Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks

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Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks

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dc.creator Shepard, Daniel
dc.creator Humphreys, Todd
dc.date.accessioned 2012-08-22T17:11:56Z
dc.date.available 2012-08-22T17:11:56Z
dc.date.created 2011-10
dc.date.issued 2012-08-22
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2152/17605
dc.description Preprint of the 2011 ION GNSS Conference Portland, OR, September 19-23, 2011
dc.description.abstract Test procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture, and (2) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in smart power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.
dc.publisher The Institute of Navigation
dc.subject GPS Spoofing
dc.title Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks
dc.type Article
dc.description.department Aerospace Engineering

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