are statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), and signify that French people's unemployment concerns were important in determining their support for EU enlargement. This aspect is going to be dealt with in detail in Chapter 7. Concerns regarding the impact of immigration were also important in determining people's support for enlargement.

Table 6-5. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on Immigration in France

Attitudes towards Enlargement	Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more people coming from the new member countries to France		Total N
	Disagree	Agree	
Opposition to Enlargement	54%	76.6%	63
Support for Enlargement	46%	23.4%	34
Total N	50	47	97

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

As Table 6-5 indicates, in France, more than two thirds of those who thought that enlargement would increase immigration to France opposed the EU enlargement. Similarly, those who did not think that enlargement would increase immigration tended to oppose enlargement. This relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Furthermore, Table E-3 in Appendix E effectively illustrates how the concerns about illegal immigration also played an important role in determining the attitudes of the French people on enlargement. 76% of those who agreed with the argument that enlargement would increase illegal immigration to France opposed to enlargement, whereas 56% of those who disagreed with that argument supported enlargement. This finding is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Additionally, economic concerns in France were predominant among the public during the enlargement debates (Please refer to Table E-4 in Appendix E). 77% of those who thought that enlargement would increase prices in the country opposed the enlargement. By contrast, 57% of those who disagreed with that statement supported enlargement. This finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As such, French people's concerns regarding the cost of living in France after new countries have joined the EU were also important in determining their support for EU enlargement.

Table 6-6. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on Illegal Immigration in Britain

Attitudes towards Enlargement	Q. 40cc8. After new countries have joined, there will be more illegal immigration to Britain		Total N
	Disagree	Agree	
Opposition to Enlargement	40%	64.9%	42
Support for Enlargement	60%	35.1%	40
Total N	45	37	82

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

As shown in Table 6-6, 65% of the British respondents who believed that enlargement would increase illegal immigration to Britain opposed enlargement. On the other hand, about 60% of those who disagreed with the argument that enlargement would increase illegal immigration to the UK supported enlargement. This finding is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. As expected by the results of the framing analysis in Chapter 5, the British people's concerns about illegal immigration had important effects on their attitudes towards the EU enlargement. Consequently, immigration concerns were influential in both the British and French public opinion on enlargement.

The focus on the relationship between different consequences of enlargement and public support for enlargement is useful for detecting the priming effects of the media. In Britain, for instance, people's attitudes towards illegal immigration had a statistically significant relationship with their support for enlargement. Similarly, in France, people's attitudes towards unemployment, illegal, and legal immigration were important

determinants for the public support for enlargement. As such, we expect the media coverage of these subtopics of enlargement to be influential in shaping the public attitudes towards enlargement. These observations support the results from the first part of this chapter. After analyzing the relationship between attitudes towards various consequences of enlargement and support for EU enlargement, this chapter now deals with the impact of gender and age on the support for enlargement.

The Effect of Demographic Variables

While Table E-5 in Appendix E demonstrates that the distributions are too close to draw any meaningful conclusions about the relationship between gender and enlargement support in Britain. This relationship is not statistically significant. Similarly, in the French case, we cannot observe any discernable differences between the attitudes of female and male respondents toward enlargement (Please refer to Table E-6 in Appendix E). As in the British case, this relationship is not statistically significant in France. We cannot confirm the existence of a statistically significant relationship between gender and attitudes toward enlargement.

The following section tests if there is a statistically significant relationship between age and support for EU enlargement in both countries. The literature on EU integration suggests that the younger portions of the society develop more favorable attitudes towards EU integration, when compared with the older portions of the society. Accordingly, similar tendencies are expected regarding the age and support for EU enlargement.

Age was found to be a statistically significant factor in determining the support for EU enlargement in Britain ($r = - 0.135$; $p < 0.005$). There is a weak but negative relationship between age and support for EU enlargement (Please refer to Table E-7 in Appendix E).

Senior British citizens had much higher opposition levels to enlargement. By contrast, the younger generations in the British society generally tended to support more the EU enlargement. This finding confirms our expectations that age is a significant determinant of the support for the enlargement.

In France too, the direction of the relationship between age and support for EU enlargement is negative ($r = - 0.085$; $p < 0.05$). But it is again a very weak relationship, and the distributions in each cell are too close to draw definitive conclusions. But we can see that the most ardent supporters of EU enlargement come from the 25-35 age-group in France. Once again, our expectations regarding the relationship between age and support for EU enlargement are confirmed (Please refer to Table E-8 in Appendix E).

The Effects of Media Exposure and Perceptions of Media Objectivity

This section presents the cross-tabulation results for the media (newspaper or TV) consumption habits of people and their support for EU enlargement. This helps us determine differences in attitudes towards enlargement as a result of the exposure to different mediums. This analysis then proceeds with a description of the relationship between people's perceptions of media objectivity and support for EU enlargement.

Table 6-7. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to Newspaper Coverage in Britain

Attitudes towards Enlargement	Newspaper as Information Source on EU		Total N
	No	Yes	
Opposition to Enlargement	39.3%	32.6%	253
Support for Enlargement	60.7%	67.4%	430
Total N	456	227	683

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table 6-7 demonstrates that 67% of the British survey respondents who regarded newspapers as their information sources on EU supported the enlargement. 61% of those who did not regard newspapers as information sources on EU matters supported the enlargement. This finding is not statistically significant, but the descriptive statistics are vital for the purposes of this study.

Those who read newspapers to gain information about EU affairs supported the issue of EU enlargement less when compared with those who did not read newspapers. On the other hand, those who did not read newspapers opposed EU enlargement more than those who read newspapers. This finding supports the results suggested by the consequences of agenda setting section in this chapter.

The relationship between people's reliance on newspaper for EU affairs and their support for EU enlargement is again not statistically significant in the French case. Nevertheless, if we look at the results in Table 6-8, we can see that in France, similar to the case in Britain, those who read newspapers to gain information on EU developments

tend to support EU enlargement much less than those who do not read newspapers. These results may be attributable to the predominantly negative press coverage on EU enlargement in both countries.

Table 6-8. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to Newspaper Coverage in France

Attitudes towards Enlargement	Newspaper as Information Source on EU		Total N
	No	Yes	
Opposition to Enlargement	46.4%	45.1%	369
Support for Enlargement	53.6%	54.9%	434
Total N	535	268	803

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

When compared to France, in Britain, among the opponents of EU enlargement, there was a bigger difference between the people who relied on newspapers to gather information on EU events and those who did not rely on newspapers for such information. This is probably due to the fact that the British newspapers generally cover EU affairs more negatively, when compared with the French newspapers.

This analysis continues with an emphasis on the effects of reliance on TV for information on EU affairs. This is a useful exercise especially since this research could not conduct a content analysis of TV news on enlargement. This exercise should help us in identifying possible differences (if any) between the effects of the TV and the newspaper exposure on the public attitudes towards the EU enlargement.

Table 6-9. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to TV News Coverage in Britain

Attitudes towards Enlargement	TV as Information Source on EU		Total N
	No	Yes	
Opposition to Enlargement	40.3%	33.5%	253
Support for Enlargement	59.7%	66.5%	430
Total N	352	331	683

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

As shown in Table 6-9, the British people who regarded TV as an information source on EU affairs supported the EU enlargement slightly more than those who did not regard TV as a source. While, on the other hand, opposition to EU enlargement was less among people who watched TV to gain information on EU affairs, when compared to those who did not watch TV.

In other words, the opposition to enlargement decreased with exposure to TV coverage on EU. This observation implies that the TV news coverage on EU in Britain was primarily positive. However, this relationship is not statistically significant. As such, this analysis concludes that there were differences between the effects of TV and press coverage on people's attitudes on enlargement in Britain. These findings tentatively suggest that while TV exposure was likely to encourage support for the Eastern enlargement, press exposure was likely to discourage it.

In order to test for cross-national differences in the effects of TV coverage, this analysis now turns to the French case. Table 6-10 depicts the statistically significant relationship ($p < 0.001$) between the support for EU enlargement and the reliance on TV

coverage for gathering information on EU affairs. This is a positive but weak relationship ($r = 0.128$).

Table 6-10. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Exposure to TV News Coverage in France

Attitudes towards	TV as Information Source on EU		Total N
	No	Yes	
Enlargement			
Opposition to Enlargement	53.4%	40.4%	369
Support for Enlargement	46.6%	59.6%	434
Total N	343	460	803

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

In France, the respondents who relied on TV for gaining information on EU affairs supported EU enlargement almost twice as much as those who did not rely on TV for such information. This finding supports the tendencies outlined in the British case. TV has a more positive impact on the support for EU enlargement when compared with the press. 60% of those who regarded TV as information source supported EU enlargement; while 53% of those who did not regard TV as information source on EU opposed to enlargement.

The following section presents the findings of the Pearson correlation analyses for the relationship between people's perceptions of media objectivity and support for EU enlargement. This study expects that when people think that the media are objective, they are more likely to support EU enlargement than not. It first starts with the results for the newspaper objectivity and then continues with the results for TV objectivity.

Questions 9a and 9b of *Standard EB 56* ask people about their perceptions of television and newspaper coverage objectivity, respectively. In Britain, the relationships between the support for EU enlargement and people's perceptions of media objectivity (press and TV objectivity) are not statistically significant. The *Pearson correlation coefficients* are identical for both relationships ($r = 0.09$). The results of these analyses are important for descriptive purposes. In Britain, people give better objectivity scores to TV than they did to newspapers. This illustrates the skepticism newspaper coverage raised among the British public.

Similar to the case in Britain, TV coverage received better scores for objectivity among the French people, when compared with the press coverage. However, unlike the case in Britain, in France, the relationships between the support for enlargement and perceptions of TV and press coverage objectivity are not so strong but are statistically significant ($r = 0.171$, $p < 0.05$; and, $r = 0.211$, $p < 0.05$ respectively). In other words, as the perceptions of media objectivity increased, French people became more likely to support EU enlargement than not. With these important results, this analysis now turns to an assessment of the effects of people's interest in enlargement on their attitudes towards the topic.

The Effects of Interest in the Enlargement Topic

There is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the support for EU enlargement and people's level of interest in the topic ($r = 0.265$; $p < 0.001$). This

is in line with the expectations from the political communication literature: as political interest increases, so does the support for an issue.

As expected, 77% of those who expressed their interest in EU enlargement supported. 51% of those who are not interested in EU enlargement still supported the issue. By contrast, among the opponents of enlargement, those who were interested in the topic were by far surpassed by those who were not interested in the topic. This again is in line with our expectations. People who showed interest to enlargement issue were more likely to support enlargement than those who were not interested in the topic (Please refer to Table E-9 in Appendix E).

Similar to the case in Britain, 67% of French respondents who expressed their interests in enlargement supported the EU enlargement. On the other hand, 63% of those who were not interested in enlargement opposed enlargement. People who were not interested in enlargement tended to oppose enlargement more than people who were interested in this development. In other words, interest in enlargement and support for the issue are dependent on each other (Please refer to Table E-10 in Appendix E).

These findings are statistically significant ($r = 0.302$; $p < 0.001$) and confirm the findings in the British context. As such, we can conclude that there is a very important positive relationship between people's interest in enlargement and their attitudes toward enlargement. After confirming the important cross-national role of interest in enlargement on the support for the issue, this section now turns to an analysis of the impact of political sophistication.

The Effect of Political Sophistication

There is little consensus in the priming literature on the role played by the intervening variables of political knowledge, political awareness, or political sophistication (Van der Brug *et al.* 2007). This section seeks to shed new light on the effect of political sophistication on people's attitudes towards EU enlargement.

Question 35 in *Standard EB 56* asks, "How well informed do you feel about enlargement?" Although it is a subjective measure based on a self-proclaimed measure, it still gives us an important opportunity to draw several conclusions regarding the effects of the level of information about enlargement on the support for enlargement.

As expected, Table E-11 in Appendix E shows that with an increase in the level of information on enlargement, people became more likely to support enlargement than not (even though the numbers are extremely low in the "very well" or "well-informed" categories). However, if we look at category 1, *i.e.* people who thought that they were "not at all informed" about enlargement, we can see that those who expressed opposition to enlargement were more than those who expressed support. This relationship is positive and statistically significant ($r = 0.135$; $p < 0.005$).

In other words, in the British case, we can argue that political sophistication was an important element in determining people's attitudes toward enlargement. Another substantial result from Table E-11 is the low number of people that expressed that they feel very well-informed about enlargement. Among those who were against enlargement ($N = 247$), only one person claimed to be very well informed about the topic. Among those who supported enlargement, only seven people did so.

The tendencies in the French case are similar to the ones in the British case. The relationship between political sophistication and support for enlargement is positive and statistically significant ($r = 0.175$; $p < 0.001$). With an increased political sophistication, people became more likely to support enlargement than not. But, 57% of those who thought that they were “not at all informed” about enlargement opposed the issue (Please refer to Table E-12 in Appendix E).

An important cross-national comparative result emerges from this analysis. In France, the percentage of people who claimed to be “well” or “very well” informed about enlargement was slightly larger than the case in Britain. As suggested by the results of the first-level agenda-setting analyses in Chapter 4, this finding may be due to the extensive coverage on enlargement in the French media. In other words, this broad coverage in the French press might have educated the French people about the different dimensions of the EU enlargement.

The Effect of Attitudes towards the EU

Question 47d of *Standard EB 56* sought to determine people’s attachment to the EU. This analysis hypothesizes that people’s attachment level to EU would affect their attitudes toward the EU enlargement. It expects the support for EU enlargement to be greater among the people who expressed their attachments to the EU.

In Britain, only 6.2% of the people expressed that they were closely attached to the EU. This proportion is less than half of the French percentage (Please refer to Tables E-13 and E-14 in Appendix E). Also, the percentage of people who did not feel attached

to EU in Britain was much more sizeable than was the case in France. This does not come as a surprise considering the fact that the British people are renowned for their Euro-skepticism whereas the French people are famous for their Euro-enthusiasm. The question is: How do these findings relate to their support for EU enlargement?

As expected, among the British people who did not feel attached to the EU, opposition to EU enlargement was more than twice as much as the support for enlargement. Additionally, among those who are “somehow” and “very attached” to the EU, support levels for EU enlargement were higher than opposition levels. Again, when people’s attachment levels were low, the proportions of opposition to EU enlargement were higher than the proportions of support for the topic. As such, this analysis concludes that there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between people’s attachment to the EU and their support for enlargement ($r = 0.339$; $p < 0.001$).

In France too, among the people who did not feel attached to the EU, opposition to enlargement was much higher than the support for the topic. Again, among the French people who expressed that they are only “slightly” attached to the EU, opposition to enlargement was higher than its support. However, among the people who were “somehow” and “very attached” to the EU, support levels for EU enlargement were higher than opposition levels. These results point to a strong positive correlation ($r = 0.397$) between the level of attachment to the EU and the support for EU enlargement and are statistically significant at the 0.001 level (Please refer to Table E-14).

In addition, Question 53 of *Standard EB 56* asked people about their favorability toward the EU. This analysis hypothesizes that the more favorable people feel toward the EU, the more likely they are to support the EU enlargement. In line with our

expectations, the results of the *Pearson's r* correlations in both the British and French cases suggest that there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between people's favorability towards the EU and their support for the enlargement ($r = 0.480$, $p < 0.05$; and $r = 0.494$, $p < 0.01$, respectively). In other words, as favorability towards the EU increased, the support for EU enlargement also increased in both France and Britain.

This part provided individual-level bivariate analyses for the relationships between several independent variables and people's support for EU enlargement. The following part conducts an individual-level multivariate public opinion analysis in France to explore the factors that are involved in determining public support for EU enlargement.

An Individual-Level Multivariate Data Analysis in France, 2001

Following an analysis of the individual-level bivariate relationships between several independent variables and the support for EU enlargement, the next step in this research is to determine which of these factors best account for the likelihood of supporting the EU enlargement. As such, this research continues with a multivariate analysis that illustrates the individual-level dynamics of the interaction between these independent variables and the support for EU enlargement in France.³

It conducts an individual-level analysis on public opinion to explore the interaction of different factors in determining the overall public support for enlargement. In other words, it aims to provide a better understanding of what other independent

³ A multivariate analysis could not be conducted on the British sample in year 2001 due to the large number of missing values in the British public opinion data.

variables are involved in the EU enlargement public opinion formation process. A logistic regression is conducted on the French sample to determine the contribution of a number of independent variables in the prediction of the dependent variable, support for EU enlargement. In other words, this analysis conducts binary logit on the French sample of the *Standard EB 56* data in order to model the probability of support for enlargement.

In interpreting the results of a logistic regression, the odds ratios are usually used to quantify the effect of significant independent variables on the dependent variable. As a rule, odds ratios less than 1 correspond to decreases and odds ratios more than 1 correspond to increases in odds. Odds ratios close to 1 indicate that unit changes in that independent variable do not affect the dependent variable.

The Dependent Variable

As in the previous analyses in this chapter, the dependent variable is the support for EU enlargement, a dichotomous variable (with support coded as 1 and no support coded as 0).

The Independent Variables

The independent variables employed in this individual-level analysis are: gender (coded as female); age; newspaper exposure; TV exposure; perceptions of objectivity of TV; perceptions of newspaper objectivity; people's interest in enlargement; political sophistication; cost-benefit analysis; perceived impact of enlargement on unification of the continent, on peace, on the elimination of conflicts, on the fight against terrorism, on

economic growth, on employment, on the quality of life, on EU's power in the world, on economies of the new members, on EU decision-making; on the variety of products, on national companies, on the role of France within the EU; on quality of food, on environment, on immigration, on the EU power vis-à-vis the US, on EU's relations with the citizens; people's attachment to town; their attachment to region; their attachment to country; their attachment to EU; and, their favorability towards the EU.

Results

Of the 32 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-11. As such, Table 6-11 suggests a model for explaining an individual's support level for enlargement. In other words, it presents the results for a general model of public support for EU enlargement in France.

Support for EU enlargement = $\beta_1 + \beta_2 * \text{Gender} + \beta_3 * \text{Age} + \beta_4 * \text{Exposure to Newspaper} + \beta_5 * \text{Exposure to TV} + \beta_6 * \text{Interest in Enlargement} + \beta_7 * \text{Political Sophistication} + \beta_8 * \text{Impact on Workings of the EU} + \beta_9 * \text{Impact on Companies} + \beta_{10} * \text{Impact on Immigration} + \beta_{11} * \text{Impact on EU Power} + \beta_{12} * \text{Attachment to EU} + \beta_{13} * \text{Favorability towards EU}$

Table 6-11 presents the predicted change in odds for EU enlargement support for a unit increase in the corresponding independent variable, such as gender, age, reliance on newspapers, reliance on TV news, interest in enlargement, political sophistication, attachment to EU, favorability towards the EU, and perceived impact of enlargement on the internal workings of EU, on national companies, on immigration, and on EU's power in the world.

Table 6-11. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in France, 2001

	French Support for EU Enlargement, 2001
Gender	0.70; 2.01 (0.98)
Age	- 0.55; 0.95 (0.48)
Exposure to Newspaper Coverage	- 2.47; 0.08* (1.36)
Exposure to TV Coverage	1.326; 3.76 (1.45)
Interest in Enlargement	3.02; 20.51** (1.24)
Political Sophistication	- 1.35; 0.26* (0.84)
EU will Work Better	4.88; 130.94*** (1.68)
Companies will Benefit	2.93; 18.69** (1.41)
Easier for Others to Settle in	- 0.57; 0.57 (1.75)
EU Stronger than US	- 1.34; 0.26 (1.25)
Personal Attachment to EU	1.02; 2.77 (0.74)
Favorability towards EU	0.83; 2.30*** (0.33)
Constant	- 10.98; 0.00*** (4.64)
Observations	112

Entries are log-odds; and odds ratio coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests)

The most important empirical finding presented by the model in Table 6-11 is that there is a statistically significant but negative relationship between exposure to newspaper coverage and the support for EU enlargement. This means that for every one unit increase in exposure to newspaper coverage, the odds of supporting the EU enlargement (vs. no support) decrease by a factor of 0.08 ($p < 0.10$). This finding provides limited support for the relationships identified by the previous cross-tabulation analyses on the individual-level bivariate relationships between newspaper exposure and support for EU enlargement in France (Please refer to Tables 6-1, 6-3, and 6-8). However, this relationship is relatively weak.

As people received increasing exposure to newspaper coverage on EU affairs, they became less likely to support enlargement. This supports the “negativity-effectiveness” thesis noted earlier in this chapter. The tone of the media coverage is a very significant determinant of the support for EU enlargement. An important implication of this finding is that the journalists need to pay extra caution to the content of their reporting on EU affairs since it has vast consequences on the gap between elites and public opinion as will be explained in Chapter 7.

The relationship between the TV coverage and enlargement support is positive, but not statistically significant. As Table 6-11 displays, with one unit increase in exposure to TV coverage, the odds of supporting the EU enlargement increase by a factor of 3.76. This comparison between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supports the previous findings in this chapter (Please refer to Table 6-10).

Since TV coverage tends to be more supportive of the EU enlargement, people exposed to TV coverage are also more supportive of the topic. On the other hand, since

the press coverage is relatively negative, people who are exposed to newspaper coverage are more skeptical towards the issue than not. Future studies should content analyze both the TV news coverage and the press coverage of European affairs to explore the differences in media effects on public opinion between these two different outlets.

Another significant finding indicated by Table 6-11 is that, as expected, as the level of interest in enlargement increases, people's likelihood of supporting enlargement also increases. The relationship is strong, positive, and statistically significant. For every one unit increase in the interest in enlargement, the odds of supporting this development increase by a factor of 20.51 ($p < 0.05$). This represents a stronger relationship than the relationship between the newspaper exposure and the support for EU enlargement.

What is more surprising is that for every one unit increase in the thoughts about the positive impact of enlargement on the workings of the EU, the odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 130.94 ($p < 0.01$). This demonstrates the strongest statistically significant relationship in this multivariate analysis. Put more specifically, when people's thoughts on the positive implications of enlargement on the internal workings of EU increase, the odds of supporting enlargement increase substantially.

This observation signifies that people consider the benefit of enlargement for the Union (instead of the benefit of enlargement for themselves) when they consider their support for EU enlargement. It is very counterintuitive, since most works in the EU integration literature suggest that people engage in cost-benefit analyses of the impact of integration on their own lives when they come up with their position on issues regarding European integration.

This unexpected finding may be due to the fact that the public opinion data for this analysis is derived from the year 2001. As the enlargement issue received more public attention, people might have started to think about enlargement more in line with the expectations of the cost-benefit analysis argument. Put more precisely, since the coverage on enlargement became more comprehensive as the enlargement date approached, people might increasingly have started to realize the impact of this development on their own lives, and hence, based their decisions to support enlargement on considerations regarding the consequences of this development for their own lives (rather than consequences for the EU itself).

The results of this logistic regression analysis also point to a strong relationship between the support for EU enlargement and another perceived consequence of EU enlargement. This time it is the perceived benefit of enlargement on national companies. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the perceived benefit for national companies and the support for enlargement ($p < 0.05$). For every one unit increase in the perception that there will be increased benefits for the national companies, the odds of supporting the EU enlargement increase by a factor of 18.7.

As the analysis illustrates, the perceptions of positive consequences of EU are likely to increase the support for enlargement among the public. However, the two negative consequences displayed in Table 6-11 are found to be statistically insignificant for determining the decision to support enlargement. These are the impact of enlargement on increased immigration and on the power of the EU vis-à-vis the US in the world. These findings may again be due to the fact that this analysis does not take into account the more recent developments in public attitudes towards enlargement. This study expects

an increase in the attention to negative aspects of EU enlargement as the enlargement day approaches, yet it is too early in the time frame to observe any such changes in the Standard EB 56 public opinion data.

On the other hand, as hypothesized, there is a very strong, positive and statistically significant relationship between favorability to the EU and the support for EU enlargement. For every one unit increase in favorability, the odds of supporting the EU enlargement (vs. not supporting) increase by a factor of 2.30 ($p < 0.01$).

One of the most unforeseen and contradictory results from the multivariate analysis is that political sophistication has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the support for EU enlargement. This finding is inconsistent with the individual-level bivariate tendencies outlined in Table E-12.

The results of the individual-level analysis suggest that for every one unit increase in self-declared political knowledge on enlargement, the odds of supporting the EU enlargement (vs. not supporting) decrease by a factor of 0.26 ($p < 0.10$). This finding is particularly striking since we would expect people who know more on the EU enlargement to be more likely to support the issue (than not support it).

One reason for this negative relationship may be that this independent variable is not based on people's actual level of knowledge on enlargement, but their self-suggested level of knowledge on the topic. Even if respondents may claim that they are knowledgeable on the enlargement issue, in reality, they may not have been as well-informed as they have suggested.

Another explanation for this negative relationship may be that as people become more educated on the specific aspects of the topic, they may become alienated from

enlargement. This has something to do with the realization of several negative consequences of enlargement. If people learn that enlargement will cause increased unemployment as well as increased illegal and legal immigration in their countries, they may become more likely to oppose it. Further analysis should be conducted to come to a decisive conclusion on this significant relationship.

The gender variable has an odds ratio coefficient of 2.01, which signifies that women are more likely than men to support EU enlargement. This confirms the previous results on the relationship between gender and support for EU enlargement. However, this is not a statistically significant relationship. Furthermore, the age variable does not seem to have any discernable effect on the support for EU enlargement ($\text{Exp}(B) = 0.95$).

In sum, the results of this logistic regression analysis suggest that gender, age, exposure to TV coverage, considerations about immigration, power of the EU vis-à-vis the US, and personal attachment to EU are not statistically significant variables in determining the support for EU enlargement in France. On the other hand, exposure to newspaper coverage, political sophistication, interest in enlargement, projections of enlargement's impact on the workings of EU and benefit for national companies, and favorability towards the EU are statistically significant variables for predicting the French support for enlargement in 2001.

As such, while the current analysis concludes that print media has a negative and statistically significant influence on the public support for EU enlargement, this influence is found to be quite limited. As illustrated by the model in Table 6-11, there were a number of other significant variables that determined people's support for EU enlargement.

However, as explained earlier, these results should be treated with caution since they only account for the public support for enlargement in 2001, three years before the enlargement date. Furthermore, there were only 112 observations for the French sample in 2001. This was due to a large number of missing values (“don’t know”s) in the *Standard EB 56* data. In the course of three years, it is only natural to expect significant changes in public opinion regarding the enlargement topic with an increased attention to the topic by the media. The remaining sections in this chapter conduct individual-level multivariate analysis on both the British and the French samples using *Flash EB 132.2* survey data in order to provide a more recent analysis of developments in public opinion.

Individual-Level Multivariate Data Analyses in Britain and France, 2002

This section presents the findings from the analyses of the relationships between people’s expectations regarding the consequences of EU enlargement and their attitudes towards enlargement in Britain and France in year 2002. Besides its more up-to-date account of changes in public opinion on enlargement, this analysis further helps us determine which consequence(s) receive(s) the highest attention among the British and French publics during the public opinion formation process. As such, the results of this analysis have important implications on the validity of priming thesis.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the support for EU enlargement, a dichotomous variable. Support for enlargement is coded as 1 and no support is coded as 0.

The Independent Variables

The independent variables employed in this individual-level analysis are: gender (with female coded as 1); awareness of EU enlargement; perceptions of national importance of EU enlargement; perceptions of personal importance of EU enlargement; perceptions of enlargement as moral duty; perceived impact of enlargement on peace, on EU's power in the world, on the cost of enlargement for the country, on the role of country within the EU, on EU decision-making, on EU's relations with the citizens, on expansion of markets, on immigration, on illegal immigration, on crime and drug trafficking, on unemployment, on social welfare, and, on culture.

Results for the British Sample

Of the 19 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-12. As such, Table 6-12 suggests a model for explaining an individual's support level for enlargement in Britain.

Support for EU enlargement = $\beta_1 + \beta_2 * \text{Enlargement awareness} + \beta_3 * \text{Personal Importance of EU enlargement} + \beta_4 * \text{EU's power in the world} + \beta_5 * \text{Cost of enlargement} + \beta_6 * \text{Impact on UK's role within the EU} + \beta_7 * \text{Historically natural} + \beta_8 * \text{Impact on the expansion of markets} + \beta_9 * \text{Impact on culture}$

Table 6-12 presents the predicted change in odds for support for EU enlargement for a unit increase in the corresponding independent variable.

Table 6-12. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in Britain, 2002

	British Support for EU Enlargement, 2003
Awareness of EU Enlargement	0.925; 2.521*** (0.263)
Importance of EU Enlargement for the UK	- 0.116; 0.891 (0.172)
Personal Importance of EU Enlargement	0.316; 1.372** (0.154)
Positive Impact on EU's Role in the World	0.742; 2.101** (0.328)
The Cost of EU Enlargement	- 0.917; 0.400** (0.343)
Impact on UK's Role within the EU	- 0.551; 0.577* (0.285)
Historically Natural to Expand the EU	1.092; 2.979*** (0.276)
Impact on the Expansion of Markets	1.500; 4.480*** (0.391)
Impact on Culture	- 1.012; 0.363*** (0.304)
Constant	- 1.245; 0.288* (0.698)
Observations	568

Entries are log-odds; and odds ratio coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses.
 ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests)

One significant finding indicated by Table 6-12 is that as the level of enlargement awareness increases, people's likelihood of supporting enlargement also increases. The

relationship is strong, positive and statistically significant. For every one unit increase in the interest in enlargement, the odds of supporting this development increase by a factor of 2.521 ($p < 0.01$).

Another notable finding suggested by the results of this analysis is that in Britain, people's perceptions of the importance of EU enlargement for their country did not play a statistically significant role in affecting their likelihood of supporting the issue. On the other hand, people's perceptions of the personal importance of EU enlargement played an important role in determining their support for the issue. For every one unit increase in the perception of enlargement as personally significant, the odds of supporting this development increase by a factor of 1.372 ($p < 0.05$). It is very natural to observe this relationship, since as noted earlier people have a tendency to engage in cost-benefit analyses when they come up with their attitudes towards certain policy issues.

For every one unit increase in British people's expectations of a positive impact of enlargement on EU's power, the odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 2.101 ($p < 0.05$). This means that if people believe that enlargement will contribute to the power of the EU in the world, they become more likely to support this development.

As displayed by Table 6-12, when people think that the EU enlargement will be costly, their likelihood of supporting enlargement decreases by a factor of 0.400 ($p < 0.01$). Also, if when the British people think that enlargement will make the UK less important within the EU, their likelihood of supporting this issue decreases by a factor of 0.577 ($p < 0.1$).

The results of this logistic regression analysis point to a strong but negative relationship between the British support for EU enlargement and the perceived impact of

enlargement on culture. For every one unit increase in the perceived impact of enlargement on culture, the odds of supporting enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.363 ($p < 0.01$). This is probably due to the concerns the British people had regarding possible effects of post-enlargement immigration waves and other negative consequences of enlargement on their culture and society.

Furthermore, as expected, Table 6-12 shows that people's perceptions of the enlargement's effect on the expansion of markets have the highest impact on people's support for enlargement in Britain. The expansion of markets has been one of the components of the economic consequences of the EU enlargement. For every one unit increase in people's perceptions of the positive impact of enlargement on the expansion of markets, their odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 4.480 ($p < 0.01$). This is by far the strongest statistically significant and positive relationship in this multivariate analysis. This finding implies that the anticipated economic consequences were vital when the British people developed their attitudes towards the EU enlargement; and, supports the findings of the second-level agenda-setting analysis in Britain.

Results for the French Sample

Of the 19 independent variables included in this analysis, only the statistically significant and some key ones are presented in Table 6-13. As such, Table 6-13 suggests a model for explaining an individual's support level for enlargement in France in 2002. It presents the predicted change in odds for support for EU enlargement for a unit increase in the corresponding independent variable.

Table 6-13. A Model of Public Support for EU Enlargement in France, 2002

	French Support for EU Enlargement, 2003
Gender	0.372; 1.451* (0.217)
National Importance of EU Enlargement	0.427; 1.533** (0.148)
Personal Importance of EU Enlargement	0.326; 1.385** (0.138)
Moral Duty to Expand the EU	0.730; 2.076*** (0.226)
EU's Power in the World	0.630; 1.877** (0.238)
Impact on France's Role within the EU	- 0.810; 0.445*** (0.224)
Impact on the EU's Proximity to Citizens	- 0.608; 0.545** (0.232)
Historically Natural to Expand the EU	0.912; 2.489*** (0.226)
Impact on the Expansion of Markets	0.472; 1.604* (0.260)
Impact on Social Welfare	- 0.572; 0.564** (0.243)
Impact on Culture	- 0.626; 0.535** (0.233)
Constant	- 1.675; 0.187** (0.624)
Observations	760

Entries are log-odds; and odds ratio coefficients statistics. Standard errors in parentheses.
 ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests)

As can be seen in Table 6-13, the model supported for the French sample in 2002 is as follows:

Support for EU enlargement = $\beta_1 + \beta_2 * \text{Gender} + \beta_3 * \text{National Importance of EU enlargement} + \beta_4 * \text{Personal Importance of EU enlargement} + \beta_5 * \text{Moral Duty to Enlarge} + \beta_6 * \text{Impact on EU's power in the world} + \beta_7 * \text{Impact on the Country's role within the EU} + \beta_8 * \text{Impact on the EU's proximity to the citizens} + \beta_9 * \text{Historically natural} + \beta_{10} * \text{Impact on the expansion of markets} + \beta_{11} * \text{Impact on Social Welfare} + \beta_{12} * \text{Impact on Culture}$

In France, in 2002, gender is found to be a statistically significant factor determining the likelihood of support for EU enlargement. Put more specifically, women have more likelihood of supporting the EU enlargement, when compared to men in France ($p < 0.10$). This tendency was similar for the French sample in 2001. But the results were not statistically significant at that time.

Similar to the British case, in France, there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between the anticipated personal importance of enlargement and people's likelihood of supporting the enlargement issue. For every one unit increase in the perceived personal significance of EU enlargement, the odds of supporting EU enlargement increase by a factor of 1.385 ($p < 0.05$). Furthermore, as in the British case, the French people's perceptions of the impact of enlargement on the expansion of markets contributed to the support for enlargement. Again, as in the British case, for every one unit increase in people's perceptions of the impact of enlargement on culture, the likelihood of supporting enlargement decreased significantly.

However, unlike the British sample, the results of this logistic regression in French sample point to a statistically significant and positive relationship between the perceived national importance of enlargement and support for enlargement. This observation illustrates a very important difference between the ways the British and the French people form their opinions on enlargement. When determining their opinions on enlargement, the French sample emphasized the importance of enlargement both personally and for their country, while the British sample only considered the perceived significance of this EU affair personally.

Furthermore, the French people's concerns about the impact of enlargement on social welfare were found to decrease their likelihood of supporting the EU enlargement. For every one unit increase in people's perceptions of the impact of enlargement on the welfare system in France, the odds of supporting the enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.564 ($p < 0.01$).

Most importantly, confirming the results of the second-level agenda-setting analysis in France, among the three main consequences of EU enlargement, the French sample is found to pay most attention to the political consequences of EU enlargement. As illustrated by Table 6-13, people's perceptions of EU enlargement as a moral duty, the impact of enlargement on EU's power in the world, impact of enlargement on France's role within the EU, impact of enlargement on EU's proximity to citizens, perceptions of enlargement as historically natural were all identified as statistically significant factors in determining the support for EU enlargement.

Among these independent variables, people's perceptions of EU enlargement as moral duty and historically natural, and the impact of enlargement on EU's power in the

world were found to increase the likelihood of support for enlargement. Especially, people's perceptions of enlargement as a historically natural development had the strongest positive relationship with people's likelihood of supporting the EU enlargement. For every one unit increase in French people's perceptions of enlargement as a historically natural development, the odds of supporting enlargement increase by a factor of 2.489 ($p < 0.01$).

However, people's perceptions of enlargement's negative effects on both France's role within the EU and proximity of EU to citizens were found to decrease the likelihood of support for enlargement. To illustrate, for every one unit increase in people's concerns about a possible negative impact of enlargement on France's role within the EU, the French people's odds of supporting enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.445 ($p < 0.01$). This finding effectively underlies the sensitivities of the French people regarding the possible negative political consequences of the addition of ten new members that are sympathetic to US foreign policy preferences.

Additionally, people's concerns about enlargement's potential negative effects on the proximity of EU to masses led to a decreased likelihood of support for enlargement among the French public. For every one unit increase in the concerns regarding this particular political consequence, the odds of French support for EU enlargement decrease by a factor of 0.545 ($p < 0.05$). These statistically significant and strong findings indicate that the projected political consequences of EU enlargement were notable when the French people formed their opinion about enlargement in 2002. In other words, the findings of the second-level agenda-setting analysis are confirmed in this section.

CONCLUSION

This chapter was primarily interested in identifying the factors that are influential in determining the public support for EU enlargement. In line with the recent developments in the agenda setting research, this chapter first dealt with the consequences of agenda-setting. The results presented in this chapter illustrate strong agenda-setting consequences of the media on public opinion. They suggest that the daily newspaper readership has a strong influence on people's attitudes toward enlargement. The results presented in this chapter also suggest that people are more sensitive to the salience of negative information than to that of non-negative information in the press coverage of enlargement.

Regarding the consequences of agenda setting, this chapter also conducted a priming analysis. The findings of the priming analysis suggest that the public attention to different consequences of enlargement (as determined by the press attention to these subtopics) is influential in determining the weight assigned to these particular consequences by people when they form their opinions on the EU enlargement. The issues of immigration in Britain and unemployment in France perfectly illustrate the validity of the priming argument.

Besides testing the effect of print media exposure on people's support for enlargement, this chapter also analyzed the effects of age, gender, TV exposure, political sophistication, as well as different attitudes towards the consequences of EU enlargement on public support for EU enlargement. In that sense, this is one of the pioneering projects that specifically analyze the determinants of public support for EU enlargement at the individual level.

It concluded that people's considerations about the effects of enlargement on their daily lives played a major role in determining their attitudes toward enlargement. Regarding the French public support for EU enlargement, the results in this chapter draw attention to a significant impact of the concerns regarding unemployment as well as legal and illegal immigration-related consequences of enlargement. Furthermore, French concerns regarding the immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement were paralleled in the British public opinion formation process.

Both in France and in Britain, those who read newspapers to gain information on EU developments tended to support EU enlargement much less than those who did not read newspapers. However, this relationship was not statistically significant in either case. Findings in this part also tentatively suggest that while TV exposure encouraged support for EU enlargement, press exposure discouraged it. These tendencies are confirmed at the individual-level analysis as well.

The perceptions of media objectivity were also positively correlated with the enlargement support in both countries (yet, the results were only statistically significant in France). Interest in the enlargement issue, political sophistication, personal attachment to EU, and favorability towards EU are also found to be significantly correlated with the support for enlargement in both countries.

Following the bivariate analysis of the relationship between different independent variables and the support for EU enlargement at the individual-level, this chapter further concluded with an individual-level multivariate analysis, in order to get a better sense of the influence of various independent variables that may affect people's support for the EU enlargement.

Exposure to newspaper coverage was found to have a negative relationship with the support for EU enlargement. This again supports the negativity-effectiveness thesis suggested by an earlier finding in this chapter.

The comparison between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supports the previous bivariate findings in this research. Since TV coverage tended to be more supportive of the EU enlargement, people exposed to TV coverage were also found to be more supportive of the topic. Further analysis should be conducted by future studies regarding the differences in the effects of these different mediums on public attitudes.

Furthermore, confirming the results of the bivariate analysis in this chapter, an individual's level of interest is again found to be positively correlated with his or her likelihood of supporting enlargement. Also validating the previous results presented in this chapter, this research found a very strong, positive and statistically significant relationship between favorability to the EU and the support for enlargement.

However, the individual-level results regarding the effect of political sophistication on the support for enlargement challenged the bivariate results on the topic. Put more specifically, the results of the multivariate individual-level analysis suggested a statistically significant but a negative relationship between political sophistication and support for EU enlargement. As such, this relationship commands further analysis. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the results presented in this chapter should be treated with caution since they are derived from a public opinion survey conducted three and two years prior to the enlargement date.

Confirming the results presented in Chapter 5, our regression analysis in the final section indicates that the British people were more prone to emphasizing the economic

consequences of EU enlargement when developing their opinions towards enlargement. Similarly, our findings regarding the French sample suggest that the French people emphasized the political consequences of EU enlargement the most when forming their opinions on enlargement at the end of year 2002.

The results presented in the empirical chapters of this research are very important for the purposes of this research. But without contextualization, they do not add much clarity to the interactions between the media, the masses and the elites. Hence, in order to provide some background for the empirical findings presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the following chapter reviews the political climate in Britain and France during the EU enlargement debates.

Chapter 7: The Connection between Elites, Public Opinion, and the Media in Britain and France

European Union, from the beginning, has been an elite-driven project. European elites have historically and typically favored the movement towards greater European integration. Indeed, it is empirically undeniable that most of the time they have done so in disregard of public opinion.

It is not uncommon to see European elites initiating EU projects even when most of the public is against such moves. As the failure of the ratification of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch people in 2005 demonstrates, the EU runs the risk of ending up being an entirely elite-driven exercise that fails to engage the mass public altogether. Hence, “democratic deficit” and “lack of transparency” are familiar expressions in academic and media commentaries on the shortcomings of the EU.

The interaction between the public opinion, the mass media and the political elites is usually ignored by the political communication scholars. Scholars are still in the process of defining how public opinion intersects with the European Community’s policymaking process.

After confirming the media effects on public opinion through empirical analyses in the previous chapters, this research now proceeds with searching for answers to the following questions: Is there a direct connection between what the public thinks and what policymakers do? What role do the media play in this process?

The current chapter adds some flesh to the empirical findings presented in this research. It is essential to review the political climate in Britain and France during the debates regarding the Eastern enlargement in order to provide some background for the

empirical analysis conducted in this research. Through case studies of British and French policies on EU enlargement, this chapter delineates how media coverage, public opinion, and policymaking intersect with one another.

Recent studies in agenda setting theory broadened the scope of agendas beyond measuring the public and media agendas to include policymakers (Rogers and Dearing 1988, 1996). As Rogers and Dearing (1996, 1-2) maintain, agenda setting is “an ongoing competition among issue proponents to gain the attention of media professionals, the public, and policy elites.” Analysis in this chapter aims to broaden our understanding of the flow of information and the critical linkages between the media, political elites, and the masses, the center of the democratic process.

The period under study in this analysis is replete with exciting developments in both Britain and France. As such, this chapter supplies some point of reference and context to the reader. This chapter places the EU enlargement debate in political context to provide an in-depth examination of the relationship between the people, the media and official policies of Britain and France on EU enlargement. It also examines the development of specific positions British and French governments staked out with regards to enlargement from 2002 to 2004.

France and Britain are two major actors within the EU that are well-known for their different approaches towards the EU project. Britain is infamous for its Euro-skepticism, while France is renowned for its Euro-enthusiasm.

As Moravcsik (1993) asserts, the big three actors in the EU – the UK, France and Germany, seeks to shape EU development to serve “rationally constructed state preferences.” As explained in the remainder of this chapter, this line of reasoning works

well in providing a general outline for the responses of British and French governments on the issue of EU enlargement. As a consequence, regarding the issue of EU enlargement, the French government has taken an ambivalent attitude whereas the British government has generally been in favor of it.

In contrast, the majority of both the British and French publics were against the Eastern enlargement of the EU in May 2004. This has important implications on the democratic deficit debate in the EU. Since the legitimacy of elite actions depends upon the level of public support for European integration processes (see Rohrschneider 2000 and Meyer 1999), this chapter explores the interaction between the elites, the media and public opinion on Eastern enlargement. This chapter points to the important role played by the media in affecting both the public opinion and actual policy.

THE EASTERN ENLARGEMENT OF THE EU: AN OVERVIEW

The Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 was the fifth and the largest enlargement round in the history of the EU. It marked a very important achievement in European history, symbolically as well as politically. Put more specifically, this round of EU enlargement signified the reunification of the European continent that remained divided throughout the Cold War era.

The ten new Member States constituted a large addition of landmass to the EU. Moreover, with the Eastern enlargement, the EU population increased by 74.1 million people coming from the Central and Eastern European countries. The EU after the Eastern enlargement had approximately 450 million citizens. Differences in incomes per

capita between the old members of the EU and the new members were much larger than in previous enlargement episodes. Since this issue had many implications on the lives of people living in the EU15, throughout the debates on EU enlargement, the cleavage between the elite and general public was strikingly manifest.

Due to the increased media attention allocated to the enlargement topic and its consequences, this issue has become more “visible,” and hence, more liable to arouse public disquiet over time. Needless to say, it sparked contentious public debate in both the British and French publics. As shown by the empirical analyses in this research, two subjects – immigration and unemployment – especially dominated the enlargement debate in Britain and France. Media started to increasingly put economic problems at the top of the issue list in both Britain and France. As the enlargement date approached, the affected publics turned increasingly against Eastern enlargement.

Unlike in the case of the European Constitution, the EU15 Member States did not hold referenda on the issue of Eastern enlargement. Although it is the elite opinion that ultimately determined this particular EU policy, we cannot say that public was not assigned a role in the EU enlargement process.

In democracies, public opinion sets parameters on policymaking. The argument in this chapter is that public opinion served as a delimiting factor, determining the speed of the eventual integration of the new Member States into the EU. While EU enlargement was preordained, the general public in Britain and France still had to be convinced that their general interests were being addressed. As the European publics became more aware of the impact of European integration on their lives, they demanded recognition for

their concerns. At this point, people's sensitivities about the issue of immigration played a constraining role on the actions of European policymakers.

Immigration was, and still is, a very controversial issue in both the British and the French societies. Furthermore, references to problems of particular industrial sectors, and effects of enlargement on markets were fairly frequent in both countries. The balance generally tilted in the negative direction when the economic and social consequences of EU enlargement were discussed in Britain and France. This is the reason why the British and the French public opinion usually had the highest opposition levels to enlargement among the EU15 members. The high salience of immigration-related and economic concerns during the enlargement debates in both Britain and France justifies a detailed look at these issues.

Accordingly, this chapter contemplates the political climate in Britain and France during the debates on Eastern enlargement. The analysis in this chapter tracks policy developments that might be attributable to increased public concerns on several enlargement-related issues, which emerged subsequent to an increased print media attention to these issues. It seeks to find answers to the following questions: How did the media affect public opinion and official policy on EU enlargement? How did public opinion affect government positions?

A CASE STUDY OF BRITISH OFFICIAL POSITION ON EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

Britain has always been regarded as “unique” in having a continuing aversion or skepticism towards the European integration (Bulmer 1992, 5). Wallace (1995) refers to

this as “British singularity.” Britain was “reluctant” to become a part of the Economic and Monetary Union, the Euro, and the Schengen Agreement, among other key EU developments. The centralist structure of Britain, its late accession to the EU, and its long history of parliamentary sovereignty render the handling of European integration complicated.

In 1950, Britain turned down the chances of becoming a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1955, Britain declined the invitation of ECSC members for the establishment of a customs union. In 1961 and 1967, the British application for entry to the European Community was declined by De Gaulle. Once De Gaulle retired in 1969, the way was finally open for the British membership. Consequently, Britain joined the EC in 1973. Immediately after its accession to the EU, Britain requested renegotiation of its entry terms. After renegotiation, Britain held a referendum in 1975 on whether to withdraw from the EC. British people voted to remain.

Under the Conservative Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, its minimalist attitude towards European integration distanced Britain from the rest of the EU. Although one should note that under Prime Minister Major, the British policy toward the EU was less Euro-skeptic than it was during the Thatcher administration.

With Tony Blair, Britain’s rhetoric on the EU changed greatly. After coming to power, the Labour government has repeatedly emphasized its determination to establish a more positive relationship with the EU. Prime Minister Blair has repeatedly mentioned the necessity for Britain to locate itself “at the heart of the continent” and be a “passionate European.” But due to the strength of Euro-skepticism among the British public, this rhetorical change failed to be translated into action.

Additionally, the rift between the UK and continental Europe became wider due to Britain's ardent support for the George W. Bush Administration's foreign policy initiatives – the War on Terrorism and military intervention in Iraq. These developments exposed severe tensions between the UK and the core countries of the EU, France and Germany. While the UK ardently supported the US foreign policy on Iraq, France and Germany were opposed to the US-UK stance on Iraq. The next section provides several explanations for explaining the “awkward” nature of the UK-EU relationship.

Europe, most frequently, is viewed as a threat to British national sovereignty (Baker 2001). Accordingly, the British policy towards the EU is referred to as “semi-detachment,” and Britain is often characterized as a “reluctant” or “awkward” partner of the EU (See George 1992, 1994; Gowland and Turner 2000).

British historical experience lends a heightened sense of national identity and greater awareness of the importance of preserving sovereignty, which is socialized into succeeding generations of political leaders and the general population. This means that national interests are defended more enthusiastically in Britain than elsewhere, because the dangers of losing national identity and sovereignty are more readily apparent or less likely to be tolerated (see Wallace 1991; Young 1993; Baker 2001; Geddes 2004).

Taking into account the Anglo-Saxon tradition of *laissez-faire* capitalism (in contrast to France's emphasis on social market democracy) it comes as no surprise that Britain has traditionally seen Europe as part of a free-market project, rather than a political project (Geddes 2004). As such, “Britain appears to retain a Churchillian ‘with’ but not ‘of’ Europe” (Geddes 2004, 26).

The peripheral geographical positioning of the island may also be said to contribute to the isolation of Britain from the European continent. Closer political union would possibly weaken Britain's special relationship with the US and undermine its ability to run an independent, liberal economic policy. Consequently, British official policy has traditionally been very skeptical towards the EU.

One exception to this traditional Euro-skepticism of the British governments can be vividly observed on the issue of Eastern enlargement. The UK official policy had been in favor of the EU enlargement. On June 29, 2000, *The Times* published the following headline to announce the British policy: "Britain to Champion Enlargement of the EU."

There are several explanations for this atypical policy stance of the UK. The Labour Party was already emphasizing its strong support for EU enlargement while in opposition. When it came to power in 1997, it maintained its support for the expansion process and wanted to give momentum to the ongoing and protracted negotiations on enlargement.

Moravcsik (1993) suggests that each Member State instrumentalizes the European framework in a way to maximize their interests. If we follow this line of reasoning in explaining the formulation of the British policy on enlargement, we can see that it was in the interest of the UK to support the EU enlargement, which would push the EU towards becoming less constraining, less integrationist, and wider not deeper.

Britain was, in other words, a strong supporter of the "widening" of the EU to include the Eastern European countries, largely because this would delay further "deepening" of the Union. Including Central and Eastern European countries with significantly lower levels of economic development into the Union was perhaps seen by

policymakers as a way of stalling moves by the French-German axis towards further European integration in the form of common currency and federalism.

For instance, on 27 June 2000, French President Jacques Chirac called for the formation of a “pioneering group” of nations within the EU, which would push ahead faster with further integration. Again, only one week before this call by Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder proposed an ambitious plan for a federal Europe led by an “inner-core.” These would lead to the creation of a “two-speed” Europe, something the UK government opposed, partly for fear of losing influence in the Union and partly to prevent divisions both within the Government and among the British citizens about the nature of the EU.

Pushing for further enlargement provided a panacea for this particular concern. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook justified the British calls for a faster enlargement in *The Times*. He announced, “We want those countries to be joining [to EU] as full members of a Europe of equals, not finding that some other countries have moved on to an inner chamber from which they are excluded” (quoted in Craske 2000).

Furthermore, these Central and Eastern European countries primarily pursued pro-American and pro-British foreign policies in the aftermath of the Cold War. Inclusion of these new members into the EU would shift the internal balance of power in favor of the UK and hence increase the political influence of the UK in an enlarged Union.

Additionally, Britain did not face immediate border issues with the Central and Eastern European countries. Hence, Britain did not share the concerns of those EU Member States that are in closer geographical proximity to the acceding countries

(Hughes and Smith 1998). As such, these factors made it relatively unproblematic and less risky for the UK to support the Eastern enlargement of the EU.

The next section specifically focuses on the issue of immigration in Britain and places it within the EU enlargement debates since expansion of EU borders towards the East blew a fresh breath into the discussion on the role of migration. It seeks to discover the interrelationship among the media, the public, and policymaking, and shed some light on the role of media in explaining the initial gap between the official policy and public opinion regarding immigration policies in Britain.

Accordingly, the next section asks what has caused the British government to announce several changes in its immigration policy; more importantly, it attempts to provide an answer as to why the British government has chosen to make these policy changes just before the enlargement date, at the last minute.

The Issue of Immigration in Britain

The issue of immigration in Britain illustrates the tremendous potential of the media's agenda-setting power first on public and then on policymakers. Until the very end of the time frame of this study, the EU enlargement issue received very little debate in the British context.

Initially, the debate on the Eastern enlargement tended to take place in serious broadsheet press like *The Times* and *The Guardian*. Coverage of the issue in the tabloid press was largely reduced to occasional passing references, for example, in the middle of an article on asylum and immigration policy. Hence, as illustrated by Chapter 4, in the

beginning, the British public only had a vague awareness of the timetable for Eastern enlargement, lacking a thorough understanding of the content of this particular EU policy.

Later on, the number of enlargement-related newspaper articles increased. As the results of the first- and the second-level agenda-setting analyses indicate, there was a transfer of both “issue” and “attribute” salience from the print media agenda to the public agenda. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in Britain, the transfer of “attribute” salience was most noticeable for the immigration-related consequences of Eastern EU enlargement. Finally as suggested in Chapter 6, immigration has been one of the most important determinants of public support for the EU enlargement.

Following the increased salience of the immigration issue in the media agenda, immigration soon became a top item on the public agenda. As Jones and Baumgartner (2004, 2) correctly note, in democracies, there is “little doubt that people have a strong sense of what issues the government ought to be addressing,” even if public opinion tends to be vague when it comes to complex solutions of problems. The impact of public opinion on immigration policies is more relevant than appears. This begs the question of why and how the policies change (Lahav 2004).

In this chapter, I argue that by setting the agenda of the British people, the British print media carried out three major tasks vis-à-vis the debate on enlargement: it conveyed information between the government and the public; mobilized public opposition against the initial stance of the British government regarding immigration from the Central and Eastern European countries; and finally, helped convince the government that it needed to adopt a more restrictive approach towards the immigration issue. In other words, the

media focused and escalated public attention; through its effects on public opinion, it has led to a change in the way the British government reacted to the question of immigration vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement. I now turn to explaining this process in detail.

Freeman (1995, 884) hypothesizes that public opinion in liberal democracies is slower to mobilize and crystallize, and more indifferent if not more favorable to immigration, than it would be if more and better information were available. The logical extension of this argument would be that as the information becomes more readily available on the issue of immigration, the public opinion takes shape more rapidly and becomes more hostile towards immigration.

Givens and Luedtke (2004) include “political salience” into their equation for explaining the immigration policy harmonization in the EU. They maintain that salience can politicize an issue by mobilizing society as a whole against certain areas of immigration policy harmonization. Referring to the model developed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Givens and Luedtke (2004) suggest that increased salience adds an important dimension to the nature of political change through changing public indifference to issues. As a result, they posit that “not only does the public become more involved in an issue, but political parties, the organizers of societal cleavages, also become involved” (Givens and Luedtke 2004, 150). They hypothesize that this mobilization may lead to more restrictive immigration policies at the national level. This is exactly what we have observed regarding the issue of immigration in the British political context.

With an increase in the media salience of EU enlargement, we have seen a parallel increase in the public salience of EU enlargement. As the issue was covered more

frequently from the immigration-related aspects by the British press, immigration-related concerns of the British public also increased.

To start with, Freeman (1995, 883) suggests that “the most direct barrier to information about immigration is the scarcity and ambiguity of official data.” It was exactly the case in Britain. Even the report that the Home Office commissioned, *The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows* (2004, 58) complained about “the lack of good data.” The report forecasted that migration to Britain as a result of EU enlargement will be “relatively small,” at between 5,000 and 13,000 immigrants per year up to 2010 (*The Impact of EU Enlargement on Migration Flows* 2004). The rightwing group Migration Watch UK, on the other hand, claimed 40,000 people a year would enter the UK from Eastern Europe.

Against this background of confusion and uncertainty due to limited level of knowledge among the British public on immigration, media framings of EU enlargement increasingly referred to the negative implications of the Eastern enlargement for immigration to the UK and the British welfare system. Over time, the British tabloids started to publish the immigration scare stories more extensively. As Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament at the time, correctly noted, “It is greatly to be regretted that – at a moment of such historic significance for Europe – so much of the debate has been reduced to accountancy and mere hype, speculation and unsubstantiated claims about migration” (*The Guardian*, “Blunkett Urged to Resist Immigrant Crackdown,” February 24, 2004).

As the enlargement day loomed closer, due especially to the intense tabloid press coverage of potential risk of “waves of foreigners flooding the nation and swamping

public services,” immigration and Eastern enlargement topics started to cause a number of controversies raised in the British public and political context. The British public started to prioritize the issue of immigration in the context of EU enlargement debate. As a consequence, in Britain this issue has grown to define something of a political cleavage, separating one party, newspaper, or person from another.

Until very late in the enlargement time frame, Britain and Ireland stood alone in their willingness to open their borders to workers from the new Member States (or in their unwillingness to impose transitional measures) whereas, other EU members like France, Germany, Austria, and Italy introduced transition periods and banned migrants from the newly acceding Central and Eastern European countries for these transition periods.⁴

Britain’s “open door” policy was heavily criticized by British tabloids. As mentioned earlier, in Britain, the largest difference over time in press coverage has been observed on the issue immigration. Towards the end of the time frame of this research, British newspaper articles increasingly covered the possibility that illegal and legal immigration would become a problem in Britain as a result of the latest round of EU enlargement. Most of the newspaper articles criticized government’s “soft touch” on asylum and immigration. Among the British press outlets content analyzed in this research, this was most apparent in *The Daily Mail*’s coverage. The results of content analysis in this project illustrate tabloids’ inherent hostility towards the EU and its policies.

⁴ These restrictions were allowed to last for a maximum of seven years. After May 2011, all Member States would be required to allow the citizens from new Member States to move to work freely in their countries.

For example, referring to a British government advertising campaign in Slovakia asking people not to come to the UK, *The Daily Mail* asked: “Are ministers living in the real world?” Or, under the headline “See you in May,” *The Sun* speculated that “tens of thousands” of Eastern European Gypsies were planning to settle in the UK. Right-wing skeptics of the British government’s immigration policy claimed that the “open door” policy would signal a green light to “benefit tourists” entering the UK to have access to state handouts.

As May 2004 approached, the public opinion surveys taken in England strongly depicted that the British public had prioritized the issue of immigration as related to the Eastern enlargement. To illustrate, according to a public opinion survey conducted by YouGov on April 3, 2004, 46% of the respondents identified “immigration and asylum-seekers” as “the most important political issue” in the country, while only 29% identified “the war on terrorism” as such. On the other hand, in the same survey, 80% of the respondents maintained that the “present Government’s policies on immigration and people who seek asylum in Britain” was not tough enough.

Another public opinion survey carried out by MORI in 2003 suggested that 85% of people in Britain disagree that the Government has immigration under control. Regular MORI surveys of the British public similarly showed a major increase in those who see immigration as the most important issue facing Britain. While two thirds of the UK saw immigration policy as being a domestic affair, the majority of the EU (52%) saw it as an issue that should be handled jointly within the EU (*Standard EB 59*). These surveys make evident both the extent of the immigration controversy in Britain, and the feeling among the British people that immigration and asylum were out of control.

Fuelled by the sensationalist journalism of the British tabloid press, a strong opposition to granting complete free movement of labor from the new member countries emerged among the British public. Opponents of enlargement in Britain feared increased unemployment with the arrival of cheap labor from the new Member States or increased drug trafficking and organized crime in their country, issues that are mainly emphasized by press outlets such as *The Daily Mail* and *The Sun*.

British Home Secretary David Blunkett and other supporters of UK's "open door policy," on the other hand, asserted that the arrival of new workers would boost the British economy. Blunkett claimed that the British economy requires "overseas workers to help fill skill gaps" in the British labor market. However, they were unable to convince the majority of the British people that hold concerns about immigration's consequences.

As a result of the heightened alarm in the British media, especially in *The Daily Mail* and other tabloids, there emerged growing concerns among the British public about more and more Eastern Europeans flying to Britain with a "one-way ticket." Many British citizens feared that migrants from the new Member States would swamp their labor markets and exploit their welfare systems. They feared that the weaker economies of these Central and Eastern European countries would encourage Eastern Europeans to migrate in search of work. As Blair stated, "immigration and politics do not make easy bedfellows. They never have" (*Guardian Unlimited*, Speech by Tony Blair to the Confederation of British Industry on migration, April 27, 2004).

In democracies, the policy priorities of the public and of the government should correspond in order to achieve legitimate representation. Referring to the "electoral connection" in EU politics, Carruba (2001) provides evidence that public preferences

influence elites. As Stimson, MacKuen and Erikson (1995) comment, politicians receive the faintest signals and clues in their political environment. The “policy mood” argument suggests that the public opinion trends guide the policymakers and that elites respond to public pressure because of reelection considerations.

Policymakers try to anticipate the impact of media coverage of issues on the public and build their political strategies on that premise. As Walgrave and Aelst (2006, 100) maintain, “political actors do not primarily react on media coverage itself but on presumed public opinion.” While citizens tend to perceive politics through the media, “politicians also tend to rely exclusively on the media” for learning about citizens’ concerns (Kriesi 2004, 191).

The British government’s response to the alarming media coverage on immigration-related consequences of EU enlargement is an effective example of this phenomenon. The British government adopted the immigration issue and proposed several changes in its immigration policy to signal its commitment to the concerns of the British people and address these immigration-related concerns among the public.

When immigration became a key issue during the enlargement debates in the UK, the Labour party was accused by the Conservatives of having a too liberal asylum seeker-immigration policy. The Conservative Party traditionally wants to keep immigration as a key issue in political debates, since it is an important policy area in which British people give the Conservatives higher marks than the Labour government.⁵

⁵ Consequently, the immigration issue became one of the major issues of the British elections on May 2005.

The Opposition leaders in Britain reacted on negative media coverage about the immigration-related consequences of Eastern enlargement almost immediately in order to hammer the government for not having effectively dealt with the problem earlier. For instance, Conservative Party leader Michael Howard continuously called on the British government to follow the example of its EU counterparts and impose restrictions on immigration from new Member States. Howard asserted that “uncontrolled immigration” would put community relations at risk.

The heavy criticism by the tabloid press and the opposition led popular concern over the large increase in immigration from Eastern Europe has caused the UK to take a more cautious approach on immigration. In February 2004, only three months to the enlargement day, British Prime Minister Tony Blair conceded there was a “potential risk” of an influx from new Member States (*Guardian Unlimited*, “EU Enlargement: Facts and Fears,” February 23, 2004). Blair accused Conservatives of trying to exploit public concerns about immigration and discredited the tabloid scare stories on Eastern immigration by reminding the British people of the similar scare stories published at the time of Spanish accession, which went unfulfilled.

In order to reassure the public, in his speech in the House of Commons, Blair announced that the government was examining rules governing the eligibility to benefits of new migrant workers.⁶ Confirming the expectations of Carruba (2001), British public opinion forced a change in British government’s position regarding the free movement of labor and immigration policy.

⁶ These restrictions do not apply to Cyprus or Malta because of their small size and their relative economic strength.

Due to the increased public pressure, the British government at the final hour made some minor changes to its liberal policy towards asylum and immigration and adopted a number of limitations to the free movement of labor and imposed welfare access restrictions on those coming from Eastern Europe. On the face of increasing negative coverage of enlargement and expected public backlash, British ministers rushed out a host of announcements – from restricting benefits and housing for migrants to cutting back on work permits.

Winning a cabinet battle to prevent the introduction of work permits, British Home Secretary David Blunkett announced the government's plans to limit the numbers of people from Central and Eastern European countries to claim benefits in Britain. According to this new policy, "migrants to Britain who are resident for less than a year will need to prove they have a job or can support themselves without access to state benefits before they register for work" (*The Guardian*, "Blunkett Urged to Resist Migrant Crackdown," February 24, 2004). The register, Blunkett claimed, would also act as a means of keeping track of numbers entering the UK.

These measures required migrants from the new member countries of the EU to register for work in Britain and denied them the right to social security benefits and other services, including health care. They were designed to protect Britain from the negative immigration and welfare system related consequences of enlargement. These restrictions were proposed to last for at least two years and possibly longer. The then Immigration Minister Beverley Hughes maintained that the new measures would enable "managed migration" and protect the British benefits system.

The tabloid press was again quick to criticize these policies of the government and suggested that these “last-minute measures” demonstrated the government was “panicking” about “thousands of people that are planning to come and work in Britain” on May 2004. Tabloids were very pessimistic about the effectiveness of these policies. Regarding these newly announced changes to British immigration policy, *The Daily Mail* noted that “[Blunkett’s] plans that [immigrants] must register for work and pay taxes will be unenforceable and impossible to police” (*The Daily Mail*, “A Pounds 50 Fare to Britain and No Return,” February 25, 2004).

Negative framings of the enlargement issue by tabloids are hardly surprising. The British tabloid press is notorious for its anti-EU coverage (see Anderson and Weymouth 1999; Harcup and O’Neill 2001). The British tabloid newspapers generally take a right-wing populist stance, emphasizing nationalism, anticommunism, and hostility to the EU. Furthermore, British tabloids often market themselves by launching campaigns around causes they expect to be popular (Harcup and O’Neill 2001).

Writing in *The Daily Mail*, Sir Andrew Green, Chairman of Migration Watch UK, cautioned that the “[British] Government’s 11th-hour decision to mount an advertising campaign warning Eastern Europeans of the pitfalls of entering the UK if they are not prepared to work would have the opposite effect to that desired.” He maintained that “there is a serious risk” that this campaign would “backfire by drawing attention to the possibilities rather than deterring potential migrants” (*The Observer*, “Can a Bigger Europe Work for Britain?” February 22, 2004).

By contrast, some political elites, like the Trade Union Confederation (TUC) General Secretary Brendan Barber, urged the cabinet to stand firm against rightwing

demands to close the door on migrants, and to honor its earlier commitment to permit citizens of the new EU states to work in Britain from May 1.

To make things worse, British immigration minister Beverley Hughes resigned due to a scandal over the handling of visa applications from Eastern Europe in the beginning of April 2004. Hughes stepped down from her post along with claims that immigration officers, struggling with an accumulation of visa applications, had rubber-stamped bids to move to Britain from citizens of EU accession countries.

This scandal further fuelled the bitter criticism by tabloids and the Conservative Party of the Labour government's capabilities in controlling immigration. As the immigration concerns escalated, the government announced that it was suspending all visa applications from Bulgaria and Romania, candidate countries that were planning to join the EU in 2006.

On April 27, 2004, with only three days left to EU enlargement, in his address to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), British Prime Minister Blair stated that "now is the time for controlled migration, simultaneous with tackling the abuses [of the benefits system] we have identified" and declared "we have begun a top to bottom analysis of the immigration system, how it operates, how it can be improved, how it can agree migration where it is in [the UK's] interests and prevent it where it isn't." He maintained that the British government's strategy against illegal immigration aims to secure the British borders, and "prevent abuse by those who entered the UK legitimately but then attempt to stay on illegally" (*The Guardian Unlimited*, "Blair's Migration Speech," April 27, 2004).

In an attempt to address the concerns of the British people on the effects of EU enlargement on the British welfare system, Blair announced, "we are putting tighter rules

to restrict migrants' access to benefits and housing." He continued, "No one will be able to come to the UK from anywhere in the enlarged EU simply to benefit claims and housing" (*Guardian Unlimited*, "Blair's Migration Speech," April 27, 2004).

Michael Howard accused Blair of "blind panic," as the British Prime Minister tried to regain control of the immigration agenda with a speech to the CBI in London. The Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis too criticized the government by arguing that the new announcement is "a panicky response to a problem which has been long in creation" (*Guardian Unlimited*, "Howard Attacks Blair's Immigration Plans," April 27, 2004). Several ministers including Beverley Hughes (before her resignation) and Anthony Smith insisted that the British government was not panicking in the face of tabloid and Tory pressure, saying the proposals being announced by Blunkett were being formulated the government for about one year.

On April 29, 2004, only two days left for the enlargement date, the Government put in place a package of measures to enable people to work legally, help fill the half a million job vacancies in the UK labor market, boost productivity and the UK's overall economic growth. The Home Office announced the details of the Worker Registration Scheme applicable to citizens from the Central and Eastern European accession countries (excluding those from Cyprus and Malta) who wanted to come to the UK to work. Individuals from the Central and Eastern European accession countries were required to register under this scheme within one month of starting a new job in Britain. It came into effect on 1 May 2004. These announcements provide excellent illustrations of how the media coverage first shaped the public opinion and then affected the actual government policy.

Since EU expansion, 91,000 people from the new member states have registered to work in Britain. The amount of people registered has significantly surpassed the Home Office expectations. Shadow Home Secretary David Davies has described the British immigration system as a “shambles” following the release of this official figure, prompting speculations of radical changes to the UK immigration system.

As illustrated by this case study, the British government responded to the concerns of the people, and introduced several regulations for its “open doors” policy on immigration. The rise of the immigration question in the UK seemed to mirror a similar debate that was going on in France with the looming shadow of EU enlargement hanging over the issue. The next part concentrates on the debates regarding the Eastern EU enlargement in the French political context and fleshes out the interactions between the French media, public and the policy makers regarding the enlargement issue.

A CASE STUDY OF THE FRENCH OFFICIAL POSITION ON EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

France was one of the original members of the European Economic Community in 1958. Since the departure of De Gaulle from power, France has been a staunch supporter of further European integration, regarded as the “locomotive” for major economic and political developments within the EU. France traditionally plays a leading role in the EU. French people are typically pro-European.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Britain and France can be said to have swapped their traditional European positions on the issue of Eastern enlargement. To be more precise

while France was more reluctant to expand the membership of the EU, Britain was more enthusiastic about this particular EU initiative.

French policy on Eastern enlargement has shifted several times, depending on the French government's projected calculation of national interest (Moravcsik 1993). Initially, the French official policy was ambivalent towards the enlargement of the EU, since the French elites believed that this would undermine the "deepening" of the Union. Just as in the case of the UK, political elites in France perceived "widening" and "deepening" as irreconcilable. Craske (2000) suggested that French President Jacques Chirac might have been using deeper integration as a way of "opposing enlargement, about which [Chirac] and the French electorate [were] distinctly uneasy."

French elites gradually came to assume that "deepening" and "widening" were compatible goals (De la Serre 2004). For instance, even Chirac admitted he had scaled down his ambitions to speed up the pace of closer ties in Europe. In July 24, 2003, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin included both elements, "adapting [France] to European Union enlargement, and greater European integration," as a part of his newly announced governmental program – "Agenda 2006" (*Financial Times*, "Education, R&D, and EU Enlargement Top Raffarin's 'Agenda 2006' for France," July 25, 2003).

On February 2002, while maintaining the public commitment to EU enlargement, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, also pointed to the "innumerable" problems that remain with the negotiations on farm subsidies due to be completed by the end of 2002. This symbolized the doubtful approach of France to the issue of Eastern enlargement. The analysis in this section elaborates on the possible causes for this reluctance in the French official policy towards the Eastern enlargement.

The French government had three key concerns regarding the issue of enlargement that needed to be satisfied to various degrees: an institutional reform prior to the accession of ten new countries, a limited adjustment of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and a limitation of budget expenditure after accession (De la Serre 2004).

First of all, in February 2000, France threatened the EU's enlargement plan by demanding changes in the Amsterdam Treaty that provided the basis for adding new members. The French position requesting a reform in institutional structures of the EU before accession was based on the argument that institutions that were created for six original members in the 1950s are ill-suited to a union of 25 or more members. It maintained that for the accession of new members to happen, a thorough institutional reform was required prior to expansion of membership.

Second, for a long time, EU enlargement was blocked by a conflict between France and Germany over agrarian subsidies. According to the European Commission's *General Budget for the European Union* (2004), around 40% of the EU budget was allocated to the CAP. France ranked highest among CAP beneficiaries, receiving 21.6% of the CAP budget in 2004.

France had concerns about a possible CAP reform before the enlargement date. As the biggest beneficiary of the CAP, and as a country with a powerful farm lobby that was championed by Chirac, France expressed its concern that the big farm subsidies it received would be at risk from any serious CAP reform to accommodate the new EU members. French President Jacques Chirac wanted to keep subsidies in order to satisfy the French farmers and made it clear that France was unwilling to reform the CAP and

address changes to EU direct farm payments to facilitate funding the Eastern enlargement.

On the other hand, as the biggest net contributor to the EU budget, Germany was worried that the EU enlargement would boost the Community budget. In other words, it feared that the enlargement would increase the cost of funding the EU. As such, it requested to restrain the spending packages. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder sought cuts for the benefit of German budget. France rejected German proposals made in the middle of October 2002 to cut direct payments to farmers in the existing 15 member states by an extra 2% each year for a decade to pay for phasing in such payments to new EU members' farmers.

After long negotiations, the conflict was finally resolved when Schroeder gave in – much to the anger of the British government, which also wanted to reduce agrarian subsidies. France and Germany managed to reach a deal on October 22, 2002 to limit the ceiling of the EU's farm spending from 2007, paving the way for enlargement.

De la Serre (2004, 517) notes that these difficult negotiations among the EU15 revealed the failure of the Franco-German alliance to propose a common vision for the future of Europe. Franco-German alliance was considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for a well-functioning EU after enlargement. France and Germany needed to convince their EU partners about the merits of further integration (De la Serre 2004).

The debates on the admission of ten new Member States to the EU, almost all of them sympathetic to the US and Britain in terms of their foreign policies, led to questions as to whether France's role in the future might be less central in the aftermath of the

Eastern enlargement of the EU. The sense was that the EU had started to incorporate the British economic model and had become more about open markets and competitiveness.

French policymakers feared that the Eastern enlargement would create a different kind of Union, and that France's influence and vision of Europe would become diluted in a large, loose, and liberal Union. Chirac, for instance, was always wary about EU enlargement fearing it would reduce the French influence in the EU.

French reservations regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU were also centered on a looming German economic and political dominance of Central and Eastern Europe and France's relative marginalization in the EU. The Central and Eastern European candidate countries also had strong ties with Germany.

In addition, there were increasing concerns about declining significance of the French language after the enlargement. There were several articles especially in *Le Figaro* attracting attention to the "danger" of increasing dominance of the English language in an enlarged Union.

Finally, the Eastern enlargement of the EU took place against the background of growing transatlantic tensions due to debates on a possible US-led military intervention in Iraq. The French had always pursued a fiercely independent approach to US foreign policy and were the first to distance themselves from a possible US-British intervention in Iraq.

While France was against a military intervention in Iraq, the Central and Eastern European candidate countries supported the US position on Iraq. Chirac attacked EU candidates as "infantile" and accused them for being "reckless" supporters of the US. He added that in supporting Washington's stance on Iraq, the East Europeans had "lost a

good opportunity to keep quiet.” In the run-up to the war in Iraq, “new” vs. “old” Europe rhetoric of the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld helped create further tensions between the acceding countries and France.

In the beginning of the enlargement process, the French government thought of enlargement as a way to strengthen the political influence of the EU in the world vis-à-vis the US power. However, later on, the debates on Iraq intervention made it clear that the Central and Eastern European countries would change the internal balance of power of the enlarged Union to the disadvantage of France.

After an overview of the major factors that affected the formation of the French government’s official position on the Eastern enlargement; this chapter proceeds with a discussion of the public opinion-media-policy nexus during the French debates on enlargement. The following section focuses on the issue of unemployment in France within the context of the enlargement debates.

The Issue of Unemployment in France

As in the British case, although to a lesser extent, press outlets in France, preferred representations on EU enlargement that were more anxiety driven, more about what people would find outrageous and frightening. Concerns about French agriculture, job losses and outsourcing of companies dominated the print media coverage of the Eastern enlargement.

Consequently, similar to the developments in the British public opinion, French people started to worry about an “invasion” of low-paid workers from Eastern Europe

“stealing” their jobs and “destroying” their social system. They also became concerned that “social dumping” might lead to a decrease in wages in France.

As such, unemployment became a key issue in people’s agenda related to the Eastern enlargement topic in France. Since the unemployment level surpassed 10%, it became a highly salient and contentious issue in the French context. The economic situation did not help either. Slow economic growth combined with high unemployment was the basic ingredient of public dissatisfaction about EU’s Eastern enlargement initiative.

Opponents of enlargement in France also feared expansion of markets and “*les délocalisations*” – outsourcing of big companies to new EU Member States leading to increased levels of unemployment in the country. “*Délocalisations*” (companies moving their production sites abroad) and “*mondialisation*” (globalization) were two keywords frequently seen in newspaper articles published on the Eastern enlargement, signaling possibly negative economic as well as political consequences of enlargement.

The government failed to prepare the public opinion for the way the EU was changing. The French people feared that more immigrants would come to France with Eastern enlargement and that more French companies would relocate to low-cost Eastern European countries.

“*Le plombier polonaise*” (the “Polish plumber”) became a prominent motto of French opposition to further Eastern enlargement of the EU. It was first used during the run-up to the European Constitution referendum by Philippe de Villiers, leader of the *Mouvement pour la France*, and the “no” camp.

Many commentators of the “no” vote to the French referendum on the draft European Constitution discuss the issue in terms of “shock” and note that the fears of “Polish plumbers” dominated the “no” campaign in 2005. Yet, the reading of French newspaper articles on Eastern enlargement indicates that even in 2003 and 2004 there was tremendous print media coverage on the impact of Eastern enlargement on “*délocalisations*” and unemployment. As such, the result of the French referendum in May 2005 becomes less surprising when it is observed within the context of an expanded time frame in France, dating back to the pre-enlargement period.

Although the majority of old members of the EU, including France, have adopted several protective measures – such as, transition periods restricting the free movement of labor force from Eastern Europe and benefits eligibility – against possible negative economic consequences of the Eastern enlargement; the French people were not informed in great detail about these measures. Many French people’s concerns about increased unemployment as a result of accession of new members would have been alleviated if there were more information available on the implementation of this transition period.

As mentioned earlier, the issue of reforming the level of subsidies provided to farmers in the new EU Member States under the CAP was unpopular in France. French intransigence over agricultural reform was another reason why French people were at first reluctant about the Eastern enlargement. The CAP reform remained a highly salient issue vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement in France.

French farmers feared that their agricultural subsidies would be cut with the accession of agriculturally oriented countries like Poland and the Czech Republic. Agriculture constitutes a very significant part of many newly admitted EU member states.

Approximately four million farmers were projected to enter the EU market after the enlargement (*General Budget for the European Union* 2004). This was perceived to be threatening by many in France.

As shown in Chapter 5, the French public was increasingly becoming concerned about the costs of accommodating ten new members, the effects of enlargement on unemployment, on economic competitiveness of the country, on EU decision-making processes, and organized crime and drug trafficking. In contrast, the French media were talking about the implications of EU enlargement on the reunion of the European continent, on France's position within the enlarged EU, on agriculture, and on the strength of the EU as a global power.

Finally, the debates on Iraq also hijacked the debate on the enlargement's true consequences in the French media and public. Almost every enlargement-related article published by the French press outlets emphasized the impact of enlargement on the role of France in the enlarged Union or the role of the EU vis-à-vis the US. Accordingly, there were many concerns among the French public regarding the loss of French political and linguistic influence, and national identity.

Although there was some correspondence between the media and public framings of EU enlargement, the elites did not emphasize the aspects that concerned the French people the most. While political elites often talk about the effects of EU enlargement on the strategic actorness of the EU, for example, the media have been more interested in the economic consequences. Consequently, the findings imply that the policymakers did not do their part of the homework in informing the public in France about the actual expected consequences of EU enlargement.

Only six months to the enlargement date, the public opposition reached its zenith in France, with 55% of the French people against the Eastern enlargement (Please refer to Figure 6-2). As the enlargement day approached, the affected publics turned increasingly against enlargement.

Only days before the actual enlargement day, French President Chirac sought to reassure the French public concerns about the effects of EU enlargement on employment, social welfare and French national identity in a press conference.

The French President said he realized that the changing nature of the EU was giving rise to doubts among many people, but argued that an enlarged Union was “asserting itself as an economic power of the first rank, in which growth and investment would create a new dynamic environment for employment. It is a process in which everyone will be a winner.” Regarding the effect of enlargement on the French national identity, he added, “Europe is not a substitute for nations. It brings them together to give them greater strength” (*Agence France Presse*, “EU Enlargement Opportunity for France,” April 29, 2004).

That was unfortunately one of the few speeches made by Chirac addressing the expected consequences of the EU enlargement. Furthermore, these public relations efforts came very late in the process. Significant numbers of French citizens were already alienated from enlargement’s cause. French policy makers should have tried to convince their people about the positive implications of the EU enlargement, by making frequent references to the aspects that concerned the people.

CONCLUSION: MEDIA-PUBLIC OPINION-POLICY NEXUS

The results of this chapter draw attention to the significance of the media coverage of European affairs due to the considerable impact the coverage has over the public opinion. In Britain, the media focused and escalated public attention; through its effects on public opinion, it has led to a change in the way the British government reacted to the question of immigration vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement. This only partially supports the “electoral connection” argument in EU politics (Carruba 2001), and hence provides some evidence that public preferences influence elites.

In the French case too, the media effects on public opinion were clearly visible. Nevertheless, the effects of coverage on the government’s policies were not so clearly discernible. One clear lesson from the French case is that the policymakers should have been engaged in public’s concerns if they wanted to have popular support behind the government’s policies.

European citizens often do not distinguish between the effects of the EU integration and those of globalization. At a policymaking level, political leaders have to recognize this reality and deal with it rather than pretend that the problem is nonexistent. Instead of using technical jargon and assuming public knowledge on the European affairs, the European policymakers need to educate the masses on the issues that concern them the most using the media.

However, what we have observed during the enlargement debates was populist and xenophobic right-wing party leaders and sensationalist journalists scaring the people about an “avalanche” of immigrants that are desperate to come to Western Europe and offer their labor for low wages. A concerted campaign by the media and several

politicians created public alarm concerning the number of migrant workers who would flood into Britain after May 1, 2004 as a consequence of the Eastern expansion of the EU.

The critics of “tabloidization” maintain that sensation and scandal is a major element provoking public mistrust of politics, and as the negation of the kind of journalism that is essential to democracy (Esser 1999; Sparks 1998). Since negative evaluations tend to attract greater attention to political issues, as do aggression, conflict and controversy (*i.e.* negativity-effectiveness), media coverage is particularly important where the central values of society are affected (Schulz 1983). The results of this analysis confirm these suspicions that tabloidization is harmful for a democratic and a healthy functioning give-and-take process between the people and the leaders.

Put more specifically, it was almost impossible get a balanced and thoroughly objective view of the immigration and unemployment related implications of the Eastern EU enlargement in Britain as well as in France. Scare-mongering, sensational headlines and distorted “facts” were very common practice among the print media in both countries.

Accordingly, public discussion about the Eastern enlargement in Europe was fuelled by the “hysteria” rather than “facts.” The political leaders did not provide their worried publics with clear facts on the realities of immigration as well as the actual risk of unemployment created by immigration and outsourcing of companies to Eastern Europe.

Consequently, the British and French publics increasingly turned skeptical towards the EU enlargement. While the support for EU enlargement hit its highest point in autumn 2002, in both France and Britain; from then on, it decreased tremendously in

both countries. There was a 10% decrease in the support level for enlargement among the British public from November 2002 to March 2004. The decrease in support was relatively lower in the French case with a 5% decline. In France too, the controversies surrounding enlargement's impact on already high levels of unemployment in the society were highly salient.

These examples demonstrate that domestic concerns were highly present at the time of the enlargement debates. Nevertheless, as the case studies in this chapter indicate, the policymakers did not take fundamental or concrete policy decisions to alleviate the popular concerns. They have only either addressed the concerns on the surface and verbally (as in the case of France) or introduced minor cosmetic changes to their policies (as in the case of the United Kingdom).

As indicated by the results of the public opinion analyses in this project, European citizens are interested in practical issues that affect their everyday lives, such as jobs and social welfare. The benefits of enlargement for existing members are mostly long-term and intangible – in other words, an investment in democracy, security and prosperity in the European neighborhood – while the costs are much more immediate and concrete. As such, this situation calls for additional efforts by the policymakers to convince people about the benefits of European initiatives.

Some populist political leaders also contributed to the confusion among European citizens. For instance, Laurent Fabius of the Socialist Party in France argued that some of the economic difficulties French people were experiencing were caused by the enlargement. Negative portrayals of EU and its policies in the media and by the politicians can succeed easily among the people due to people's lack of specialized

information. It is this lack of information what made it very easy for tabloids and politicians to make people believe that the adversities they encountered in their lives were due to the EU enlargement. In short, European citizens need more information. And this is where the EU's major failure lies.

During the enlargement debates, the cleavage between governmental elites and general public was strikingly manifest. This was probably due to the fact that while political elites talked about the effects of EU enlargement, they most often referred to abstract terms like the reunification of the European continent, the increased prospects of peace and stability in Europe, expansion of markets, and the power of the EU in international politics. Unfortunately, the nature of the issues elites have covered regarding EU enlargement did not allow them to attract people's interest on the positive effects of enlargement in their lives. The arguments made by elites remained too abstract and too much related to EU itself to attract the attention of the lay people in Europe to the positive consequences of EU enlargement.

By contrast, the aspects that are covered by the media, such as immigration, unemployment, and outsourcing were proven to be perceived as more interesting by people. Consequently, due to the increased media attention to the enlargement issue and its subtopics, the affected publics turned increasingly against enlargement as the enlargement day approached.

Since the incorporation of public feedback was limited on the issue of Eastern enlargement of the EU, the European publics decided to show their reaction for further rounds of EU enlargement in a louder and stronger manner. The negative result of the EU Constitutional referendum in France provides the strongest evidence to such

observations. While the original purpose of the Constitutional Convention was to close the “democratic deficit” in the EU, the results of the referendum indicate that it contributed to the widening of the already existing deficit.

This does not, of course, mean that the people in Britain and France do not support the European ideals. Nevertheless, it is important to not to confuse favorable attitudes towards the EU policies with the commitments, interests, and priorities attached to them.

There was a disparity, a breakdown of political communication between the political leaders and people. Leaders mostly debated on European enlargement as a means of tackling problems whereas the people were eager to hear what political solutions were offered by their leaders to several possible problems that would be caused by the Eastern enlargement. In order to rebuild support for the EU and its specific policies, national political leaders need to focus on delivering visible solutions to the problems European citizens care most about. They further need to publicize these solutions through the mass media to their citizens.

Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions

Political scientists and journalists have engaged in a vigorous and fruitful debate over the impact of media on public opinion in the US context. Yet, there is still a relative paucity of scholarship in the political communication literature in the European context. Since the Eastern enlargement of the EU has generated substantial coverage in the media outlets across Europe, this topic is deemed appropriate to demonstrate that the media effects are pertinent in this geography as well.

This dissertation aimed to make a contribution to this relatively underdeveloped area of the political communication literature. It was a scientific examination of agenda-setting, framing, and priming functions of the media on public opinion in the European political context.

The findings in this research represent an important theoretical, empirical, and methodological contribution to the study of comparative political communication, in general and public support for European enlargement, in particular. The results of this project suggest that the way the media cover an EU event is more relevant than often considered and demonstrate how it has consequences for European public opinion, media outlets, and policymakers.

This chapter first summarizes my findings. It then draws lessons for both the European media outlets and the European policymakers. It finally concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the research and avenues of future research suggested by the project.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

To reiterate, this study is conducted under the theoretical umbrella of agenda setting research. It tested the robustness of the agenda-setting, framing, and priming hypotheses in the British and French contexts. Within the confines of available data, it analyzed if the print media agenda and framings exerted substantial influence on the public agenda and attitudes regarding EU enlargement in France and the UK, and found ample evidence for the applicability of agenda setting theory.

This research studied attitudes towards enlargement as a reflection of the media coverage of enlargement following the Laeken Council of December 2001 up until the day of Eastern enlargement of the EU – 1st of May 2004. Through an analysis of the cross-national comparative media effects, it offered an innovative explanation for the gap between European elites and masses on the issue of the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Moreover, conducting a cross-national comparative analysis is certainly proven useful in detecting several cross-national similarities and differences regarding the media effects on public opinion.

Chapter 1 introduced the puzzle of the gap between the elites and the masses on the EU enlargement topic, and explained the relevance of studying this topic. Chapter 2 presented a synopsis of the main theories in the existing literature on media effects. It then surveyed the political communication scholarship in the European context, as well as the “democratic deficit” and “communication deficit” arguments. Finally, based on the literature review, Chapter 2 presented an outline of the research questions and hypotheses. Chapter 3 explained various data sources and methods employed in this analysis to examine the content and consequence of enlargement-related coverage in

Britain and France. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 presented the empirical findings. Chapter 7 delved into qualitative case studies of the British and French official positions on the Eastern enlargement of the EU.

Empirical analysis in this dissertation left us with some clear and some ambiguous answers about the role of the media on public opinion. By integrating survey and content analysis methodologies on one hand, and qualitative case studies on the other, this research concluded that the print media have become key players during the debates surrounding the fifth and the biggest round of EU enlargement in both countries.

The results of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 clearly pointed to strong first-level agenda-setting effects in the European context. They effectively demonstrated a transfer of issue salience from the print media agenda to the public agenda. Evidence suggests that the changing public attention to EU enlargement was in large part reflective of media content.

Since the media agenda examined over the two-year period were prior in time to the public agenda, this evidence on time-order supported agenda-setting's causal assertion that the public agenda results, to a considerable degree, from the media agenda. Hence, the first-level agenda-setting analysis findings suggested that the public agenda not only correlated with the media agenda, but it resulted from the media agenda. This serves as a strong evidence for the existence of first-level agenda-setting effects. As such, agenda setting theory is confirmed at the first-level in both Britain and France.

The results of the cross-national first-level agenda-setting analysis forcefully demonstrated several similarities and differences between the ways the EU enlargement topic is covered in different national contexts. Although the pattern of monthly press

coverage of enlargement was similar in both cases; evidence from our content analysis demonstrated that the French press covered the issue of EU enlargement more extensively than the British press. The relative lack of reporting on EU enlargement in Britain underscored how the media contributed to keep the Eastern enlargement issue low on the public agenda. This particular finding highlighted the extent to which media effects on public salience vary across borders.

However, media's first-level agenda-setting influence was found to be stronger in the British context. This is probably due to the fact that the British public salience levels were lower than the French salience levels from the beginning on. Therefore, the British media outlets probably had better prospects for shaping the British public agenda over time.

The second level of agenda setting analysis in Chapter 5 attempted to identify the close association of priority orders in a list of enlargement's subtopics between the media and the public. This analysis concluded that the print media set the public attribute agenda on enlargement, bringing some subtopics to the forefront and minimizing others.

The second-level agenda-setting analysis in both Britain and France suggested a perfect correlation between the media framings and the public framings regarding the three main consequences of EU enlargement (*i.e.* political, economic, and social consequences). These results also demonstrated the presence of recognizable nationally distinct agendas in newspaper contents and public opinion alike.

Put more specifically, while the British press covered the enlargement issue with an overwhelming emphasis on the economic consequences of EU enlargement, the French press covered the issue with a heavy emphasis on the political consequences of

enlargement. This trend corresponded to the aspects the British and French publics thought about enlargement, respectively. In other words, the British people prioritized the economic consequences of enlargement when they thought about enlargement. The French people prioritized the political consequences of enlargement when they thought about enlargement.

As explained in Chapter 5, these statistically significant rankings between the press framings and the public framings not only demonstrated that the press attribute-agendas and the public attribute-agendas were highly correlated, but also suggested that the press framings led to different public framings on enlargement.

The results of the second-level agenda-setting analysis concerning the 17 subcategories of enlargement's consequences, however, only provided tentative evidence for the existence of second-level agenda-setting effects in both countries. Further analysis to resolve this inconsistency in the second-level agenda-setting analysis is warranted.

Nevertheless, when compared with the British case, there was a better rate of correspondence between the press and the public agendas in the French case regarding the 17 subcategories of enlargement. Overall, these findings are compatible with findings from previous agenda-setting and framing research.

The findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5 pointed to the existence of significant media effects on public opinion. Although the media effects were proven substantial, they might not be the only determinants of public attitudes on enlargement. As such, along with an analysis of the effects of the media exposure, Chapter 6 also analyzed the effects of a number of other possible determinants of public support for EU enlargement at the individual level.

The results for the consequences of agenda-setting presented in Chapter 6 are also promising. They suggested that the daily newspaper readership in Britain had a strong but negative influence on the support for enlargement. The results in Chapter 6 further implied that people were more sensitive to the salience of negative information than that of non-negative information in the press coverage of enlargement.

The bivariate analyses between public opinion and different determinants of public support for enlargement concluded that people's considerations about the effects of enlargement on their daily lives were important in determining their attitudes towards enlargement. These findings further suggested that in both France and Britain, those who read newspapers to gain information on EU developments tended to support EU enlargement much less than those who did not read newspapers. However, these relationships were not statistically significant. Moreover, the findings tentatively suggested that while TV exposure encouraged support for EU enlargement, press exposure discouraged it.

The perceptions of media objectivity were also positively correlated with the enlargement support in both countries (yet, the results were only statistically significant for the French public opinion). Interest in the enlargement issue, political sophistication, personal attachment to the EU, and favorability towards the EU were also found to be considerably correlated with the support for enlargement in both countries.

Following a bivariate analysis of the impact of different independent variables on the support for EU enlargement, Chapter 6 conducted an individual-level multivariate analysis, to achieve a better sense of the true influence of various independent variables on the support for EU enlargement.

Most significantly, confirming the trends in the bivariate analysis in Chapter 6, exposure to newspaper coverage was found to have a statistically significant but negative relationship with the support for EU enlargement in France. Furthermore, the comparison between exposure to newspaper and TV coverage supported the previous findings in this research. Since TV coverage tended to be more supportive of the EU enlargement, people exposed to TV coverage were also found to be more supportive of the topic. The difference in the effects of different media calls for future studies to conduct content analysis on both the TV and the newspaper coverage of different issues.

Moreover, confirming the results of the bivariate analyses in Chapter 6, people's level of interest in enlargement and favorability levels to EU were found to be positively correlated with their likelihood of support for the EU enlargement. Finally, the results of the individual-level multivariate analysis suggested a statistically significant but a negative relationship between political sophistication and support for EU enlargement. This finding challenged the findings of the bivariate analysis regarding the relationship between political sophistication and public support for enlargement. Accordingly, this relationship requires a follow-up analysis. In addition, the public opinion results presented in Chapter 6 should be treated with caution, since they are derived from a public opinion survey conducted three years before May 2004.

The findings of the priming analysis in Chapter 6 showed that public attention to different consequences of enlargement (as determined by the press attention to these subtopics) is influential in determining the weight assigned to these particular consequences by people when they form their opinions on EU enlargement. These results suggested that the consequences of EU enlargement on immigration have been influential

when the British people formed their opinions on enlargement. Regarding the analysis of the French sample for the year 2001, the results of the priming analysis suggested that the unemployment-related consequences of enlargement have been assigned a heavy weight when French people formed their opinions on EU enlargement. As such, focusing on the determinants of public support for EU enlargement enabled this study to comment on the gap between the European elites and the masses.

Chapter 6 concluded with presenting the results of logistic regression analyses on both the British and the French samples for the year 2002. These results supported the second-level agenda-setting findings presented in Chapter 5: they suggested that when forming their opinions on EU enlargement, the British people emphasized the economic consequences of EU enlargement the most, while the French people highlighted the political consequences of enlargement the most.

Although these findings are very important, without contextualization, they would not add much clarity to the relationship between the elites, masses and the media. Accordingly, Chapter 7 presented the findings from the qualitative case studies and mapped the development of the official British and French positions on enlargement vis-à-vis the public opinion and media coverage on the issue.

The results of Chapter 7 drew attention to the significance of the media coverage of the European affairs due to their considerable impact on the public opinion. In Britain, the media focused and escalated public attention; through its effects on public opinion, it has indirectly caused a change in the way the British government reacted to the question of immigration vis-à-vis the Eastern enlargement. In the French case, the effects of

newspaper coverage on the government's policies were not as discernible as they were in the British case.

Nevertheless, in either country, it was almost impossible get a balanced and thoroughly objective view of the immigration and unemployment-related implications of enlargement from the print media. Scare-mongering, sensational headlines and distorted "facts" were very common print media practices in both countries. European citizens were mostly interested in practical issues that affect their everyday lives, such as jobs and social welfare.

However, even in the face of these distorted "facts," the political leaders did not provide their worried publics with clear facts on the realities of immigration as well as the actual risk of unemployment. They did not propose fundamental policy changes to assuage popular concerns about the negative consequences of EU enlargement. They have only either addressed the concerns on the surface and verbally (like in the case of France) or introduced minor cosmetic changes to their policies (like in the case of the United Kingdom). Chapter 7 called for additional efforts by the policymakers to convince their publics about the benefits of important European initiatives.

Consequently, this analysis concludes that the media define the agenda of issues that the European citizens and policymakers regard as priorities, and give people the perspectives that guide their thinking about European affairs. These findings imply that in the democratic process, the media participates as an information broker between the public and policymakers. As such, media coverage on EU political and social affairs has a significant impact on the building of a sense of community. Through their continuous

selection and display of news stories, media coverage influences European citizens' picture of the EU.

People's attitudes towards the Union and its specific policies have significant implications on the role of the EU as an international actor. However, the predominantly negative press coverage and frequent references to several controversial issues regarding the enlargement by the press in Britain and France led to the formation of a skeptical public opinion on the issue of the EU enlargement. It created a gap between the public opinion and official policy on EU enlargement and damaged the future of the creation of a true European community.

Furthermore, the results of a comparison of content analysis and public opinion data suggest that there were marked discrepancies between the enlargement-related coverage of the tabloids and the broadsheets. The quality newspaper coverage on EU enlargement emphasized broader European themes, while the tabloid coverage concentrated on the bread-and-butter problems of economic consequences of EU enlargement.

People are more likely to remember and attach greater value to more concrete issues, in which the problems of daily life are involved. Put differently, problems that are critical to people's domestic well-being are more likely to attract their attention, rather than subjects like Europe and international relations. As such, the tabloids were more effective in shaping the public attitudes.

The results of the case study chapter suggest that perhaps European citizens expected to hear about themes that interested them most – the economic and social crisis and the prospects of overcoming it – rather than about the broad ideals of achieving peace

and prosperity in the European continent that were emphasized by the European political elites and quality newspapers. Both the British and French people received mixed messages from their political leaders regarding the effects of EU enlargement.

These findings have two wide-ranging implications on a practical political level. First, the journalists need to be more conscious of the important role they play when they cover political issues. Second, European elites need to pay special attention to setting the media agenda, and providing more easily accessible information to the European masses. The following sections discuss these important implications in detail.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR THE EUROPEAN MEDIA

As shown by the consequences of agenda-setting analysis in Chapter 6, increased exposure to tabloids meant decreased support for enlargement. Because of their anxiety-driven coverage on European issues, tabloids tended to create a sense of alarm among the public about the detrimental effects of EU developments on people's daily lives. As suggested by various findings in this research, tabloidization provoked public skepticism on political issues generally, and on European affairs particularly. Hence, tabloidization is certainly a hurdle against people's access to unbiased information.

To illustrate, the issue of immigration was a central topic of especially the British tabloid newspaper coverage on EU enlargement. Consequently, British people feared the arrival of cheap labor from the new Member States or increased drug trafficking, organized crime or welfare system abuses in their country, issues that are mainly emphasized by *The Sun* and *The Daily Mail*. Similar observations were valid for the

enlargement related coverage in the French tabloid *Libération*. There were frequent references to the negative impact of EU enlargement on the French economy and agriculture.

Mass communication has significant consequences for the building of community. As illustrated by the empirical results in this project, dissemination of information and opinion-formation are great responsibilities of the media in democracies. Consequently, the media coverage is an essential vehicle for political socialization – a major learning experience for the European citizens about the European political process. The nature of the EU-related media coverage and its effects on people are central to the operation of democracy in the EU.

As a result, when a major European issue like the EU enlargement gains the spotlight; the media outlets should be especially careful to execute their mission with thoughtfulness and awareness of their unique ability to set the course of the shared European future. In sum, the European media outlets should do a better job of explaining the benefits of enlargement to European citizens.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR THE EUROPEAN POLICYMAKERS

The results of this project also shed light on some information relevant to policymakers. The first direct popular participation in European Community affairs was through the 1972 referenda in Ireland, Denmark, Norway and France. Britain's referendum on continued EC membership in 1975 broadened the public's role in deciding

the future course of European integration. The direct elections of the European Parliament started in 1979 have institutionalized this trend (Dalton and Duval 1986, 119).

Nevertheless, scholars, journalists and news reporters still have plenty of reasons to continue their assault on the democratic nature of the EU. The recent failures of the French and the Dutch referenda on the EU Constitutional Treaty effectively illustrated the significance of convincing the European public on EU-related issues.

Furthermore, France and Austria have already announced that they would hold public referenda on the prospective Turkish accession to the EU. Now that there are increasing signs that popular referenda will be held in several member states of the EU for a possible Turkish accession, the importance of convincing the public becomes even more visible.

Greater insight into the effects of media on public opinion has significant implications for the ongoing democratic deficit debate in Europe. The findings of this research provided some evidence to the existence of democratic deficit in the European context.

As noted earlier, the media helps in facilitating the public debate required for effective democracy. The media's portrayal of European political issues is central to the success or failure of European elites' attempts to initiate EU projects.

Consequently, even though the results of the analysis in this project suggest that the media shoulders an important responsibility in shaping the public opinion regarding EU affairs, the findings also imply that neither the media nor the policy-makers in Britain and France properly did their part of the homework, *i.e.* informing their respective publics about possible consequences of EU enlargement. In the end, the quality of

democratic decision-making rests on the quality of information flowing to citizens from the media and the political leaders, which makes it imperative that scholars understand the factors that shape both the content of European news and the policy-public opinion-media nexus.

The results of this analysis further suggest that the EU has difficulties in bringing itself into the spotlight of the mass media's attention. Hence, public communication should be treated as an integral part of EU policy-making and implementation. Put more precisely, decision makers are well-advised to engage in various forms of public relations strategies by which they should seek to enhance the image of the EU and related issues in their respective news media. Most importantly, governments and political leaders should do a better job of explaining the benefits and the costs involved in the enlargement process to the people.

In order to rebuild support for the EU, national political leaders need to focus on delivering visible solutions to the problems European citizens care most about. These problems include low economic growth and high unemployment, illegal immigration, welfare system, organized crime, terrorism, environmental pollution, and global warming.

LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This analysis is an initial foray into the relationship between the media, public opinion and policymaking. This study, of course, has limitations. First of all, this project did not analyze TV news coverage because of the unavailability of a systematic

collection of TV news transcripts on EU enlargement in Britain and France. As such, we should be cautious to not to draw over-precise conclusions from the analysis that mainly took into account the newspaper coverage of the EU enlargement debate.

Exposure is an important variable in the agenda-setting process. Even though there is no guarantee that the media coverage was actually seen and processed by the respondents to the *Eurobarometer* polls, the six newspapers content analyzed in this study have the largest circulations of any newspaper in each country. Additionally, the results of the consequences of agenda-setting analysis in Chapter 6 confirm our expectations that the media outlets utilized in the content analysis were influential in determining people's attitudes towards EU enlargement.

Finally, previous research also suggests that large newspapers in a region can set the agenda of smaller papers. Thus, the agenda of attributes in the newspapers analyzed in this research could have been filtered down to smaller papers and other media, making the media agenda accessible to all respondents throughout the country.

Still, it is by no means certain that the analysis of the print media reflects the enlargement debate comprehensively as depicted in the whole range of media. In fact, as suggested by Chapter 6, there are significant differences in the effects of the newspaper coverage and TV coverage. Nevertheless, as explained by McCombs (2005), there is a "rough rule of thumb" in the agenda setting research, suggesting that about half the time, newspapers have the edge in setting the public agenda.

Furthermore, this project initially planned to include *The Sun* and *France-Soir* in the content analysis to represent the tabloid outlets, due to their large circulation figures. However, due to unavailability of these tabloids at the *Lexis-Nexis* database, other

popular news outlets, *The Daily Mail* and *Libération*, were used as proxies. Regardless of these limitations, this project documented strong evidence of the media's first-level agenda-setting effects on the public in both Britain and France.

Another methodological issue needs to be addressed here. Due to limitations in the public opinion survey data, for measuring public salience, this study employed an indirect measure – *i.e.* name recognition of EU enlargement. However, this is not an uncommon indirect measure of salience when other options are unavailable (Kiousis and McCombs 2004).

In addition, the number of cases included in the quantitative analyses was fairly small due to the limited amount of newspaper articles on the Eastern enlargement topic (especially in Britain). The small size of the sample might have entailed various statistical problems, although the current study tried to address most of them.

Moreover, this project studied the second-level of agenda-setting effects according to EU enlargement's subtopics. In other words, it provided an issue-specific framing analysis. As such, it is hard for the researchers to adopt the same frames used by a previous study and generalize these frames to other topics. This is one general criticism against the media effects studies that employ issue-specific frames. As such, for the sake of theory building, future studies should try to adopt more general frames that are applicable to other political issues as well.

Regarding the second level of agenda setting analysis, future studies need to construct smaller numbers of subtopics on issues than employed in this second-level analysis (N=17); to better account for the correspondence in the priorities of the media and the people regarding the EU enlargement. Additionally, due to the lack of a *Flash EB*

survey data conducted shortly before the enlargement date, the research could not account for more recent media effects on public opinion.

Regarding the priming thesis, this research shows that the media framing helped set determinants in public's evaluation of the issue of Eastern enlargement. But this is far from definitive. The "affective" attributes of press reporting on Eastern enlargement could not be quantitatively analyzed in this project due to the low intercoder reliability. Future studies should include the tone of the media coverage on the issue of EU enlargement. Doing so may shed light on some of the inconclusive results presented thus far, especially regarding the consequences of agenda-setting and priming analyses.

Also, the individual-level multivariate analysis in Chapter 6 could not explore the effects of left-right political ideology, education, occupation, and income as independent variables on the support for EU enlargement. This was due to the unavailability of such information in the key to the *Standard EB 56* dataset. Future studies should try to shed light on the effects of these independent variables on the support for EU enlargement.

Some questions still remain unanswered. One such question is: Do media have independent agenda? If not, who sets the media agenda? One may argue that the government policy instead of the media coverage drives the public opinion. Another such question is: Could the observed media effects on public opinion be due to some real world events?

No single study can be considered totally comprehensive. These unsolved questions, however, provide a valuable guideline for future research. Subsequent research in this field should try to build much more controlled analytical models using time-order

analysis to see how the media coverage and public opinion interact with each other over time.

To provide a full account of the media effects on public opinion, local and national television news on EU enlargement will also need to be examined by future studies. Moreover, in order to make generalizations about the effect of the media on public opinion regarding the EU affairs, future studies in this field need to expand their scopes to study the effect of media coverage of several other EU policies on public opinion.

As explained in this section, future research in the European political communication field is likely to prove fruitful. Many inquiries, both within the bounds of the current data and outside, present themselves for future studies. Their findings too will hold significant public policy implications.

Referendums in France and the Netherlands on the European Constitution exposed both the gulf between Europe's elites and masses and the limits to the supranationalist endeavors of the EU. There is an ongoing communications deficit in the EU's policy making process. In other words, the EU is not doing a good job in getting its message out; and the national political leaders are not doing a good job of assuaging the concerns of their domestic public opinion regarding the EU-related developments.

The findings of this research had profound implications for European policymakers regarding actions to be taken on both future referenda concerning the adoption of the EU Constitution and possible future referenda on the subsequent rounds of EU enlargement. Clearly, the media plays a very important political role in shaping the political and public preferences on European affairs. The upshot is that the mass media

shoulder an important responsibility in filling the gap between the public opinion and the elite actions.

While there is no doubt that the EU issues get less attention than other topics in the European media, the results of this study show that they are hardly absent from the news. Overall, this study confirmed the hypothesis that there is a strong statistically significant relationship between the media coverage and the public opinion regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU. By combining quantitative and qualitative methods, this project provided a comprehensive understanding of the complex interrelationship between the media coverage, public opinion and policymaking on EU enlargement in Britain and France.

Appendix A: Coding Scheme and Codebook for Content Analysis

Coding Scheme

EU ENLARGEMENT

Affective Attributes

Substantive Attributes

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Political Consequences

Economic Consequences

Social Consequences

Same coding sheet was used for the survey and the content analysis data.

Codebook for Content Analysis

- 01 Coder ID
- 02 Article ID
- 03 Date of the Article
- 04 Newspaper
- 05 Headline
- 06 Length
- 07 Peace
- 08 Peace (Tone)
- 09 Moral Duty to Enlarge
- 10 Moral Duty (Tone)
- 11 Effects of Enlargement on EU power in the world
- 12 Effects on EU power (Tone)
- 13 Cost of EU enlargement
- 14 Cost of Enlargement (Tone)
- 15 Role of the Country after Enlargement
- 16 Role of the Country (Tone)
- 17 Effects on EU Decision-making
- 18 Effects on Decision-making (Tone)
- 19 Effects on EU's Proximity to Citizens
- 20 Effects on Proximity to Citizens (Tone)
- 21 Historically Natural to Expand
- 22 Historically Natural to Expand (Tone)
- 23 Effects on Expansion of Markets
- 24 Effects on Expansion of Markets (Tone)
- 25 Effects on Immigration
- 26 Effects on Immigration (Tone)
- 27 Effects on Illegal Immigration
- 28 Effects on Illegal Immigration (Tone)
- 29 Effects on Drug Smuggling and Organized Crime
- 30 Effects on Drug Smuggling and Organized Crime (Tone)
- 31 Effects on Environment
- 32 Effects on Environment (Tone)
- 33 Effects on Unemployment
- 34 Effects on Unemployment (Tone)
- 35 Effects on Social Welfare
- 36 Effects on Social Welfare (Tone)
- 37 Effects on Culture
- 38 Effects on Culture (Tone)
- 39 Effects on Agriculture
- 40 Effects on Agriculture (Tone)

Appendix B: Definition of Categories for Coding

The “political consequences of EU enlargement” frame consisted of six subcategories extracted directly from the *Flash Eurobarometer* survey questionnaires. They include: (1) “peace” – effect of EU enlargement on peace and stability in the European continent; (2) “moral duty” – moral responsibility of Europeans to include new members to the EU; (3) “stronger EU” – effect of EU enlargement to boost the power of EU in the international arena; (4) “count less” – effect of EU enlargement on the role played by one’s country (Britain or France) within the enlarged EU; (5) “difficult to take decisions” – impact of enlargement on EU decision-making processes; and (6) “historically natural” – perceptions of EU enlargement as a historically natural development.

The “economic consequences of EU enlargement” frame included seven subcategories extracted directly from the *Flash Eurobarometer* survey questionnaires. They include: (1) “expansion of markets” – effect of EU enlargement on the investment opportunities in a bigger market; (2) “immigration” – effect of EU enlargement on immigration from new EU member states to one’s country; (3) “illegal immigration” – effects of EU enlargement on illegal immigration to one’s country; (4) “environment” – impact of EU enlargement on environment; (5) “unemployment” – the effect of EU enlargement on unemployment in one’s country; (6) “agriculture” – the impact of EU enlargement on agriculture and the CAP; and (7) “expensive” – the cost of funding of EU enlargement.

The “socio-cultural consequences of EU enlargement” frame consisted of four subcategories extracted directly from the *Flash Eurobarometer* survey questionnaires. They include: (1) “proximity to citizens” – impact of EU enlargement on people’s feeling of affinity with the EU; (2) “drugs and organized crime” – the impact of EU enlargement on the fight against drug smuggling and organized crime in one’s country; (3) “welfare system” – impact of EU enlargement on the social welfare system; and (4) “culture” – effect of EU enlargement on the cultural life of local populations and on language.

Appendix C: Information on the Eurobarometer Surveys Utilized

Eurobarometer Surveys Employed	Field Research Dates
Standard Eurobarometer 56.3 *	January-February 2002
Standard Eurobarometer 57.1 *	March-May 2002
Flash Eurobarometer 132.1 **	September 2002
Standard Eurobarometer 58.1 *	October-November 2002
Flash Eurobarometer 132.2 **	November 2002
Flash Eurobarometer 140 **	March 2003
Standard Eurobarometer 59.1 *	March-April 2003
Standard Eurobarometer 60.1 *	October-November 2003
Standard Eurobarometer 61.0 *	February-March 2004

* *Standard Eurobarometer* public opinion data are obtained through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPRS) website, the URL: <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu>.

** *Flash Eurobarometer on Enlargement* data are gathered through the University of Cologne's Central Archive for Empirical Social Research Data Service (ZA) website, the URL: http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/order/index.htm.

Appendix D: Definition of Categories for the Eurobarometer 56 Public Opinion Data

Political consequences of enlargement included:

SUM(q40bc02,q40bc09,q4301r,q4302r,q4303r,q4304r,q4304r,q4312r,q4403r,q4407r,q4408r, q40cc15)

Positive

Q40BC02 The risk of armed conflicts on our continent will be lower
Q40BC09 It will give the EU a stronger voice in the world

Q4301r: Enlargement unites our continent
Q4302r: Enlargement secures peace in Europe
Q4303r: Enlargement will help eliminate armed conflicts in Europe
Q4304r: Enlargement will help to fight against terrorism
Q4312r: Enlargement will make the EU work better

Q4403r: Our country will make itself better heard in the world
Q4407r: The EU will be stronger than the US
Q4408r: The EU will be closer to its citizens

Negative

Q40CC15: Smaller countries will lose out

Economic consequences of enlargement included:

SUM(q40bc03,q40bc04,q40bc08,q40bc11,q40bc12,q40bc13,q40bc15,q4305r,q4306r,q4310r,q4311r,q4401r,q4402r,q4404r,q4405r,q4406r,q40cc01r,q40cc02r,q40cc03r,q40cc04r,q40cc07r,q40cc12r,q40cc13r,q40cc14r,q40cc16r,q40cc17r,q40cc19r)

Positive

Q40BC03 There will be better economic prospects in a bigger market
Q40BC04 There will be better employment prospects
Q40BC08 It will be easier to prevent immigration from outside of the EU
Q40BC11 Tourism will develop
Q40BC12 There will be less taxes
Q40BC13 Your personal financial situation will improve
Q40BC15 Environment will be better protected

Q4305r: Enlargement will favor economic growth

Q4306r: Enlargement will help to create more jobs in our country
Q4310r: Enlargement will make the EU stronger politically
Q4311r: Enlargement will help new member countries to reach the EU level of economic development

Q4401r: There will be a greater variety of products in the shops
Q4402r: Companies in our country will benefit from enlargement
Q4404r: There will be stronger guarantees on the quality of food products
Q4405r: The environment in our country will be better protected
Q4406r: It will be easier for citizens of other EU member states to settle in our country

Negative

Q40CC01: There will be a risk of unfair competition from new members
Q40CC02: The costs of funding new members will be too high
Q40CC03: The value of euro will fall
Q40CC04: There will be more unemployment
Q40CC07: There will be more people from new member states looking for work in our country
Q40CC12: There will be less European Union's funds allocated to our country
Q40CC13: Prices will rise
Q40CC14: Taxes will rise
Q40CC16: The quality of food products will be poorer
Q40CC17: The environment will suffer
Q40CC19: It will be harder to prevent immigration from outside the EU

Socio-cultural consequences of enlargement included:

SUM(q40bc01,q40bc05,q40bc06,q40bc07,q40bc10,q40bc14,q4407r,q40cc05r,q40cc06r,q40cc08r,q40cc09r,q40cc10r,q40cc11r,q40cc18r)

Positive

Q40BC01 There will be more countries to visit and go on holiday to
Q40BC05 Cultural life will be richer and more varied
Q40BC06 It will be easier to fight against organized crime
Q40BC07 There will be less drug trafficking
Q40BC10 Easier to travel, no passports needed
Q40BC14 We will learn more about new countries, about our neighbors
Q4307r: Enlargement will help to increase people's quality of life in our country

Negative

Q40CC05: There will be more organized crime
Q40CC06: There will be more drug trafficking
Q40CC08: There will be more illegal immigrants from outside the EU

Q40CC09: There will be problems caused by people in the EU being too different to get along with each other

Q40CC10: Our language will be used less and less

Q40CC11: There will be a loss of our national identity and culture

Q40CC18: Your statutory entitlements (social welfare, holidays, maternity leave, etc.) will be reduced

Appendix E: Supplementary Cross-tabulation Tables for Chapter 6

Table E-1. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on the Quality of Life in Britain

	Q. 40a. After new countries have joined, your life will be ...			Total N
	Better	Worse	About the Same	
Opposition to Enlargement	3.8%	51.2%	14.7%	115
Support for Enlargement	96.2%	48.8%	85.3%	520
Total N	78	82	475	635

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-2. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on the Quality of Life in France

	Q. 40a. After new countries have joined, your life will be ...			Total N
	Better	Worse	About the Same	
Opposition to Enlargement	6.8%	64.9%	25.8%	230
Support for Enlargement	93.2%	35.1%	74.2%	558
Total N	59	97	632	788

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-3. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on Illegal Immigration to France

	Q. 40cc. After new countries have joined, there will be more illegal immigration to France		Total N
	Disagree	Agree	
Opposition to Enlargement	55.8%	75.6%	63
Support for Enlargement	44.2%	24.4%	34
Total N	52	45	97

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-4. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Enlargement's Impact on Prices in France

	Q. 40cc13. After new countries have joined, prices will rise in France		
	Disagree	Agree	Total N
Opposition to Enlargement	56.9%	76.9%	63
Support for Enlargement	43.1%	23.1%	34
Total N	58	39	97

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-5. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Gender in Britain

	Gender		Total N
	Male	Female	
Opposition to Enlargement	36.5%	37.4%	253
Support for Enlargement	63.5%	62.6%	430
Total N	293	390	683

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-6. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Gender in France

	Gender		Total N
	Male	Female	
Opposition to Enlargement	45.3%	46.6%	369
Support for Enlargement	54.7%	53.4%	434
Total N	402	401	803

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-7. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Age in Britain

	Age				Total N
	18-24	25-35	36-49	50+	
Opposition to Enlargement	25.3%	34.5%	34.7%	45.5%	253
Support for Enlargement	74.7%	65.5%	65.3%	54.5%	430
Total N	95	209	144	235	683

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-8. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Age in France

	Age				Total N
	18-24	25-35	36-49	50+	
Opposition to Enlargement	36.7%	44.3%	50%	49.5%	369
Support for Enlargement	63.3%	55.7%	50%	50.5%	434
Total N	128	253	204	218	803

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-9. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Self-Proclaimed Interest in Enlargement in Britain

	Interested in EU Enlargement		Total N
	No	Yes	
Opposition to Enlargement	48.7%	23.1%	242
Support for Enlargement	51.3%	76.9%	412
Total N	355	299	654

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-10. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Self-Proclaimed Interest in Enlargement in France

	Interested in EU Enlargement		Total N
	No	Yes	
Opposition to Enlargement	63.1%	32.7%	358
Support for Enlargement	36.9%	67.4%	428
Total N	333	453	786

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-11. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Political Sophistication on Enlargement in Britain

	Level of Information on Enlargement (4-very well informed)				Total N
	1	2	3	4	
Opposition to Enlargement	44%	31.5%	30%	12.5%	247
Support for Enlargement	56%	68.5%	70%	87.5%	418
Total N	318	289	50	8	665

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-12. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and Political Sophistication on Enlargement in France

	Level of Information on Enlargement (4-very well informed)				Total N
	1	2	3	4	
Opposition to Enlargement	56.8%	39.6%	30.3%	50%	360
Support for Enlargement	43.2%	60.4%	69.7%	50%	427
Total N	324	364	89	10	787

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-13. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and the Level of Attachment to EU in Britain

	Level of Attachment to EU (4-very attached)				Total N
	1	2	3	4	
Opposition to Enlargement	57.3%	38.8%	15.2%	14.6%	249
Support for Enlargement	42.7%	61.2%	84.8%	85.4%	413
Total N	220	237	164	41	662

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

Table E-14. Cross-tabulation of Support for EU Enlargement and the Level of Attachment to EU in France

	Level of Attachment to EU (4-very attached)				Total N
	1	2	3	4	
Opposition to Enlargement	78.9%	52.5%	31.4%	19%	357
Support for Enlargement	21.1%	47.5%	68.6%	81%	425
Total N	156	238	283	105	782

Source: *Standard Eurobarometer 56* (Cell entries are column percentages)

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Vita

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