Technocracy under democracy : assessing the political autonomy of experts in Latin America

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Technocracy under democracy : assessing the political autonomy of experts in Latin America

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dc.contributor.advisor Weyland, Kurt Gerhard
dc.creator Dargent, Eduardo
dc.date.accessioned 2012-07-13T15:30:07Z
dc.date.available 2012-07-13T15:30:07Z
dc.date.created 2012-05
dc.date.issued 2012-07-13
dc.date.submitted May 2012
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5000
dc.description.abstract The important role that technocrats play in Latin America has stimulated a lively theoretical debate about experts’ influence in policy making and their effective independence from other sociopolitical players, especially politicians, international financial institutions and business. Through an in-depth analysis of the role of economic and health technocrats in Colombia from 1958 to 2011 and in Peru from 1980 to 2011, this dissertation demonstrates that technocrats are best conceptualized as autonomous actors in Latin America. This technical autonomy, though, varies in strength from policy sector to policy sector and even within the same policy sector across time. I propose a theory of technocratic autonomy to explain both the bases of experts’ autonomy and the determinants that explain the variation in the degree of autonomy across policy sectors and across time. Fundamentally, technocrats’ higher degree of expertise provides them with considerable leverage over sociopolitical actors and allows them to enhance their influence. x Four factors explain experts’ degree of autonomy and its variation across policy areas. First, a high level of technical complexity in a policy area enhances autonomy by making it more difficult for politicians to counter technocrats’ proposals. Second, the degree of technocratic consensus in a policy area limits the possibility of experts being replaced by other experts with preferences closer to those of politicians. Third, experts are more likely to gain autonomy in state areas where bad policy performance causes high political costs for the incumbent. Finally, a balanced constellation of diverse powerful stakeholders having interests in a policy area also enhances technical autonomy. These stakeholders monitor competing stakeholders and the incumbent, opening a space for technocrats to act with more autonomy. I argue that these four factors explain why economic experts, in general, are more likely to gain autonomy and entrench it over time, whereas health experts remain more vulnerable. These factors also explain the variation in technocratic autonomy over time within the same policy area.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.subject Technocrats
dc.subject Democracy
dc.subject Latin America
dc.subject Economy
dc.subject Health
dc.subject Public policy
dc.title Technocracy under democracy : assessing the political autonomy of experts in Latin America
dc.title.alternative Assessing the political autonomy of experts in Latin America
dc.date.updated 2012-07-13T15:30:19Z
dc.identifier.slug 2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5000
dc.contributor.committeeMember Madrid, Raul
dc.contributor.committeeMember Brinks, Daniel
dc.contributor.committeeMember Hunter, Wendy
dc.contributor.committeeMember Roberts, Bryan
dc.description.department Government
dc.type.genre thesis
dc.type.material text
thesis.degree.department Government
thesis.degree.discipline Government
thesis.degree.grantor University of Texas at Austin
thesis.degree.level Doctoral
thesis.degree.name Doctor of Philosophy

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