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History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. by Frederic Wakeman,

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praiseworthy because it is a primer on the use of poll data. Mueller is properly jaundiced and conservative. Occasionally this bias leads him to include excessive tabular material and documentation at the expense, perhaps, of more explication and interpretation. And in general this work does not have a strong theoretical bent. Questions are occasionally raised but left dangling. For example, after showing the relationship (logarithmic) of casualty rates to public support, he does not seize the opportunity to say why or how this happens or what the consequences are. On the other hand, what he sets out to do he does exceedingly well. In an area of hyperbole and misinformation, that is no mean accomplishment.

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History and Will: Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. By FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. xvi, 392. \$12.75.)

My unqualified recommendation to any reader seeking *one* book to read on the general subject of ideology in China, or its recent expression in Mao Tse-tung's thought is to choose this one. Here for the first time is a study which transcends the standing dichotomy in a field tending to treat pre-Communist intellectual history and Chinese Marxism as two separate subjects, not one. Moreover, Wakeman's literate and moving style makes for swift reading and digestion at an enjoyable pace. His study is a praiseworthy contribution to the interpretation of Chinese ideology for scholars whose own specialties lie elsewhere; it also provides good food for thought for practitioners of Chinese studies.

Wakeman's central interest lies less in the concepts of Chairman Mao (about which one can learn more from Stuart Schram or John Starr) than in the making of *a Chinese ideology*. That is, Wakeman's meatiest sections are found neither in his early "montages" (Mao as Revolutionary Founder, Red Sun, Dictator, Great Legislator, Myth-Prince and Image Seeker) nor in his later conclusions about Neo-Hegelianism, Contradictions, or Mao's frame of mind upon inspiring the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (or even in his grand summation: "Without will there would be no history.

And without history, no will at all," p. 327). Rather, his most enlightening analysis is to be found in Part Two, "Transition to Ideology," where he argues that nineteenth-century developments in Chinese thought generally prevailed over nineteenth- and early twentieth-century intellectual currents flowing in from Europe. The famous reformer of the Confucian tradition, K'ang Yu-wei, for example, "used Darwin's principles of evolution to redefine Chinese thought. Yet once that had been accomplished, the Western theory ceased to interest him. The agent, evolution, precipitated a contact reaction by which it was not ultimately absorbed" (p. 130). In the later-middle chapters we find Wakeman arguing for an essentially similar relationship between Kant and Mao, and, most importantly, between European Marxists and Mao.

Significantly, K'ang Yu-wei's major period of creativity, when he embraced quietism and duty to enlighten as a substitute for classical erudition (after 1879), and when he began to conceive of the possibility of scientific social laws of development (after 1885), gestated during a long period of seclusion in a classical setting—"a villa in the shadow of Hsi-ch'iao Mountain near the small town of Yin-t'ang. The house, which faced a large private library built by his granduncle, dominated a garden graced with gazebos, juniper trees, and a pond arched with bridges" (p. 120). His visions from solitary contemplation (after voracious reading) led K'ang to a relativism which regarded social institutions (including Confucian ones) as corresponding necessarily to stages of human development, instead of being intrinsically and permanently good. In Wakeman's view, "K'ang Yu-wei's perception announced the birth of ideology for modern China" (p. 122). Even while he remained a moderate and practical constitutional monarchist in his political espousals, K'ang grew into a fanciful utopian in his widely admired writings. It was this contradictory intellectual stance which was "transmitted obliquely through [his disciple] T'an Ssu-t'ung to Mao and his fellow students in Ch'ang-sha, and which enabled the transition from orthodox Confucian values to autonomous ideologies of radical social criticism" (p. 100).

Wakeman's final step is to suggest that ultimately these intellectual transitions were strongly flavored by earlier Chinese sociopolitical history. The political tradition in China whereby "Chinese emperors only acknowledged unincorporated public opinion" (p. 19) predisposed the emergence in Mao's thought of a distinctive

strain of despotic populism, the need for a strong leader who rules through communion with "the masses." By contrast "European monarchs tested the justice of their reigns against the reactions of political estates," and this has retarded the growth of the modern despotic ideal of "one ruler/one people."

This book is strong medicine for interpretations of twentieth-century Chinese thought and institutions which attach momentous and lasting importance to that country's "response to the West."

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A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example. By JOHN R. NELLIS. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 217. \$12.25.)

This monograph tries to show how rational choice theory can make a contribution to understanding the role of ideology in developing African states. With this purpose in view, it first provides a critical review of the major analytical approaches to the study of ideology currently employed by political scientists. These treat political behavior as a variable dependent on some more fundamental social, economic, or psychological factor. Professor Nellis finds explanations of this type not altogether satisfactory and instead adopts the rational choice approach suggested by economic theory.

He develops a model as a heuristic device to enable him to understand actual developments in Tanzania. The model defines ideology as "an organized set of justifications for the policies and activities of the ruling regime." It assumes individual rationality in the pursuit of material self-interest, recognizing however that there are large differences in information available to the citizenry which affect their political awareness. The motivation of rulers is assumed to be the retention of office. It is assumed further that the regime has limited means for satisfying the demands of the citizenry, who are treated as if they were equal in power.

The main conclusions derived from the model, which is, of course, more elaborate than my sketchy outline suggests, are that: "Elites and not the masses were the likely source of African instability and that the major societal function of ideology is to forge