Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks

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Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks

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dc.creator Shepard, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned 2012-08-22T17:03:09Z
dc.date.available 2012-08-22T17:03:09Z
dc.date.created 2011-05
dc.date.issued 2012-08-22
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2152/17603
dc.description THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Undergraduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN AEROSPACE ENGINEERING
dc.description.abstract Test procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution, and (2) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in “smart” power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.
dc.subject GPS Spoofing
dc.title Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks
dc.type Thesis
dc.description.department Aerospace Engineering

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