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**EXPLORING POTENTIAL COMPONENTS OF PREJUDICE TOWARD
CERTAIN STIGMATIZED OTHERS**

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by

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To Dad and Mom, whose endless generosity allowed me to do everything right.

To Todd, for your wonderful patience and understanding.

To Anna, for all your insight, energy, and well-timed distraction.

And

To Tom, for taking me into your world and teaching me more than I ever thought possible.

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Social cognition theory promotes the idea that an individual's knowledge structures, values, and beliefs will influence perceptions of the world in particular ways (Abrams & Hogg, 1999; Kunda, 1999). Differences in locus of control, attributional style, and belief in a just world have been shown relevant in shaping interpretations of behaviors and situations (e.g., Miller, 1984; Calhoun, 1994; Karuza & Carey, 1984). There is evidence that a specific combination of these factors may create the recipe for an ideology of blame in which individuals are likely to blame others for their condition and to derogate those in undesirable circumstances (Crandall, 1994).

Previous research suggests that the individualist value orientation is more subject to the types of attitudes that might promote this ideology of blame. However, relatively few studies have sought to link these attitudes and beliefs with individual-level measurements of collectivist/individualist tendencies, which are known as

allocentrism and idiocentrism. When faced with evidence that the world is on a trend toward becoming more individualist (Triandis, 1997; Hui & Yee, 1994), it becomes more important to explore the values and beliefs that may lead individuals to a set of cognitions that foster prejudice toward certain others whose condition can be seen as either controllable or uncontrollable.

This dissertation begins by bringing together the research on individualism/collectivism and idiocentrism/allocentrism, locus of control, belief in a just world, and attributions of personal blame to explore relationships that may be useful for predicting negative attitudes toward criminals, homosexuals, fat people, and poor people.

Evidence does not support the existence of an ideology of blame. Rather, negative attitudes toward stigmatized others are best described as stemming from an element of fear. Multiple regression models are described for predicting Anticriminal, Antipoor, Antifat, and Antihomosexual Attitudes among men and women. In addition, methods for altering attitudes are discussed and one possible educational application is presented.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I	
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	
Cultural Ideology in the United States	5
Attributional Style and Cultural Value Orientation	11
Locus of Control and Cultural Value Orientation	13
Ideology of Blame	14
Belief in a Just World	17
Cultural Ideology and Overweight	20
Weight Locus of Control	22
Implications for This Study	26
CHAPTER II	
ATTRIBUTION THEORY	
Heider	29
Jones and Davis	31
Kelley	33
Summary	36
Social Cognition and Attribution	37
Cultural Differences	40
Linguistic Implications	44
Implications for Helping Behavior	48
Attributions for Crime	50

CHAPTER III

METHODS

Hypotheses	53
Participants	60
Instruments	61
Data Analyses	69

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS REGARDING AN “IDEOLOGY OF BLAME”

Primary Hypothesis Analyses	71
Secondary Hypothesis Analyses	84

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS REGARDING AN “IDEOLOGY OF BLAME”

Discussion of Results	93
First Model for Predicting Negative Attitudes Toward Others	94
Specific Hypotheses	95
Making Sense of the “Unexpected”	106

CHAPTER VI

EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATE RESULTS

Political Affiliation Differences	114
Prediction Models Including Specific LOC and Fear	117
Factor Analysis	122

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATE RESULTS

Political Affiliation	124
-----------------------	-----

Male Models Including Political Affiliation	125
Female Models Including Political Affiliation	126
Male Models Including Political Affiliation, Fear and Specific LOC	127
Female Models Including Political Affiliation, Fear and Specific LOC	129
Summary	131
Discussion of Possibilities for Changing Attitudes	132
The Role of Fear in Prejudice	132
What Works to Change Attitudes?	135
One Suggestion for Decreasing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Others	137
Limitations of the Study	140
Concluding Remarks	141
APPENDICES	143
Bibliography	167
VITA	200

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is based on the premise that an individual's knowledge structures, values, and beliefs will influence perceptions of the world in particular ways. This assumption is the major foundation of social cognition theory and permeates much of psychology today.

According to Sherman, Judd, & Park (1989), social cognition is a conceptual and empirical approach to understanding social psychological phenomena by investigating the cognitive structures and processes by which they operate (Devine, Hamilton, & Ostrom, 1994). It is an approach used to study how people make sense of other people and themselves (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) that does not rely on any one theory. Rather, the social cognition approach assumes a communality across different content domains in psychology (Devine et al., 1994).

The social cognition approach focuses on the direct investigation of the cognitive underpinnings of whatever social phenomenon is being studied, and adopts an information-processing model as a means of understanding social phenomena (Devine et al., 1994). Accordingly, social cognition research often attempts to measure the various stages of social information processing (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).

Abelson (1994, p.124) describes Heider's role in the early social information processing movement: "His book, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (Heider, 1958), was a smash hit in social psychology, though it did not say a thing about actual interpersonal relations, only people's conceptions of generic social

events. Heider's 'balance theory' saw a number of applications, and his early papers on social attribution were the foundation for all the attribution work that came after. Heider's 1958 book can be seen as a precursor of the modern fascination with the concept of schemas."

The schema concept originated in response to long-standing issues running through research on person perception and object perception. The schema concept follows from a fundamental assumption: perceivers actively construct reality. The schema concept builds on the constructive or interpretive view of perception by positing that organized prior knowledge shapes what is perceived and recorded in memory. The schema concept has proved useful in social cognition research and has generated an explosion of research. The schema concept implies that there are cognitive principles that potentially cut across attributions, attitudes, and other elements of social perception. The schema concept reflects a search for broadly applicable principles of information processing (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).

As Leyens and Fiske (1994) note, there are individual differences in impression formation processes, and almost all theories of person perception have assumed that the processing of information represents a combined influence of stimulus factors and individual differences in social experiences. Theories of person perception are often intertwined with the notion of causal analysis. The emphasis on causal analysis is central to social cognition because even the most trivial of observations often contains an implicit causal analysis (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).

In the 1970's, the dominant topic was attribution theory. Just like other popular topics of the 60's and 70's, attribution theory focused on cognition. In the 1980's, social cognition emerged in an attempt to capture some of the complexities of real belief and knowledge structures while still embracing the methodology of cognitive psychology. The concept of a cognitive schema was adopted as a kind of mascot in social cognition (Abelson, 1994).

Researchers generally assume that people possess a vast library of specific knowledge organized in scripts, schemas, and other cognitive structures on which they draw to make judgments and enact behaviors (Smith, 1994). The attribution theories have detailed the conditions that prompt attributions and have outlined methods for making causal inferences, both of which are presumably followed by most individuals. (See Chapter II for a more detailed description of attribution theory.) In contrast, work on locus of control posits that stable individual differences among perceivers influence causal inference (Smith, 1994). The locus of control concept has been widely researched and studies demonstrate that locus of control influences both how one perceives events that befall the self and how one interprets the experience of others. Fiske and Taylor (1984) review evidence that locus of control does indeed play a prominent role in the ascription of causal responsibility when attributional concepts are applied to social issues and problems. Attributional style is now viewed as a relatively stable characteristic, similar to locus of control.

The social cognition perspective leads me to believe that a variety of beliefs and cognitions may blend together into a combination that promotes an ideology of

blame. I have chosen a few such beliefs to explore in hopes of understanding their relation to each other and to negative attitudes toward others. I begin with a description of cross-cultural research regarding these constructs, with hopes of demonstrating that not only do these beliefs cause differences in the various attitudes among cultures, they also may be studied as individual differences within a single culture.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Collectivism and Individualism in the United States

According to Markus and Kitayama (1994), the idea of the autonomous individual is a notion that is peculiar to Western, Euro-American culture. Japanese and other Asian cultures have a very different view of what a person is all about. These cultures emphasize the interdependence of the person with the larger culture, or “the collective.” Western modes of thought and political ideology combine to view people as essentially separate from each other and emphasize independence, autonomy, and individual differences. The Eastern view sees individuals as part of a greater whole, and places less emphasis on competition between individuals.

This model of cultures states that the independent view of the self involves an enduring concern with expressing one’s internal attributes both in public and in private. This construal of the self concerns others to the extent that others provide standards of comparison and evaluations of the self. Alternately, the collective self is defined and experienced as inherently connected with others. There is an abiding fear of being on one’s own, or being separated or disconnected from the collective. A desire for independence is cast as unnatural and immature. One’s thoughts, feelings, and actions are made meaningful only in reference to the thoughts, feelings, and

actions of others in the relationship, and consequently others are crucially important in the very definition of the self.

Social identity theory suggests that individuals form social identities based on the groups they identify with. Interdependence in the sense of collectivism is theoretically distinct from social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Turner & Oaks, 1989), which refers to social categorizations that define a person as a member of particular social categories. Social identity, in the framework of Turner and colleagues, is always defined in counterpoint to personal identity, which is all the ways a person is different from his or her in-groups. The key feature of interdependence is not distinctiveness or uniqueness but a heightened awareness of the other, and of the nature of one's relation to the other, and an expectation of some mutuality in this regard across all behavioral domains, even those that can be designated as private or personal. Thus, the collectivist notion of interdependence is an embedded identity, not viewed apart from the relationship of self and other.

Many studies based on the theory of individualism/collectivism have attempted to compare and contrast the ideology of nations, much in accordance with Hofstede's (1980, 1984) original rankings of 66 nations on the value dimensions of power-distance, uncertainty-avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. However, Gains, Marelich, Bledsoe, Steers, Henderson, Granrose, Barajas, Hicks, Lyde, Takahashi, Yum, Rios, Garcia, Farris, and Page (1997) caution against making generalizations in research by simply comparing samples from the United States with samples from nonwestern cultures. They emphasize the importance and relative lack

of research on collectivism/individualism among different cultural/ethnic groups within specific cultures. There is little research addressing possible cultural distinctions on the dimensions of individualism and collectivism within a nation, but some have attempted to capture these characteristics at the ethnic or group level within the U.S.

The existing research that analyzes the selves of those groups in U.S. society that are somewhat marginalized - women, members of nondominant ethnic groups, the poor, the unschooled, and the elderly - reveals a more obvious interdependence between the self and the collective (Vandello & Cohen, 1999; Noricks, Agler, Bartholomew, & Howarth-Smith, 1987). For example, women describe themselves in relational terms (Gilligan, 1982; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stivey, & Surrey, 1991), are more allocentric than males (Yamaguchi, Kuhlman, and Sugimori, 1995; Watkins, Adair, Akande, Gerong, McInerney, Sunar, Watson, Wen, and Wondimu, 1998), and they do not reveal the “typical” individualist preference for being positively unique or different from others (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992). Similarly, other studies reveal that those groups that are in the minority with respect to skin color, language, or religion are decidedly more likely to define themselves in collective terms (Allen, Dawson, & Brown, 1989; Bowman, 1987; Husain, 1992; Gaines et al., 1997).

Degelman (1991) reports that personal power scores vary significantly as a function of age and gender, such that there is a lower belief in personal power among older women, and a higher sense of injustice among women than men. Related to perceptions of personal power is the concept of locus of control. An internal locus of

control represents a feeling of efficacy and control over one's situation. Several studies of United States Blacks found that young, non-college educated, lower class samples tended to score more externally on measures of locus of control than White samples (Jones & Thorne, 1987). These findings suggest that those with power and privilege are those most likely to internalize the prevailing European-American cultural frame to experience themselves as autonomous individuals. J. B. Miller (1976) suggests that women and other groups actually develop relationality as a product of holding less power.

We can see that in viewing entire nations as either individualist or collectivist, important distinctions are lost. Even within nations, different groups are more or less collectivist. For example, there is evidence that U.S. Hispanics and Asian-Americans (see Triandis, 1994 for summary of studies) are more collectivist than most Americans and urban samples tend to be more individualistic than rural samples (Triandis, 1989). Evidence also suggests that in both collectivist and individualist societies, female subjects scored higher on the collectivism scale than did male subjects. Marshall (1997) also challenges the assertion that individualism is based primarily on nationality or culture and suggests that social class has a stronger effect on individualism than culture. Triandis (1989) explains that affluence means an individual can be independent of the ingroup. Once again we see that more powerful groups may be more likely to be individualistic and those with less power may be more likely to be collectivistic. Not only may the power of a group affect a cultural or ethnic group's individualist or collectivist tendencies, these ramifications of power

or status may also be important for individual differences on the dimensions of individualism and collectivism.

Just as differences emerge among groups within cultures, there are undoubtedly individual differences even within these groups. This argument applies to presumptions about any group. Therefore, it is not only important to look at subcultures within each nation, but also to consider the individual differences in levels of collectivism and individualism. In fact, Bohan (1993) argues that to presume that all women or men conform to characteristic or universal ways of being denies the contextuality that frames behavior, suggesting the need for an even more specific situation-level analysis. However, for the purposes of this dissertation an analysis of individual differences in value orientation within groups and also without reference to group remains the focus.

This personal collectivism (allocentrism) or individualism (idiocentrism) may be studied at the individual level, regardless of culture. Thus, at the cultural level, comparisons are made among cultures based on the mean of national data, within nations, comparisons may be made among subcultures, and at the individual level, one may examine the relationship between each person's individualist or collectivist tendencies and the person's behavior, cognition, or emotion. Triandis, Chen, & Chan (1998) state that the distribution of these individual responses within the culture is what provides the profile of the culture. Thus, it is the average of individual responses that makes a nation more or less individualist or collectivist, and each person can be more or less idiocentric or allocentric within a given culture. Cultures

are ranked according to the aggregate data obtained from individuals. Though collectivism (or individualism) on a cultural level involves a general propensity toward selves not separated from the larger culture as a whole, each individual can display more or less of this tendency to feel connected to others, and can be more or less enmeshed within an inseparable network of relationships. According to Triandis et al. (1998), there is great variation in the extent to which any individual is representative of the culture.

Allocentrics, as opposed to idiocentrics, are those who weigh collective goals more heavily than they weigh private goals, especially when the two are in conflict, according to Yamaguchi (1994). Although Yamaguchi makes the distinction between idiocentrism and allocentrism, others note that according to Baumeister (1986) and Greenwald & Pratkanis (1984), there is also another aspect to consider, the collective self (Bochner, 1994; Triandis, 1989). The collective self involves group cognitions such as group membership (i.e., “I am a Catholic.”) or cognitions concerning a view of the self that is found in some specific reference group, as opposed to the generalized other (i.e., “My family thinks I am introverted”). Bochner (1994) notes that the “I am” technique which has typically been used to compare cultures may also be used to compare individuals on the relative salience of idiocentric cognitions such as “I am smart,” (Triandis refers to this as private self), allocentric cognitions such as “People think I am honest,” (Triandis refers to this as public self), and group cognitions such as “I am a son,” (Triandis refers to this as collective self). Similarly, Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz (1993) promote the notion that another type of group

cognition, the tendency to promote the welfare of one's family (familism), is equally important and distinct from the idiocentric and allocentric dimensions of the self. Thus, they have created a three-dimensional scale to measure idiocentrism, allocentrism, and familism.

High allocentric tendencies, as measured by one method, the Collectivism Scale, are associated with higher affiliative tendency, higher sensitivity to rejection, and lower need for uniqueness both in an individualist culture and collectivist cultures. (Yamaguchi et al., 1995). Allocentrics are more likely to emphasize the values of cooperation and honesty, and those who are idiocentric are more likely to emphasize the values of comfortable life, competition, pleasure, and social recognition. Idiocentrics also report higher achievement motivation and more loneliness (Triandis, Leunge, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). Future studies involving this personal level of collectivism/individualism may reveal additional characteristics associated with these value orientations.

Attributional Style and Allocentrism/Idiocentrism

One variable that has been associated with collectivism and individualism is attributional style. We have observed that people in collectivist cultures are more likely to attribute their own and others' behavior to situational rather than dispositional causes (Jaspars & Hewstone, 1982; Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992). For example, J. G. Miller (1984) found that Americans make more attributions to the individual's general dispositions than do Indian Hindus in

explaining social and antisocial behaviors. Cha and Nam (1985) similarly find that Korean subjects make more external attributions than do Americans. This is demonstrated in attributions of crime. Koreans are more likely to attribute crime to society/situation than Americans, and are less likely to attribute crimes to internal factors such as personality and intention (Na, 1998).

Westerners tend to overestimate the power of dispositions relative to situational factors, a bias known as “the fundamental attribution error” (Carr, 1998). This fundamental attribution error appears to be specific to Western, more individualistic cultures (Inkeles, 1983; J. G. Miller, 1984; Na, 1998; Kunda, 1999). Triandis (1989) believes that the separation of the self from the in-group is necessary for one to make personal responsibility attributions. Perhaps collectivist or allocentric individuals are less able to separate the self from the in-group, and thus are less likely to make the fundamental attribution error of overestimating the contributions of disposition versus situational causes. Accordingly, the interdependent construal of self understands behavior as influenced much more strongly by the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others (Triandis, 1989). See Chapter II for a more detailed description of attribution theory.

Although these studies represent attempts to compare attributional style of collectivist and individualist cultures, the possibility remains that even within nations, cultures, or groups, the variability in allocentrism and idiocentrism may influence attributional style at the level of the individual.

Locus of Control and Allocentrism/Idiocentrism

The attribution theories have detailed the conditions that prompt attributions and have outlined methods for making causal inferences, both of which are presumably followed by most individuals. In contrast, work on locus of control posits that stable individual differences among perceivers influence causal inferences (Smith, 1994). The locus of control concept has been widely researched and studies demonstrate that locus of control influences both how one perceives events that befall the self and how one interprets the experience of others. Fiske and Taylor (1984) review evidence that locus of control does indeed play a prominent role in the ascription of causal responsibility when attributional concepts are applied to social issues and problems.

Because individualistic societies place more emphasis on an individual's responsibility than do collectivist societies, it is reasonable to assume that people in individualistic cultures believe in an internal locus of control more than those in collectivist cultures (Na, 1998). In fact, Hui & Yee (1994) note that definitions of individualism often include a component of internal locus of control (Waterman, 1984) or agency (Kashima et al., 1995). In support of the assumed relationship between individualism and internal locus of control, Na (1998) finds that Koreans are less likely to hold an internal locus of control than Americans.

Even within cultures we can see group differences in locus of control. As mentioned earlier, lower class, less educated Blacks are less likely to hold an internal locus of control than Whites (Jones & Thorne, 1987). Calhoun (1994) suggests that

the illusion of control that has been assumed to exist for individuals may not be characteristic of members of minority groups. He states that the experience of victimization because of one's group status may preclude the development of any illusion of control. Studies of women in America traditionally portray women with a more external locus of control than men (Calhoun, 1994); however, Lee & Dengerink (1992) suggest that societal changes in the U.S. may be causing a change in the locus of control of women.

The potential relationships between power, allocentrism, and locus of control at the individual level of measurement remain unexplored, yet the evidence suggests that individuals who are less powerful will hold a more external locus of control and will also be more allocentric than individuals in more powerful situations.

Ideology of Blame

When considered together, locus on control and attributional style pave the way for the potential to blame others for their condition. Social cognition theory and research support the premise that different individuals may understand the same situation quite differently, if they view it through the lenses of different knowledge structures, goals, and feelings (Kunda, 1999; Abrams & Hogg, 1999). Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit (1997) suggest that differences in allocentrism and idiocentrism may provide people with particular ways of constructing, defining, and extracting meaning from situations. When one believes in the power of an individual to control his/her own behavior and when one attributes behavior to

personal causes as opposed to situational factors, the result supports an “ideology of blame.” Crandall (1994) suggests that American culture, with its traditional Protestant work ethic and individualistic nature, promotes an ideology of blame. He states that beliefs, values, and ideologies should be closely linked with individual differences in the tendency to make internal, controllable attributions, and that consistent attributional styles might in turn lead to the derogation of any disadvantaged group.

Triandis et al. (1995) state that Americans do not feel that unsuccessful minority members are “really” a part of their community that must be helped to come out of poverty in every way possible, even if that means much personal sacrifice. This tendency suggests that individualists are more likely to blame others, such as the poor, for their condition. In support of this, when comparing individualist/collectivist groups in America, Feagine (1972) finds that White, well-schooled, and middle-income members of the public tended to attribute domestic poverty in the U.S. to dispositions among the poor themselves, such as laziness. In contrast, African Americans, less well-schooled, and lower income respondents are “strongholds” (p. 104) for situational factors, such as low wages. Along these lines, Koreans (who are more likely to attribute crimes to society/situation than are Americans, and are less likely to attribute crimes to internal factors such as personality and intention) tend to believe in hating the act of crime but not the person who committed the offense (Na, 1998). Although these studies measure relationships between various beliefs of groups and group differences in collectivism and individualism, an individual-level

measurement might reveal similar findings for those who are more allocentric or idiocentric.

Bohan (1993) warns that person-blame attributions often ignore the impact of power and its differential distribution in society. Perhaps those who feel less powerful in society and recognize the impact of differential societal power structures will be less likely to blame individuals for their condition. For example, Na (1998) feels that Koreans are more likely to be sympathetic toward prisoners because they might guess that the prisoners are victims of the unjust practice of their legal system, as compared to Americans who might hold a relatively stronger belief in the fairness of their legal system. However, once again we see a comparison of groups, rather than a measurement of individual differences.

According to Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz (1993), although existing attribution studies often compare individualistic with collectivistic cultures, and some compare individualistic and collectivistic groups within cultures, very few relate attributional patterns to individual-level measures of idiocentrism and allocentrism. Perhaps using the individual as the unit of analysis rather than culture would demonstrate that those who are more allocentric and have more group cognitions are also more likely to make external attributions for behavior. In other words, the possibility exists that those people who have more allocentric and group cognitions will be less likely to make internal attributions for their own and others' behavior. In addition, certain groups of people within America may be more likely to be comprised of either allocentric or idiocentric people, and thus may also be more or less likely to make

internal attributions. This could also be studied according to situation to examine whether or not attributions vary as a function of relative situational power.

Belief in Just World

Related to attributional style and locus of control is the belief in a just world. Belief in a just world has been used to explain things such as why people blame apparently innocent victims of violence (Karuza & Carey, 1984), feelings that the poor deserve their fate (Furnham & Gunter, 1984), and other attitudes toward justice (Nelson, Eisenberg, & Carroll, 1982). Na (1998) explains that those who trust that everything goes in a right way believe they can control their own destiny because they can gain as much as they try. Those who believe in a just world also believe that people deserve the circumstances they experience in life. Lerner (1970) explains that Americans tend to assume that the other man's suffering is probably a result of his own failures. Those who believe in a just world tend to admire people who have been fortunate and they tend to deride those who have been unfortunate as having brought their plight upon themselves.

This tendency has been shown to happen to victims of misfortune such as poverty and rape, among others (MacLean & Chown, 1988). For example, Na (1998) suggests that belief in a just world makes people blame criminals rather than sympathize with them. According to Lerner (1970), many feel that any help offered to a suffering person deprives themselves of what they earned and what they need to take care of their families. However, we are often deeply moved by the suffering of

other people and reactions of sympathy and compassion are easily aroused in most of us. Lerner (1970) describes how both rejection of victims and compassionate reactions toward them derive from the same underlying psychological process called belief in a just world. We want to believe that good things happen to good people and serious suffering only comes to bad people. However, we are confronted every day with events that do not support this belief. In an attempt to reestablish justice, one can either compensate the victim or persuade himself that the victim deserved to suffer because of his or her own undesirable behavior.

If the desire for justice is to be translated into action designed to help a victim, one essential factor is that the deprived person clearly should not appear to have earned his fate (Lerner, 1970). In addition, Lipkus (1993) suggests that a person with a strong belief that people “get what they deserve” might be most sympathetic toward a group of individuals who are actively trying to improve their situation. This becomes especially important when considering those who are unable to do so, such as the handicapped or the very elderly. MacLean and Chown (1988) found a positive relationship between belief in a just world and the attribution of blame to elderly people for their circumstances of poor health and lower income, as well as the tendency to dismiss the needs of elderly people. A belief in a just world has been linked to the belief that social inequalities that exist are “fair, inevitable, and immutable” (Smith, 1994).

According to Fiske & Taylor (1984), Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1965, 1970; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Simmons & Lerner, 1968) investigated the just

world phenomenon. They found that unless people believed that the suffering of an innocent victim had ended or was about to end or unless they could compensate the victim for that suffering, they often derogated him or her. Lerner and others (e.g., Ryan, 1971) have suggested that this belief in a just world often provides a justification for the oppression of society's victims. It also appears that the Just World theory has cross-cultural validity (MacLean & Chown, 1988).

Who is likely to believe in a just world? Hunt (2000) reports that women are less likely to believe in a just world, but others do not report a sex difference (Mohiyeddini & Montada, 1998). There also remains a mixed picture regarding the relationship between social status and belief in a just world (BJW). Mohiyeddini & Montada (1998) note that although several studies have found that objectively disadvantaged groups have lower BJW compared to more privileged groups, other studies report the opposite. Lipkus (1993) finds that those with a strong belief in a just world report fewer acts of personal discrimination. Perhaps this could be an indication that those who actually are more discriminated against (i.e., minorities, women, etc.) believe less in a just world. In a review of research on the Just World Beliefs Scale, Furnham (1993) cites evidence that belief in a just world is related to characteristics of power, wealth, and property. He also notes the strong positive correlation between belief in a just world and factors such as locus of control and authoritarianism.

These various findings prompt Hunt (2000) to suggest further research about who believes in a just world. If belief in a just world is due to factors such as power,

locus of control, and authoritarianism, an individual level analysis of these relationships may reveal additional relationships between and among allocentrism, feelings of powerlessness, locus of control, and belief in a just world.

Cultural Ideology and Overweight

We can see evidence in support of the hypotheses that allocentrics are more likely to make external attributions and less likely to blame others for their condition by examining the stigmatization of overweight. Rodin, Price, Sanchez, & McElligot (1989) found that rejection of a target with a controllable stigma was judged as more reasonable and less prejudiced than rejection of a target with an uncontrollable stigma. Weiner, Perry & Magnusson (1988) also found that individuals with controllable stigmas were less likely to be liked or pitied, and elicited more anger and less assistance than individuals with uncontrollable stigmas. Many people tend to hold the overweight as responsible for their condition (Allon, 1982; Millman, 1980; Weiner et al., 1988). According to DeJong (1980), overweight individuals are criticized and often excluded from activities when they are believed to be at fault for their fatness. Crandall (1994) states that rejection of fat people is based on the underlying ideological assumption that people get what they deserve, or deserve what they get. He states that attributions, rather than stereotypes, lead to the rejection of fat people. The relationships reported in the literature suggest that certain individuals and groups are more likely to make internal attributions to the overweight, and thus are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward those who are overweight. Crandall and

Martinez (1996) suggest that the place of antifat attitudes is likely to differ according to culture. Therefore, it is worthy of testing the relationships among variables to see if antifat attitudes are linked to specific ideologies that differ by both culture and the individual. It is possible that even within cultures, individual differences in ideology may affect attributions toward overweight.

There is evidence that White males are the most likely to hold negative attitudes towards the overweight, followed by White females, then Blacks. For example, White men choose thinner figures for ideal girlfriends and report wishing their girlfriends would lose weight more than Black men (Greenberg & LaPorte, 1996). Black males are less likely than White males to have refused to date someone because of her weight, and Blacks (men and women) personally consider overweight women to be more attractive, sexier, less ugly, and less sloppy than whites (Harris, Walters, & Waschull, 1991). Additionally, when attributing positive traits to normal and overweight people, boys are more biased against the overweight than girls (Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994) and men are more concerned about a date's weight than women. Among women, White women are significantly more likely to endorse negative attitudes toward overweight than black women (Wilfley, Schreiber, Pike, Striegel-Moore, Wright, & Rodin, 1996). However, although they personally express less negative attitudes than men express toward overweight women, females perceive the societal stereotypes of obesity as more negative than do males. (Harris et al., 1991). This could be why women are more likely to be concerned about dieting and weight. Perhaps testing the relationships between

power, locus of control, allocentrism/idiocentrism, and belief in a just world will reveal that this previously mentioned difference in attitudes toward overweight is related to differing tendencies within the individual in addition to those differences found among the groups.

Weight Locus of Control

Crandall & Biernat (1990) suggest that prejudice against fat people, "fatism", involves "moral feelings that the obese violate such traditional American values as individualism, self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline." Similarly, studies show that a belief that fat is controlled by willpower and denigrating fat people go hand in hand (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Biernat, 1990; Crandall & Martinez, 1996). Additional evidence also suggests that people are more stigmatized by others when their condition is viewed as under their control (Weiner et al., 1988). In support of this view, Tiggemann and Rothblum (1997) found that women with an internal weight locus of control exhibit greater negative stereotyping of obese people. Consistent with the finding that actual weight does not relate to stereotyping of obesity, weight locus of control is not significantly correlated with actual body mass index (Tiggemann & Rothblum, 1997). However, weight locus of control correlates with the perception of being overweight (Tiggemann & Rothblum, 1997), supporting the view that attitude towards one's body may contribute to negative stereotyping of the obese. Jones & Thorne (1987) found that young, non-college educated, lower-class African-Americans tended to score more externally on measures of locus of

control than White samples. This could be one explanation for the difference in negative weight stereotypes among American subcultures. The relationship between locus of control and weight locus of control remains unclear.

According to Crandall & Martinez (1996), the place of antifat attitudes in an ideological network will differ from culture to culture. This assertion is based on a study comparing Mexican students to American students, which found that Mexican students are significantly less concerned about their own weight and more accepting of fat people than are U.S. students. Attitudes of controllability over life events are significantly less important in Mexico for predicting antifat attitudes. Perhaps studying different American subcultures would illuminate differences in ideological networks even within the United States. This raises the possibility that attitudes of controllability over life events may be less important among African-Americans for predicting antifat attitudes. It is unclear how these attitudes relate to an internal locus of control with regard to weight.

Eating disorders and dieting are extremely rare among Asian-Americans. In light of evidence that collectivists are more likely to make external attributions for behavior and are more likely to hold an external locus of control, it seems possible that some groups do not perceive that weight, specifically, is controlled by willpower. It may be assumed that dieting behavior is related to a sense of internal weight locus of control because the act of dieting inherently involves the belief that one can control his/her weight. Perhaps this partially explains the relative lack of dieting behavior and eating disorders among Asian-Americans.

Neff, Sargent, McKeown, Jackson, and Valois (1997) find that White students are almost four times as likely to engage in dieting and exercising as methods of weight management compared to Black students. In light of the evidence that Black students are less likely to be dissatisfied with their bodies (Wilson et al., 1994; Kumanyika et al., 1993), consider the following. Two thirds of those White students who wanted to lose weight were proactively attempting to lose weight, compared to less than one half of those Black students who wanted to lose weight (Neff et al., 1997). This supports the notion that Blacks are less likely to view weight as controllable. Tiggemann & Rothblum (1997) show that for women, internal weight locus of control is related to negative stereotyping of fat people. These two ideas suggest that Blacks are less likely to endorse negative stereotypes of overweight in part because they are less likely to have an internal weight locus of control. Although these studies suggest group differences in attitudes toward weight and weight control that may be related to group differences in ideology, individuals within these may be more or less inclined to exhibit these beliefs and tendencies. It is important to examine these ideologies beyond the group level in order to discover how individuals may be affected by their own beliefs.

According to the reformulated helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Alloy, Abramson, Metalsky, & Hartlage, 1988), when people hold themselves responsible for uncontrollable events they will suffer loss of self-esteem. In spite of many people's belief in the controllability of weight, there is actually much support for the uncontrollability of overweight (see Crandall, 1994 for a review).

These two things combined help us understand the finding that overweight children who believe that they, themselves are at fault for being overweight experience lower self-esteem (Pierce & Wardle, 1997). This applies to adults and children alike. Tiggemann and Rothblum (1997) find that lower self-esteem is found in overweight women having strong beliefs that weight is controllable.

We find that those who adhere to the Western culture and the Eurocentric model of beauty have increased vulnerability towards eating disorders (Pumariega, 1986; Silber, 1986). However, in line with the proposed model, this effect may be mediated by a strong sense of belonging to a group of peers (Kuba & Harris, 1994). Harris (1992) notes the importance of fostering a sense of belonging to a family and community and increasing feelings of interdependence in order to stimulate resilience against the development of eating disorders (Harris & Kuba, 1997). This evidence supports the hypothesis that a person's allocentric tendencies may lead to fewer internal attributions and less endorsement of what Crandall (1994) refers to as an "ideology of blame."

This argument is supported by pilot research examining the relationships among ethnic identity, antifat attitudes, and weight locus of control suggesting that those with high ethnic identity are less likely to endorse negative attitudes about overweight, regardless of ethnicity (Terry, 2000). Although ethnic identity is not a direct measure of allocentric tendencies, several studies have established a strong relationship between ethnic identity and allocentrism/idiocentrism (Parham & Williams, 1993; Plummer, 1996; Taylor & Rogers, 1993; Gaines et al., 1997).

Perhaps this link between allocentrism/idiocentrism and negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others can be found when exploring other types of prejudice.

Implications for This Study

Through my dissertation I intend to broaden the hypotheses from the topic of antifat attitudes to include the possibility that allocentric individuals will be less likely to perceive the characteristics of weight, poverty, criminality, and homosexuality as controllable, and that this more external locus of control may lead to less negative attitudes towards members of those groups. I will examine these relationships not only at the group level of collectivism/individualism in men and women, but also at the individual level of allocentrism/idiocentrism. The goal of the dissertation is to explore these relationships in hopes of proposing a model for prejudice.

I also will test the relationship between perceived power and allocentrism, hypothesizing that those individuals who feel less powerful will be more likely to hold allocentric tendencies. This is consistent with research suggesting that within both collectivist cultures (Wainryb & Turiel, 1994) and individualist cultures (Bohan, 1993) autonomy is linked to power and connectedness is linked to subordination.

Why is this study important? First, there is merit in exploring whether or not these variables are related in a way that might help us to understand certain types of prejudice. It is helpful to identify which values, beliefs, and ideologies shape our individual behaviors and interpretations of the world. For example, Carr (1998) reports that a substantial amount of research has shown that altruistic behavior,

including donations to the poor, is enhanced if people estimate that the person in need is genuinely a victim of circumstances. Thus, understanding these relationships can not only arm us with information in hopes of combating prejudice, there is also potential for learning how to increase helping behaviors and altruism. The link between education in social sciences and “system blame” rather than “person blame” (Guimond, Begin, & Palmer, 1989; Guimond & Palmer, 1994) suggests that potential altruists can be “educated” into adopting situational attributions (Carr, 1998). This gives hope for the possibility of altering attitudes toward others and creating an atmosphere of harmony.

Allocentrism, which entails a sense of duty toward others and maintaining a cooperative environment, might support a greater likelihood of helping behaviors and less likelihood of derogating those in unfortunate or undesirable situations. In addition, there is evidence that allocentrism correlates with psychological well-being (Sinha & Venna, 1994). Stasio (1998) explains that mental health is moderated both by one’s capacity for community feeling and by one’s motivation toward social interest (defined as a specific interest in the welfare of others and a motivated action toward that end). For these reasons, it appears that allocentrism might be more desirable than idiocentrism.

However, Stasio (1998) warns that behaviors of individuals may actually demonstrate selfish and self-protective movement under the guise of concern for others and the common welfare. This mirrors J. B. Miller’s (1976) suggestion that relational tendencies may stem from the needs of powerless individuals who must be

concerned about others in order to operate effectively in their environment. According to Stasio (1998), social interest may be highest for cultures (and people, I suggest) with roughly equal amounts of both individualist and collectivist traits. Stasio states that extremely collectivist cultures may discourage self-reliance such that people do not act toward a particular social goal, and extremely individualist societies may promote competition over cooperation, thus eliminating the desire for a specific interest in the welfare of others. Therefore, the potential for the highest level of social interest is reflected toward the middle of the collectivist-individualist dimension, where it could be argued that people demonstrate both a collective concern for the welfare of others and the self-reliance to act individually toward that end (Stasio, 1998).

Others argue that internal locus of control is not a necessity for the motivation to achieve. Ang (1999) suggests that achievement does not necessarily encompass individualism, a key element in Western conceptualizations of achievement. Instead, achievement-related behavior can also be seen as an expression of a motive within a socially interdependent context with values emphasizing collectivism. Therefore, perhaps extreme allocentrics can demonstrate the ability to act upon their concern for the welfare of others and maintain a true social interest.

Exploring the relationships among the variables in this study will not only give us a better indication of the factors that may be important in fostering certain attitudes toward others, but also may provide an indication of some beliefs that promote a genuine concern for others and the ability to act toward that end.

CHAPTER II

ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Heider

According to many (Shultz & Schleifer, 1983; Hewstone, 1989; McArthur, 1972), Heider is widely acknowledged as the founder of modern attribution theory. He outlined, among other things, the processes involved in attributing responsibility to persons.

Heider's (1958) attribution theory derives directly from Brunswik's treatment of perception (McArthur, 1972). Just as the perceiving organism must integrate the highly variable cues given in proximal stimulation in order to "infer" the relatively unchanging object that gave rise to them, the attributing organism, according to Heider, must integrate the cues given in responses in order to infer the more stable factors that gave rise to them.

Heider believed that attributions serve to simplify the individual's perceptual world, which otherwise would be impossibly complex (Eiser, 1983). Perhaps Heider's single most important argument is that ordinary people's "common sense" explanations and interpretations of their social world are a proper, and indeed essential, topic for study by social psychologists. He believed that individuals shape their behavior as a function of their interpretation of events. Moreover, such interpretations will vary predictably as a function of various personal and situational

factors. At its most basic level, Heider's concept of "naïve psychology" implied that interpretations of events rest on perceptions of personal or impersonal causality.

One of Heider's major contributions is the crucial distinction between personal and situational causes. This distinction opened the way for Weiner's (1986) extensive research on attributions for success and failure. Heider also addressed again the perceiver's tendency to ignore, partly or completely, situational factors when explaining behavior (Hewstone, 1989). Heider noted Ichheiser's belief that a 'person' attribution was more likely than a "situational" one because persons are seen as the "prototype of origins". Heider argued that this tendency to perceive persons as origins influenced social perception in many ways; indeed, it led to "an underestimation of other factors responsible for [an] effect. Changes in the environment are almost always caused by acts of persons in combination with other factors. The tendency exists to ascribe the changes entirely to persons" (Heider, 1944). Here Heider was referring to what has become known as the "fundamental attribution error" (L. Ross, 1977).

Heider also suggested that personal dispositions were more readily inferred for intentional than unintentional actions. He put forward three criteria for making inferences about intentionality: equifinality (whether action is goal-directed rather than means-centered), local causality (whether people are seen as agents of an action, rather than passive recipients of environmental forces) and exertion (people are presumed to try harder to achieve intended effects or goals) (see Heider, 1958, p.101).

These criteria have, however, had little impact on subsequent research, although the attribution of intentions is central to Jones and Davis's (1965) theory.

Jones and Davis

According to Shultz & Schleifer (1983), the second major influence on the emergence of modern attribution theory is generally acknowledged to be a paper by Jones and Davis (1965) on the attribution of intentions and dispositions. They reasoned that human actions are often explained by the attribution of stable, relatively invariant dispositions to the actor. They argued that the attribution of intention to the actor was a precondition for a dispositional attribution, and proceeded to formulate sets of principles for these two attributional steps. In their theory, the knowledge and ability of the actor were held to determine the attribution of intention. And given that intentionality had thus been established, Jones & Davis (1965) believed the attribution of disposition was governed by the principle of correspondent inference. They stated that Correspondent Inference Theory attempted to formalize some of Heider's attributional ideas. The aim of Correspondent Inference Theory was "to construct a theory which systematically accounts for a perceiver's inferences about what an actor was trying to achieve by a particular action." The central concept of the theory, the correspondent inference, refers to the perceiver's judgment that the actor's behavior is caused by, or corresponds to, a particular trait. According to Jones and Davis, there are two main stages in the process of inferring personal dispositions: the attribution of intention, and the attribution of dispositions.

As Shultz & Schleifer (1983) explain, dispositions may cause intentions which, in turn, may cause actions. The model is also presumably relevant to the attribution of responsibility for action and outcome to the extent that intention of the actor may be considered a crucial part of responsibility for action. Jones and Davis assume that the attribution of intentions is a necessary step in the assignment of more stable characteristics to the actor. Intentions are seen as causing behavior, and traits are seen as causing intentions (Eiser, 1983). In this model, the action and its effects are observed, and the knowledge, ability, intention, and disposition are inferred.

In their paper Jones and Davis (1965) concentrate on the perception of others. They seek to understand how a subject attains a specific truth about an observed individual and attempt to isolate the conditions for attributing stable personal dispositions to another on the basis of observed actions. The subject makes inferences about the actor's intentions, which permits the attribution of a personal disposition to the individual. It is thus the specific effect of an act that reveals the stable, personal characteristics of the actor (Deschamps, 1983).

Hewstone (1989) notes four main limitations of the theory, including its applicability only to actions that have some element of choice, a lack of description of process, the exclusion of expectancy-confirming behaviors, and the possibly faulty assumption that processes of dispositional and causal attribution are similar.

Kelley

Kelley dealt explicitly with the problem of attributing events (usually behaviors) to their causes and delineated a highly abstract model of the processes by which such attributions are made (Shultz & Schleifer, 1983). The model encompasses both covariation principles such as consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency, as well as configuration principles such as discounting, augmentation, and compensation. These principles have been used to account for a vast array of diverse causal phenomena but without being applied to the actor's responsibility for action and outcome.

Kelley (1973) states that attribution theory is a theory about how people make causal explanations, about how they answer questions beginning with "why?" It deals with the information they use in making causal inferences, and with what they do with this information to answer causal questions.

For Kelley, attribution is an inferential process that enables the individual to "know" the environment (Deschamps, 1983). According to Kelley, subjects are assumed to behave like statisticians, devoting themselves to objective information processing. He postulates that the individual is driven by the search for the real, the "real" being an intrinsic property of the object. This theory of attribution seems to apply to an isolated subject, detached from the social context, passive with regard to the world that surrounds him or her. For Kelley, socially constructed reality is opposed to the conception of a physical reality. Kelley includes consensus in his model, but he seems to assert that physical and social reality are independent, and

that, in the last resort, it is physical reality (a constant reality of which one can have a veridical picture) that is more important for the subject. However, it appears that sometimes, in perceiving the causal structure of the environment, attributions are made much more as a function of social phenomena than as a function of real, objective characteristics of the situation.

According to Hewstone (1989), Kelley's (1967, 1972a, 1973) contribution to attribution theory began with the question of what information is used to arrive at a causal attribution. He outlined two different cases that depend on the amount of information available to the perceiver. In the first case the perceiver has information from multiple sources and can perceive the covariation of an observed effect and its possible causes. In the second case, the perceiver is faced with a single observation and must take account of the configuration of factors that are plausible causes of the observed effect.

In outlining attribution in the case of covariation, Kelley built onto Heider's proposals that: 1.) understanding of the environment was gained by means of a causal analysis that is "in a way analogous to experimental methods" and 2.) social perception was similar to a naïve "factor analysis". According to Kelley, the perceiver's purpose, like the scientist's, is to separate out which effects are to be attributed to which of several possible factors.

Kelley's (1967) conceptualization, which is derived directly from Heider, details the cognitive processes that might be engaged in by the individual during this "inference" (McArthur, 1972). He proposed that the individual interprets a given

response in the context of the information gleaned from experiment-like variations of conditions. The conditions varied are (a) entities from which distinctiveness information is obtained (i.e., whether or not the response occurs when other entities are present), (b) persons from whom consensus information is obtained (i.e., whether or not the same response is produced by other people in the presence of the entity), and (c) time/modalities from which consistency information is obtained (i.e., whether or not the response occurs whenever the entity is presented and in whatever way it is presented). Kelley presented these three sources of information in an analysis of variance model for which entities, persons, and time/modalities are orthogonal dimensions. Kelley's major prediction is that "external attribution is made when evidence exists as to the high distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus of the appropriate effects."

Kelley's (1967, 1972) influential models of attribution emphasized judgmental rather than perceptual mechanisms (Morris, Nisbett, & Peng, 1995). In Kelley's view, a dispositional cause is judged more likely when a behavior covaries with a person across situations than when a behavior covaries with a situation across persons. Drawing on advances in judgment research, subsequent theorists explained attributional patterns in terms of heuristics, such as selecting causes that are high in "availability," "representativeness," or "consistency". Because studies of Western subjects pointed to a widespread and consequential "tendency to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to overestimate the role of dispositional factors in

controlling behavior”, Ross designated this the “fundamental attribution error” (L. Ross 1977).

Summary

Hewstone (1989) summarizes attribution theory by stating that the three theories converge on a few specific and general themes: generally, they highlight mediation between stimulus and response, active and constructive causal interpretation, and the perspective of the naïve scientist or layperson. Specifically, the theories all address the kinds of information that people use to determine causality, the kinds of causes that they distinguish, and the rules they use for going from information to inferred cause. Most important, all share a concern with common-sense rules people might be using to make causal attributions.

According to Hewstone (1989), the theories of Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967) were primarily responsible for the upsurge of experimental studies of causal attribution. Both models of the attribution process tended to view the perceiver as a fairly rational person, and Kelley’s (1967) ANOVA model was even given the status of a normative model that indicated how perceivers should make attributions (using consensus, consistency and distinctiveness, according to the covariation principle). It is sometimes forgotten, however, that Kelley, like Heider, and Jones and Davis before him, also acknowledged that “attribution processes are subject to error” (1967). Indeed, he devoted the final section of his article to the exposition of biases or departures from the models. Both Heider and Kelley

mentioned that personality factors influence the biases and errors in attribution (Furnham, Jaspars, & Fincham, 1983).

Kelley (1973) also addressed the importance of prior knowledge when he asked, “How do a priori causal beliefs affect the intake and processing of further information bearing on the attribution problem?” He believed that prior beliefs about causation affect the intake of information about covariation between various causes and effects and that further development of attribution theory requires an account of this conflict between existing cognitive structures and new data, and of the process by which they interact and become reconciled. This is where social cognition theory steps in.

Social Cognition and Attribution

Hewstone (1989) describes the knowledge-structure approach to causal attribution and social cognition, explaining that knowledge is “organized in chunks or packages so that, given a little bit of appropriate situational context, the individual has available many likely inferences on what might happen next in a given situation” (Abelson & Black, 1986). Scripts provide information about such matters as the typical goals, actors, roles, objects, location and sequence of actions for performing a given action. Thus the script enables the perceiver to fill in gaps in what is explicitly stated.

Wyer & Carlston (1979) apply the theory of information processing to social cognition, inference, and attribution in one of the first works to incorporate

attribution/inference and information processing. As in the cognitive information processing models, social cognition also involves both automatic and controlled processes. Attributions, or indeed social judgments in general, are identified as automatic to the extent that they fulfill three criteria: 1.) they occur without intention, 2.) they occur without giving rise to awareness, 3.) they occur without interfering with ongoing mental activity (Hewstone, 1989).

According to Wyer & Carlston (1979), a trait attribution is simply an inference about the characteristics of an actor or object on the basis of information about the actor's behavior and its situational context. A second type of attribution, referred to as a causal attribution, is an inference of the extent to which these characteristics are responsible for the actor's behavior.

In the absence of more specific information, the context surrounding an event is constructed by the judge himself through access to a script or vignette that happens to be salient to him at the time the information is received. Abelson (1981) defines a script as a "coherent sequence of events expected by the individual, involving him either as a participant or observer." Scripts are presumably acquired throughout the individual's lifetime, either through direct experience with people and events or indirectly, through various communications media (conversations with others, reading, television, etc.). Thus scripts may often be idiosyncratic to an individual, resulting from his unique past history. On the other hand, many situations and experiences are sufficiently common to our culture that the essential features of some scripts are apt to be widely shared.

The particular vignettes and scripts that a judge accesses probably depend upon (a) the type of judgment he wishes to make and (b) the aspects of the information presented that happen to attract his attention. Different vignettes and scripts may be accessed even when the same information is attended to, depending upon the perspective of the judge. On the other hand, if the judge fails to notice this information, he may access a very different script, and thus draw very different conclusions.

As Wyer & Carlston (1979) state, the information that stimulates the use of a particular vignette or script may not describe completely the many detailed features of its various elements. When this occurs, unmentioned features of the situation may be “filled in” in a manner consistent with the vignette that is elicited.

According to Hewstone (1989), the availability heuristic refers, generally, to the tendency to judge events as frequent, probable or causally efficacious to the extent that they are readily available in memory. This is closely tied to the topic of salience, which has been used synonymously with Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) use of “availability” to suggest some factor that is literally prominent in the perceiver’s field of view, or that is easily retrievable from memory. Because of each person’s unique experiences, we have different repertoires from which to draw inferences. The explanation that a person provides on any particular occasion may then depend upon a variety of factors (Lalljee, Watson, & White, 1983).

Cultural Differences

Clearly, a range of social and psychological factors interact to determine when an attribution of cause or responsibility will be made and the form it will take, and distinctions between these various factors need to be drawn (Lloyd-Bostock, 1983). According to Hewstone, (1989), at the societal level, some have pointed out one obvious limitation of the cognitive-salience account – it fails to explain cultural and developmental differences. After all, if individual differences in experience account for differences in salience, why should any cultural differences in attributional style exist? J.G. Miller (1984) reported a developmental increase in reference to dispositional factors in an American sample, but an increase in reference to contextual factors in an Indian-Hindu sample. Studies have also shown that as children in a Western culture develop, they come to hold an increasingly dispositional view of the causes of behavior (Higgins and Bryant, 1982; Ruble et al, 1979). Both findings strongly call for an explanation at the societal level.

In response, Jellison and Green (1981) proposed a societal norm for internality, so that internal attributions were viewed more favorably than external attributions (see also Beauvois and Dubois, 1988). This societal approach was emphasized by Nisbett and Ross (1980):

“It is difficult to prove that people adhere to anything like an overarching ‘general theory’ of the relative impact of dispositional versus situational factors. There is reason to suspect, nevertheless, that a rather general, ‘dispositionalist theory’ is shared by almost everyone socialized in our culture. Certainly, it is part of the

world view of the so-called Protestant ethic...the 'dispositionalist theory', in short, is thoroughly woven into the fabric of our culture." However, it must not be overlooked that there are individual differences even within culture.

The study of beliefs that are shared by large numbers of people within and between societies brings attribution theory back to the issue of common-sense psychology with which Heider (1958) was originally concerned and deals with the rather neglected question of where attributions come from (Pepitone, 1981). The fact that attributions appear to be largely culturally and sub-culturally shared suggests the examination of wider social beliefs as bodies of knowledge that provide the basis, even the vocabulary, for social attributions. There are various constructs with which one could attempt an analysis of this knowledge – ideologies, attitudes, beliefs and so on.

The concept of social representations offers a means by which common sense can be reinstated into attribution theory, with a focus on shared social beliefs and knowledge. Like other representations, social representations serve as categories that influence the perception of social information; unlike other representations, they focus on the process by which specialized knowledge is transformed into common sense and can be used in everyday thinking. Still, Hewstone (1989) reminds us that, of course, it is ultimately the individuals, not the groups or societies, who do the thinking and the attributing. Thus, the question of individual differences remains important to the study of attributions for the behavior of self and others. Individuals

make these attributional assumptions, however, on the basis of widely circulating information.

Work by Triandis and colleagues on “subjective culture” (Triandis, 1976; Triandis et al., 1972) has found that persons from different cultural groups often make different causal attributions for the same behavior, with interpersonal misunderstandings as the result. J. G. Miller (1984) was interested in the influence of “cultural meaning systems”, as opposed to either cognitive capacities or different experiences, on age and cultural variation in attribution. In particular, she studied the development of dispositional attributions, following the suggestion that there were different “cultural conceptions of the person” in the cultures of North America and India. Previous research on Western populations had found a significant increase over development in references to general dispositions of the agent (e.g., Livesley and Bromley, 1973; Peevers and Secord, 1973). In contrast, Shweder and Bourne (1982) found that adults from non-Western cultures generally placed less emphasis on dispositional properties of the agent (they used more contextual qualifiers and behavioral descriptions) than did American and Western European adults; this non-Western concept of the “person” was not distinguishable from social roles and social relationships. Fletcher and Ward (1988) pointed out that this holistic, versus individualistic, conception of the person in non-Western cultures may have a realistic basis in that external roles and norms have a greater impact on the individual’s behavior in collectivist, compared to non-collectivist, cultures (Jahoda, 1982).

Miller's unique research provides evidence of the independent impact of cultural meaning systems on attribution and the need for future research to pay more attention to the social aspects of knowledge acquisition. Miller's findings also provide a persuasive societal-cultural account for the fundamental attribution error (L. Ross, 1977).

As Morris, Nisbett, & Peng (1995) state, studies of lay people in non-Western cultures by anthropologists and cross-cultural psychologists have found an opposite tendency toward external situational attributions for certain kinds of events. Hsu (1953) proposed that person-centered conceptions of society guide American social thought, whereas situation-centered conceptions guide Chinese social thought; he linked these conceptions to social orders based on individualism versus interdependence. Dumont (1970) argued that the European conception of the individual does not apply in India, where society is seen as primary. Cultural differences in social concepts would affect attributions for social behavior but not for other kinds of events. As for the generality of these concepts across the world's cultures, many have taken the stance of Geertz that "the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action...is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures" (Geertz 1975, p.48).

Attributors in highly individualist cultures hold person-centered social theories that bias them towards personal dispositions as causes of behavior, whereas

attributors in highly collectivist cultures hold situation-centered theories that bias them towards social situations as causes of behavior. As Deschamps (1983) explains, a subject cannot be held responsible for his or her acts unless he or she is perceived as the source, or the cause, of this behavior. However, an individual is not perceived as the source of an action unless he or she can choose – or give the impression of choosing – the behavior. In other words, the individual becomes a subject when one can attribute to him or her the cause of, and then the responsibility for, personal acts; if this is not possible the individual remains dependent on the physical and social environment. In the first case, there is internal causality where the individual as subject is autonomous or relatively autonomous. In the second case, there is external causality where the individual acts under the pressure of events.

Although differences in these attributional tendencies have been widely studied at the cultural level, individual differences in the types of attributions made for the behavior of self and others are undoubtedly present even within cultural groups. Considering attributions at the individual level of measurement may capture some of the beliefs that contribute to internal or external attributions for actions.

Linguistic Implications

Furnham, Jaspars, & Fincham (1983) note that there may be cultural and sub-cultural differences in the range and type of attributions made. According to Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, & Rosenbaum (1971), the language used to describe events and actions frequently contains implicit attributions in itself. As Hewstone

(1989) mentions, Brown and Fish (1983) have proposed that a theory of psychological causality is implicit in natural language. They were interested in phrases such as “Ted helps Paul” and “Ted likes Paul” and whether subjects assigned greater causal weight to the subject of the sentence (Ted) or to the object (Paul). Brown and Fish argued that verbs such as “help” activate an “agent-patient schema” (if “S helps O”, O is the stimulus and S is the experiencer). The agent in the former schema and the stimulus in the latter schema are regularly perceived as the causal origins of behavior. It is difficult to do justice to Brown and Fish’s complex article in any summary, but its essence is captured in their own statement that “adult native speakers of English think of causality in such inter-personal interactions as unequally apportioned between the interactants”. The causality implicit in language is hard to deny.

For example, our vocabulary is rich in dispositional or trait terms (the Allport-Ogbert list includes over 18,000 terms) and quite impoverished when it comes to describing the situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1983). Perhaps a comparison of the terms in other languages like Spanish, Chinese, and even African American Vernacular English would reveal a difference in the proportion of dispositional and trait terms among languages.

Another implicit attributional linguistic characteristic involves the lack of ability to describe situations easily. Nisbett and Ross (1980) state that although it is usually possible to describe both an action and an actor using near-identical terms (for example, we speak of generous/hostile actions or actors), the English language rarely

allows us to label situations succinctly, using synonyms for action (for example, there is no word to describe the kind of situations that typically elicit generous/hostile behavior). Linguistic factors in causal attribution have received little attention (e.g., Brown and Fish, 1983; Kanouse, 1972), but they are certainly worthy of closer attention. A study of manifest and subjective verbs reveals another implication of language for attributions.

As stated by McArthur (1972), accomplishments and actions generally represent acts performed by the subject that are “directly observable and relatively delimited in time,” and may therefore be classified as “manifest” verbs. The emotions and opinions, on the other hand, generally represent mental states of the subjects that are “relatively enduring and not directly observable,” and may therefore be classified as “subjective” verbs (Kanouse & Abelson, 1967).

Emotions and opinions are commonly regarded as being elicited by stimuli, as opposed to being emitted by persons. An opinion is necessarily of something, and, by this token alone, it is caused at least in part by the properties of that stimulus. Similarly, with the exception perhaps of psychotic reactions, it is difficult to conceive of any emotion that originates within the person and is unprovoked by an outside force.

Unlike emotions and opinions, accomplishments and actions are at least as easily conceived of as being emitted by persons as being elicited by stimuli. As Heider (1958) pointed out, the dispositional property “can” or “able” is a joint function of the power or ability of the person and the difficulty of environmental

factors. He further noted that an effect (i.e., an accomplishment) may be attributed to the ability of the person, the difficulty of environmental factors, or both. Jones et al. (1968) demonstrated that, in point of fact, another person's accomplishment tends to be attributed to his ability – the person- rather than the task difficulty – the stimulus. This is consistent with the results of McArthur's (1972) study in which observers tended to attribute accomplishments to the person more than to the stimulus.

A random sample of 20 pages drawn from Roget's International Thesaurus contained significantly more manifest than subjective verbs. Considering the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that language influences perceptions of reality, it makes sense that speakers of English are more likely to make attributions to the person rather than to the situation, since the language contains more manifest verbs, which are shown to elicit personal responsibility attributions. Emotions and opinions (subjective verbs) produce attribution to the stimulus; accomplishments and action (manifest verbs) produce attribution to the person.

Weiner et al. (1971) suggest that a limited form of the Whorfian hypothesis is illustrated by the phenomenon of implicit quantification. They note that the generality of a given relation over objects is implicitly specified by the verb. To the extent that a given verb implies extensive or limited generality over objects, it tends to locate to source of the relation either in the subject or the object. This effect seems to be "built in" to the language; that is, implicit quantifiers seem to form part of the meaning of verbs, agreement concerning generality which is shared by language

users. This demonstrates how those who share a common language may also share common attribution tendencies.

Although this application of the Whorfian hypothesis has received little empirical attention, it should not be dismissed as a possibility for future research. According to Hewstone (1983), in his original exposition of attribution theory Kelley (1967) drew attention, albeit in passing, to “the interplay between language and attribution” as a significant aspect of the theory.

Implications for Helping Behavior

As Eiser (1983) quotes “If we can find the correct explanation for a person’s behaviour, we can decide how to react towards him or her, and predict how s/he is likely to behave in the future.” Hewstone (1989) notes that Yarkin, Harvey, and Bloxom (1981) investigated the sequence of receiving a cognitive set about, making attributions about, and then behaving towards a person. The results of this study confirm that attributions can mediate between social perception and social interaction. Other studies also suggest that attributions can mediate between social perception and interaction. These studies made an important contribution in studying the link between attributions and social interaction, a link that had been largely overlooked.

According to Hewstone (1989), an improved and multidimensional approach to the structure of perceived causality has been developed over some years by Weiner and colleagues (Weiner, 1979, 1983, 1985a, 1986). Weiner has developed a taxonomy of causes that specifies their underlying properties in terms of three

dimensions. Locus refers to the familiar location of a cause internal or external to the person; stability refers to the temporal nature of a cause, varying from stable (invariant) to unstable (variant); and controllability refers to the degree of volitional influence that can be exerted over a cause. Causes can theoretically be classified within one of eight cells, although Weiner has cautioned that the exact meaning of a cause may change over time, perceivers and situations. Thus, for example, ability (normally thought of as internal/stable/uncontrollable) might be viewed as an unstable cause of achievement, if learning were expected to occur; similarly, luck (normally thought of as external/unstable/uncontrollable) could be seen as an enduring personal characteristic of some people. The important point, Weiner argues (1985a), is that even though the interpretation of specific causal inferences may change, the underlying dimensions (i.e., locus, stability, controllability) are constant.

Fiske & Taylor (1984) note the following applications of attribution theory to helping behaviors. Similar to Weiner's dimensional formulation of attributions, Ickes and Kidd (1976) proposed an attributional model of helping. In Weiner's model (1979, 1982) attributions of others' unfortunate circumstances to controllable factors should produce anger, which discourages helping, whereas attributions to uncontrollable factors should produce pity and subsequent helping. Ickes and Kidd (1976) argued that when one encounters an individual in need of help, he attempts to infer why the person needs help. He determines whether or not the need was caused by the person or by someone else (locus) and whether the need for help was a consequence of that individual's intention. Ickes and Kidd refer to the last dimension

as intentionality, but in fact it is very close in meaning to Weiner's controllability dimension. Previous research on helping (Berkowitz, 1969) suggests that people will help another if they believe the other's need comes from an environmental barrier or other external factor, but they are not as likely to help if they believe the problem was caused by the person.

Attributions for Crime

As cited by Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver (1987), Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn, & Kidder (1982) showed that alternative strategies for helping people arise from different patterns of attributions of responsibility for problems and their solutions. This can be seen in the approaches people take to the topic of crime. Attributions about the causes of crime are derived from a person's preexisting knowledge of crime, criminals, and society, which is provided by ideology, fed by needs and motives, and learned or developed in a social context.

According to Kelley (1973), rewards and punishments are delivered to other persons according to the particular causal factor to which their task performance is attributed. Causal attributions play an important role in providing a person's impetus to action and in his decisions among alternative courses of action. Sociopolitical ideologies are associated with different viewpoints about the causes of criminal behavior and suggestions for combating crime.

W. Miller (1973) expressed these ideologies very clearly. The conservative political right holds the view that the most serious crime is committed by people who lack self-control and moral conscience. In contrast, the liberal political left holds social conditions of inequality and discrimination at fault for crime. Sosis (1974) found that those with internal locus of control were more punitive than externals, presumably because they blamed offenders for choosing to commit crimes. Once again, we see the overlap of attributions, ideology, and locus of control.

Sosis (1974) found that subjects who believe in social causation for crime tend also to believe that life is difficult and people get what they deserve in the end. People who believe in economic causation tend to believe strongly in the concept of welfarism, that the government would provide a certain minimum standard of living regardless of ability to pay. Individual causation, in contrast to economic causation, was negatively predicted by the Welfarism factor. In short, people who think crime is caused by general economic conditions agree with welfarism. Individual causation was also significantly predicted by the Just-Unjust World factor and the Moral Conservatism factor: People with strict moral attitudes believe that crime originates from greedy individuals who deserve to be punished. (See Chapter I for a more detailed description of Belief in a Just World.)

A Final Note

Kelley (1973) cautions against using attribution theory alone to explain social perception such as liking and evaluations, monitoring behavior, and the

administration of sanctions, saying that it will never constitute more than a partial basis for predicting such phenomena. For this reason, I suggest using a variety of variables such as Locus of Control, Belief in a Just World, and Allocentrism/Idiocentrism in combination with Attributional Style to explore the potential components of prejudice toward certain others.

Based on previous studies involving various group comparisons, it is plausible to believe that these theories are linked in ways that promote an ideology of blame that may exist more in some groups than others. However, little empirical research has attempted to show the links that may exist between Attributional Style, Locus of Control, Belief in a Just World, and Allocentrism/Idiocentrism at the individual level of measurement. In addition, there have been few attempts to relate these variables to a potentially important factor – Feelings of Power. This study represents an attempt to explore the potential relationships between these variables as they may relate to an “ideology of blame” among certain individuals.

CHAPTER III

METHODS

Hypotheses

Based on previous research regarding the relationships between Allocentrism/Idiocentrism, Locus of Control, Belief in a Just World, Power, and Attributions, I believe that the variables included in this study may, in combination, predict negative attitudes toward stigmatized others through a possible “ideology of blame”. This is reflected in tentative hypotheses regarding negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others. This search for a possible ideology of blame begins an exploration of the potential variables that could contribute to negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others (homosexuals, criminals, poor people, and fat people). I suggest that certain individuals might be more or less likely to demonstrate the characteristics that could lead to negative attitudes toward others. Therefore, specific hypotheses are suggested regarding each stigmatized characteristic, based on the potential existence of an ideology of blame. Secondary hypotheses (sex difference hypotheses) are also included because they will be tested in order to compare these results with findings from other studies and to evaluate the representativeness of this sample.

Anti- Attitudes.

Research on prejudice indicates that when an individual is perceived to be able to control his or her undesirable condition, people are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward that individual. However, due to individual differences in attributional style, locus of control, and belief in a just world, some people may be more or less likely to maintain negative attitudes toward someone with an undesirable condition/situation. With the stigma of overweight, we see that men are more likely to blame the overweight for their condition than women, and that an internal weight locus of control is related to more anti-fat attitudes. Social cognition theory suggests that people's cognitive structures and beliefs may provide them with particular ways of interpreting situations. If one believes in the power of an individual to control his/her own behavior and one attributes behavior to personal causes as opposed to situational factors, the result may be an ideology of blame that leads to the derogation of any disadvantaged group. Based on previous information about who is more likely to have an internal locus of control, make internal attributions, and believe in a just world, I make the following suggestions for who may be more likely to have negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

Hypothesis 1: Allocentrics will have less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than idiocentrics.

Hypothesis 2: Those who believe in a just world will have more negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than those who don't believe in a just world.

Hypothesis 3: Those with internal locus of control will have more negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than those with external locus of control.

Hypothesis 4: Those who make more internal attributions will have more negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than those who make fewer internal attributions and those who make more external attributions.

Hypothesis 5: Those who feel more powerless will be less likely to have negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

Secondary Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 6: Women will have less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than men.

Allocentrism/Idiocentrism.

Allocentric individuals experience themselves as inherently connected with others in a way that is interdependent and made meaningful only in reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others in the relationship. Idiocentric individuals view themselves as autonomous, independent, and unique. While there is much

research using the national/cultural level of measurement, relatively few studies involve the measurement and comparison of the allocentrism/idiocentrism (collectivism/individualism) of smaller groups within cultures. Within the United States, studies measuring similar constructs allows us to make certain logical predictions. Due to evidence that women and members of marginalized groups in the U.S. are more interdependent, more relational, and describe themselves in less collective terms, it is likely that women may be more allocentric. According to J. B. Miller's (1974) belief that relational tendencies stem from a powerless situation, individuals who perceive themselves to be less powerful may also be more likely than others to be allocentric.

Hypothesis 7: Those who feel less powerful are more likely to be allocentric.

Secondary Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 8: Women will be more allocentric and less idiocentric than men.

Locus of Control.

Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals feel they can control their own fate. Internal locus of control means that an individual has the belief that it is possible to act on the environment in such a way that the individual can control his/her destiny. An external locus of control is a belief that either powerful others or fate is in control of an individual's situation. Those in less privileged situations may

be more likely to have an internal locus of control. Previous evidence indicates that lower class samples, ethnic minorities, and women score more externally on measures of locus of control. Evidence also suggests that collectivists or allocentrics also have a more external locus of control. Because of these studies indicating differences in locus of control of groups with more or less privilege or power and groups that are more or less allocentric, I would like to explore the potential for the same relationships to exist at the individual level. Although the previous studies involve group level data, predictions are made for this study at the individual level.

Hypothesis 9: Allocentrics will have more external locus of control and less internal locus of control than idiocentrics.

Hypothesis 10: Internal locus of control will be positively related and external locus of control will be negatively related to socioeconomic status.

Secondary Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 11a: Women will have a more external locus of control than men.

However, due to evidence that women's traditionally more external locus of control may be changing to levels similar to that of men because of societal changes in the U.S., another hypothesis (11b) is suggested.

Hypothesis 11b: Women and men will both have internal locus of control.

Attributional Style.

People can attribute their own and others' behaviors either to internal causes such as personality and intention or to external causes like society or the situational context. Americans typically make more internal attributions for behavior than people from collectivist cultures. Additionally, in America there is evidence that ethnic minorities and lower class samples tend to make more external attributions for poverty. When considering this and evidence that women, ethnic minorities, and lower class samples are more likely to exhibit collectivist tendencies, the following hypotheses are suggested.

Hypothesis 12: Allocentrics will make more external attributions and fewer internal attributions than idiocentrics.

Hypothesis 13: Internal attributions will be positively related and external attributions will be negatively related to socioeconomic status.

Hypothesis 14: Those with internal locus of control will make more internal attributions and less external attributions than those with external locus of control.

Secondary Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 15: Women will make more external attributions than men.

Belief in a Just World.

Belief in a just world entails a belief that people “get what they deserve.” It has been linked to characteristics of power, wealth, and property. Although the literature is mixed on the relationship between other specific factors and belief in a just world, the strong link between locus of control and belief in a just world leads me to suggest the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 16: Allocentrics will have less belief in a just world than idiocentrics.

Hypothesis 17: Those who believe in a just world will have a more internal locus of control than those who don't believe in a just world.

Hypothesis 18: Those who believe in a just world will make more internal attributions and less external attributions than those who don't believe in a just world.

Secondary Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 19: Women will believe less in a just world than men.

Feelings of Power.

“Feelings of power” is not a typical construct, but it has been included in the study due to its logical relationship to locus of control, attributional style, and belief in a just world. Many of the previously suggested hypotheses are based on the assumption that perceptions of how powerful one is in society are what determines an individual’s beliefs about himself and the world in general. It is important to include the following hypotheses in order to test this implicit assumption.

Hypothesis 20: Feelings of power will be positively related to belief in a just world.

Hypothesis 21: Feelings of power will be positively related to internal locus of control and negatively related to external locus of control.

Hypothesis 22: Feelings of power will be positively related to internal attributions and negatively related to external attributions.

Secondary Hypotheses.

Hypothesis 23: Women will feel more powerless than men.

Participants

Participants included approximately 350 members of the Educational Psychology Subject Pool at The University of Texas. These students participated for

credit towards fulfillment of a departmental research requirement. This allowed for more participants than the suggested 15 subjects per predictor variable (Stevens, 1996). Participants included 238 females and 110 males, with an ethnic breakdown as follows: Caucasian/white (n=221), Asian-American (n=71), Hispanic (n=29), African-American (n=14), and Other (n=13).

Instruments¹

The Individualism/Collectivism/Familism Scale (Gaines et al., 1997) is a 30-item questionnaire used to assess these three aspects of cultural value orientation at the individual level. Using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), this scale uses 10 items to measure each factor. Examples of items include, “These days, the only person you can depend upon is yourself,” “I don’t feel that I’m a success unless I’ve helped others succeed as well,” and “I owe it to my parents to do well in life.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability for Individualism is reported from .56 to .59, for Collectivism is from .73 to .74, and for Familism is from .84 to .87. This is a relatively new measure, but I have chosen to include it because of the distinction between collectivism and familism. See Appendix B for a copy of these items.

The Shortened INDCOL Scale (Hui & Yee, 1994) is a 33-item questionnaire to measure individualism and collectivism. Using a 6-point Likert scale from 0

¹ See Appendix O for a table of variables and scales measuring each.

(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), the Shortened INDCOL assesses two factors: ingroup solidarity and social obligation. Examples of items are, “If a colleague lends a helping hand, one needs to return the favor,” and “If possible, I would like co-owning a car with my close friends, so that it wouldn’t be necessary for them to spend much money to buy their own cars.” It has been used to measure cultural values at the national, group, and individual level. The original longer version of the INDCOL was believed to be a six-factor instrument, but this version was shortened and factor analyzed to reveal these two factors. Cronbach’s alpha reliability for Ingroup Solidarity is reported to be .59, and for Social Obligation is .68. The INDCOL and Shortened INDCOL are two of the most widely used methods for measuring cultural value orientation. See Appendix A for a copy of these items.

The Social Connectedness Scale (Lee & Robbins, 1995) was used to measure this construct that represents a general emotional distance between self and others. It was chosen as an additional measure of allocentric tendencies because it is very similar to the construct of allocentrism and may represent an additional aspect of allocentrism, although it was not intended for the purpose of measuring these tendencies. However, a factor analysis of the scales involved in this study indicates that social connectedness does indeed fall under that category of allocentrism. The Social Connectedness Scale is an 8-item scale with an internal reliability alpha of .91. Test-retest correlation for a two-week interval is estimated at .94. Using a 6-point Likert continuum from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 6 (Strongly Disagree), a strong sense of

belonging is represented by higher scores. Items include, “I feel disconnected from the world around me,” and “I feel so distant from people.” See Appendix L for items.

Levenson’s Locus of Control Scale (Levenson, 1981) is a 24-item questionnaire used to measure to what extent a person believes events to be controlled by internal causes, powerful others, or chance. Each subscale is measured on a six-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The Internality Scale measures the extent to which people believe that they have control over their own lives. Kuder-Richardson reliabilities are reported at .64, and split-half Spearman-Brown reliabilities at .62. The Powerful Others Scale measures the belief that others control the events in one’s life. Kuder-Richardson reliabilities are reported at .77, and split-half reliabilities at .66. The Chance Scale measures the extent to which one believes that chance determines his or her experiences and outcomes. Kuder-Richardson reliabilities are reported at .73, and split-half reliabilities at .64. Test-retest reliabilities for the Levenson measure range between .60 and .79 for one week and .66 and .73 for seven weeks. Factor analysis supports the independence of the three scales. Convergent validity has been demonstrated with Rotter’s I-E and various other measures. Discriminant validity has also been demonstrated sufficient (Lefcourt, 1991; Presson, Clark, & Benassi, 1997). See Appendix D for items.

Although Rotter’s (1966) I-E Locus of Control Measure has been heavily criticized for not being unidimensional, it has been included as an additional measure

of locus of control. It includes 29 paired statements, from which participants are instructed to choose the statement most closely matching their viewpoint. The instrument includes six distracter pairs in addition to 23 pairs designed to assess the degree to which a person holds internal or external locus of control. One point is given for each external statement selected. Scores range from low to high, with low scores representing more internal locus of control.

Internal Consistency is reported with a Kuder-Richardson reliability coefficient of .70. Test-Retest reliability is reported as .72 at one month, and .55 for two months. Convergent validity is sufficient and Discriminant validity has been weak to moderate (Lefcourt, 1991). See Appendix E for a copy of these items.

Specific Locus of Control for Stigma Characteristics:

The Weight Locus of Control (Saltzer, 1982) is a 4-item scale used to measure the extent to which a person believes weight to be controllable. Using a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 6 (Strongly Disagree), subjects answer questions such as, “Whether I gain, lose, or maintain my weight is entirely up to me,” and “Being the right weight is largely a matter of good fortune.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability is .58, and test-retest reliability is .67, $p < .001$. (This suggests that specific locus of control beliefs may be altered with instruction, as these measures were taken before a weight control program and during the course of the program.) The WLOC shows good convergent validity with the Rotter I-E and three measures of health locus of control. This scale has been included based on the assumption that for the

prediction of specific expectancies for situations, scales measuring personal control relevant to the situations might be more useful than the generalized measures of locus of control. In order to minimize confusion for participants, this scale has been changed to a 9-point scale to be consistent with other instruments in the battery of questionnaires. See Appendix F for a copy of these items.

Willpower Subscale of Antifat Attitudes Scale (Crandall, 1994) is a 3-item scale measuring the extent to which people believe one can control weight with willpower. Using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 9 (Strongly Disagree), beliefs are measured with items such as, “Some people are fat because they have no willpower,” and “Fat people tend to be fat pretty much through their own fault.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability for these three items is .66. See Appendix F for a copy of these items.

*In this study the Weight Locus of Control and Antifat Attitudes Willpower Subscale will be combined to create one Locus of Control scale score for each characteristic. (Pilot study research obtained an alpha for the combined Locus of Control 7-item scale of .70.)

Adapted Weight Locus of Control for other characteristics (Homosexuality, Poverty, and Criminality) will be used in order to maintain consistency in the attitudes/beliefs that are measured for specific characteristics. For each characteristic,

a 4-item scale will use a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 9 (Strongly Disagree) to measure locus of control for that area.

The Fear of Fat Scale (Crandall, 1994) is from a 13-item scale measuring attitudes toward fat people and attitudes about fat. There are three subscales: Dislike, a 7-item scale measuring dislike of fat people; Willpower, a 3-item scale previously discussed; and Fear of Fat, a 3-item scale measuring a person's fear of becoming fat. The Dislike subscale will be discussed as a measure of the dependent variables of this study. The Willpower subscale has been previously discussed as a measure of weight locus of control. The remaining Fear of Fat subscale was included and adapted for each stigmatized characteristic to address the possibility that fear of becoming or "catching" the stigma may be an important indicator of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. Using a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 9 (Strongly Disagree), items on the Fear of Fat scale include, "One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I gained 25 pounds." Cronbach's alpha reliability for Fear of Fat is .79.

The Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire was used to measure attributional style. This instrument measures three dimensions of attributions: Stability, Globality, and Internality. There is clear support for the presumed attributional dimensions as cohesive, discriminable, and replicable (Joiner &

Metalsky, 1999). The instrument consists of 12 scenarios that are rated along the three dimensions on a scale from A to G. The following is an example item: “You take an exam and receive a low grade on it. Write down the one major cause of your low grade on the exam. Is it something about you or something about other people or circumstances that caused your low grade on the exam? [rate from A (Totally caused by other people or circumstances) to G (Totally caused by me)] In the future when taking exams, will the cause of the low grade on this exam also cause other exam grades of yours to be low? [rate from A (Will never again cause my exam grades to be low) to G (Will always cause my exam grades to be low)] Is the cause of your low grade on the exam something that causes problems in just that exam grade, or does it also cause problems in other areas of your life? [rate from A (Causes problems just in that exam grade) to G (Causes problems in all areas of my life)]. See Appendix M for scenarios.

The Belief in a Just World Scale for Self and Others (Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996) is a 16-item questionnaire measuring one main construct, belief in a just world, as it applies to self and others. It has been demonstrated to measure distinctions between an individual’s belief in a just world for self versus others. Using a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree), 8 items measure each application (self or others) of belief in a just world. Examples of items are, “I feel that I get what I deserve,” and “I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.” Cronbach’s alpha reliability for each subscale is .84. The

Belief in a Just World (BJW) Scale for Self and Others demonstrates good convergent validity with other BJW measures. See Appendix C for a copy of these items.

Feelings of Power were measured using a 6-item instrument developed for the purposes of this study. Using a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (Agree) to 6 (Disagree), three aspects of perceived power are included in order to obtain a broad range of power situations. These categories are power to achieve personal goals, power in the community, and power in the country. Examples of items are, “I can make an impact on my community,” “I don’t have much power to influence the decisions that affect my own life,” and “This country is concerned with what I think.” This scale has not been previously validated, nor has it demonstrated reliability. However, these items assess beliefs that may be important in the interpretation of relationships this study is designed to explore. Therefore, these questions were valuable for inclusion.

Subsequent analyses of this scale for this sample obtained a moderate Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of .65. Additionally, the Feelings of Power scale correlated positively with the Levenson Internal Scale ($r=.280$, $p<.001$) and negatively with the Levenson Powerful Others ($r= -.293$, $p<.001$) and Levenson Chance Scale ($r= -.248$, $p<.001$), further validating its inclusion. See Appendix K for a copy of these items.

Demographic Items including ethnicity, sex, age, education level, socioeconomic status, major, religious orientation, and a variety of other

characteristics were used to obtain a clear picture of the sample and to provide information that may affect the dependent variables in this study. The demographic items are included in Appendix N.

Antifat and Adapted Antifat Attitudes Scale for stigmatized characteristics were used to measure negative attitudes toward fat, homosexuals, criminals, and poor people. Seven items from the Dislike subscale of the Antifat Attitudes Scale (Crandall, 1994) were measured on a 9-point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 9 (Strongly Disagree). Cronbach's alpha reliability for the original 7-item Dislike subscale is reported at .84. Reliability for the adapted scales were determined moderately strong from a pilot sample of N=30. Reliability coefficients from this study prove similar to those obtained in pilot research. For the Anti-Poverty scale, alpha = .87. For the Anti-Homosexuality, alpha = .88. For the Anti-Criminality, alpha reliability is .85, and for Anti-Fat, alpha = .85. See Appendices H-J for copies of these items.

Data Analyses

Three types of data analysis were performed: Pearson product-moment correlation, multiple regression, and multiple analysis of variance. All analyses were conducted using SPSS.

Pearson's product-moment coefficient of correlation summarizes the magnitude and direction of the relationship between two variables that are at the

interval or ratio level of measurement. The Pearson correlation measures the strength of the linear relationship between variables X and Y.

Multiple regression analysis involves the estimation of a dependent variable from a linear combination of independent variables. Stepwise multiple regression (SMR) is a technique that measures how much concurrent impact each of several factors has on a single other factor. SMR allows for experimentation with differently combined weights of independent variables so that the largest proportion of variance in the dependent variable is accounted for. Several series of simple linear regressions are calculated until the largest coefficient of determination is established. In each step the next predictor variable entered into the regression equation will be the variable that has the largest correlation with the criterion when all variables already included in the previous regression equation have been partialled out. The series ends when either all the specified independent variables are included or there are no remaining variables that increase the amount of variance that can be accounted for.

Multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests hypotheses about group means in which at least one independent variable has been manipulated and more than one dependent variable is involved. MANOVA is an extension of analysis of variance that allows for testing the effects of multiple independent variables on multiple dependent variables. MANOVA combines all the dependent variables into a single composite, and then performs analysis of variance on the weighted scores formed by the composite.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS REGARDING AN “IDEOLOGY OF BLAME”

This chapter first presents the regression model produced to explore the best combination of factors for predicting negative attitudes toward certain others, using the original hypothesis regarding the potential existence of an ideology of blame. Next are the results for the specific relationships that were suggested in accord with the search for an ideology of blame.²

For data analysis, the four types of negative attitudes were summed into one overall measure of Negative Attitudes Toward Others. Each measure was significantly correlated with the combined scale as follows: Anticriminal Attitudes ($r=.554$, $p<.001$), Antipoor Attitudes ($r=.761$, $p<.001$), Antifat Attitudes ($r=.667$, $p<.001$), and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r=.736$, $p<.001$). See Table 1.³

Correlations with Negative Attitudes Toward Others Variable

(<i>N</i> =344)	<i>Anticriminal</i>	<i>Antipoor</i>	<i>Antifat</i>	<i>Antihomosexual</i>
Pearson <i>r</i>	.544***	.761***	.667***	.736***
<i>r</i> ²	.296	.579	.445	.542

Table 1

² Hypotheses are numbered according the original number in the Methods section, as they are listed by category.

³ All Tables use the following format for significance level. * = $p<.05$, ** = $p<.01$, *** = $p<.001$

Stepwise multiple regression was used to determine the variables that may best account for the variance in predicting negative attitudes toward stigmatized others, using the variables that are potentially important to an ideology of blame. The main hypothesis was suggested that in combination, Cultural Value Orientation, Locus of Control, Attributional Style, and Belief in a Just World may be used to predict an individual's attitudes toward others. This hypothesis is indeed supported, however the relationships do not support an ideology of blame. The obtained five variable regression model demonstrates a significant combination ($R = .435$, $p = .01$) and an adjusted R^2 of .176, indicating that the model accounts for 17.6% of the variance in negative attitudes toward others. Order of variables in the equation is as follows: Levenson Powerful Others Scale, Allocentrism Scale, BJW Others Scale, Familism Scale, and Social Connectedness Scale (See Table 2). This combination does not necessarily follow the expected direction in every case, and may not support the existence of an ideology of blame.

Although Allocentrism, Belief in a Just World for Others, and Social Connectedness are related to Negative Attitudes Toward Others in the predicted directions, Levenson's Powerful Others Scale and Familism are related in unexpected ways. This model suggests that the more one believes in powerful others and the more one is familistic, the more negative attitudes he or she will hold toward certain others. See Table 2 for coefficients.

Overall Prediction Model for Negative Attitudes Toward Others

<i>Constant +</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R²</i>	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
Powerful Others	.277	.077	.074	1.422	.223	4.195***
Allocentrism	.370	.137	.131	-2.338	-.294	-5.455***
BJW Other	.401	.161	.152	.094	.150	2.909***
Familism	.414	.172	.161	1.038	.166	2.869**
Social Connectedness	.435	.189	.176	-.075	-.148	-2.583**

Table 2

The specific expected relationships below were tested during the process of multiple regression analysis by Pearson product-moment correlation:

Hypothesis 1: Allocentrism will be positively related to less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others and idiocentrism will be positively related to more negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

This hypothesis is partially supported by significant correlations between Allocentrism and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=-.266, p<.001$), Ingroup Solidarity and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=-.147, p<.01$), and Social Connectedness and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=-.175, p<.001$). (See Table 3.) However, no relationship is found between Familism, Idiocentrism, or Social Obligation and Negative Attitudes Toward Others.

Relationships between variables measuring Allocentrism/Idiocentrism
and Negative Attitudes Toward Others

<i>Negative Att. Toward Others by</i>	<i>Allocentrism (n=342)</i>	<i>Ingroup Solidarity (n=323)</i>	<i>Social Connectedness (n=343)</i>
Pearson r	-.266***	-.147**	-.175***
r ²	.071	.022	.031

Table 3

In addition, there are significant negative correlations between Allocentrism and Antipoor Attitudes ($r = -.321, p < .001$), Allocentrism and Antifat Attitudes ($r = -.274, p < .001$), Allocentrism and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = -.134, p < .02$), Social Connectedness and Antipoor Attitudes ($r = -.154, p < .01$), Social Connectedness and Antifat Attitudes ($r = -.276, p < .001$), Social Connectedness and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = -.120, p < .03$), Familism and Antifat Attitudes ($r = -.184, p < .001$), Ingroup Solidarity and Antipoor Attitudes ($r = -.204, p < .001$), Ingroup Solidarity and Antifat Attitudes ($r = -.243, p < .001$), and Social Obligation and Antipoor Attitudes ($r = -.108, p < .05$). See Table 4.

A positive relationship is found between Familism and Anticriminal Attitudes ($r = .174, p < .001$) emerges. See Table 4.

Relationships between measures of Allocentrism/Idiocentrism
And Specific Anti Attitudes

<i>Pearson r</i>	<i>Allocentrism</i>	<i>Familism</i>	<i>Social Connectedness</i>	<i>Ingroup Solidarity</i>	<i>Social Obligation</i>
Antipoor <i>r</i> ² n	-.321*** .103 342	--	-.154** .024 343	-.204*** .042 321	-.108* .012 341
Antifat <i>r</i> ² n	-.274*** .075 346	-.184*** .034 348	-.276*** .076 347	-.243*** .059 325	--
Antihomosexual <i>r</i> ² n	-.134* .018 347	--	-.120* .014 348	--	--
Anticriminal <i>r</i> ² n	-- .030 349	.172*** .030 349	--	--	--

Table 4

Hypothesis 2: Belief in a just world for self and others will be positively related to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

This hypothesis is partially supported by a significant correlation between Belief in a Just World for Others and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=.160$, $p<.01$), but not supported by the finding of no significant relationship between Negative Attitudes Toward Others and Belief in a Just World for Self (see Table 5).

In addition, there is a positive relationship between Belief in a Just World for Others and Anticriminal Attitudes ($r= .186$, $p<.001$) and also between Belief in a Just World for Others and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r=.120$, $p<.03$). However, there is a contradictory negative relationship between Belief in a Just World for Self and Antipoor Attitudes ($r= -.142$, $p<.01$). See Table 5.

Relationships between Belief in a Just World (BJW)
and Negative Attitudes Toward Others (NATO)

	<i>BJW Self</i>	<i>BJW Others</i>
NATO		
Pearson r (n=339)	--	.160**
r ²		.026
Anticriminal Att.		
Pearson r (n=344)	--	.186***
r ²		.035
Antihomosexual Att		
Pearson r (n=344)	--	.120*
r ²		.014
Antipoor Att.		
Pearson r (n=344)	-.142**	--
r ²	.020	

Table 5

Hypothesis 3: Internal locus of control will be positively related and external locus of control will be negatively related to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

This hypothesis is partially contradicted by significant correlations between Levenson Powerful Others Scale and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=.262$, $p<.001$) and between Levenson Chance Scale and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r=.120$, $p<.03$). Also, no correlation is found between Negative Attitudes Toward Others and Rotter I-E or Levenson Internal Scale (see Table 6).

Additional contradictory evidence includes a significant negative correlation between the Levenson Internal Scale and Antipoor Attitudes ($r= -.156$, $p<.01$), the Levenson Internal Scale and Antifat Attitudes ($r= -.131$, $p<.02$), and positive correlations between the Levenson Powerful Others Scale and Anticriminal Attitudes

($r = .119, p < .03$), Levenson Powerful Others Scale and Antipoor Attitudes ($r = .241, p < .001$), Levenson Powerful Others Scale and Antifat Attitudes ($r = .176, p < .001$), Levenson Powerful Others Scale and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = .170, p < .001$), and Levenson Chance Scale and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = .121, p < .03$). See Table 6. It appears that this hypothesis is unsupported and, in fact, contradicted.

Relationships between Locus of Control
and Negative Attitudes Toward Others (NATO)

	<i>Powerful Others</i>	<i>Chance</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Rotter I-E</i>
NATO				
Pearson r	.262***	.120*	--	--
r ²	.069	.014		
n	343	343		
Antipoor Att.				
Pearson r	.241***	--	-.156**	--
r ²	.058		.024	
n	343		343	
Antifat Att.				
Pearson r	.176***	--	-.131*	--
r ²	.031		.017	
n	347		347	
Antihomosexual				
Pearson r	.170***	.121*	--	--
r ²	.029	.015		
n	348	348		
Anticriminal				
Pearson r	.119*	--	--	--
r ²	.014			
n	348			

Table 6

Hypothesis 4: Internal attributions will be positively related and external attributions will be negatively related to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

No relationship is found between Attributional Style and Negative Attitudes Toward Others.

Hypothesis 5: Feelings of power will be positively related to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

This hypothesis is unsupported, and in fact, contradicted by a significant negative relationship between Feelings of Power and Negative Attitudes Toward Others ($r = -.134, p < .02$).

In addition, contradiction also is seen in the negative relationship between Feelings of Power and both Antifat Attitudes ($r = -.124, p < .03$) and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = -.144, p < .01$).

Hypothesis 7: Allocentrism will be negatively related to Feelings of Power.

This hypothesis is contradicted by several significant relationships suggesting that Allocentrism is positively related to Feelings of Power. For example, there are significant relationships between Feelings of Power and Allocentrism ($r = .222, p < .001$), Social Connectedness ($r = .442, p < .001$), Familism ($r = .176, p < .001$), Ingroup Solidarity ($r = .209, p < .001$), and Social Obligation ($r = .252, p < .001$). See Table 7.

Relationships between measures of Allocentrism and Feelings of Power

<i>Feelings of Power by</i>	<i>Allocentrism</i>	<i>Social Connectedness</i>	<i>Familism</i>	<i>Ingroup Solidarity</i>	<i>Social Obligation</i>
Pearson r	.222***	.442***	.176***	.209***	.252***
r ²	.049	.195	.031	.044	.064
n	346	348	348	324	345

Table 7

No relationship is found between Feelings of Power and Idiocentrism or between the Levenson Powerful Others Scale and any form of Allocentrism other than Social Connectedness ($r = -.229, p < .001$).

Hypothesis 9: Allocentrism will be positively related to external locus of control and idiocentrism will be positively related to internal locus of control.

This hypothesis is partially supported by significant correlations with the Levenson Internal measure of Locus of Control (LOC), but not by the Rotter I-E. It does appear that Idiocentrism is the most strongly correlated with the Levenson Internal scale ($r = .373, p > .001$). However, Allocentrism is also positively correlated with Levenson Internal LOC through significant relationships between internal LOC and Allocentrism ($r = .149, p < .01$), Familism ($r = .152, p < .01$), Ingroup Solidarity ($r = .148, p < .01$), and Social Connectedness ($r = .257, p < .001$). Only one significant relationship is found for both the Levenson Chance and Levenson Powerful Others scales. Social Connectedness is correlated negatively with each ($r = -.229, p < .001$) and ($r = -.241, p < .001$), respectively. See Table 8.

Relationships Between Idiocentrism/Allocentrism and Locus of Control

<i>Pearson r</i>	<i>Rotter I-E</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Chance</i>	<i>Powerful Others</i>
Idiocentrism (n=346) r^2	--	.373***	--	--
		.139		
Allocentrism (n=346) r^2	--	.149**	--	--
		.022		
Familism (n=348) r^2	--	.152**	--	--
		.023		
Ingroup Solidarity (n=324) r^2	--	.148**	--	--
		.022		
Social Connectedness (n=348) r^2	--	.257***	-.229***	-.241***
		.066	.052	.058

Table 8

Hypothesis 12: Allocentrism will be positively related to external attributions and idiocentrism will be positively related to internal attributions.

This hypothesis is partially contradicted by significant correlations between Attributional Style (high = internal) and Familism ($r=.176, p<.001$) and Attributional Style and Ingroup Solidarity ($r=.187, p<.001$). No other relationships are found for Attributional Style with respect to Allocentrism or Idiocentrism.

Hypothesis 14: Internal locus of control will be positively related to internal attributions and external locus of control will be positively related to external attributions.

This hypothesis is partially supported by a significant correlation between the Rotter I-E and Attributional Style ($r = -.119, p < .04$) where internal locus of control relates to internal attributions. However, Attributional Style does not relate to the Levenson measures of LOC.

Hypothesis 16: Allocentrism will be negatively related and idiocentrism will be positively related to belief in a just world for self and others.

This hypothesis is partially supported and partially contradicted. It is supported in the relationship between Belief in a Just World for Self and Idiocentrism ($r = .138, p < .01$). However, Belief in a Just World for Self is also positively correlated with measures of Allocentrism including Allocentrism ($r = .152, p < .01$), Familism ($r = .194, p < .001$), Ingroup Solidarity ($r = .158, p < .01$), and Social Connectedness ($r = .263, p < .001$). In addition, Belief in a Just World for Others does not correlate with any measures of Idiocentrism or Allocentrism. See Table 9.

Relationships between Idiocentrism/Allocentrism and Belief in a Just World (BJW)

<i>Pearson r</i>	<i>BJW Self</i>	<i>BJW Others</i>
Idiocentrism (n=343) r^2	.138** .019	--
Allocentrism (n=343) r^2	.152** .023	--
Familism (n=345) r^2	.194*** .038	--
Ingroup Solidarity (n=323) r^2	.158** .025	--
Social Connectedness (n=344) r^2	.263*** .069	--

Table 9

Hypothesis 17: Belief in a just world for self and others will be positively related to internal locus of control and negatively related to external locus of control.

This hypothesis is supported for Belief in a Just World for Self, and partially supported for Belief in a Just World for Others. Belief in a Just World for Self correlates significantly with the Rotter I-E ($r=-.158$, $p<.01$), the Levenson Internal Scale ($r=.331$, $p<.001$), Levenson Powerful Others Scale ($r=-.141$, $p<.01$), and Levenson Chance Scale ($r=-.107$, $p<.05$). The hypothesis for Belief in a Just World for Others is partially supported by a significant correlation between Belief in a Just World for Others and the Rotter I-E ($r=-.127$, $p<.03$). See Table 10.

Relationships between Locus of Control and Belief in a Just World (BJW)

<i>Pearson r</i>	<i>Rotter I-E</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Chance</i>	<i>Powerful Others</i>
BJW Self	-.158** (n=319)	.331*** (n=344)	-.107* (n=344)	-.141** (n=344)
r^2	.025	.110	.011	.020
BJW Others	-.127* (n=318)	--	--	--
r^2	.016			

Table 10

Hypothesis 18: Belief in a just world will be positively related to internal attributions.

This hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 20: Feelings of power will be positively related to belief in a just world for self and others.

This hypothesis is partially supported by a significant relationship between Belief in a Just World for Self and Feelings of Power ($r=.266, p<.001$). There is no relationship between Feelings of Power and Belief in a Just World for Others.

Hypothesis 21: Feelings of power will be positively related to internal locus of control and negatively related to external locus of control.

This hypothesis is fully supported by the relationships between Feelings of Power and the Rotter I-E ($r= -.200, p<.001$), the Levenson Internal Scale ($r=.280,$

p<.001), the Levenson Powerful Others Scale ($r = -.293, p < .001$), and the Levenson Chance Scale ($r = -.248, p < .001$). See Table 11.

Relationship between Feelings of Power and Locus of Control

<i>Pearson r</i>	<i>Rotter I-E</i>	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Chance</i>	<i>Powerful Others</i>
Feelings of Power	-.200*** (n=322)	.280*** (n=348)	-.248*** (n=348)	-.293*** (n=348)
r^2	.040	.078	.062	.086

Table 11

Hypothesis 22: Feelings of power will be positively related to internal attributions.

This hypothesis is not supported.

Secondary Hypothesis Analyses

These hypotheses regarding sex differences are included for the purpose of comparing the results of this study with the findings of previous studies examining group differences on the variables in this study, and also for the purpose of evaluating the representativeness of this sample. Therefore, these secondary analyses were conducted in addition to testing the main hypotheses of this study, which involve individual differences rather than group comparisons. All hypotheses were suggested as potential relationships involved in an ideology of blame. The following secondary group hypotheses were tested using MANOVA:

Hypothesis 8: Women will be more allocentric and less idiocentric than men.

This hypothesis is supported. Women (n=238) score significantly lower than men (n=110) on Idiocentrism (women = 3.59, men = 3.76) and significantly higher on Allocentrism (women = 3.80, men = 3.66), Familism (women = 4.33, men = 4.09), and Ingroup Solidarity (women = 26.38, men = 23.61). See Table 12.

Allocentrism and Idiocentrism by Sex

<i>Idiocentrism by Sex</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	2.114	1	2.114	8.414**
Within	86.683	345	.251	
<i>Allocentrism by Sex</i>				
Between	1.466	1	1.466	5.075*
Within	99.685	345	.289	
<i>Familism by Sex</i>				
Between	4.189	1	4.189	9.493**
Within	153.109	347	.441	
<i>Ingroup Solidarity by Sex</i>				
Between	532.053	1	532.053	7.968**
Within	21566.919	323	66.771	

Table 12

Hypothesis 11a: Women will have a more external locus of control than men.

This hypothesis is partially supported by the significantly more external score on the Rotter I-E for women (women = 11.82, men = 10.68). See Table 13.

Locus of Control by Sex

<i>Sex</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>Df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	91.102	1	91.102	5.481*
Within	5335.084	321	16.620	

Table 13

Hypothesis 11b: Women and men will both have internal locus of control.

This hypothesis is partially supported by the lack of difference between men and women on the Levenson measures of LOC and the higher internal than external scale scores on these measures. See Table 14.

Mean Scores on Levenson LOC Measures

	<i>Internal</i>	<i>Chance</i>	<i>Powerful Others</i>
Men (n=110)	4.65	3.09	3.07
Women (n=238)	4.60	3.09	3.14

Table 14

Hypothesis 15: Women will make more external attributions than men.

This hypothesis is not supported.

Hypothesis 19: Women will believe less in a just world for self and others than men.

This hypothesis is partially supported by the significantly lower score of women for Belief in a Just World for Others (women = 24.03, men = 25.79). See Table 15.

Belief in a Just World for Others by Sex

<i>Sex</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	229.932	1	229.932	5.216*
Within	15075.949	342	44.082	

Table 15

Hypothesis 23: Women will feel more powerless than men.

This hypothesis is contradicted by significantly higher Feelings of Power scores for women than for men (women = 4.25, men = 4.07). See Table 16.

Feelings of Power by Sex

<i>Sex</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	2.551	1	2.551	4.203*
Within	209.991	346	.607	

Table 16

Hypothesis 6: Women will have less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others than men.

This hypothesis is supported by significantly less Negative Attitudes Toward Others for women than men (women = 25.05, men = 23.31).⁴ When looking at individual characteristics, the hypothesis is also supported for Antifat Attitudes (women = 7.53, men = 7.09) and Antihomosexual Attitudes (women = 7.16, men = 5.72). However, we find that although women have slightly less negative attitudes than men, there is no significant difference for Antipoor Attitudes (women = 6.91, men = 6.64). We also find that men have significantly slightly less Anticriminal Attitudes than women (women = 3.49, men = 3.86). See Table 17.

Negative Attitudes by Sex

<i>NATO by Sex</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	226.92	1	226.928	12.540***
Within	6188.774	342	18.096	
<i>Antifat by Sex</i>				
Between	14.717	1	14.717	7.970**
Within	638.909	346	1.847	
<i>Antihomosexual by Sex</i>				
Between	157.007	1	157.007	54.621***
Within	997.449	347	2.874	
<i>Anticriminal by Sex</i>				
Between	10.129	1	10.129	3.925*
Within	895.511	347	2.581	

Table 17

⁴ Negative Attitudes are scored such that low scores represent more negative attitudes than high.

Correlations for Males and Females

Due to the differences found between males and females during the secondary analyses, correlations were run separately for males and females to see if men and women hold different relationships among the variables in the study. Indeed, there are some differences.

Antihomosexual Attitudes

We find a difference between men and women in the relationship between Levenson Internal Scale and Antihomosexual Attitudes. For men, there is a positive relationship ($r = .14$, n.s.) such that an internal locus of control relates to antihomosexual attitudes, but for women, this relationship is completely the opposite ($r = -.158$, $p < .02$), where external locus of control relates to negative attitudes among women.

Among men, there is no relation between Allocentrism and Antihomosexual Attitudes ($r = .009$, n.s.). However, among women, the relationship is significant ($r = -.156$, $p < .02$) such that the more allocentric, the less antihomosexual. Similarly, there is no relationship between Social Connectedness and Antihomosexual Attitudes among men ($r = -.02$, n.s.), but the relationship is significant among women ($r = -.155$, $p < .02$).

Antipoor Attitudes

Again, discrepancies emerge for Antipoor attitudes. For men there is a negative correlation between Attributional Style (Internality) and Antipoor Attitudes

($r = -.227$, $p < .02$) such that antipoor attitudes are unexpectedly related to external attributions. For women this relationship does not exist ($r = .011$, n.s.).

Also, Ingroup Solidarity is more strongly related to Antipoor Attitudes among men ($r = -.272$, $p < .01$) than among women ($r = -.148$, $p < .03$), where for both men and women, less ingroup solidarity is related to more antipoor attitudes.

Antifat Attitudes

The following differences are seen for the relationship between Attributional Style and Antifat Attitudes. For men, the relationship is negative ($r = -.206$, $p < .03$), such that antifat attitudes are surprisingly related to external attributions, but for women the relationship does not exist ($r = .007$, n.s.).

In addition, Ingroup Solidarity is more strongly related to Antifat Attitudes among men ($r = -.376$, $p < .001$) than among women ($r = -.128$, $p = .05$), where less ingroup solidarity is related to more antifat attitudes for both men and women.

Anticriminal Attitudes

Anticriminal Attitudes are near unrelated to Familism among men ($r = -.03$, n.s.) and negatively related to Belief in a Just World for Self ($r = -.126$, n.s.). However, among women, Anticriminal Attitudes are positively related to Familism ($r = .235$, $p < .001$) and also positively related (unlike among men) to Belief in a Just World for Self ($r = .136$, $p < .04$). Anticriminal Attitudes are also negatively related to Feelings of Power among men ($r = -.211$, $p < .03$) but positively related to Feelings of Power among women ($r = .104$, n.s.).

Other Correlational Discrepancies between Men and Women

For women, there is a significant positive relationship between Belief in a Just World for Others and Levenson Internal Scale ($r=.20, p<.01$). For men, this relationship does not exist ($r= -.09, n.s.$). For men, there is a theoretically opposite relationship between Belief in a Just World for Others and Levenson Powerful Others ($r=.209, p<.03$) that does not exist among women ($r=.006, n.s.$).

The positive relationship between Ingroup Solidarity and Levenson Internal Scale exists strongly among men ($r=.337, p<.001$), but not at all among women ($r= .031, n.s.$).

For men, Levenson Powerful Others is negatively related to Attributional Style (Internality) ($r= -.173, n.s.$) as would be predicted. However, for women this relationship is opposite ($r=.150, p<.03$). Also, Levenson Powerful Others is more negatively related to Social Connectedness for women ($r= -.284, p<.001$) than for men ($r= -.136, n.s.$), although for both men and women, low social connectedness relates to high belief in powerful others.

Social Connectedness is also more strongly and positively related to Attributional Style for men ($r=.190, p<.05$) than for women ($r= -.074, n.s.$), meaning that men who make internal attributions are more likely to be high in social connectedness, but the relationship does not appear for women.

When examining Belief in a Just World for Others (BJWO), we find that for men, BJWO is negatively related to Levenson Internal Scale ($r= -.09, n.s.$) and positively related to Levenson Powerful Others ($r=.209, p<.03$). However, for

women, BJWO is positively related to Levenson Internal Scale ($r=.204$, $p<.01$) and unrelated to Levenson Powerful Others ($r=.006$, n.s.).

Due to these different relationships among variables for women and men, it was decided to examine the regression models for predicting each Anti variable separately for men and women to see if different patterns emerge for predicting negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. We find that although the models for males provide more explanation of the variance in Antipoor and Antifat Attitudes, the components that contribute to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others are similar for men and women, including low Allocentrism and high belief in the control by Powerful Others.

Due to the lack of support found for an ideology of blame, additional analyses were conducted to explore other potential components of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. Chapters VI and VII will present the results and discussion of these analyses. First, however, we turn to a discussion of the implications for this set of results related to the exploration of possible relationships involved in an ideology of blame.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS REGARDING AN “IDEOLOGY OF BLAME”

The goal of this research was to explore the potential components of negative attitudes toward certain others – fat people, poor people, criminals, and homosexuals. Several hypotheses were suggested for possible relationships that might combine in such as way that promotes an “ideology of blame”. Previous research has studied many of these relationships at the cultural or group level, but this study represents an attempt to explore these variables from an individual level of measurement. This first set of analyses produced a variety of interesting information, although the results are in many ways contradictory to predictions for an ideology of blame. However, they may nevertheless be informative, useful, and interesting. This chapter presents an indication of certain patterns reflected in the results, finally suggesting an alternate image of the person who may hold the most negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others.

Discussion of Results

This section describes the best model produced by the predicted combination of study variables. This is followed by a discussion of the results among other predicted relationships and possible explanations for the lack of support for an ideology of blame.

First Model for Predicting Negative Attitudes Toward Others

The first task of this study was to examine whether or not a particular combination of variables including various measures of allocentrism/idiocentrism, feelings of power, attributions, belief in a just world, and locus of control can explain a substantial part of the variance in negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others. Although there are four separate types of “others” included in this research, all four negative attitude scores were combined into one total score variable called Negative Attitudes Toward Others (NATO) for producing one overall model. However, each negative attitude was also examined separately. The overall model for predicting NATO indicates that five specific world views (belief in powerful others, allocentrism, belief in a just world for others, familism, and social connectedness) might, in combination, account for about 18% of the variance in NATO. Although this may seem like a rather small percentage of explained variance to some, explaining nearly one-fifth of the negative attitudes toward certain others may also be viewed as a substantial social benefit when considering the implications for education, which will be discussed later in this dissertation.

This combination of variables does, however, contain some unexpected relationships that do not support the existence of an ideology of blame. For example, a belief that powerful others are in control of one’s life (Powerful Others) is the strongest predictor of NATO in the model. However, it is a positive relationship that is contrary to predictions that external locus of control will be related to *less* negative attitudes toward others. It seems that those who feel more controlled by powerful

others are also more likely to have negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. This could represent a certain fear of stigmatized people that is due to feeling out of control. Or, perhaps feeling like others are in control leads people to feel a sort of resentment toward anyone, not just those with stigmas. An examination of additional relationships among variables in this study will help to clarify the role of external locus of control in negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

Another unexpected relationship that occurs in this model is the positive relationship between Familism and NATO. This is an especially interesting finding because familism is considered by many to be an allocentric tendency, and Allocentrism is negatively related to NATO in the model. However, Familism is also considered by Gaines et al. (1997) to be independent of Idiocentrism and Allocentrism. This study supports the inclusion of Familism as a separate variable when measuring specific types of allocentrism and idiocentrism. This positive relationship between Familism and NATO indicates that those for whom family ties are especially important may feel more negative toward stigmatized others. This is perhaps a familistic protective response to stigmas or could also represent an additional corresponding moral belief not measured in this study.

Specific Hypotheses

When examining the predicted relationships among all the variables, those with allocentric tendencies (in the form of Allocentrism, Social Connectedness, Ingroup Solidarity, and/or Social Obligation) are indeed less likely to hold negative

attitudes toward poor people, fat people, and homosexuals. This supports the hypothesis that allocentric individuals are less likely to hold negative attitudes toward others. This hypothesis was based on previous evidence that those in collectivist cultures are less likely to blame individuals for their condition and are more likely to take situational or contextual factors into account when attributing causes for behavior. Although this simple relationship does not address the attributional process that may or may not be involved, it does support previous research that allocentric tendencies relate to less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. However, most allocentric tendencies do not relate significantly to Anticriminal Attitudes. This contradicts the findings of Cha and Nam (1985) who find that Koreans are less negative toward criminals than Americans.

The allocentric tendency that does relate to Anticriminal Attitudes is Familism, in the unexpected positive direction. The unpredicted role of Familism in supporting negative attitudes toward others will be discussed later as part of a potentially protective response to stigma. In addition, perhaps the cross-cultural work relating allocentric tendencies to attitudes toward criminals through contextual attributions does not apply as well in America, where the justice system is not perceived to be as unjust as in other cultures. At this point, however, it appears that although the link between allocentrism and other negative attitudes exists, there may be something different about Anticriminal Attitudes.

Belief in a Just World (BJW) also has some interesting relationships with the various negative attitudes toward others. First, BJW for *oneself* (BJW Self) is related

only to Antipoor Attitudes and not to any other anti attitude. Yet, this relationship is in the negative direction, such that those with high BJW Self are less likely to hold Antipoor Attitudes. On the other hand, as predicted, high BJW for *others* (BJW Others) relates to more Anticriminal and Antihomosexual Attitudes. This supports the existence of an ideology of blame. However, BJW Others does not relate to Antipoor or Antifat Attitudes. This is somewhat contrary to the notion that people blame others for their condition because of a belief that people get what they deserve. The “ideology of blame” is only partially supported at this point in the data analyses.

Believing that the world is just for others should naturally lead to attributions that others can control their situation due to the belief that others get what they deserve and deserve what they get, according to Attribution Theory. The finding that BJWO relates to Anticriminal Attitudes is not surprising, due to the justice issues involved with criminal behavior. In fact, belief in a just world has been linked in much previous research with attitudes toward criminals, suggesting that the possibility still remains for an ideology of blame when it comes to criminal behavior. However, this study does not support an ideology of blame for poverty, though previous research has found evidence that BJW relates to more negative attitudes toward poor people (Feagine, 1972; Furnham. & Gunter, 1984). Instead, this data presents a picture that people are less likely to hold negative attitudes toward poor people when they believe the world is just for themselves. It seems that people who believe that they can control their own circumstances by getting what they deserve are not as likely to be negative toward the poor. This may suggest a certain

confidence that comes with believing that you will get what you deserve. Perhaps this confidence does not apply when it comes to attitudes toward criminals because many times crime appears to be without logic or reason, and seems directed at innocent victims. For this reason, it is plausible that Anticriminal Attitudes may not be affected by a belief that one will get what he or she deserves.

Although evidence may support an ideology of blame for criminal behavior, the notion of an ideology of blame for other characteristics is not supported. It seems that a combination of other beliefs are affecting people's negative attitudes toward stigmatized others, and that causal attributions may play only a small role in the combination. It appears that Kelly (1973) was correct that causal attributions will never constitute more than a partial explanation for evaluations.

The expected relationships between NATO and Locus of Control (LOC) are not found in this study. It was first predicted that an internal locus of control would relate to more negative attitudes toward certain others. This study indicates that combined NATO do not relate to internal LOC in either the Rotter measure of LOC or the Levenson measure of Internal LOC. Even more surprising is that Levenson Internal LOC scores do relate to Antipoor Attitudes and Antifat Attitudes, but in the negative direction. Those with more internal LOC are *less* likely to hold certain negative attitudes toward others. Again, we see a lack of support for an ideology of blame. When considering the similarity between the concepts of a belief in a just world for self and internal locus of control, it is not surprising that both BJW Self and Internal LOC are related in the same way to Antipoor and Antifat Attitudes. Yet, it is

surprising that they are related in the negative direction. This tendency for those who believe they get what they deserve and that they control their own lives to feel more positively toward poor and fat people is interesting. Perhaps positive feelings toward poor people and fat people represent a benevolent tendency that does not exist toward homosexuals and criminals. Homosexuality and criminal behavior may be qualitatively different from poverty and overweight on a dimension of morality. Future studies could examine the implicit differences among various stigmas in order to distinguish patterns among any discrepancies in the components of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

Perhaps the unpredictability associated with criminal behavior may be one reason for the lack of relationship between internal locus of control and Anticriminal Attitudes. People may not feel that their own person control is relevant in protecting themselves against criminals. Therefore, they may be less likely to hold the type of benevolent attitudes that is suggested by the relationship between internal locus of control and less negative attitudes toward poor and fat people. Although Attribution Theory suggests that people's world views such as locus of control will carry over into attributions for behavior and also affect evaluations of others, perhaps this is only true when some element of potential for control exists. Otherwise, people may take a defensive stance that represents fear of the undesirable stigma or circumstance and leads to attitudes of dislike toward stigmatized others.

In addition to the unexpected relationships between Internal LOC and negative attitudes toward poor and fat people, other surprising relationships appear

between *external* LOC and negative attitudes toward others. Scores on the Levenson Powerful Others Scale and the Levenson Chance Scale are both positively related to NATO, suggesting that those with more external LOC are *more* likely to hold NATO. Powerful Others scores are also positively related to each specific negative attitudes score, and Chance scores are positively related to Antihomosexual Attitudes. It appears that the belief that powerful others control one's life is related to holding negative attitudes toward others. This again refutes the argument for an ideology of blame. Rather, we again see evidence for an attitude of resentment or fear of stigmatized others. It seems that the carryover of personal power beliefs such as the internal locus of control may only take us a limited distance when it comes to making causal attributions of blame, and that a belief that powerful others control us may cause us to be even more negative toward stigmatized others. The pattern of relationships among variables is beginning to suggest that indeed an element of fear may be more likely a factor in the dislike of stigmatized others than an ideology of blame.

In light of the unexpected positive relationship between NATO and external LOC, it is not surprising that there is also a negative relationship between Feelings of Power and NATO, indicating that those who feel *less* powerful are more likely to hold NATO. More specifically, Feelings of Power are negatively related to Antipoor and Antihomosexual Attitudes. Again, evidence favors the existence of an element of fear or resentment towards stigmatized individuals, due to feelings of powerlessness and the belief that others are in control of one's life. This tendency is not predicted

under the hypothesis of an ideology of blame. According to the ideology of blame hypothesis, people should not blame others for their condition or hold negative attitudes toward stigmatized others when they feel that they cannot even control their own lives. Due to these unexpected contradictions to the ideology of blame, it becomes necessary to search for an alternate explanation for negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

We see some explanation for these unexpected relationships in the positive relationship between Feelings of Power and various measures of allocentrism. It appears that those with more Ingroup Solidarity, who are more Allocentric, Socially Connected, Familistic, and Socially Obligated also seem to feel more powerful. This is contrary to predictions that allocentric tendencies are partially due to the need for those in less powerful situations to adapt by learning to recognize and meet the needs of others. However, this relationship between Allocentrism and Feelings of Power helps to explain why Feelings of Power and Allocentrism are both negatively related to NATO. When people feel allocentric, they tend to feel powerful. When people feel allocentric and powerful, they are less negative toward stigmatized others.

One interesting finding is that there is no relationship between any of the allocentric tendencies and Levenson Powerful Others scores. This indicates that allocentrism is specifically related positively to a belief in one's own personal power in the community, country, and one's own life without being negatively related to a belief that one is controlled by powerful others. In other words, allocentrics are more likely to feel they have a say in the world, but not less likely to feel controlled by

more powerful others. This distinction between Feelings of Power and Powerful Others is also seen in relationships involving Idiocentrism.

There is no relationship between Idiocentrism and Feelings of Power. This seems unusual, as Idiocentrism involves a belief that each individual is self-sufficient. Perhaps this self-sufficient tendency does not extend beyond the personal into the social realms of community and country. The measure for Feelings of Power only includes two items for each of the three realms (personal, community, and country), but future studies might include more extensive measures to test this hypothesis.

Idiocentrism is significantly related to the Levenson measure of Internal LOC, as predicted. This supports the expected relationship between idiocentrism and power over one's personal life. However, allocentric tendencies (Allocentrism, Familism, Ingroup Solidarity, and Social Connectedness) are also related to Internal LOC. This relationship between Allocentrism and Internal LOC, combined with the relationship between Allocentrism and Feelings of Power suggests that allocentrics do not feel less in control, as predicted. In fact, those who are more group oriented may actually feel more powerful than idiocentrics, since allocentrics feel powerful in all areas, not just in the personal realm.

When it comes to external LOC, the lack of relationship between the external LOC measures (Levenson Chance and Powerful Others Scales) and either allocentrism or idiocentrism is contrary to predictions that allocentrics will hold a more external and less internal locus of control. The only variable related to these measures of external LOC is Social Connectedness, which relates in a negative

direction such that the more socially connected, the less external LOC. This indicates that social connectedness may actually allow people to feel *less* controlled by chance or others. We begin to see that although the idiocentric feels in control of his or her personal life, the allocentric person feels a sense of control that may best be described as the belief that there is “power in numbers.”

Just as idiocentrism and allocentrism are both related to internal LOC, they are also both related to BJW Self. In fact, allocentric tendencies (Allocentrism, Familism, Ingroup Solidarity, and Social Connectedness) are correlated more strongly with BJW Self than Idiocentrism. Once again, we see that the allocentric person feels more in control – allocentrics believe more that they get what they deserve and deserve what they get. As expected, BJW Self is positively related to Internal LOC and negatively related to external LOC. It seems that the belief in a just world for oneself is likely to occur along with a *more* internal locus of control and a *less* external locus of control. This relationship is logical. BJW Self also corresponds with Feelings of Power, as predicted. Similarly, we find that Feelings of Power are positively related to Internal LOC and negatively related to external LOC, as expected.

However, neither Feelings of Power nor Belief in a Just World for Self relates to Internal Attributions. This is unexpected, given the theoretical implications of attributional style. Internal attributions should logically be related to Feelings of Power, and BJW Self, and Internal LOC. Although Internal LOC does relate to Internal Attributions in the Rotter I-E, Internal Attributions are not related to any of

the Levenson LOC scales. This suggests that the relationship between Internal Attributions and Internal LOC is weak, at best. This lack of significance for the logical expected relationships involving Attributional Style will be discussed later in this chapter.

Although it does not support the notion of an ideology of blame, the overall model for predicting Negative Attitudes Toward Others does include a combination of five variables which account for 17.6 % of the variance in negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others. A belief that powerful others control one's life, low allocentrism, a strong belief that the world is just for others, strong familism, and low social connectedness all contribute to negative attitudes toward the combination of poor people, fat people, criminals, and homosexuals. Now we turn to some important questions regarding the appropriateness of this model.

Do Men and Women Hold Different Beliefs?

It does appear that men and women differ on a variety of world views and beliefs. For example, as predicted, women are less Idiocentric, more Allocentric, more Familistic, and have greater Ingroup Solidarity than men. This supports the prediction that women are more group oriented than men, and men are more individualistic than women.

One of the most interesting differences between men and women is that women feel more powerful than men. Although unexpected, this finding is consistent

with the overall finding that Allocentrism and Feelings of Power are related. Women are more allocentric, and also feel more powerful.

Women do score more externally on the Rotter I-E. However, men and women do not differ on the Levenson LOC measures. This provides somewhat mixed evidence regarding sex differences in LOC. However, as the Levenson measures are considered to be more accurate measures of the various aspects of LOC, evidence suggests that men and women do not differ much on locus of control.

There is also no difference in the internality of attributions made by men and women in this study. This is theoretically consistent with the lack of difference in LOC found between men and women. Also, considering that there is virtually no difference in LOC or Internal Attributions for men and women in this study, it is not surprising that we find no difference in their BJW Self.

However, women do believe that the world is less just for others than men believe. This becomes important when considering that a belief in a just world for others contributes to the previously discussed model for predicting NATO. This can be one explanation for the finding that men are significantly more likely to hold negative attitudes toward homosexuals and fat people, and also tend to have more negative attitudes toward poor people than women.

Now that we have found certain differences between men and women, it is important to address the possibility that men and women hold different mental relationships between and among these variables. If variables are related in different ways for men and women, one model combining both sexes is not appropriate. When

examining the relationships among variables involved in predicting negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others, we do indeed see that some variables are related in different ways for men and women. However, these relationships do not appear to make much difference in the types of variables involved in predicting each negative attitude. It appears that for both males and females, negative attitudes toward others are most likely to occur among those men and women who are not allocentric and who perceive that powerful others control their lives.

Making Sense of the “Unexpecteds”

At first, the data seem to present a confusing picture. Several relationships do not support the predictions related to an ideology of blame. For example, it was expected and found that Allocentrics may be less negative toward stigmatized others. This does correspond to previous research indicating that those in collectivist cultures or members of more collectivist groups are less likely to hold negative attitudes toward criminals, fat people, and poor people. These previous studies have attempted to explain the differences in negative attitudes toward stigmatized others as part of a value system that is not as conducive to attributions of blame toward the stigmatized groups. This explanation was offered, in part, by evidence that collectivist cultures and groups are less likely to make internal attributions and are more likely to have an external locus of control. This study finds, however, that allocentrics are no more likely to make external attributions or to have an external locus of control, and that they are also likely to have an internal locus of control. In fact, in this study

Allocentrism relates to Feelings of Power. Original hypotheses stated that allocentrism would relate to feeling *less* powerful. Yet, this study indicates that allocentric people feel more powerful than idiocentrics, at least in the community and country. This suggests that the idiocentric person may not be as confident as expected. This lends support to the suggestion that personal power scores are not enough to allow people the confidence that they will get what they deserve in a situation where people cannot control the effects of a stigmatized other (i.e., criminal, homosexual). This confidence may require the additional belief in power over one's community and country. When considering that males are more idiocentric than females, the data also suggests that perhaps men are not as confident as expected.

Additionally, the allocentric tendency may not result from a subordinate position at all. Or, if it does, the powerless position may be replaced by a feeling of power in numbers that can be used toward more power in the community and country. We see support of this through the greater feelings of power among women, who are more allocentric than men and have greater feelings of power. Attribution theory suggests that an individual's personal experiences create various scripts and schemas with which he or she may interpret the actions of the world. Perhaps there is something different about today's college students that allows allocentrics to feel more powerful, while idiocentrics feel less power in their community and country.

Second, negative attitudes toward others are related to external locus of control. Original hypotheses predicted that an internal locus of control would be more related to negative attitudes toward others through the existence of an ideology

of blame. However, data suggests that rather than an ideology of blame, negative attitudes toward stigmatized others may be caused instead by a pattern of beliefs suggesting an element of fear. This potential link between fear and negative attitudes is suggested through the positive relationship between external locus of control and negative attitudes toward others, and the positive relationship between feelings of power and allocentrism, which is also related to negative attitudes toward others. It seems that those who feel controlled by powerful others are not more likely to carry these beliefs over into an attitude that others should not be responsible for their condition due to a general lack of control over circumstances in the world, as attribution theory research has suggested. Rather, the external locus of control may indicate that when people feel that their lives are controlled by powerful others, they also feel that other people are actually more powerful than they are, and feel that although they can't control their own lives, other more powerful people should be able to do so. In any case, it is clear that those with an external locus of control are actually more likely to dislike stigmatized others, and this does not correspond with the notion of an ideology of blame that has been suggested by previous research.

This may represent a faulty conclusion about the mediator between allocentrism and lack of attitudes blaming the stigmatized other – instead of the previous conclusion that allocentrism works through an external locus of control to create an empathetic understanding of another's lack of control, these data suggest that allocentrism may provide the feelings of power that are necessary to buffer one's feelings of uncertainty about the stigmatized other. When a person does not have

these feelings of power, and in fact has the belief that he is controlled by more powerful others, he may dislike the stigmatized other due to feelings of threat that he does not feel he has the power to address. Further research should address the potential faulty conclusion about the link between allocentric tendencies and more positive attitudes toward stigmatized others. It may be that rather than providing a set of values that downplay attributions of blame, allocentrism provides the feelings of power that allow people not to feel threatened.

In addition, these findings suggest that attributions of blame may not operate in the link found by Weiner and colleagues between responsibility attributions and willingness to help others in undesirable circumstances. Perhaps it is incorrect to assume that attributions of responsibility are similar to attributions of blame. It may be that although people are less likely to help those whom are perceived to be responsible for their condition, people are not more likely to hold negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. Attributions of responsibility may not necessarily lead to blame and/or dislike. Therefore, this link between responsibility attributions and helping behavior may not provide a relevant basis for the arguments suggesting an ideology of blame.

The third unexpected relationship occurred between Familism and negative attitudes toward certain others. Although familism is often considered an allocentric tendency, this study provides strong support for those who suggest that familism be measured separately because it represents a different type of group orientation. Those who are more familistic hold more negative attitudes toward the stigmatized others in

this study. When considering the pattern of a fearful, powerless, negative person, familism may fit into the model by contributing a desire to protect one's family from the feared stigma. This hypothesis can be explored in future studies.

The final unexpected result involves the lack of relationship between attributional style and some of the other variables in the study. Attributions do not relate to Feelings of Power, Belief in a Just World, or the Levenson LOC measures. In addition, external attributions (rather than internal attributions) are predictors of Antipoor Attitudes among men and women, and Antifat Attitudes among men. Although this relationship does not fit with the notion of an ideology of blame, it fits nicely with the picture of a person who feels powerless to control becoming the feared stigmatized other, and therefore is more negative toward it. Much like the relationship between external locus of control and negative attitudes toward stigmatized others, this relationship between external attributions and negative attitudes again suggests that previous assumptions about the reasons for the link between allocentrism and less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others may have been premature. In fact, much like the evidence for a relationship between internal feelings of power and allocentrism, there is some evidence for a relationship between allocentric tendencies and internal attributions. Perhaps the link may be explained by something other than an ideology of blame, such as the possibility that allocentrism provides feelings of power that allow people not to feel threatened.

This possibility is also supported by evidence that allocentrics are more likely to have a Belief in a Just World for themselves. It seems that allocentrics may use

this sense of justice and fairness to assume that they have the power to control their own lives, and therefore may not feel as threatened by stigmatized others. Although research regarding who believes in a just world is mixed, many feel that factors such as power and wealth are related to a belief in a just world. This study supports the relationship between belief in a just world and at least *feeling* powerful. Locus of control measures are also related to BJWSelf, again indicating that feeling powerful or in control relates to belief that the world is fair and just. However, the lack of relationship between internal attributions and belief in a just world is puzzling.

Due to the similarity between locus of control and the attributional dimension of internality, the theory suggests that internal attributions should be related to an internal locus of control. Although there is slight evidence for a relationship between internal locus of control and internal attributions, the relationship is weak at best. This lack of a clear relationship between locus of control or belief in a just world and internal attributions suggests that perhaps the measurement of attributional style may not capture the intended construct.

One possible explanation involves the adequacy of the EAS measure. The EAS was chosen because of its psychometric properties of reliability and the fact that it is designed for use with a college population. Reliability on various measures of the internality dimension of attributions has been consistently lower than for the other two dimensions (Joiner & Metalsky, 1999), and some suggest that the factor is difficult to measure. Measures of internal attributions rely on situation-specific attributions for events in different scenarios. It may be that these measures are too

specific to capture the theorized global style of a person's attributions. Perhaps a better method of measuring internal attributions might lead to stronger relationships in the data between these similar constructs. In addition, although this measure of attributional style is supposed to indicate a person's attributions for his or her own behavior, this measure does not allow us to know the attributions for another's behavior. Additional studies with modified questions could help to answer this question, and would be more appropriate for detecting the potential attributional component of an ideology of blame.

However, while providing some support for previous research on Belief in a Just World and the relationship between Allocentrism and less dislike of stigmatized others, these data do not support the ideology of blame suggested by others interested in the study of attributions for stigmas. Rather, the link between allocentrism and less negative attitudes toward stigmatized others may be explained by something else. One possible explanation involves the surprising link between allocentrism and feelings of power. Although this one finding, alone, should not be used to form conclusions, a pattern of results seems to suggest that allocentrism may allow people to feel less negative toward stigmatized others because they also feel more powerful and in control of their lives. This study suggests that people are more negative toward others when they feel that their lives are controlled by powerful others. It also suggests that allocentric people feel more powerful, and believe the world is more just. These findings, along with others, seem to suggest the possibility that allocentrism offers a more confident view of the world that may buffer the individual

from the threats of stigmatized others. The next chapter will explore this suggestion further, in hopes of continuing to search for the link between allocentrism and less negative attitudes toward others. Although an ideology of blame is not supported in this data, another possibility has emerged.

CHAPTER VI

EXPLORATION OF ALTERNATE RESULTS

Due to the lack of support for an ideology of blame, previous results were examined for alternate explanations for the link between allocentric tendencies and less negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others. A pattern of results seems to suggest that there is potential for an element of fear that may explain why some people are more negative toward stigmatized others. This chapter examines this emerging hypothesis and explores additional factors that may be important predictors of dislike. In addition, a factor analysis of scales is included to confirm that the instruments are measuring the constructs they are intended to measure.

Political Affiliation Differences

Some evidence suggests that conservatism is related to negative attitudes toward others (see Chapter VII). Because conservatism is often described as a fear of change, this analysis seems relevant to the emerging hypothesis that negative attitudes toward others may be more likely among those having an element of fear.

When examining differences between Republicans ($n = 131$) and Democrats ($n = 127$), the following interesting differences emerge. See Table 18.

1. Republicans make more internal attributions than Democrats (rep = 4.87, dem = 4.63).
2. Republicans believe in a just world for self more than Democrats (rep = 34.25, dem = 32.05).
3. Republicans have a more internal locus of control than Democrats (rep = 10.59, dem = 11.70).
4. Republicans are more Anticriminal (rep = 3.24, dem = 3.76), more Antipoor (rep = 6.49, dem = 7.03), more Antihomosexual (rep = 6.14, dem = 7.14), and hold overall more Negative Attitudes Toward Others (rep = 23.10, dem = 25.27).

Differences by Political Party

<i>Attributions</i>	<i>Sum of Squares</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>
Between	3.814	1	3.814	8.761**
Within	111.461	256	.435	
<i>BJW Self</i>				
Between	309.719	1	309.719	8.422**
Within	9340.496	254	36.774	
<i>Rotter I-E</i>				
Between	75.274	1	75.274	4.456*
Within	4070.783	241	16.891	
<i>Anticriminal</i>				
Between	17.619	1	17.619	7.088**
Within	636.347	256	2.486	
<i>Antipoor</i>				
Between	18.494	1	18.494	8.069**
Within	575.285	251	2.292	
<i>Antihomosexual</i>				
Between	65.646	1	65.646	20.657***
Within	813.543	256	3.178	

<i>NATO</i>				
Between	296.702	1	296.702	17.776***
Within	4189.576	251	16.692	

Table 18

Due to the differences in attitudes toward others found between Republicans and Democrats, this variable was dummy coded and included into another stepwise regression. The resulting model accounts for 23.9% of the variance ($R=.506$) in Negative Attitudes Toward Others, and includes Levenson Powerful Others Scale, Republican, Allocentrism, Belief in a Just World for Others, and Familism. See Table 19. The same unpredicted relationships occur in this model: belief in powerful others is related to more negative attitudes toward others, and familism is related to more negative attitudes toward others.

Prediction Model for Negative Attitudes Toward Others
Including Political Affiliation

<i>Constant + ...</i> <i>(B= 28.263)</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> ²	<i>Adjusted</i> <i>R</i> ²	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized</i> <i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
Powerful Others	.300	.090	.086	1.797	.280	4.731***
Republican	.408	.167	.159	2.245	.267	4.543***
Allocentrism	.470	.221	.210	-2.280	-.291	-4.635***
BJW Others	.489	.239	.225	.07907	.132	2.229*
Familism	.506	.256	.239	.934	.140	2.227*

Table 19

When examining the separate models for males and females, the female model is much stronger ($R=.543$, adjusted $R^2 = .275$) than the model produced for males ($R=.253$, adjusted $R^2 = .064$). Among males, the only predictor of Negative Attitudes Toward Others is Allocentrism. Among females, the model almost identically resembles the model for combined males and females.

The models for predicting each type of negative attitude are similar in predictive capability for males and females. Male models contain fewer variables, but all models contain basically the same predictors: Allocentrism, Familism, Powerful Others, and Belief in a Just World. It does appear that political affiliation is more important for females than males in predicting negative attitudes toward homosexuals, poverty, and criminals. Republican is the strongest predictor for Antihomosexual and Anticriminal Attitudes, and the third strongest predictor for Antipoverty Attitudes among females. However, the only model in which Republican appears for males is Antihomosexual, where it is the second predictor variable.

It appears that while political affiliation is important for the attitudes of females, more exploration must continue in hopes of finding a better model to predict each type of Anti- attitude for both males and females.

Prediction Models Including Specific Locus of Control and Fear Scales

Previous research suggests that locus of control is a better predictor when measured with respect to the particular characteristic one is concerned with

predicting. Thus, participants were asked locus of control questions pertaining to weight, poverty, homosexuality, and crime. These scale scores along with scores representing “Fear of _____” were also included in the multiple regressions specific to each type of negative attitude. Fear of _____ had been included in the data collection due to the possibility that fear might be an important component of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. However, it was not included in the initial analysis because fear did not fit into the initial group of variables potentially involved in an attribution of blame. The following models provide the best predictive capabilities for each type of negative attitude among males and females.

For Antihomosexual Attitudes, both male and female models are most strongly affected by Fear of Homosexuality and Homosexuality Locus of Control. The male model accounts for 60% of the variance in Antihomosexual Attitudes, and the female model accounts for 42% of the variance. We also find that the coefficients for Belief in a Just World for Self and a belief in Powerful Others contradict the hypothesized direction of relationship. See Table 20 for the complete models.

Predicting Antihomosexual Attitudes Among Males and Females

<i>Constant +</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R²</i>	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
<u>MEN</u> (<i>B=.982</i>) Fear of Homo	.686	.470	.462	.581	.557	6.494***
Homo LOC	.756	.571	.559	.422	.395	4.599***
Idiocentrism	.772	.597	.578	.678	.190	2.451*
BJW Self	.790	.624	.601	-.05428	-.176	-2.164*
<u>WOMEN</u> (<i>B= 4.267</i>) Fear of Homo	.566	.320	.316	.368	.449	6.565***
Homo LOC	.600	.360	.352	.177	.212	3.150**
Ingroup Solidarity	.622	.387	.375	-.03964	-.197	-3.110**
Republican	.645	.416	.401	.540	.173	2.620**
Powerful Others	.663	.440	.421	.369	.156	2.522*

Table 20

For Antifat Attitudes, neither model includes Weight Locus of Control, and only the female model includes Fear of Fat. The male and female models account for 21% and 14% of the variance, respectively. See Table 21.

Predicting Antifat Attitudes Among Males and Females

<i>Constant +</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R²</i>	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
<u>MEN</u> (<i>B=6.963</i>)						
Ingroup Solidarity	.427	.183	.171	-.05822	-.398	-3.685***
Globality of Attributions	.481	.231	.208	.352	.223	2.061*
<u>WOMEN</u> (<i>B=6.632</i>)						
Social Connectedness	.277	.077	.071	-.03296	-.209	-2.694**
Fear of Fat	.366	.134	.123	.144	.226	3.004**
Powerful Others	.398	.158	.142	.306	.163	2.090*

Table 21

The models for Antipoverty Attitudes both include Fear of Poverty, but Poverty Locus of Control seems only minorly important for females. These models both account for about 25% of the variance in Antipoor Attitudes. See Table 22.

Predicting Antipoor Attitudes Among Males and Females

<i>Constant +</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R²</i>	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
<u>MEN</u> (<i>B= -.563</i>)						
Allocentrism	.369	.136	.124	-.990	-.394	-3.765***
Fear of Poverty	.470	.221	.198	.201	.280	2.685**
Internality of Attributions	.531	.282	.250	-.511	-.247	-2.366*
<u>WOMEN</u> (<i>B=3.566</i>)						
Fear of Poverty	.368	.136	.130	.227	.275	3.878***
Powerful Others	.448	.201	.190	.589	.257	3.617***
Republican	.477	.228	.212	.645	.214	2.925**
Ingroup Solidarity	.512	.262	.242	-.03132	-.163	-2.274*
Internality of Attributions	.533	.284	.259	-.473	-.187	-2.564*
Poverty LOC	.557	.310	.282	.264	.170	2.362*

Table 22

For Anticriminal Attitudes, Fear of Criminality and Criminal Locus of Control are the strongest predictors for both males and females. The complete models for males and females account for 41% and 37% of the variance in Anticriminal Attitudes, respectively. See Table 23.

Predicting Anticriminal Attitudes Among Males and Females

<i>Constant +</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R²</i>	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Standardized Beta</i>	<i>t</i>
<u>MEN</u> <i>(B=1.561)</i>						
Fear of Crim	.504	.254	.243	.445	.515	5.524***
Criminality						
LOC	.616	.379	.361	.455	.348	3.771***
Stability of						
Attributions	.662	.439	.413	.403	.246	2.644**
<u>WOMEN</u> <i>(B=2.417)</i>						
Fear of Crim	.492	.242	.237	.400	.433	6.687***
Criminality						
LOC	.568	.323	.314	.473	.295	4.560***
SES	.598	.358	.345	.407	.185	2.889**
Powerful						
Others	.620	.385	.369	.393	.165	2.564*

Table 23

Factor Analysis

In order to determine that this combination of scales measures the intended constructs, a factor analysis was performed. Using a Principal Component Analysis with Varimax rotation and a criterion minimum of .40 for loadings, six factors emerged in nine iterations. Five of these factors are clearly identifiable and named as follows: Allocentrism, Powerlessness, Attributional Style, Idiocentrism, and Belief in Others' Ability. See Table 27. These factors were entered into a stepwise multiple regression analysis but did not yield a model comparable to the previously mentioned analysis using specific scale scores.

Factor Analysis of Variables

	<i>Allocentrism</i>	<i>Powerless</i>	<i>Attributional Style</i>	<i>Idiocentrism</i>	<i>Belief in Others</i>
Allocent.	.694				
Familism	.715				
Social Connect.	.423				
Ingroup Solidarity	.799				
Powerful Others		.710			
Chance		.832			
Feelings of Power		-.411			
Rotter Ext. LOC		.535			
Stab. Of Attribution			.644		
Glob. Of Attribution			.653		
Intern. Of Attribution			.658		
Internal LOC				.649	
Idiocent.				.825	
Social Obligation				-.472	
BJW Others					.743
Rotter Internal					.565

Table 27

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATE RESULTS

The exploration of potential factors related to negative attitudes toward others has brought us from the initial search for the existence of an ideology of blame to the search for meaning in the patterns of relationships that may suggest alternate explanations for negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others. While the large number of statistical analyses in this study makes any one finding a tentative result and makes interpretation a difficult task, the overall pattern of relationships that emerges allows us to make statements about one possible explanation for why some people hold more negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others.

Political Affiliation

Due to the suggestion that conservatism may be a factor in prejudiced attitudes, we explored the relationship of political affiliation with the various beliefs in the study and negative attitudes toward others. When examining the differences between Republicans and Democrats, we find that Republicans make more internal attributions, believe more in a just world for themselves, have a more internal LOC, and are more negative toward poor people, criminals, and homosexuals. For this

reason, political affiliation was dummy coded and added to the stepwise regressions for males and females. The following models were produced.⁵

Male Models Including Political Affiliation.

The model predicting NATO for males is not strong, accounting for little more than 6% of the variance in NATO. This model includes only the variable Allocentrism, where low allocentrism relates to more negative attitudes toward others among males. The only model affected by political affiliation for men is that of Antihomosexual Attitudes, which provides better predictive capabilities than the previous male model.

Whereas the previous model for predicting Antihomosexual Attitudes among men accounted for only 13% of the variance, the new model accounts for more than 23% of the variance in negative attitudes toward homosexuals among men. Recall that the previous model included the confusing combination of Familism, low Feelings of Power, Internal LOC, and a belief in Chance. The new model is similar, including Familism, Republican, Chance, and Internal LOC. Once again, we see the combination of high familism, belief in chance, and an internal LOC. However, the addition of Republican to the model provides a more powerful model for predicting Antihomosexual Attitudes.

⁵ It is important to recognize that political affiliation is often based on the beliefs involved in this study. Holding these particular attitudes about life may lead people to choose a Republican affiliation.

Female Models Including Political Affiliation.

The new female model for predicting NATO accounts for 27.5% of the variance in negative attitudes toward others. This combination of Powerful Others, Republican, Allocentrism, and Familism provides the best predictive capability of any model thus far. As previous patterns have shown, women are more negative toward others when they believe that powerful others control their lives, are low in allocentrism, and are high in familism. Additionally, when women are Republican, they are also more likely to hold negative attitudes toward others. Individual anti models are also affected by political affiliation.

Women who are more Antipoor are likely to hold a combination of a belief in Powerful Others, low Allocentrism, Republican political affiliation, and external Attributions. This combination accounts for about 20% of the variance in Antipoor Attitudes. There is an interesting (and unpredicted) relationship between external attributions and negative attitudes toward poor people. This relationship was also found among men. Evidence does not support an ideology of blame for attitudes toward poor people.

Anticriminal Attitudes among women are best predicted by a combination of being Republican, holding high BJW Other, believing in control by Powerful Others, and high Familism. This model accounts for 15% of the variance in negative attitudes toward criminals among women, and provides support for an ideology of blame for attitudes toward criminals. In addition, the relationship between Familism and Anticriminal Attitudes supports the emerging fear/threat hypothesis.

Antihomosexual Attitudes are also affected by political affiliation among women. We find a combination of variables that accounts for over 23% of the variance in negative attitudes toward homosexuals among women. These variables include Republican, BJW Self, Familism, Allocentrism, and Powerful Others. We find the description of a Republican woman who does not believe her world is just, is familistic but not allocentric, and believes that powerful others control her life. Again, we are beginning to see the pattern of the negative woman as one who might feel threatened by certain others.

In order to test the developing hypothesis that negative attitudes toward others represent feelings of threat, it is important to look at the role played by fear of each characteristic.⁶ Also, it is necessary to look at the role played by locus of control specific to each characteristic because specific forms of locus of control are more effective predictors than global measure of LOC. Thus, the following final group of regression models has been produced.

Male Models Including Political Affiliation, Fear, and Specific LOC.

The model for predicting Antipoor Attitudes among men includes Allocentrism, Fear of Poverty, and external Attributions. This combination, which accounts for 25% of the variance in men's negative attitudes toward poor people suggests that the most negative men are those who are *not* allocentric, have a fear of

⁶ Fear is measured by the following items: 1. One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I [lost a lot of money, e.g.]. 2. I worry about becoming [poor, e.g.]. 3. I would feel disgusted with myself if I [didn't have much money, e.g.].

becoming poor, and make external attributions. Once again, we see the relationship between external attributions and negative attitudes toward poor. We also see that fear of poverty does play a role in the combination of beliefs that relate to negative attitudes toward poor people, supporting the hypothesis that people are more negative toward those who represent the things they fear. Although this model accounts for a little less than the previous 31% of Antipoor Attitudes among men, it provides valuable support for the emerging fear hypothesis.

Anticriminal Attitudes among men are best predicted by Fear of Criminality, Criminality LOC, and Stability of Attributions. This combination accounts for over 41% of the variance in negative attitudes toward criminals among men, a much better predictor than the 13% accounted for by the previous model. Once again, we see that fear plays a significant role in negative attitudes toward criminals. We also see that men who believe in personal control over criminal behavior are the most likely to be anticriminal. Also, men who make stable attributions for behavior are more likely to hold negative attitudes toward criminals. Stable attributions are those that suggest the unchangeable nature of behavior. It seems that men are more negative toward criminals when they feel that criminals can control their behavior, but will not change. This continues to support an ideology of blame with regard to criminals.

More than 60% of the variance in Antihomosexual Attitudes is accounted for by Fear of Homosexuality, Homosexuality LOC, Idiocentrism, and BJW Self among men. Again, the model is far better than previous models that accounted for only 13% and 23% of the variance in Antihomosexual Attitudes. We see that the most

antihomosexual males are those who fear being homosexual, feel that homosexuality is controllable, are idiocentric, and do not believe they get what they deserve or deserve what they get. Once again, we see that males are most negative toward those who represent something they fear, especially when that “something” is seen as controllable by those who *are* it.

Antifat Attitudes among men are not affected by either Fear of Fat or Weight LOC. This is not surprising, considering that being overweight is not typically as negative for men as for women. It is possible that we would find different combinations of beliefs to account for Antifat Attitudes toward fat males and fat females, and that these beliefs would also differ for males and females. The changing body image perceptions in America may also alter the antifat beliefs of men and women toward fat males in the future.

Female Models Including Political Affiliation, Fear, and Specific LOC.

For women, Antipoor Attitudes are best accounted for by a combination of several beliefs including Fear of Poverty, Powerful Others, Republican, Ingroup Solidarity, Attributions, and Poverty LOC. Women are most negative toward the poor when they have a strong fear of being poor, believe that their lives are controlled by powerful others, are Republican, lack feelings of ingroup solidarity, make external attributions, and believe that poverty is controllable. Again, we see that fear provides the strongest contribution to negative attitudes. We also see that being Republican continues to be important to Antipoor Attitudes among women. The antipoor woman

seems to be one who fears poverty, does not feel in control of her life, and believes that poverty can be controlled. It seems that these women, though feeling that poverty is controllable, may feel that they, themselves, could not control their own poverty. This combination of variables accounts for about 28% of women's negative attitudes toward poor people, a better model than the previously described models that account for 10.5% and 20% of the variance in Antipoor Attitudes.

The women with the most Anticriminal Attitudes are those who fear criminality, think criminal behavior is controllable, are from higher SES, believe their lives are controlled by powerful others, and are Republican. This combination of Fear of Criminality, Criminality LOC, SES, Powerful Others, and Republican accounts for about 38% of the variance in Anticriminal Attitudes. This model again exceeds the predictive capabilities of previous models accounting for 7% and 15% of the variance in Anticriminal Attitudes. Again, we see the image of a woman who is negative toward something she fears and feels is controllable, but that perhaps she cannot control, herself.

Antihomosexual Attitudes among women are best predicted by Fear of Homosexuality, Homosexuality LOC, Ingroup Solidarity, Republican, and Powerful Others. The women who are most negative toward homosexuals are those who fear being homosexual, feel that homosexuality is controllable, lack feelings of ingroup solidarity, are Republican, and feel that powerful others control their lives. This combination of beliefs accounts for over 42% of the variance in Antihomosexual Attitudes. This model is far better than the previous models that account for only

13% and 23% of the variance in negative attitudes toward homosexuals. This model also supports the developing picture of a woman who fears something and believes that it is controllable, but maybe not by herself. This woman also lacks feelings of ingroup solidarity and is Republican.

Antifat Attitudes among women are affected by fear of being fat. The model for predicting Antifat Attitudes, which accounts for about 14% of the variance in negative attitudes toward fat people, includes Social Connectedness, Fear of Fat, and Powerful Others. Women who are negative toward fat people are not socially connected, fear being fat, and believe that powerful others control their lives. Fear plays a role in Antifat Attitudes for women, but not men. Because the stigma of overweight is more directed at females than males, this relationship is not surprising. This combination, although not as powerful a predictor as the other anti models, presents a similar picture of the woman who holds negative attitudes toward others. It is only slightly better than the previous model, which accounts for 13% of the variance in Antifat Attitudes.

Summary

Although the models for predicting negative attitudes toward certain stigmatized others were analyzed separately for males and females, the resulting regression models that best predict the dislike of stigmatized others are very similar for men and women. In sum, people are more negative toward stigmatized others when they fear the stigma, when they feel that powerful others control their lives,

when they lack allocentrism, and when they have an internal locus of control for specific stigmas. The most prevalent of these characteristics, however, is fear. We now turn to a discussion of the role of fear in prejudice and present a suggestion for altering negative attitudes toward others.

Discussion of Possibilities for Changing Attitudes

This research provides valuable information for use in educational arenas. We can attempt to combat prejudiced attitudes when armed with the knowledge that many forms of prejudice originate from fear of being or becoming the stigma, lack of allocentrism, the belief that stigmatized people can control their condition if they so choose, and feelings that powerful others control our lives. Negative attitudes toward poor people, criminals, homosexuals, and fat people are all described to some extent by these tendencies, and being Republican is also an important contributor to these attitudes for women. However, the single most common and important predictor of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others among those in this study is Fear.

The Role of Fear in Prejudice

Allport (1954) suggests that we tend to hold aversive attitudes and antipathies toward what seems to us to threaten our own mode of existence. He states that when a person can do nothing to control the source of fear, anxiety sets in and predisposes him or her to see all sorts of stimuli as menacing. Allport feels that our societal values of pride and self-respect lead people to mask anxiety by displacing it toward

socially sanctioned sources of fear. Feeling threatened may lead people to prejudice. Relatively few studies have examined the extent to which nonstigmatized persons feel threatened during social interactions with stigmatized others, but many theorists argue that bearers of stigmas cause perceivers to feel anxiety or even danger during social interactions (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). Results of this study suggest that fear does contribute significantly to negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. Beyond the study of attitudes, Blascovich et al. (2001) show that physiological responses during interactions with stigmatized others indicate patterns associated with threat.

Kunda (1999) describes how some prejudice is also driven partly by the need to affirm one's own self-worth when it is threatened. In support of this, Fein and Spencer (1997) show that when the need for self-affirmation is satisfied through other means, one is less inclined to derogate members of stigmatized groups. Recent research on defensive derogation and self-esteem distinguishes between self-worth derived from intrinsic worth versus achievement. The role of specific types of self-esteem in the derogation of stigmatized others is found in evidence that defensive distance from negatively portrayed others and defensive bias toward downward social comparison are reduced by a self-esteem that is based on being liked for intrinsic characteristics (i.e., for who one is) but not by self-esteem that is based on being liked for what one has achieved (Schimel, Pyszczynski, Arndt, & Greenberg, 2001).

Allport (1954) also describes that an underlying fear of social change may be common among prejudiced attitudes. The relationship among women between

Republican political affiliation and negative attitudes may represent some of this fear, as the Republican ideology is often linked to stability and maintaining the current social status. Although support for a prejudiced “authoritarian personality” is not generally supported by research, and has been replaced by theories of “modern” or “symbolic” racism (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996), both old and new theories share the belief that prejudice stems from attachment to the status quo.

Although the modern theories of prejudice are typically applied only to racism or sexism, they may also describe the development of negative attitudes toward other stigmatized individuals. Modern racism involves feeling that a particular group is violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for changes in the status quo, and these feelings are associated with conservatism and the Protestant ethic. However, critics of the theory contend that rather than detecting prejudiced attitudes toward others, the theory merely detects resistance to social policies that represent an undesired role of government assistance (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996). Yet, in this study, negative attitudes toward others are measured directly and still relate positively to Republican political affiliation among women.

Allport (1954) describes that prejudiced attitudes may not always lead to discrimination, but that any negative attitude tends somehow, somewhere, to express itself in action because few people keep their antipathies entirely to themselves. He states that negative action is more likely when attitudes are more intense. For this reason, attitudinal change becomes an important venture.

The stigmas chosen for this study involve the types of characteristics that may be related specifically to one of the biggest problems facing today's youth – bullying (Pellegrini, 1998; Bernstein & Watson, 1997). Children who are fat, poor, homosexual, or have past criminal records are at risk for being the targets of bullies. Due to the recent tragedies involving school violence at the hands of children with a history of being “picked on” or mocked, an increase in attention has been given to combating the unfortunate practice of bullying (Hazler & Carney, 2000). Although certainly no single cure or magic bullet exists, one step toward minimizing bullying involves changing negative attitudes toward stigmatized others.

What Works to Change Attitudes?

Among the techniques for changing attitudes are approaches involving imparting information via direct instruction, vicarious learning, active participation, and group discussion. Early studies indicate that indirect approaches provide the best potential for changing negative attitudes toward others, and that to be maximally effective, contact and acquaintance programs should lead to a sense of equality, should occur in context of a purpose, and should avoid seeming artificial (Allport, 1954; Kunda, 1999). In addition, the classic Robber's Cave experiment by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) demonstrated that working together to solve urgent situations can eventually lead to reduced hostility toward others. However, negative stereotypes often resist change even in the face of intense manipulations

involving cooperation with members of the stigmatized group over long periods of time (Kunda, 1999).

Attitude change may depend on the perceived typicality of the stereotype disconfirmer (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Kunda, 1999). One who is too extreme may be discounted as not representative of the stigmatized group. This suggests the importance of contact with a substantial number of the stigmatized group in order to maximize the potential for attitude change. However, some argue that the amount of confirming or disconfirming information cannot be determined apart from context (Oaks, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999), and the impact of typicality is unknown.

Studies of attempts at attitude change also show that persuasive messages can be processed either systematically or heuristically. When people are capable of processing a message in a systematic manner, they are more persuaded by strong arguments than by weak ones. However, if messages are processed heuristically (the “quick and dirty” surface level method), reactions are not based on the quality of arguments, but are based rather on cues such as the attractiveness, likeability, or expertise of the message bearer (Kunda, 1999; van Knippenberg, 1999). Because systematic processing is based on careful consideration of relevant information, persuasion is assumed to be relatively stable over time, resistant to change, and predictive of behavior, unlike attitude change resulting from heuristic processing (van Knippenberg, 1999). Thus, systematic processing of persuasive information is preferred for attempts to elicit attitude change.

What can we do to ensure systematic processing of counterattitudinal information, whether via direct or indirect methods? A sad mood promotes systematic processing of any persuasive message, but a happy mood only promotes systematic processing when the message promises to be uplifting rather than depressing (Kunda, 1999). This speaks to the tactic of presenting persuasive messages in a positive light. Attempts at changing negative attitudes toward others should involve an optimistic message and prime the learner for a pleasant experience.

In addition, research suggests that when counterattitudinal messages are presented by a majority, rather than minority member, motivation and processing are increased (Mackie & Hunter, 1999). Thus, for example, it seems that if a heterosexual person presents a pro-homosexual message to a heterosexual audience, the argument may be more effective in altering antihomosexual attitudes.

Using this information regarding the best strategies for changing attitudes and the knowledge of some specific characteristics that are related to negative attitudes toward poor people, fat people, homosexuals, and criminals, the following section suggests some possible practices for decreasing negative attitudes toward stigmatized others that may be applied in a school setting.

One Suggestion for Decreasing Negative Attitudes Toward Stigmatized Others

Although the results of this study are by no means conclusive and warrant further research, the pattern of results suggests that fear and allocentrism may be

important in the role of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others. Therefore, one method is suggested for an educational application of these tentative results.

Above all, methods for minimizing negative attitudes toward stigmatized others should concentrate on both reducing fear and increasing allocentrism. Because fear is the single most important predictor of negative attitudes toward others, decreasing fear is critical to the success of any attempt at altering these attitudes. In addition, increasing allocentrism is one way to minimize negative attitudes toward others and also increase feelings of personal power at the same time (because allocentrism is related to feelings of power). Not only does a lack of allocentrism relate to holding negative attitudes toward others, increasing feelings of power may result in less potential for feeling threatened by others and could lead to less derogation of others. These things may be accomplished by following the suggested methods for changing attitudes toward others.

Although such a plan might be difficult to implement, schools could benefit from a program involving an undertaking designed to decrease fear of stigmatized others and to increase feelings of allocentrism. This ideal plan is to create mandatory Community Studies classes comprised of mixed ethnicity, SES, religion, sexual orientation, etc. Students should be assigned to classes based on these characteristics. The goal is to provide as diverse a group as possible in order to increase contact with members of all stigmatized groups. Often as students move into high school, classes become more and more homogeneous due to tracking. This plan ensures that students encounter a diverse group at least some of the time at school.

The purpose of these classes should be to solve specific community problems. In doing so, this class of students will be working together all year to achieve a particular important goal, thus maximizing the potential for decreasing prejudice among those working together. In addition, the feelings of power in the community and allocentrism should also be maximized through the contact with the larger community and the development of relationships with others. The course should involve a combination of optimistically charged direct instruction regarding stigmatized groups, group discussion, and active participation in attempts at attitude change. Students will experience vicarious learning through contact with stigmatized others and through contact with the larger community.

Not only can students benefit socially from Community Studies classes, they can benefit cognitively by practicing problem solving skills and personally by possibly receiving the positive impact of their project on the community. Although the implementation of mandatory Community Studies classes presents a variety of logistical hurdles, a project such as this would serve multiple purposes and certainly merits exploration.

Though many teachers and schools currently recognize the importance of group work and collaborative learning, these concepts can be taken to even greater extremes for maximum impact. Not only can collaborative learning aid in the development of academic skills, it can also be used for the greater purpose of creating social harmony. Decreasing the fear of stigmatized others and increasing feelings of group orientation through programs such as this may lead to greater social interest

and less negative attitudes toward others among young people. If we can minimize the negative consequences (like bullying and social exclusion) of prejudiced attitudes in children, our school grounds and communities may become safer and more enjoyable places for everyone.

Limitations of the Study

This study is limited first by the sample itself. The college sample does not allow for much variation in SES, age, or ethnicity. This lack of diversity somewhat limits the generalizability of the study to the U. S. population. Perhaps studying the components of negative attitudes toward stigmatized others among various age groups, ethnic groups, and levels of socio-economic status might reveal important distinctions that are not apparent in this study.

In addition, the measure of attributional style (EAS) was not ideal for the intended purpose in this study. It does not measure attributions about *another* person's behavior, perhaps a major contributor to negative attitudes toward others. Future studies should continue to search for the potential existence of an ideology of blame.

The exploratory nature of this study allows for multiple statistical analyses in order to examine interesting relationships as the data evolved. However, an obvious limitation of this study is the increased potential for error due to multiple analyses. The results of this study should be accepted with caution and are perhaps better examined through the various patterns of relationships that emerge. This study may

be used to inform future studies in order to better plan for controlling the chances of error.

Another threat to the internal validity of this study is the fact that it was administered as a take-home survey to students who were required to complete the study for their college course. Although care was taken to examine each survey for possible bogus responses, the possibility for participant apathy and inattention remains a limitation.

Concluding Remarks

Future research should continue to examine the role of fear and stigma-specific locus of control in negative attitudes toward others. What type of fear most closely relates to negative attitudes? Is there a difference between fearing the unfamiliar and fearing becoming a stigmatized person? This study suggests that people who are negative toward certain others often have an internal locus of control specific to the stigma, yet tend to feel that powerful others control their lives. Is there a distinction between thinking others can control the stigma versus thinking one can control it, himself? Future measures can be developed to examine this more closely.

Additionally, what is the role of religion in negative attitudes toward stigmatized others? Is there a difference between Protestants and Catholics? Are attitudes of those who practice Eastern religions different from those who practice traditional Western religions? Are nonreligious people more or less negative toward others? These questions and others should be explored in future studies.

Finally, the next step involves devoting greater attention to the relationship between negative attitudes toward others and prejudiced behaviors. Do particular attitudes better predict prejudiced behavior? What are the effects of attempts to change attitudes? Does intervention among school children lead to better social relations?

The avenues for future research are endless, the implications profound. Using research to guide and inform attempts at attitude change, our hope is to direct today's youth toward a more tolerant and less violent existence. Despite the grandiose appearance of this goal, psychology provides an avenue to fulfill the potential for human change. This study presents a direction for immediate action, as well as a stepping stone for future research. Though some may argue the best method and others may preach the obstacles, certainly none can deny the merit in attempting to achieve social harmony.

Appendix A

Items from the Shortened INDCOL Scale (Hui & Yee, 1994)

1. The motto, “sharing in both blessing and calamity” still applies even if one’s friend is clumsy, dumb, and causes a lot of trouble.
2. I would help if a colleague at work told me that he/she needed money to pay utility bills.
3. If a colleague lends a helping hand, one needs to return the favor.
4. There is everything to gain and nothing to lose for co-workers to group themselves to help each other.
5. Colleagues’ assistance is indispensable to good performance at work.
6. I like to live close to my good friends.
7. It is a personal matter whether I worship money or not. Therefore it is not necessary for my friends to give any counsel.
8. To go on a trip with friends makes one less free and mobile. As a result, there is less fun.
9. I would not let my parents use my car (if I have one), whether they are good drivers or not.
10. I would not let my needy mother use the money that I have saved by living a less than luxurious life.
11. I would not share my ideas and newly acquired knowledge with my parents.
12. Teenagers should listen to their parents’ advice on dating.

13. Young people should take into consideration their parents' advice when making education/career plans.
14. Each family has its own problems unique to itself. It does not help to tell relatives about one's problems.
15. Whether one spends an income extravagantly or stingily is of no concern to one's relatives (cousins, uncles).
16. One need not worry about what the neighbors say about whom one should marry.
17. When deciding what kind of education to have I would pay absolutely no attention to my uncles' advice.
18. If possible, I would like co-owning a car with my close friends, so that it wouldn't be necessary for them to spend much money to buy their own cars.
19. I can count on my relatives for help if I find myself in any kind of trouble.
20. When deciding what kind of education to have, I would definitely pay attention to the views of relatives of my generation.
21. I am often influenced by the moods of my neighbors.
22. My neighbors always tell me interesting stories that have happened around them.
23. Even if the child won the Nobel prize, the parents should not feel honored in any way.
24. Children should not feel honored even if the father were highly praised and given an award by a government official for his contribution and service to the community.

25. In these days parents are too stringent with their kids stunting the development of initiative.
26. The decision of where one is to work should be jointly made with one's spouse, if one is married.
27. If a husband is a sports fan, a wife should also cultivate an interest in sports. If the husband is a stock broker, the wife should also be aware of the current market situation.
28. I don't really know how to befriend my neighbors.
29. My neighbors have never borrowed anything from me or my family.
30. I am not interested in knowing what my neighbors are really like.
31. I have never chatted with my neighbors about the political future of this state.
32. I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors every day.
33. One needs to be cautious when talking with neighbors, otherwise others might think you are nosy.

Appendix B

Items from the Individualism/Collectivism/Familism Scale (Gaines, 1997)

1. I'm not to blame for others' misfortunes.
2. I feel that I'm the master of my own fate.
3. I really feel that the "pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps" philosophy makes a lot of sense.
4. These days, the only person you can depend upon is yourself.
5. I take great pride in accomplishing what no one else can accomplish.
6. I actively resist other people's efforts to mold me.
7. Before I can feel comfortable with anybody else, I must feel comfortable with myself.
8. I place personal freedom above all other values.
9. I know myself better than anyone else possibly could know me.
10. I see nothing wrong with self-promotion.
11. I don't feel that I'm a success unless I've helped others succeed as well.
12. I want the opportunity to give back to my community.
13. I'm the type of person who lends a helping hand whenever possible.
14. I consider myself a team player.
15. My major mission in life is striving for social justice for all.
16. My heart reaches out to those who are less fortunate than myself.
17. If another person can learn from my mistakes, I'm willing to share my ups and downs with that person so that he or she can do better.

18. It feels great to know that others can count on me.
19. I have an important role to play in bringing together the peoples of the world.
20. I believe in the motto, "United We Stand, Divided We Fall."
21. When it comes to social responsibility, blood really is thicker than water.
22. My family always is there for me in times of need.
23. I owe it to my parents to do well in life.
24. I know that my family has my best interests in mind.
25. I cherish the time I spend with my relatives.
26. I will do all that I can to keep alive the traditions passed on to me by my parents and grandparents.
27. Even when I'm far away from home, my family ties keep me feeling safe and secure.
28. To this day, my parents' teachings serve as my best guide to behavior.
29. In my opinion, the family is the most important social institution of all.
30. I cannot imagine what I would do without my family.

Appendix C

Items from The Belief in a Just World Scale for Self and Others

(Lipkus, Dalbert, & Siegler, 1996)

1. I feel that the world treats me fairly.
2. I feel that I get what I deserve.
3. I feel that people treat me fairly in life.
4. I feel that I earn the rewards and punishments I get.
5. I feel that people treat me with the respect I deserve.
6. I feel that I get what I am entitled to have.
7. I feel that my efforts are noticed and rewarded.
8. I feel that when I meet with misfortune, I have brought it upon myself.
9. I feel that the world treats people fairly.
10. I feel that people get what they deserve.
11. I feel that people treat each other fairly in life.
12. I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get.
13. I feel that people treat each other with the respect they deserve.
14. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have.
15. I feel that a person's efforts are noticed and rewarded.
16. I feel that when people meet with misfortune, they have brought it upon themselves.

Appendix D

Items from Levenson's Locus of Control Scale (Levenson, 1981)

1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability.
2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people.
4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I am.
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck happenings.
7. When I get what I want, it's usually because I'm lucky.
8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power.
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am..
10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others.
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck.
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
14. It's not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good fortune.
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.

16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I'm lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time.
17. If important people were to decide they didn't like me, I probably wouldn't make many friends.
18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.
19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests.
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver.
21. When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it.
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of people who have power over me.
23. My life is determined by my own actions.
24. It's chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends.

Appendix E

Items from Rotter's (1966) I-E Locus of Control Scale

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard they try.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b. Trusting fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.
10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.
b. There is some good in everybody.

15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
- b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.
- b. Getting people to do the right thing depends on ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
- b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
- b. There really is no such thing as "luck."
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
- b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
- b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
- b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.

- b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
- b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
- b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over things that happen to me.
- b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
- b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
- b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
- b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
- b. In the long run they people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.

Appendix F

Items from the Weight Locus of Control (Saltzer, 1982)

1. Whether I gain, lose, or maintain my weight is entirely up to me.
2. Being the right weight is largely a matter of good fortune.
3. No matter what I intend to do, if I gain or lose weight, or stay the same in the near future, it is just going to happen.
4. If I eat properly, and get enough exercise and rest, I can control my weight in the way I desire.

Items from Crandall's (1994) Willpower Subscale

1. People who weigh too much could lose at least some part of their weight through a little exercise.
2. Some people are fat because they have no willpower.
3. Fat people tend to be fat pretty much through their own fault.

Appendix G

Items from Crandall (1994) Antifat Attitudes Scale

1. I really don't like fat people much.
2. I don't have many friends that are fat.
3. I tend to think that people who are overweight are a little untrustworthy.
4. Although some fat people are surely smart, in general, I think they tend not to be quite as bright as normal people.
5. I have a hard time taking fat people too seriously.
6. Fat people make me feel somewhat uncomfortable.
7. If I were an employer looking to hire, I might avoid hiring a fat person.
8. I would feel disgusted with myself if I gained weight.
9. One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I gained 25 pounds.
10. I worry about becoming fat.

Appendix H

Antipoverty Attitudes Scale

1. I really don't like poor people much.
2. I don't have many friends that are poor.
3. I tend to think that people who are poor are a little untrustworthy.
4. Although some poor people are surely smart, in general, I think they tend not to be quite as bright as people of average income.
5. I have a hard time taking poor people too seriously.
6. Poor people make me feel somewhat uncomfortable.
7. If I were an employer looking to hire, I might avoid hiring a poor person.
8. I would feel disgusted with myself if I didn't have much money.
9. One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I lost a lot of money.
10. I worry about becoming poor.
11. People who are poor could make more money through a little hard work.
12. Some people are poor because they have no willpower.
13. Poor people tend to be poor pretty much through their own fault.
14. Whether I make money, lose money, or maintain my economic status is entirely up to me.
15. Being poor is largely a matter of bad luck.
16. No matter what I intend to do, if I make or lose money, or stay the same in the near future, it is just going to happen.
17. If I work hard and get an education, I can control my income in the way I desire.

Appendix I

Anticriminal Attitudes Scale

1. I really don't like people who have committed crimes much.
2. I don't have many friends that are criminals.
3. I tend to think that people with criminal records are a little untrustworthy.
4. Although some criminals are surely smart, in general, I think they tend not to be quite as bright as other people.
5. I have a hard time taking people with criminal records too seriously.
6. Criminal people make me feel somewhat uncomfortable.
7. If I were an employer looking to hire, I might avoid hiring a person with a criminal record.
8. I would feel disgusted with myself if I felt like committing a crime.
9. One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I committed a crime.
10. I worry about becoming a criminal.
11. People who are criminals could straighten up through a little hard work.
12. Some people are criminals because they have no willpower.
13. Criminal people tend to be criminals pretty much through their own fault.
14. Whether I commit crimes or not is entirely up to me.
15. Being free from a criminal record is largely a matter of bad luck.
16. No matter what I intend to do, if I commit crimes or not in the near future, it is just going to happen.

17. If I take care of myself and make good decisions, I can control my criminal behavior.

Appendix J

Antihomosexual Attitudes Scale

1. I really don't like homosexual people much.
2. I don't have many friends that are homosexual.
3. I tend to think that people who are homosexual are a little untrustworthy.
4. Although some homosexual people are surely smart, in general, I think they tend not to be quite as heterosexual people.
5. I have a hard time taking homosexual people too seriously.
6. Homosexual people make me feel somewhat uncomfortable.
7. If I were an employer looking to hire, I might avoid hiring a homosexual person.
8. I would feel disgusted with myself if I had homosexual thoughts.
9. One of the worst things that could happen to me would be if I were homosexual.
10. I worry about being homosexual.
11. People who are homosexual could be heterosexual through a little effort and self-control.
12. Some people are homosexual because they have no willpower.
13. Gay and lesbian people tend to be homosexual pretty much through their own fault.
14. Whether I am heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual is entirely up to me.
15. Being homosexual is largely a matter of chance.
16. No matter what I intend to do, if I am heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, it is just going to happen.

17. If I work hard and try, I can control my sexual preference in the way I desire.

Appendix K

Feelings of Power Scale

1. I can make an impact on my community.
2. I don't have much power to influence the decisions that affect my own life.
3. This country is concerned with what I think.
4. People in the community don't value my opinion.
5. Not many people stand in my way of achieving personal goals.
6. My voice doesn't mean much in the big picture of this country.

Appendix L

Items from The Social Connectedness Scale (Lee & Robbins, 1995)

1. I feel disconnected from the world around me.
2. Even around people I know, I don't feel that I really belong.
3. I feel so distant from people.
4. I have no sense of togetherness with my peers.
5. I don't feel related to anyone.
6. I catch myself losing all sense of connectedness with society.
7. Even among my friends, there is no sense of brother/sisterhood.
8. I don't feel I participate with anyone or any group.

Appendix M

Scenarios from the Extended Attributional Style Questionnaire

1. You take an exam and receive a low grade on it.
2. You don't have a boyfriend/girlfriend (or spouse) although you want one.
3. A friend comes to you with a problem, and you are not as helpful as you would like to be.
4. As an assignment, you give an important talk in class, and the class reacts negatively.
5. Your parents have been treating you in a negative way.
6. Your gradepoint average (GPA) for the semester is low.
7. At a party, people don't act interested in you.
8. You can't get all the work done that others expect of you.
9. You apply for admission into graduate or professional schools but don't get accepted at any you want to attend.
10. During the first year of working in the career of your choice, you receive a negative evaluation of your job performance from your employer.
11. Your relationship with your boyfriend/girlfriend (or spouse) ends even though you would like it to continue.
12. A person with whom you really want to be friends does not want to be friends with you.

The main cause of each scenario is rated for globality, internality, and stability.

Appendix N

Demographic Variables Measured

1. Sex
2. Age
3. Ethnicity
4. Grade Level
5. College/Major
6. Commitment to Major
7. Religion
8. Commitment to Religion
9. Height
10. Weight
11. Population of Home Town
12. Sexual Preference
13. Marital Status
14. Parents' Marital Status
15. Parents' Income
16. Personal Income
17. Mother's Education Level
18. Father's Education Level
19. Political Affiliation
20. Number of Siblings/Birth Order
21. Frequency of Visiting Immediate Family
22. Frequency of Visiting Extended Family
23. Problems w/ Depression, Violent Behavior, Eating Disorders, Learning Disabilities, Alcoholism, Criminal Behavior, Anxiety, and Obesity
24. Languages Spoken Fluently/Time Spoken

Appendix O

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

CULTURAL VALUE ORIENTATION

Idiocentrism	<u>Indiv/Collect/Familism Scale</u>
Idiocentrism	
Allocentrism	
Allocentrism	
Familism	
Ingroup Solidarity	<u>Shortened INDCOL</u>
Social Obligation	
Social Connectedness	<u>Social Connectedness Scale</u>

LOCUS OF CONTROL

Internal	
Internal	<u>Levenson's LOC</u>
Rotter I-E	
External	
Chance	
Powerful Others	
Rotter I-E	<u>Rotter I-E Scale</u>
Weight, Poverty, Homo, Crim	<u>Saltzer, Crandall</u>

ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE

Internality	<u>Extended Attributional Style</u>
Stability, Globality, but not used	

BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD

BJW Self	<u>Lipkus BJW Self and Others</u>
BJW Others	

FEELINGS OF POWER

Feelings of Power

Demographics (Sex, Ethnicity, Political Party, etc.)

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Antifat Attitudes
Antipoor Attitudes
Antihomosexual Attitudes
Anticriminal Attitudes
NATO (combined Negative Attitudes Toward Others score)

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