

Copyright

by

Jiexia Zhai

2007

**The Dissertation Committee for Jiexia Zhai Certifies that this is the approved
version of the following dissertation:**

RELIGION, GENDER, AND FAMILY RELATIONS IN TAIWAN

Committee:

Christopher G. Ellison, Supervisor

Norval D. Glenn

Mark Regnerus

Wei-hsin Yu

Fenggang Yang

RELIGION, GENDER, AND FAMILY RELATIONS IN TAIWAN

by

JIEXIA ZHAI, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2007

Dedication

To my loving parents Zhonggui Zhai and Yuping Dong

Acknowledgements

First, I would like to give my deepest gratitude to my adviser and committee chair Christopher G. Ellison, for his guidance, encouragement, and support during all phases of my graduate study. I came in graduate school with very little knowledge of sociology of religion and with English as a second language. Throughout my six years at the University of Texas at Austin, Chris has inspired my Master's and doctoral research, given me tremendous encouragement, generously funded me for travel to conferences, and taught me how to write academic work in English. I could not have succeeded with my doctoral study without the continuous encouragement and support from Chris.

I am also indebted to Dr. Mark Regnerus, a committee member on both my Master thesis and my dissertation. Mark has shown great patience and grace in guiding my graduate study. He has generously taught me various statistics skills and helped correct my raw English. More importantly, when I was struggling with how to balance my faith and my intellectual understanding of religion, Mark has been an excellent example of a scholar who seriously seeks to excel in professionalism but at the same embrace and be devoted to one's faith.

I want to give many thanks to Dr. Fenggang Yang from Purdue University for his insights, encouragement, and friendship. He not only encouraged me to extend my study

of religion into Chinese societies (which is so close to my heart), but also introduced me to many fascinating scholars and resources in China and East Asia. The conferences and field trips to various religious places in China organized by Fenggang truly opened my eyes and understanding to this field.

I also want to thank my committee members Dr. Norval Glenn and Dr. Wei-hsin Yu for their insights, time, and helpful comments for my articles and dissertation.

I cannot give enough thanks to Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu from Taiwan Academia Sinica. He so generously offers his comments on my dissertation, introduced me to abundant research resources in Taiwan, and gave me much care during my visit in Taiwan. I deeply admire his great bravery in pursuing and speaking truth, and his great sense of justice. Moreover, as a highly respected senior scholar, he is also so personable and humble. Dr. Chiu and his wife Ms Shu-hua Chen offered their time, helped arrange various field trips in Taiwan, and opened their house for me to stay.

I would also like to thank the scholars I have met in Taiwan for their generous help. I am very touched by Dr. Hsin-chih Chen for taking me to see temples on such a raining day, and was very encouraged by our intellectually stimulating conversation. I greatly appreciate Dr. Ben-xuan Lin and Shi-ming Huang for their insights and their spirit of service driving me on long field trips. I appreciate Dr. Hsing-kuang Chao for his insights, sharing of resources, friendship, and encouragement in faith. I also want to thank all the staff in Taiwan Academia Sinica, Su-chuan Lee, Qiao-Jie, Chun-lan, and all the people I have interviewed in Taiwan.

I would also like to thank my colleges from UT, Chuck Stokes, Mike Roemer, Jeremy Uecker, Amy Burdette, Guanhua Fan, Wei Zhang, and many others. Thank you

for bringing me friendship and support. Thank you for standing side by side with me along the dissertation process. I am surrounded by a cloud of witnesses.

I also want to thank all my friends at church, Mao Hui, Lian Xiang, Fang-ian, Ray and Clara, Zhang Qing and Wang Jie, Jiang Wei, Yu Run, Maikel Joseph, Lisa and Kurtis Wagner, Sandy Williams, Chunna, and many others. Thank you for your prayers, friendship, and love.

I want to give my deep appreciation to Bob Woodberry for his generous help and support. He freely offers his time in helping me correct grammar, teaching me English, listening to my frustrations from writing, while giving abundant comfort, joy, and blessings.

Last, I would like to give my thanks to my parents and my grandparents. During my entire Ph.D studies in the States, I have been so far away from home, from China. But Mom and Dad never complained. They give me freedom in pursuing my own dreams, with their unconditional understanding, support, and love. I want to dedicate this work to them.

RELIGION, GENDER, AND FAMILY RELATIONS IN TAIWAN

Publication No. _____

Jiexia Zhai, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2007

Supervisor: Christopher G. Ellison

Abstract: Numerous studies show that religion has a strong association with gender role attitudes and family ideology in the U.S. Some religious traditions have fostered changes toward modern gender ideologies and others resisted. However, most studies are limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether these patterns apply to societies where other religious traditions have been dominant or where gender issues are different – for example in a Confucian society like Taiwan. The goal of this study is to understand the role of religion in gender and family relations in Chinese societies – particularly marital gender roles, educational aspirations, and abortion attitudes and decisions.

I utilize two large scale nationally representative surveys: the *Taiwan Social Change Survey* and the *Knowledge of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception Survey*. My research shows that religion is significantly associated with gender roles and family relations in Taiwan. After controlling socio-demographic factors, conservative religious groups such as Taiwan Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are more likely

to support traditional gender role ideologies. They view women's fulltime work outside of the home as a negative influence on children and family life and are more likely to support a traditional men-as-breadwinner women-as-home-maker division of labor, compared with Chinese traditional religionists and secular people. Catholics tend to hold more liberal views that encourage men's participation in housework and both spouses' contribution to family finance.

On abortion attitudes, both devout Christians and Yi-Guan-Dao members tend to strongly oppose abortion compared with Chinese traditional religionists and secular groups; however, there is no significant association between religion and either timing of abortion or patterns of abortion. Nominal Christians actually reported slightly higher number of abortions than other groups.

Finally, there is no significant gender gap between the educational aspirations for boy and girl of different religious groups; the difference is in overall educational aspirations. Taiwanese Protestants show the highest aspirations and Yi-Guan-Dao members the lowest. Catholics and Chinese religionists are in the middle and do not have significant differences in their educational attitudes. Qualitative interviews with knowledgeable Taiwanese informants strengthens these arguments and helps explain mechanisms for the religion-family associations.

Table of Contents

List of Tables	xiii
List of Figures	xv
CHAPTER	
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Topic	1
1.2 Research Background	4
1.2.1 Influence of Social Change in Taiwan.....	4
1.2.2 Traditional Religions in Taiwan.....	6
1.2.3 Christianity and Social Change in Taiwan.....	10
1.2.4 Research Question.....	12
1.3 Methodology.....	12
1.3.1 Taiwan Social Change Survey and KAP	12
1.3.2 Interviews in Taipei, Taiwan.....	14
Chapter 2 Religion and Gender Role Attitudes in Taiwan	16
2.1 Abstract.....	16
2.2 Introduction.....	17
2.3 Background.....	19
2.3.1 Traditional Ideology and Religion in Taiwan	19
2.3.2 Christianity and Gender Relations in Taiwan	21
2.4 Data.....	23
2.5 Measures	25
2.6 Results.....	27
2.7 Summary and Discussion.....	30
2.8 Conclusion	36
Chapter 3 Religion and Educational Aspiration in Taiwan	41
3.1 Abstract.....	41
3.2 Introduction.....	42

3.3 Background.....	43
3.3.1 Religion and Education in the U.S.....	43
3.3.2 Religion and Education in Taiwan Society.....	45
3.3.3 Reasons to Study Educational Aspiration.....	51
3.4 Data.....	57
3.5 Measures	58
3.6 Results.....	61
3.7 Summary and Discussion.....	65
3.8 Conclusion	70
Chapter 4 Religion and Abortion in Taiwan.....	77
4.1 Abstract.....	77
4.2 Introduction.....	78
4.3 Background.....	80
4.3.1 Religion and Abortion in the U.S.....	80
4.3.2 Traditional Culture, Religion, and Abortion in Taiwan.....	83
4.4 Data.....	88
4.5 Measures	90
4.6 Analytic Strategy	92
4.7 Results.....	94
4.8 Summary and Discussion.....	96
4.8.1 Limitation of Quantitative Study.....	96
4.8.2 Field Interviews and Discussion.....	97
4.9 Conclusion	102
Chapter 5 Discussion and Future Directions	113
5.1 Summary of Study	113
5.2 Speculation about the Religion, Gender, and Family Association	115
5.3 Methodological Contribution.....	118
5.4 Future Research Plan	118

Appendix A	Basic Interviewee Information	125
Appendix B	Comparison of Means and Standard Deviations of Gender Role Attitudes by Religion (TSCS 2002).....	126
Appendix C	Crosstabulation of Religion and Ethnicity in TSCS 2000.....	127
References.....		128
Vita		136

List of Tables

Table 2.1:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Women Work Fulltime by Religion and Other Factors.....	38
Table 2.2:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Household Division of Labor by Religion and Other Factors	39
Table 2.3:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Men's Participation in Housework by Religion and Other Factors ..	40
Table 3.1:	Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 1990	73
Table 3.2:	Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 2000	74
Table 3.3:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion and Other Factors in 1990	75
Table 3.4:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion and Other Factors in 2000	76
Table 4.1:	Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation of Abortion Attitudes Religion Groups	106
Table 4.2:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Abortion for Spacing Children.....	107
Table 4.3:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Abortion for not Wanting more Children	108
Table 4.4:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Abortion due to Failed Birth Control.....	109

Table 4.5:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Abortion due to Financial Constraint.....	110
Table 4.6:	Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes Toward Abortion of Unmarried Women Pregnant with Boyfriend	111
Table 4.7:	Poisson Regression Model Predicting Numbers of Abortion by Religion and Other Factors	112

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Comparison of Means of Educational Attainment by Religion in 1990	53
Figure 3.2: Comparison of Means of Educational Attainment by Religion in 2000	54
Figure 3.3: Percent Comparison of Higher Educational Attainment by Religion in 1990.....	55
Figure 3.4: Percent Comparison of Higher Educational Attainment by Religion in 2000.....	56
Figure 3.5: Percent Comparison of Aspiration for Higher Education by Religion in 1990	71
Figure 3.6: Percent Comparison of Aspiration for Higher Education by Religion in 2000.....	72
Figure 4.1: Frequency of Reported Numbers of Abortion.....	93

CHAPTER

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 TOPIC

The central goal of this study is to examine the impact of religion on gender equality in a non-Western society like Taiwan. Studies in the United States show that religion influences both attitudes toward and attainment of gender equality. Historically, some religious traditions have fostered changes toward modern gender ideologies and others resisted. Religion has helped produce and legitimize gender ideologies in the U.S. These studies suggest that fundamental religious traditions are more likely to embrace patriarchic family norms, which in turn reinforce gender inequality in family and society. However, most studies are limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether these patterns apply to societies where other religious traditions have been dominant or where gender or family ideologies are different – for example in a Confucian society like Taiwan.

Taiwan is an ideal case for testing the association between religion and gender or family issues for the following reasons. First, Taiwan is a society of considerable religious diversity. As Taiwan has experienced dramatic economic growth and transitioned from an agricultural society to an economically advanced society during the past half century, it has also experienced religious vitality (Tamney and Chiang 2002). The majority of the population is religious: approximately 75 to 80 percent of the population report practicing various Chinese traditional religions (i.e., Buddhists, Taoists, and many folk religions), about five percent are Christian (Protestant and Catholic), about four percent practice new

religious movements, and only about ten percent report do not affiliate with any religion (Chiu 1997). Even among unaffiliated Taiwanese, many report attending various religious rituals, worshiping ancestors, or visiting fortune-tellers for important life events (Chiu 2006, Vermander S.J. 1997). Although Christianity is a minority religion in Taiwan, Christian Churches have played an important role in influencing Taiwan's modern history. Churches were the main institutions to bring in international relief and aid, they helped build schools and hospitals, and advocated many civil and social welfare services in Taiwan; most important, they are considered a major agent in introducing western civilization to this society (Lin 1998, Guo 1999a).

Second, scholars argue that although the dramatic modernization process has brought challenges to Taiwanese family life, the patriarchal nature of family relations remains influential, and the traditional family cultures stay strong (e.g., Gallin 1982, Greenhalgh 1985, Xu and Lai 2002). Although women's participation in the labor force and enrollment in mandatory education have greatly increased, there is still significant inequality between men and women in earnings, educational attainment, and other areas of family life (Baraka 1999). The dominant gender role division is still the traditional men-as-breadwinner, women-as-home-maker. More than half of women will eventually leave the labor market because of marriage or childbearing (Yi and Chien 1999).

Although demographers disagree about how family and gender role ideologies have changed, they agree that there are unexamined cultural factors that are independent from economic development and have sustaining effects on family and gender relations. In a traditional Chinese society such as Taiwan, religion is never really separable from family lives (Chiu 1986). Family order and institutions are often organized through kinship

systems, which are rooted in patrilineal relations. Such systems are closely entwined with religious rituals such as ancestor worship. However, whether and how religion is associated with gender equality or family relations remain unexamined. Although such traditional family structures can provide solidarity and order, they may create gender inequality at the same time. Women can be positioned at a disadvantage position in the relational hierarchy.

Third, during the past two decades, Taiwan has been the site of high quality survey data collection, including measures of religion and gender issues that are analogous to those in major U.S. surveys, but adapted to Chinese culture. This allows me to examine the religion-gender-family connection in a non-Western context. Unfortunately, there are almost no quantitative studies examining religious effects on family life in Chinese societies. There are established anthropological pieces, but most of them focus on single cases, or individual villages to examine the relationships between family systems and ancestor worship rituals within Chinese religious traditions. Even after good nationally representative data were collected, few scholars even addressed the association between religion and family and gender issues using those data. So far the only two studies I have found using survey data are the W. Grichting Value System in Taiwan in 1970 directly examining the association between religion and family and dating behaviors in Taiwan¹; and the other one is conducted by Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and colleagues, exploring the association between religion and family ideology in Taiwan (Chiu 1986). However, this research is limited in focus, out of date, and use less advanced sampling technique to select a large scale nationally representative sample.

¹ For more information about this survey, please visit: www.icpsr.umich.edu

Thus, this study is the first empirical study examining the association between religion and gender and family issues in China or Taiwan using a nationally representative sample. It has policy relevance and will fill the gaps in both the western literature on religion and gender by providing comparisons with the situation in the non-western world, and in the Chinese literature by providing a broader statistical context for interpreting qualitative case studies. It can also provide a foundation for future large scale studies in mainland China.

1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

1.2.1 INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN

Taiwan has transitioned from an agricultural society into a highly industrialized society, yet demographers disagree about how the changing social context affects family life in Taiwan. For example, Thornton and Lin (1994) argue that dramatic economic and educational expansion, increasing women's participation in the labor force, and large scale urbanization and migration will change traditional family culture by reducing the authority of parents over children, causing diverging interests among family members, and bring divergence of interests into the family. Thus, the authority of the traditional family over individuals will diminish. Further, the influx of western media will "erode" traditional family life in Taiwan.

On the other hand, other scholars have forcefully critiqued these statements (e.g. Greenhalgh 1986, Xu and Lai 2002, Pas 2003). They point out that although Taiwan has gone through tremendous economic change, the fundamental patriarchic family culture stay strong. These scholars recognize that family life remains at the core of Chinese families, such as the belief and practice of marrying, universality of parenthood, large family kinship networks, caring for the elderly, and honoring one's ancestors, etc.

Marriage and child bearing are highly emphasized, as they are not only related to the love between two people, but also link with the fulfillment of one's filial piety to his family and their ancestors to continue the family lineage. For example, in the 1998 KAP survey, more than 70% of respondents believed it is important or very important to bear children to inherit family lines. However, some scholars do recognize the modest changing patterns within this overall stability, especially as people start to delay marriage (although most of them do marry), and reduce their fertility (Yi 2002).

However, many of these early works tend to be very descriptive (e.g. Thorton and Lin 1994) and do not demonstrate whether such trends are statistically significant. More important, although demographers disagree over how social transition changes family life, they do recognize the importance of cultural factors on family and gender relations. Religion might be one of the major cultural factors influencing family life and gender relations in traditional Chinese societies. As C.K. Yang stated, "the influence of religion on traditional Chinese family life was everywhere visible." (P28, Yang 1967) Numerous other religious activities take place at one's home instead of in public. From ancestor worship to family shrine rituals, religious practices not only function for supernatural meaning, for acquiring blessing and protection from the deities or the dead, they also help maintain family stability and harmony (Chiu 1986). Being filial to one's ancestors is to assure the continuity of family life, and connect a mortal life with an immortal continuously passing family life via ancestor worship. That is why the family system is so important, because it is the core carrier of your immortal existence. It creates the possibility to exist through eternity. And in reality, most family rituals and gatherings are

centered around ancestor worship activities in Taiwan (Chiu 2006). Thus, it also links the dead with the living through family lines.

1.2.2 Traditional Religions in Taiwan

In order to understand the influence of religion in Chinese societies, we need to understand some of the unique characters of Chinese religions. First, numerous studies depict the religious beliefs and practices in Chinese societies are polytheistic. People pray to various gods, spirits, or deities at the same time. Not only are deities not exclusive, they often function in different complementary roles. For example, some deities are believed to help people pass exams and receive academic achievements (文曲星), some specialize in granting health (藥神), some are good at helping people find a good mate (月老), some in granting fertility and sons (e.g. 文生娘娘), and others protect local communities (e.g., 土地公), or just give general blessings (e.g., 關公, 媽祖). As people often worship various deities with similar functions, the “efficacy” of deities is emphasized (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). If one deity is not efficient in granting prayers, worshippers may abandon them and switch to other gods. Both lay worshippers and most folk temples do not discriminate between deities; temples offer various rituals and services so that they can accommodate the needs of worshippers. For example, in many Taiwanese Buddhist temples, Taoist and folk deities are often present and Shou-Jing (收驚), An-Tai-Sui (安太歲), or fortune-telling (算命) are also available on site. Such polytheistic beliefs and practices are consistently reflected in national surveys, such as in the 1970 Grichting religion survey (Grichting 1971) and Chiu’s 20 years of Taiwan

Social Change Survey research (Chiu 2006).

Second, religions in Chinese societies tend to be diffused rather than institutional. In contrast with religions in the West, where an organized religious system or community is emphasized, religions in Chinese societies do not require regular attendance at a fixed religious institution, or building up a regular network among fellow worshippers or with the priesthood (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). People often go to temples to pray only in times of need or on holidays. When visiting temples, worshippers do not need to register to become a member, or talk to fellow worshippers; they offer incense, casting lots (掬杯), or light sacrificial oil on their own. In small or rural temples, there is often no priest, the only contact between the priest and the worshippers is generally when worshippers offer payment after a priest to perform a special ritual for them (Tamney and Lai 2002). Thus, traditional Chinese traditional religions do not foster close relational networks between believers and religious leaders.

Third, Chinese traditional religions tend to have strong pragmatic and utilitarian tendencies (Yang 1967, Chiu 1990). The key function of beliefs and practices tends to be this-world oriented, focusing on winning favor and protection for this world matters (Tamney and Chiang 2002). The salvation of souls is not a central theme for most people; life-after-death issues tend to be vague. For example, in Grichting's 1970s Taiwan religion survey, respondents were asked: "What do you feel will probably happen to you after you die? Do you feel you will (a) go to heaven, (b) go to hell, (c) be reborn, or (d) stop existing?" More than 65% of folk or traditional religionists chose the answer "stop existing" (Grichting 1971). Because most people speculate they will stop existing after they die, the role of religion assuring and protecting the wellbeing of this-world matters

will become more important. The rise of materialism and commercialism in Taiwan may further give pragmatic folk religions a boost (Chiu 1990).

Fourth, Chinese traditional religions do not tend to carry ethical connotations (Yang 1967). The rising popularity of You-Ying-Gong temples (有應公) illustrates this. You-Ying-Gong (YYG) literally means whatever-you-pray-will-be-granted. The deities of YYG are lonely or wondering spirits who died from war or disease and have no offspring to worship them or cannot be recognized by people, but they are believed to have special efficacy (Chiu 2006). As long as you give them offerings, they will use their power to help you. It has become one of the most popular deities for gamblers or robbers, as those spirits do not care whether your prayers are morally wrong or not (Chiu 2006).

However, regarding the ethical issues of Chinese religion, there is one exception—Yi Guan Dao. Yi Guan Dao can be roughly translated as “the Way of One Path”, or “the Way of One Unity”. Yi-Guan-Dao (YGD) – sometimes written as I-Kuan-Tao – originally developed in China in late 19th century, and was brought to Taiwan in 1946 when many Mainland Chinese fled to Taiwan with the KMT party (Lin 1994). YGD worships a high God called Ming-Ming Shang-Di (明明上帝) and a Mother Goddess named Wu-Sheng Lao-Mu (無生老母). Their doctrine combines Chinese traditional folk beliefs with teachings from various major world religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam (Lin 1994).

Compared with other Chinese traditional religions, YGD has several distinctive characters. First, it has apocalyptic beliefs about the “end times and the three stages

before that” (三期末劫)². Second, YGD emphasizes that the salvation of the soul is not based on the accumulation of merit, but on becoming an YGD member and a disciple of their divinely ordained masters (Lin 1994, Qin and Ai 2000). Third, YGD emphasizes strict vegetarian practices. It is estimated that about half of Taiwan’s vegetarian restaurants are run by Yi-Guan-Dao members (Taiwan yearbook 2004).

Fourth, YGD strongly emphasizes studying Confucianism and Taoism classics (Lin 1994). They provide many Chinese study classes (國學班), organize youth campus, and have attracted many young and educated members to their classes and temples.³ Not only do they emphasize studying and reciting classics, they also emphasize Orthodox Confucianism morality such as filial piety, honesty, chastity, faithfulness, etc. These moral principles are often connected with members’ spiritual rewards (Lin 1994). For example, if a member converts more than 64 people to YGD, this person will assure his or her parents and ancestors will be saved eternally (Song 1983a). This religion-morality connection may influence YGD members’ family ideology.

Fifth, YGD has a very different organizational structure than other Chinese traditional religions. Members worship at a temple, but also have intensive gatherings at member’s homes (Lin 1994). Historically, they often gather at night (Lin 1994, Song 1983a), and are often considered secretive (Lin 1994, Song 1983a, Qin and Ai 2000).

Their highly organized religious system, intense proselytism, secrecy, and end times messages may have increased the KMT government’s suspicion of them. Thus YGD was

² <http://www.fecd.org.tw/index2.htm>

banned as an “evil cult” until 1987 (Chiu 2006, Lin 1994). It is also banned in Mainland China, and is heatedly criticized by orthodox Chinese Buddhists (Chiu 2006). However, decades of restriction and regulation have not limited its growth; it has become one of the largest religious groups in Taiwan, and one of the fastest growing (Lin 1994).

1.2.3 Christianity and Social Change in Taiwan

In the west, Christianity is often the dominant religious culture. In Taiwan Christianity is a minority religion. Although Christianity has rapidly grown since the 1950s-especially the evangelical denominations-Christians still make up less than five percent of Taiwanese population. Christian churches have played a unique and influential role in influencing Taiwan modern society, especially politically and socially.

Christian missionaries initiated and promoted modern education and medical work in Taiwan (Lin 1996; Lin 2003). Christian churches also become the major sources of foreign relief and aid to Taiwan (Lin 1998). Churches devoted vast resources to social welfare work and health care. They also influenced Taiwan’s political democratization process. The Taiwan Presbyterian Church has been a major force fighting against the political corruption of the KMT party, fighting against injustice toward aboriginal mountain people, and promoted Taiwan’s independence and selfhood internationally (Rubinstein 2003, Tamney and Chiang 2002, Hunter and Chan 1993). Christian churches have also been a major cultural agent bringing in western civilization in Taiwan (Guo 1999a).

Taiwanese Christians also have distinct demographic characters. They are much more highly educated than the average population (Tamney and Chiang 2002, Chao

2004). About 6% of Taiwanese are enrolled in higher education, but about 40% of Taiwanese Christians are (Grichting 1971). Christians are also disproportionately government workers, white-collar professionals, military officers, and college students. Their minority status but high accumulation of social capital have put them in a position like the Jews in the U.S.

Furthermore, unlike the world orientation of most Chinese traditional religions, Protestants especially conservative evangelical ones in Taiwan emphasize confession, salvation, and eternal life (Chao 2004). Taiwanese Protestants often strongly oppose ancestor worship practices. These teachings and traditions have made Protestants in Taiwan show distinct characters regarding family life in Taiwan.

Similar to Protestantism, Catholicism has also been an important cultural agent for spreading western civilization in Taiwan (Guo 1999a). However, different from the theoretically generally conservative Protestantism, Catholics in Taiwan tend to be very theologically liberal (Guo 1999b, Chao 2004). According to Guo Wenban (1999b), among the “Western” religions, Catholicism has the highest contextualization with Chinese societies. Catholics have greater tolerance for ancestor worship, and since the 1970s, Catholics have had several movements promoting Chinese culture into Catholic religious practices, for example designing church buildings in Chinese style, clergy wearing ancient Chinese-style clothing, and drawing on Chinese philosophical concepts in theological teachings. By doing so, catholic churches emphasize the connection between “Catholic beliefs” with “Chinese traditional culture.” However, because of most of those movements were top-down rather than grass-root movements, most laity do not

have similar attitudes. Catholicism is still related to “foreignness.”

1.2.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The central question of this dissertation is whether and how religion influence gender and family relations in Taiwan. Are certain religions more likely to promote gender equality? How do Chinese traditional religions and Christian religions differ on these issues? Which aspects of gender and family relations are more or less likely to be affected by religious backgrounds and beliefs?

In order to explore those questions, I focus on three gender issues. Chapter 2 focuses on religious variations in gender role ideologies within marriage. Chapter 3 explores the association between religion and educational aspiration for children. And Chapter 4 examines how religion affects women’s attitudes toward fertility issues especially abortion. Although these are independent chapters, together they explore whether and how religion affects gender relations in a Chinese society.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

1.3.1 Taiwan Social Change Survey and KAP

My primary data come from two national representative Taiwanese data sets: *The Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS)* and *The Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice of Contraception among Married Women in Taiwan (KAP)*. Both of these are replicated cross-sectional surveys.

The TSCS tries to depict the long-term impact of social change on society. Since 1985, it has been conducted almost annually, and each year is a nation-wide probability

sample of about 1,900 adults between 20 to 75 years old. With more than 80,000 interviews completed over the past 22 years, the TSCS has become the largest survey series among all of the general social surveys in the world (Chiu 2006 presentation). The TSCS is based at the Academia Sinica, R.O.C., jointly operated by the Institute of Sociology and the Center for Survey Research of Taiwan. Analogous to the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics such as family, education, religion, occupation, political participation, etc. In the religion modules, it asks about denominations and frequency of service attendance, as well as unique measures about multiple aspects of the Chinese religious contexts, such as folk religion practices, beliefs about afterlife and spirits, ancestor worship, etc. It contains series of measures about respondent's attitude on household division of labor, decision making within marriage, and definition of womanhood. It allows me to assess religious effects on gender roles and family issues at multiple levels. In this study, I use the 1990, 2000, 2002, and 2002-family modules.

In order to further examine religious association with gender role attitudes and abortion, I also use data from KAP. KAP was conducted by the Taiwan Institute of Family Planning, and provided by the Bureau of Health Promotion, Department of Health, R.O.C. Analogous to the *National Survey of Family Growth* in the U.S.; KAP is a representative sample of married women aged 20-49 in Taiwan. The average sample size is 3,500 each year. It covers rich information on pregnancy history, family planning and contraception use, actual and desired number and sex of children, gender role attitudes, marriage history, women's working history and working attitudes, religious beliefs and practices, family background, etc. KAP provide incredible measures on history of and

motivations for abortion and attitudes toward son preference. It is the most comprehensive data sources on fertility and marriage in Taiwan. It enables me to examine the impact of religious tradition plus other measures of religious practices in Taiwan, such as ancestor worship, Feng-Shui, etc. With the help of Professor Wei-hsin Yu from University of Texas at Austin, I have obtained the KAP 1998 data from the Taiwan Institute of Family Planning. It enables me to test the impact of religious traditions on abortion and gender issues in Taiwan.

1.3.2 Field Interviews in Taipei, Taiwan

Although the data are very rich, they have some limitations. For example, the detailed religious modules are separate from the family or education modules. Thus, in my analysis I can only use very basic religion questions such as affiliation, level of devotedness etc. KAP and TSCS cannot provide information on how and why respondents have certain attitudes. In addition, in many of my models the N of Christians and new religion movements are very small. Thus, in order to further examine my quantitative results and better understand religious variations on gender issues, I also gathered first-hand qualitative data. In the summer of 2007, with the help of *Fichter Research Grant* from the Association for the Sociology of Religion and the *Jack Shand Research Grant* from the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, I went to Taiwan and conducted in-depth interviews, and visited various religious groups. I have interviewed both religious authorities (e.g., Christian pastors, priests, Buddhist master or Abbots) and lay members from various background.

I interviewed 22 people in Taipei district (including Taipei city and Taipei county), Taiwan. Among them were four Buddhists --two masters and two lay members, three folk religion practitioners, one YGD teacher/elder, seven Catholic—one priest, one nun, five lay members, seven Protestants—two pastors (one PCT, one Fundamental), and five lay members . Among those seven Protestants were two from the Presbyterian church (mainline), one from a very large charismatic church, three from small fundamental evangelical church, one from the True-Jesus-Church (aboriginal group, a fast growing very conservative and Pentecostal church). For more information, please see Appendix A.

CHAPTER 2: RELIGION AND GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES IN TAIWAN

2.1 ABSTRACT

Utilizing a large scale nationally representative survey (KAP) and in-depth interviews, this study examines the association between religion and gender role attitudes in Taiwan. My findings show that members of conservative religious groups such as Taiwan Protestants and the new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao are more likely to view women's work as having a negative impact on family life and more likely to support traditional men-as-breadwinner, women-as-home-maker gender roles. On the other hand, Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal views of gender roles, especially regarding men's participation in the house and financial contribution from both genders. I also discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.

2.2 INTRODUCTION

During the past three decades, Taiwan has transformed from an agricultural society to one of the most developed societies in East Asia. Modernization has dramatically increased women's participation in the labor force and enrollment in mandatory education. However, scholars also noted that the patriarchic nature of gender relations stay strong (Gallin 1982, Yu 2001, Xu and Lai 2002). The dominant household division of labor is still traditional, with the form of men-as-breadwinner and women-as-homemaker. More than half of women who have work experience before marriage will leave the labor force because of childbirth or family obligations (Yi and Chien 1999). The increased acceptance and participation in work outside of the home does not bring a more egalitarian gender role ideology (Yu 2001). Demographers and family scholars have paid substantial attention to this issue, and they suggest there may be cultural factors that help sustain these traditional gender role ideologies (Yi 2002). Yet they have not studied what these cultural factors are. Chinese traditional culture and religion are so intimately connected. How much does religion influence gender role attitudes? Are certain religious traditions more likely to encourage traditional patriarchic relations, while others promote more egalitarian views?

Studies in the United States show that religion influences both attitudes toward and attainment of gender equality. Religion has been an important force in producing and legitimizing family ideology in the U.S. (e.g., Wilcox 2004). These studies suggest that fundamental religious traditions are more likely to embrace patriarchic family norms, which in turn reinforces gender inequality in family and society. However, most studies

are limited to Judeo-Christian contexts. It is not clear whether these patterns can apply to societies where other religious traditions have been dominant or where gender or family ideologies are different – for example in a Confucian Asian society like Taiwan.

Taiwan is an ideal case for examining the association between religion and gender relations in a changing society. Taiwan has gone through tremendous modernization and urbanization during the past half century, and the religious market is also thriving. Although ritual-oriented Chinese traditional religions rarely produce moral ethics from their doctrines, they have reinforced traditional Chinese Confucianism orthodoxy (Yang 1967, Chiu 2006). Not only so, Taiwanese Protestant and Catholic churches have also played an important role in modern Taiwan history, and showed distinct characteristics in the area of family, sexuality, political participation, and ethnic relations (Chiu 1986; Huang 1996; Rubinstein 1991). Understanding whether different religions affect gender role ideologies and why will help scholars understand the association between religion and gender and family life more broadly.

Thus, it raises a number of interesting and unexamined questions. For example: How do Chinese religious groups vary in their support or resistance to Chinese traditional gender ideologies? Are Christians in Taiwan more likely to endorse patriarchal beliefs like Conservative Protestants in the U.S. are, or are they more likely to endorse egalitarian roles associated with “Western civilization” and “progress”? What aspects of gender role ideology are more likely to be stressed by certain groups? In this study, I will use nationally representative surveys together with field interviews to explore these questions.

2.3 BACKGROUND

2.3.1 TRADITIONAL IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION IN TAIWAN

Chinese societies have emphasized the traditional “men as breadwinner women as homemaker” gender ideologies throughout history (男主外- 女主内). This ideology implies several aspects: first, men’s primary responsibility is to earn money and women’s job is to take care of the family; traditionally, a woman is expected to devote her life to her family, and married women are discouraged from working outside of the home except for working in family businesses. Second, the household division of labor tends to be gender-oriented. There are men’s jobs and women’s jobs within the household. The stereotype of a Confucian gentleman is a “respectful,” strict, but distant man. Men are typically not to be expected to participate much in housework chores such as cooking, doing laundry, cleaning, spend time playing or rearing children. Those tasks are considered as “women’s work.” Thus, a traditional-minded man may feel ashamed to do these chores. The more traditional the household is, the more likely they will have this gendered division of labor. Third, as the traditional family system is organized through patriarchic kinship systems, fathers, elder brothers, and husbands tend to have higher authority in the family hierarchy than women do.

In the traditional Chinese societies religion is not separable from family lives (Chiu, 1986, Yang 1967). For example, patriarchic family systems are closely entwined with the rituals and ceremonies of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship is not only a ritual, but also tightly related to filial piety. It is also related to the idea of honoring one’s family, respecting seniority, and continuing the family lineage (Yang 1967). Chinese traditional

religionists tend to have pressure to have children, especially more sons. Marriage and fertility are important in fulfilling family's needs for religion and continuity of tradition.

Moreover, Confucianism orthodoxy is often emphasized by Chinese traditional religions (Chiu 1989). Many Chinese traditional religions focus on performing rituals, and either folk religions do not have formal doctrines or the doctrines do not have ethical connotations (Yang 1967). Because of this, they tend to rely heavily on Confucianism as their ethical orthodoxy. In such contexts, Confucian ideas of submission and filial piety are often emphasized (Wang 1997). Thus, Chinese religions can legitimize and reinforce the traditional Confucianism through the moral frame of family solidarity.

The emphasis on Confucian orthodoxy is even stronger in some new religious movement groups such as Yi-Guan-Dao (YGD). Although YGD was only legalized in Taiwan about twenty years ago and is still a quasi-secretive religion, it has one of the fastest growth rates of any religious group in Taiwan (Lin 1994). It emphasizes traditional family morals such as chastity of women, filial piety to parents, loyalty and faithfulness to one's family, etc., to fight against the "decaying of modern secular culture." Most importantly, they emphasize patriarchal relations in both their religious orders and family life (<http://www.fecd.org.tw/index2.htm>).

For example, one of the 18 highest YGD masters, Ms Hong-ling Chen of the Chong-De lineage, a highly respected, 92-year-old, YGD leader, addressed gender role issues at the World Conference of Women Religious and Spiritual Leaders (<http://www.fecd.org.tw/index2.htm>). Regarding the family relationship, Ms Chen said:

According to our tradition, men are in charge of the public sphere while women, private. They have separate responsibilities and they respect each accordingly.... Men have always been leaders while women, followers.

Since our tradition is in keeping with our natural tendencies, we should follow the good tradition passed down from ancient times....This is the power of morality....On the contrary, it violates female virtue for a woman to quarrel with her husband constantly....

It seems that YGD leaders not only emphasize traditional Confucian gender roles, but also advocate them in order to promote family morality. Even when addressing women's roles in religious organizations, Ms Chen still emphasizes the priority of a woman's family over temple services, as she said:

If you are a female leader (in temple), you should show a little moderation, especially when dealing with male colleagues...Do not be authoritative and do not adhere to your own stance on matters...In Yi-Guan-Dao, a female can be a leader, a Transmitting Master or a Lecturer. However, a married female should focus on promoting family harmony. Since I am unwed and have contributed all my energy into Dao, it will not interfere with my family.

Because of this, I expect that YGD members will display more traditional gender roles than other religionists.

2.3.2 Christianity and Gender Relations in Taiwan

Studies conducted in the U.S. suggest that fundamentalist religious traditions, particularly Conservative Protestantism, produce and legitimize conservative gender ideologies. For example, Conservative Protestants are more likely to emphasize men's headship in the household, to defend traditional family roles, and to resist "modern" egalitarian family ideologies than other religious groups (Bendroth 1993, Ellison and Bartkowski 2002, Glass and Jacobs 2005, Lehrer 1999, Sherkat 2000). They tend to encourage women to marry earlier, have more children, and be homemakers, and they are more likely to discourage women from working outside the home – especially when

children are young(Glass and Jacobs 2005). Such gender roles are often sacralized because the relations between men and women represents the relationship between Jesus and the church (Focus on the Family website).

Compared to conservative Protestants, U.S. Catholics and mainline Protestants typically hold more liberal family ideologies. Catholics often have ambiguous family ideologies and thus are less alarmed by the surrounding secular culture “eroding” family morality (Wilcox 2004; Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz 2004). Instead of setting boundaries around traditional family life, mainline Protestants and Catholics focus more on the “golden rules,” social justice and the impact of socio-economic factors on the family instead of conservative theology about gender and sexuality (Wilcox 2004; Wilcox, Chaves, and Franz 2004).

Christians in Taiwan have distinct attitudes toward family relations, sexuality, parenting, and even politics (Chiu 2006). I have two competing hypotheses about the association between Christianity and gender roles in Taiwan. One the one hand, the majority of Taiwanese Protestants have conservative evangelical theology (Chao 2004), thus similar to U.S. conservative Protestants I expect Taiwan Protestants to have more conservative gender role ideologies than other groups.

On the other hand, Christian churches are viewed as one of the major agents bringing western civilizations to Taiwan (Guo 1999a). This is especially true of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church (TPC). They have been one of the most active advocates of political reform, democracy, anti-corruption, and human rights for indigenous groups and women compared with other religious groups (Lin 1994). Catholics may also be more socially liberal than Protestants in Taiwan. For example, where as Protestants actively oppose

participation on folk religious rituals and ancestor worship, and at most are highly selective in which aspects of Confucianism they appropriate (Jiang 1996; 2004, <http://www.forerunner.cc>); the Catholic Church in Taiwan has emphasized localization of Christianity into Chinese culture for decades (Guo 1999b). For example, they hold national ancestor benediction ceremonies to ease tension between Christianity and Chinese folk beliefs. This focus on tolerance and integration was further confirmed in my interviews with two Catholic priests in Taiwan. Father Wu mentioned that the current slogan for the Taiwan Catholic Church is “there goes everyone.” They often emphasize the similarity of Catholic faith with other religions, organize charity or community work together with people from other faiths, and focus on social justice and humanitarian issues rather than theological issues (Interview notes 2007). The majority of Taiwanese Catholic laity is very also liberal (Guo 1999b, Chao 2004). Most Taiwanese Catholics are baptized at birth and typically have a very loose connection with the Church after that. According to Dr. Guo Wenban, the leading expert on Catholicism in Taiwan, about 75% of self-proclaimed Catholics rarely attend church throughout their adult life; among those who attend about half only attend on religious holidays.

Because of these reasons, I have another competing hypothesis, that Taiwan Christians (especially mainline Protestants and Catholics) will have less traditional gender role ideologies compared with other traditional religious groups.

2.4 DATA

The primary data come from two nationally representative Taiwanese data sets: *The Taiwan Social Change Survey* (TSCS). TSCS is a replicated cross-sectional survey. TSCS was conducted by the Academia Sinica, R.O.C. almost annually from 1984. It is a

nation-wide probability sample of about 1,900 adults between 20 to 75 years old.

Analogous to the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics such as family, education, religion, occupation, political participation, etc. In the religion modules, it asks about denominations and frequency of service attendance, as well as unique measures about multiple aspects of Chinese religious contexts, such as folk religion practices, beliefs about afterlife and spirits, ancestor worship, etc. It also covers family and spousal religious backgrounds and community religious practices. It contains a series of measures about respondents' attitude about household division, decision-making within marriage, and definition of womanhood. It will allow me to assess the religious effects on gender role attitudes and ideologies on multiple levels. After listwise deletion, the final sample is 1795.

In addition to quantitative survey research, I also conducted twenty two in-depth interviews in Taipei, Taiwan with my knowledgeable informants. My twenty two interviewees come from various religious and social backgrounds. With the generous help and counsel of Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and other scholars in Taiwan, I constructed a sample of 30 people based on religion, gender, residence, ethnicity, education and social background. My final achieved sample included twenty two interviews, including both clergies and lay worshippers from all the major religious groups I studied in the quantitative research. There were four Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and two devoted lay Buddhists; three folk religion practioners, one is an accountant in a folk temple, one a Taxi driver, and one runs a computer shop; there was one new religious movement (YGD) teacher; seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay members from various social backgrounds; and there are seven Protestants from various

denominations with two pastors and five lay Protestants. My qualitative discussions are mainly based on these interviews.

2.5 MEASURES

GENDER ROLE ATTITUDES

In 2002 TSCS, there are a set of questions about gender role attitudes. Respondents are asked the level of (dis)agreement with the following statements: (1) “Mothers that have full time jobs will bring harm to pre-school children;” (2) “Generally speaking, a wife’s full time career will interfere with her family life;” (3) “It will not be a bad thing for women to have a career, but what women really want is to have family and children;” (4) “Men’s job is to earn money, and women’s job is to take care of family;” (5) “Both men and women should contribute financially to the household;” (6) “Compared with how much housework men do now, they should do more;” and (7) “Compared with the current share on child rearing, men should do more.” These questions provide a more comprehensive view to measure different dimensions of gender role attitudes. Item (1) to (3) refer to the views regarding people’s attitudes toward women work outside of home; items (4) and (5) measure attitudes toward division of household labor; and items (6) and (7) access respondent’s views on men’s participation in family life. Egalitarianism relates not only rely to the acceptance of non-traditional gender roles of women, but also revealed in the attitudes toward men’s participation in domestic life (Wilcox 2004). Items are coded so that the higher value the more likely the respondent agrees with the statement. ⁴

⁴ In exploratory analyses, I tested whether all seven items could be combined into a single scale. However, the alpha was only .48, which is too low to be used as a reliable scale. I also tested whether the variables in each table could be combined into three distinct scales. However, the variables for the first two groups did not have sufficiently high alphas (.43 and .02 respectively).

RELIGIOUS MEASURES

One of the limitations of survey research, including this study, is a lack of effective measures for Chinese religions. Although TSCS has very rich religion questions in the religion modules, in the family and cultural modules I use for this chapter it only has basic religious measures such as religious affiliation and “devoutness.” It cannot fully capture the complexity of Chinese religious phenomena. However, this is still the first empirical study examining the association between religion and family and gender issues in Taiwan. It will hopefully inspire extensive data collection in the future.

Because of the polytheistic nature of Chinese religions, scholars tend to treat various folk religions under one category “*Chinese traditional religion*”, which include Taoists, Buddhists, and various folk religion practices. Moreover, in order to empirically test whether there are actual differences on attitudes of gender among those groups, I created separate categories for Buddhists, Taoists, and folk religionists. The results show that these three groups are very similar to each other. All differences are minor and not statistically significant. Thus, in the final model, I created a combined religious category “Chinese traditional religions” including respondents from the three traditions. In addition to the Chinese traditional religion group, I included *Catholics*, *Protestants*, *YGD*, and *non-religious* categories. In this paper, the traditional religionist group is the reference category. However, in supplementary analyses I compare each religious group by pair and use each group in turn as the reference group, in order to examine religious variations among those groups, instead only comparing with traditional religionists. I discuss significant differences I found in these supplementary analyses in the text. In order to save space, I did not include these models in the final paper. But they are

available upon request.

OTHER BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Although there is little study about religious effects on gender role ideology in Taiwan, family researchers or demographers have given attention to the impact of other socio-demographic factors on gender role ideology in Chinese contexts (Thortin and Lin 1994; Xu and Lai 2002; Yi 2002; Yu 2006). In order to take these factors into account, I controlled respondent's age (measured in years), sex(1=male, 0=female), region (1=Metropolitan cities, 0=other regions), marital status (1=married, 0=single), presence of children(1=have one or more children, 0=otherwise), ethnicity (Minnan-reference group, Hakka, Mainlander, and Aboriginal), education (measured in years), and household income. ⁵

2.6 RESULTS

[Table 2.1 about here] ⁶

Table 2.1 shows odds ratio results from ordered logistic regression models predicting attitudes toward women's work outside of home by religion. There are three dependent variables: (1) "women's full time work is bad for preschool children," (2) "women's full time work will harm her family life," and (3) "it is OK for women to work outside of home, but what women really want is to have family and children." For each variable I include a base model with only the religion variables (M1) in it and a full model with other controls (M2).

⁵ There are 106 missing cases produced by the income measure. In order to save sample size, I impute mean score for these cases.

⁶ For the descriptive statistics table, please refer to Appendix B.

After controlling all other factors, only non-religious respondents are significantly less likely to think that mother's full time work will bring bad influence on small children, compared with traditional religionists (OR=.729, $p<.01$). As for the influence of women's work on family life, Protestants are more likely to believe women's full time work will harm family life, compared with traditional religionists (OR=1.266, $p<.05$). In my supplementary analyses there were significant differences between any other religious groups regard this issue: Protestants are also significantly more likely to agree on this negative view regard women's full time work than Catholics, YGD, and non-religious respondents. Finally, regarding the statement, "it is OK for women to work, but what women really want is to have family and children," Catholics and non-religious respondents are less likely to agree with this traditional statement compared with traditional religionists (OR=.404, $p<.01$ and OR=.791, $p<.05$ respectively); while Taiwanese Protestants are significantly more likely to agree on this issue than Catholics with other factors controlled.

In summary, Taiwanese Catholics and non-religious respondents tend to display less traditional views of women's employment than traditional religionists; however, Protestants seem to show more traditional views than traditional religionists and other groups, particularly Catholics and non-religionists.

[Table 2.2 about here]

Table 2.2 shows the odds ratios from ordered logistic regression models predicting attitudes toward household division of labor by religion. It includes two items, attitudes toward the statement "men's primary job is to earn money and women's primary job is to take care of the family" and "both men and women should contribute to the household financially." This second item is special because no study has examined the impact of

religion on attitudes toward financial division of household in such a context. According to the results, similar to Table 1, non-religious respondents are significantly less likely to support the traditional men-as-breadwinner women-as-home-maker division of labor, compared with the traditional religionists (OR=.803, $p<.05$). YGD respondents have modestly more traditional views than traditional religionists (OR=1.768, $p<.10$); according to my supplementary analyses, YGD respondents also have more traditional views regarding this issue than Protestants and non-religious respondents.

Interestingly, regarding gendered financial contribution to the household, Taiwanese Catholics and Protestants show very different views as Catholics are significantly more likely to agree that both men and women should contribute to family finance compared with traditional religionists (OR=1.977, $p<.05$), while Protestants are more likely to disagree with this statement compared with the traditional religionists (OR=.560, $p<.05$). My supplementary analyses also show that Catholics are also significantly more likely to support this view than non-religious respondents (OR=2.36, $p<.05$), YGD members (OR=2.38, $p<.10$), and Protestants (OR=3.65, $p<.01$). On the other hand, Protestants are less likely to favor women's financial contribution compared with others.

[Table 2.3 about here]

The last table (Table 2.3) displays the odds ratios from ordered logistic regression models predicting men's participation in the housework by religion. Consistent with other tables, after controlling other socio-demographic factors, Catholics are more likely than traditional religionists to think men should do more housework and spend more time on child rearing (OR=2.501, $p<.05$ and OR=3.179, $p<.01$ respectively); demonstrated by my supplementary analyses, Catholics are also significantly more likely to advocate greater

domestic work for men than Protestants, YGD members, and non-religious respondents (e.g., for item 6, OR=2.63, $p<.01$, OR=3.81, $p<.01$, and OR=2.91, $p<.01$ respectively). In other words, Taiwanese Catholics have the least traditional views regarding men's participation of housework.

The control variables also reveal interesting results. For example, education is negatively associated with traditional gender role attitudes, people who have more education are significantly less likely to think women's full time work outside the home will bring harm to family life or be bad for kids, and people who have higher education are more likely to support men's participation in housework and childrearing. Similarly, people who live in metropolitan areas are significantly less likely to hold traditional views compared with people who live in the rural areas.

2.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Consistent with studies in the U.S. (Glass 2000, Sherkat 2000) , conservative religious groups such as Taiwanese Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are more likely to hold traditional gender ideologies compared with other groups; Taiwanese Catholics and secular people tend to have the least traditional gender role ideologies. Contra my hypothesis, traditional religionists did not necessarily have more traditional views regarding gender roles. Especially on the issues regarding the negative influence of women's work on family and division of labor over finances, Taiwanese Protestants are more likely to hold traditional views; regarding traditional men-as-breadwinner and women-as-homemaker gender roles, YGD are the most likely to support on this attitudes than others; on the other hand, regarding financial contrition and men's participation in

housework, Catholics show the least traditional views compared with other groups.

These findings are further supported by my field interviews. For example, Miss Li, from the Church of Revival, a small fundamentalist/evangelical church in Taipei, said “the traditional men as breadwinner women as homemaker division is the ideal division of labor.” Li, a 30-year-old single woman working in a well-paid position for an import company, added that, “If one day I get married, I would like to stay at home and take care of my family.” When I asked her why she would like to make this choice, she explained, “People should educate their children with biblical principles from a very young age... A mother plays a very important role in educating her child...I really want to be a good mother and wife.” In my interview with the new pastor of this church, Mr. Chang, he mentioned that:

If both husband and wife work, it will bring very negative influences, for example, the parents might not be able to build up a close relationship with their children. You will not be able to educate your children but let the world educate them. Plus, in current Taiwan, day care is very expensive, which almost cost a person’s full time salary. So if both work, you do not gain much, but lose a lot.

These are demonstrations of how conservative Protestantism emphasizes familism and women’s role in educating children. This is consistent with the quantitative findings that Protestants are more likely to view women’s full time work will bring harm to her family life and discourage both men and women contribute to household financially.

Similar to the conservative Protestants, the YGD teacher emphasized traditional gender views. Teacher Bai, in her late thirties and works part time in a family business, described the YGD temple’s emphasis on “traditional gender relations.” As YGD temples often stress patriarchic Confucianism orthodoxy, Ms. Bai acknowledged that in her

temple, men have higher status than women. For example, women are not allowed to hold any of the important temple positions for public ceremony; instead, women are expected to do the “backstage service jobs” or the “helping work” (interview notes). The temple also teaches members that “men’s position and authority should be honored at home...maintaining this order is to maintaining traditional virtue.”

However, the devout Buddhist woman Ms. Wang, a homemaker and a mother of two children, seems to have very traditional views on gender relations too. When I asked her opinion on household division of labor, she answered: “Well, my marriage is difficult... My husband is very patriarchic and authoritarian. He came from a very traditional family. He does not do any housework. He comes back home from work, feeling tired, and just sits there having dinner or watching TV. If I ask him to do housework, he will get very upset.” She further told me: “We have been having this kind of division of labor for many years. I feel a lot of suffering because of this.” She paused and added. “Because I am a devout Buddhist, I often receive peace through meditation. Sometimes when I feel really bad or am suffering, I will spend a lot of time reading sutras. That is really helpful...” When asked how her faith helps her in dealing with this, she explained: “I believe that my suffering in this life may be caused by my relations with my husband from our previous lives. It may be I have to repay him emotions I owe him in our previous life. But I do not have concrete teachings from Buddhism on how to deal with marital issues. As a wife, a very traditional person, once I’ve married to him I have to be with him. I need to just live with it, and survive from it...” It seems that as a very devout Buddhist, she shows very traditional family ideology. However, such traditional views are more drawn from Chinese traditional family culture, instead of

directly from her faith. Unlike the conservative Protestants who are actively promoting the traditional relations, she has a more passive view about these issues.

The in-depth interviews further reveal interesting variations among different Christian denominations on gender role attitudes. My interview of the pastor of Zhong-Yan Presbyterian Church, a small Presbyterian church in Taipei, demonstrates the variation among Protestants. When I asked his opinion on the statement of “men’s primary job is to earn money, women’s primary job is to take care of family,” he laughed and said, “Well, this is how people would think forty or fifty years ago! ... Taiwan is an equal society now, and it would be so out-dated and biased to emphasize this.” When I asked him about the often-mentioned men’s headship issues in fundamentalist churches, he said, “It is a misinterpretation of the Bible if churches only emphasize men’s headship and women’s submission, because we are called to mutual submission.” He fully supports women’s work outside of the home, and does not think it will be a problem. In reality, his wife has never stopped working even after he became a pastor. In a separate meeting with Ms Jiang, a regular member of the Zhong-Yan Presbyterian Church, she also expressed her support for a double-income lifestyle.

Compared with conservative groups in Taiwan, mainline Protestants display much looser attitudes toward the traditional gender role ideology. Because the majority of Protestants in Taiwan are from evangelical and conservative background (Chao 2004), this pattern is masked in the survey results. Because the total N for Protestants is so small, I cannot differentiate these two groups of Protestants. The fact that the Taiwan Presbyterian church (TPC) display such less traditional views are not surprising, as in Taiwan’s modern history, TPC as a whole has taken a leading role in promoting Taiwan’s

political and cultural democratization and liberalization (Lin 1990) instead of emphasizing evangelism. In their national statement in 1998, they promote gender equality in Taiwan as part of their mission⁷.

The Catholics in my samples showed even more non-traditional attitudes toward gender role issues than their Protestant counterparts. For example, Mrs. Gao, a homemaker in her forties who received a Master's degree in science and raises two children, told me: "I have no problem with both husband and wife working if that is what they want...That is what the society is like nowadays." When asked whether and how her faith influences her views on gender ideology, she said:

I don't feel my Catholic faith affects my view on gender roles at all. You live in a modern society, you can be much more influenced by the society than by church.... My family has been Catholics for five generations. Even my brother is a priest. But I have never heard any teachings from the Church specifically addressing gender role issues...It does not seem to be something important.

She further added, "My sense is, what matters is people's background. If people have high education and if they live in a big city like Taipei, it is quite common that both people work, and both husband and wife contribute to the family..." She also mentioned that her husband, a devout Catholic and a professor in a large university, contributes to housework almost as much as she does.

Similarly, in my interview with another Catholic woman, Mrs. Fu, a manager of a funeral home, who was converted to Catholicism from Chinese folk religions in her thirties, kept on mentioning that she does not know any teaching from the Church

⁷ For more information, please visit : <http://www.pct.org.tw/>

regarding family or gender roles. She said: “In terms of gender role ideology, I feel we Catholics are no different from anyone else.”

It seems that, in contrast to the conservative Protestant interviewees, the Catholics I interviewed rarely mentioned any religious motivation for or concern about gender ideology. Rather than viewing the surrounding mainstream secular culture as “eroding”, they tend to accept it and embrace it. Their liberal views and the loose conviction from Church make them distinct from the Protestants.

According to Dr. Wenban Guo, a leading expert on Catholicism in Taiwan, most of Taiwanese lay Catholics are very liberal (Guo 1999b). Many of them were baptized at birth and rarely attend church during adulthood. The members tend to have a very loose connection with church. Thus, it is not surprising that their views can be much influenced by the surrounding secular culture. Further, the Taiwan Catholic Church has focused on social justice issues and humanitarian services for a long time. Gender role issues have not been a major concern for the church. More importantly, as the society tends to view the Catholic church as an important cultural agent bringing in “Western civilization,” and the stereotype of a Catholics may be someone who is more attracted to western culture or someone who is more “open-minded”, such cultural influence might further accentuate Catholics’ liberal views toward gender and family relations. Further, most Catholics live in urban areas, therefore they may be influenced by urban lifestyles (Guo 1999b). Thus, combined altogether, the weak church teachings, the loose connection between church and laity, and the liberal western influence might together contribute to Catholics’ more liberal views on gender relations compared with other groups.

2.8 CONCLUSION

In summary, drawing on large scale nationally representative survey and in-depth interviews, this study examines the association between religion and gender role attitudes in Taiwan. As hypothesized, there are religious variations in gender role attitudes, as conservative religious groups such as Taiwanese Protestants and members of the new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao are more likely to support traditional gender role ideologies, that they are more likely to view women's work as having negative impact on family life and more likely to support the traditional men-as-breadwinner, women-as-home-maker model; while Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal views on gender role issues than their conservative parts, they display less traditional gender views, especially regarding men's participation in the house and financial contribution for the household .

Study limitation and future direction

One of the limitations of this study is the very small N for minority groups in the data I use. Although Protestants, Catholics, and YGD members seem to indicate very interesting and distinctive characteristics in the study, each of them is less than five percent of Taiwan total population. Thus, the very small N and large standard error may suppress further patterns and variations. It prevents me from further looking at variations among different Protestant denominations, or subgroup variations among each group (such as Catholic men vs. Catholic women). In order to solve this problem, in my future research, I would like to pool different years of data together to get a bigger sample. Fortunately, TSCS has repeated questions on religion and family and gender roles in different years of data. It will allow me to explore the religion-gender association using a

bigger sample.

As this study is just a snapshot of religion and gender association in a particular year, it is difficult to reflect the changing patterns of the religion-gender association. Especially during the past several decades, Taiwan has experienced tremendous social and economic change. It is necessary to examine the religion-gender connection overtime. Thus, in my further research I will conduct trend analysis utilizing TSCS data from 1984 to 2004.

Table 2.1: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Women Work Fulltime by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios)

	Bad for kids		Bad for family life		Women want family & children			
	M1	M 2	M 1	M 2	M1	M2		
Catholic	1.369 (.43)	.993 (.36)	1.370 (.43)	.727 (.33)	.480 (.15)	* (.14)	.404 (.14)	* (.14)
Protestant	1.025 (.21)	.869 (.20)	1.509 * (.31)	1.266 * (.32)	1.026 (.23)		1.017 (.24)	
YGD	.672 (.20)	.746 (.22)	.696 (.22)	.795 (.27)	.772 (.26)		.796 (.27)	
Non-religious	.774 ** (.07)	.729 ** (.08)	.888 (.09)	.970 (.10)	.651 *** (.07)		.791 (.08)	* (.08)
Education		1.016 (.04)		.953 ** (.04)			.970 ** (.04)	** (.04)
City		1.233 * (.11)		.853 (.08)			.912 (.09)	
Age		1.009 * (.01)		1.017 *** (.01)			.996 (.01)	
Married		.828 (.10)		.774 * (.10)			.941 (.13)	
Child(ren)		1.020 (.17)		.980 (.16)			2.037 *** (.17)	*** (.17)
Male		1.134 (.1)		1.356 ** (.13)			1.030 (.10)	
Income		.997 (.01)		.973 * (.01)			.987 (.01)	
Hakka		1.176 (.15)		1.091 (.13)			1.091 (.15)	
Mainlander		1.450 * (.16)		1.098 (.15)			1.796 (.12)	
Aboriginal		1.376 (.45)		1.671 + (.36)			1.214 (.40)	
-2log likelihood	4790	4760	4550	4432	4151		4074	
N	1977	1977	1977	1977	1977		1977	

Table 2.2: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Household Division of Labor by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios)

	men breadwinner		both contribute financially	
	M1	M2	M1	M2
Catholic	2.124 (.72)	* 1.241 (.47)	2.453 (.86)	* 1.977 (.84)
Protestant	.916 (.18)	.911 (.20)	.681 (.15)	+ .560 (.13)
YGD	1.253 (.41)	1.768 (.58)	+ 1.370 (.47)	1.140 (.39)
Non-religious	.606 (.06)	*** .803 (.08)	* .980 (.11)	.979 (.11)
Education		.846 (.03)	***	.877 (.04)
City		.923 (.09)		1.058 (.11)
Age		1.020 (.01)	***	1.005 (.01)
Married		.745 (.10)	*	1.151 (.16)
Child(ren)		1.188 (.19)		.628 (.11)
Male		1.926 (.17)	***	.405 (.04)
Income		.996 (.01)		.998 (.01)
Hakka		.905 (.11)		1.154 (.15)
Mainlander		.918 (.13)		1.106 (.15)
Aboriginal		1.181 (.36)		1.307 (.43)
-2log likelihood	5384	4954	4054	3950
N	1977	1977	1977	1977

Table 2.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Men's Participation in Housework by Religion and Other Factors (Odds Ratios)

	men do more housework		men do more childrearing	
	M1	M2	M1	M2
Catholic	2.327 *	2.501 *	2.800 **	3.179 **
	(.87)	(1.01)	(.13)	(.11)
Protestant	1.246	1.125	.000	.901
	(.24)	(.24)	(.21)	(.23)
YGD	.794	.744	1.120	1.040
	(.24)	(.22)	(.27)	(.30)
Non-religious	1.186 +	.959	1.210 *	.955
	(.08)	(.10)	(.08)	(.10)
Education		1.089 ***		1.081 ***
		(.03)		(.03)
City		1.389 **		1.589 ***
		(.07)		(.06)
Age		1.003		.996
		(.01)		(.01)
Married		1.028		.876
		(.13)		(.15)
Child(ren)		.688 *		.904
		(.23)		(.18)
Male		.895		.850 +
		(.10)		(.10)
Income		.997		.977
		(.01)		(.01)
Hakka		1.050		1.008
		(.14)		(.12)
Mainlander		1.227		1.351 *
		(.15)		(.15)
Aboriginal		1.155		.954
		(.35)		(.32)
-2log likelihood	5004	4888	4842	4699
N	1977	1977	1977	1977

CHAPTER 3: RELIGION AND EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATION IN TAIWAN

3.1 ABSTRACT

Drawing on Taiwan Social Change Surveys (1990 and 2000) and field interviews, this chapter explores the religious effects on educational aspirations and gender (in)equality in education in Taiwan. Contra expectation, there is no significant gender gap among different religions on educational aspirations. The real variation lies in the overall different levels of educational aspirations for both boys and girls. After controlling other socio-demographic factors, Taiwanese Protestants show the highest educational aspirations for both boys and girls; new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao members show the lowest aspirations; Catholics, traditional religionists, and secular respondents are in the middle and do not have significant differences on education among each other. The mechanisms of influences are discussed.

3.2 INTRODUCTION

Chinese culture has emphasized education for thousands of years, but only education for men. Chinese women were excluded from formal education until the late 19th century (Huang 1996, Lutz 1971, Ng 2003). Subsequent modernization and mandatory education have helped women's educational develop (Xu and Lai 2002); but, there is still a significant gender gap in educational attainment, especially at higher education levels (Chiu and Tsai 1992). For example, in 2006, 46 percent of registered university students in Taiwan were women; 32 percent of Masters' students and 23 percent of doctoral students were women (Taiwan Ministry of Education data)⁸. Thus, rapid educational and economic expansion did not bring equal growth of in the level and quality for women's education in Taiwan (Chiu and Tsai 1992).

Economists and demographers have given substantial attention to gender inequality in education in Taiwan. Although using different methods and data, they generally agree that there are some unexamined cultural factors which may explain this disparity. Although Taiwan has developed dramatically during the past several decades, the patriarchic family nature stays strong. Especially the emphasis on education for men still seems to be strong. What aspect(s) of culture influences women's educational attainment and people's beliefs about education? Because religion is an important carrier of Chinese traditional norms, how does religion affect people's educational achievement and expectation? Does religion promote or hinder educational aspirations in Taiwan? Is there variation between Chinese traditional religions and western religions such as Christianity in relating to education

outcomes in such context? In this article, using national representative data, I will explore the questions.

3.3 BACKGROUND

3.3.1 RELIGION AND EDUCATION IN THE U.S.

Numerous studies have shown the association between religion and educational achievement in the United States. For example, Jews in the U.S. tend to have the highest educational achievement among all religious groups, while fundamental Protestants show the lowest educational attainment especially when measured by “Biblical Literalism”, with mainline Protestants and Catholics in the middle (Darnell and Sherkat 1997; Sherkat and Darnell 1999, Glass and Jacobs 2005). Such religious variation is often accentuated among women’s educational achievements with white conservative Protestants women tending to display the lowest post-graduate levels of education (Glass and Jacobs 2005).

Personal religiosity is also associated with educational achievement. For example, in Regnerus’ study (Regnerus and Elder 2003), adolescents who attend church more often report higher educational achievements than their less religious peers; Ellison and Muller also demonstrate that religiosity can even counter some negative racial effects, in that religious black children tend to have greater educational achievements (Muller and Ellison 2001).

There are several reasons why religion may be associated with educational outcomes:

(1) Conservative religious groups such as conservative Protestants in the U.S. tend

⁸ For more information, please visit www.mov.gov.tw

to hold traditional gender role ideology which discourages women from pursuing higher education. In such traditions, men's headship in a household is divinely granted, and thus women's primary role is a wife and mother. Women are often encouraged to marry earlier, to stay home, and to have more children. Pursuing higher education and a career may interfere with women's responsibility for family life. Thus the incentives for pursuing higher education for women may be discouraged in such context.

(2) Religion can also influence perceptions of investment in education. For example, using economic models, Evelyn Lehrer (2005) points out that religion can affect how parents perceive the value and cost of education, and thus they make more or less investment into children's education. If the parents perceive women's primary role is to take care of family and children, investing in higher education for a girl may not be necessary. Thus they might be more reluctant to invest more in women's higher education. Moreover, if religious believers view the contemporary educational systems as secular, and suspect it may do spiritual harm to their children, they may discourage their children from pursuing higher education in the contemporary education systems. On the other hand, Jews in the U.S. tend to emphasize the accumulation of wealth and high educational achievement as a way to maintain their comparative higher social status in the U.S. (Keister 2003). Thus, Jews may be more likely to have higher expectations for education. However, this evidence is all from the U.S., a context with a long history of Protestantism, religious competition, and state provision of education which may not hold in other social contexts.

In international studies, scholars often argue that religion influences the provision of and attainment in education. For example, scholars pointed out that because Protestant missionaries wanted people to read the Bible, they initiated or promoted mass education and

education for women in many non-western societies (Lutz 1971, Ng 1998, Woodberry and Shah 2004). On the other hand, as Catholics did not focus on spreading mass education, as the priesthood is the sole authority for reading and explaining the Bible. Thus they are less likely to promote education at the same level.

Despite these historical studies, we have little empirical research examining religious effects on education in non-western societies, where the dominant religious culture is not Judeo-Christian.

3.3.2 Religion and Education in Taiwan society

The distribution of education by sex is frequently argued to be a key determinant of gender inequality (e.g., Parish and Willis 1993). In order to understand how traditional religions may influence education aspirations, it is necessary to understand the connection between Chinese family culture and education.

Traditional Culture, religion, and Education in Taiwan

First, the patriarchal nature of society may affect women's education. Historically Chinese societies emphasize men's education through the Confucianism exam system. The goal for Confucianism education is to get a high ranking official job after passing the exams. Since women were excluded from the traditional bureaucratic system, women were excluded from Confucianism classical education. Rich families may hire private tutors to teach daughters how to read, however, the level of education provided for daughters was often very limited. Although there is no official exclusion of women from education anymore, in a patriarchic society it is often easier for men to succeed. On

average, men have more job opportunities and earn more than women for similar jobs on average (Parish and Willis 1993). Contemporary Taiwanese higher education is a very expensive investment, thus parents may be less willing to invest in more in daughters as they have high cost but potential lower return (Parish and Willis 1993).

Second, traditional family ideologies may influence women's educational outcomes. In traditional Chinese society, elder parents expect to live with their sons, especially the oldest sons, who are expected to be the primary caretakers for their elder parents. Daughters will eventually marry out of their maternal family (嫁出去的女儿泼出去的水) and thus are not considered a reliable source of old-age security. Daughters are expected to be devoted to the wellbeing of their husband's families. Once women are married, they will be considered their in-law family's property. Thus from an economic perspective, scholars argue that parents will invest more in sons' education rather than daughters because they themselves will have a better reward and a lower risk financial investment (Greenhalgh 1985). Financial constraint of a family can further accentuate son preference in education (Parish and Willis 1993).

Third, the idea of marriageability can influence women's educational outcomes in Chinese societies (Tsai, Gates, and Chiu 1994). Influenced by traditional Confucian culture, women are often expected to marry up, meaning men prefer to have higher education than their wives. It is not only a traditional belief but also an ongoing practice in Taiwan (Tsai 1987). A woman who has much high education will naturally reduce her pool of potential husbands on the marriage market, as men tend not to prefer women who have more education than they do. As long as women's primary role is considered to be

family care-taker, wife and mother, spending a long time in school can be perceived as delaying women's opportunity to get married and to bear children. Further, as women's social achievements are often believed to come through marriage (学得好不如嫁得好), in a society in which marriage is almost universal and families often put high pressure on women to get married, a woman's pursuit of higher education can be greatly discouraged. In many cases, "sufficient education" instead of "high education" is expected under such a context. Thus, the more people hold such traditional beliefs, the more likely they will hold a negative impression toward women's higher education, and the more likely they will discourage women from pursuing higher education.

Fourth, although women's education may be expected to increase with industrial development and expansion of women's labor force participation, it is not necessarily the case. During the past several decades, Taiwan's economic opportunities have grown dramatically, it has become one of the primary export societies in the world. There is great demand from skill-intensive occupations that provide women increasing job opportunities (Zveglich et.al. 1997). Many such jobs are characterized by low technical requirements and a quick return for earning. However, one of the consequences of this changing economy is the on-going conflict between such increasing low-skill job opportunities available for unmarried Taiwanese women and the ongoing pricing higher education. Parents must decide whether they want to invest more in their daughter's education or send them into the labor force to make money quickly, help the family's finances, repay the parents' investment before they marry, and maybe help provide for their brother's education (Greenhalgh 1985). Thus, after daughters have "sufficient" education, pragmatic and traditional minded parents may want to encourage their

daughters to work instead of pursuing higher education. Even when parents invest in their daughters' education, they may be more likely to invest in those types of education that can bring quick financial returns such as junior colleges or technical schools (Greenhalgh 1985, Brinton 1993). Such conflicts are accentuated especially when the family has scarce resources (Yu and Su 2006). Gender inequality may particularly exist at higher levels of education.

Chinese traditional religions have a strong association with Chinese traditional family ideologies. As most folk or traditional religions do not make ethical requirements in their teachings or rituals, most adopt Confucianism as their ethical orthodoxy. Traditional religionists tend to promote early marriage and encourage larger traditional families (Chiu 2006). In many folk religion families, relational hierarchy based on male ancestor worship is often emphasized (Yang 1967). Although traditional Confucianism tends to emphasize education for boys, because the educational achievement of a son can bring honor to the family and ancestors, it does not extend to education for girls and women; traditional religionists may also encourage boy's education more than girl's education. Further, because of the strong pragmatic or utilitarian tendency of traditional religions, they might also more likely to emphasize investing more in men's education, so that they can have higher chance of success and have more chances to earn money or find jobs with education.

Christianity Influence on education in Taiwan

There are competing hypotheses about how Christianity might influence education in Taiwan: First, unlike Chinese traditional religions' emphasis on rituals and ceremonies, Christianity, especially Protestantism, emphasizes Scripture-reading in order to understand theology. As reading and studying the scripture is a necessity for one's Christian faith, it is difficult for people who are illiterate or have lower educational background to access the Gospel (Su 2006). Thus in order to spread the Gospel, Protestant missionaries have often promoted mass education and literacy in non-western countries so that people can read the Bible in their own languages (Ng 2003, Roberts 2002, Woodberry and Shah 2004). The existence of large number of "Bible women" who have become literate in East Asia is a typical manifestation (Ng 2003, Lutz 1971). Not only did these Christians promote mass education, they often provided religious programs, religious educators, or directly established educational institutions in those places. Such influence is not only for mass education, but also for higher education. For example, the earliest five universities and women's colleges in Taiwan were funded by Christian educators (Lin 2003). As women were historically excluded from formal educational system in Chinese societies, accessing education through such religious institutions allow families to gain women education inexpensively.

Second, Christian educators promoted modern education to undercut the influence of Confucianism and "superstitious" folk culture in Chinese societies (e.g. Lin 2003, Rubinstein 1991, Ng 1985, Woodberry and Shah 2004). Christians as a minority in

Taiwan who are surrounded by an overwhelming majority of traditional religious culture may further accentuate the need for promoting modern education. Consist with historical patterns, Taiwanese Christians might also specially emphasize women's education as women are believed to have an irreplaceable influence over their children's and husband's religion (Lutz 1971). Thus, I expect Christians in Taiwan will emphasize higher education for both boys and girls.

Third, Taiwanese Christian's unique socio-demographic characteristics may affect their attitudes toward education. Taiwanese Christians tend to be middle or upper middle classes, and a disproportionate number of them are white-collar workers, high technology professionals, government or military officers. Thus, they may be like Jews in the U.S. who emphasize the accumulation of social capital and wealth (Su 2006). Because of the need to maintain their comparatively elite social status, emphasizing education may become a necessity. In return, people who are from comparatively middle or upper class may be more likely to value and invest more in children's education in a way to assure the continuity of their status. As men from these backgrounds might also be expected to marry women who are from similar backgrounds, Christian parents may emphasize women's education because of the concern of marriageability. Thus I expect that the socio-demographic characteristics of Christians will influence them to have higher educational aspiration in this context.

However, it is also possible that fundamentalist Christian groups in Taiwan may be similar to the fundamental conservative Protestant counterparts in the U.S., where higher education, especially higher education for women is discouraged (Sherkat 2000, Glass and Jacobs 2005). As women's roles are primarily based at home and childrearing,

higher education might be discouraged. This study will examine these assumptions in the Taiwan context.

3.3.3 REASONS TO STUDY EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATION INSTEAD OF CURRENT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

As TSCS data are repeated cross-sectional data instead of longitudinal data, it is difficult to distinguish a causal effect from a spurious association. More specifically, (1) as mentioned in previous chapters, Taiwanese Christians are disproportionately middle class, white collar professionals, and highly educated, thus it could be that Christianity is more likely to attract highly educated people, or it could be that Christianity increases higher educational aspirations. In other words, Christianity merely attracts more educated people rather than providing them. If one only predict current education level using religion, it could produce a spurious relationship. I illustrate the problem by showing the association between religion and educational level using TSCS 1990 and 2000 data. For example in 1990, the mean years of education for male Christian is 10.92 years, while the mean education level for devoted traditionalists is 7.39, which is about 3.5 years lower (Figure 3.1). While in 2000, the mean years of educational attainment for male Christians is 12.16 years, which is about 2 years longer than male Chinese traditional religionists (Figure 3.2). Although the comparative religious difference reduced over time, there is still a significant religious difference in education level. These patterns are even clearer for the higher education as shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. For example, it shows in Figure 3.3 in 1990 about 40% of Catholic men and 27% of Catholic women had an undergraduate degree or higher education, compared with only 7% of devout male traditional religionists

and 6% devout women traditional religionists. In 2000 about a quarter of Protestant men and about 17 % of Protestant women have an undergraduate degree or higher education, compared with only 12 % of devoted male traditionalists and 8% female traditional religionists (Figure 3.4). Although the religious variations on educational levels have diminished, there are still significant differences in overall educational level and on higher levels of education for both men and women (tested by Scheffe command in STATA). However, in order to minimize the possibility of spuriousness, I use educational aspirations instead of current educational attainment.

Figure 3.1: Comparison of Means of Educational Attainment by Religion in 1990




Figure 3.2: Comparison of Means of Educational Attainment by religion in 2000




Figure 3.3: Percent Comparison of Higher Educational Attainment by Religion in 1990





Figure 3.4: Percent Comparison of Higher Education Attainment by Religion in 2000



3.4 DATA

My primary data come from the *Taiwan Social Change Survey* (TSCS). It is a replicated cross-sectional survey conducted by the Academia Sinica, Taiwan. It has been conducted almost annually since 1984, and is a national probability sample of about 2,000 adults between 20 to 75 years old. Analogous to the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS), TSCS covers a wide range of topics such as family, education, religion, occupation, political participation, etc. I use the cultural modules from 1990 and 2000 for this study, which include various topics including respondent's attitudes toward education and actual levels of education, religious background, and various socio-demographic variables. My primary analysis is based on the 2000 culture data. In order to further examine the hypotheses, I use 1990 data with the same questions to further test my findings.

In addition to my quantitative analyses, I also conducted 22 in-depth interviews in Taipei with knowledgeable informants in June 2007. My 22 interviewees come from various religious and social backgrounds. My original sampling of TSCS 2000 sampling respondents list was not successful, thus, in order to get a useful sample in a very limited time, I constructed a purposive sample with the counsel from Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and many other scholars in Taiwan. They helped me to select a sample taking the religion, gender, residence, ethnicity, education and social background of respondents into consideration. My final sample included 22 successful interviews with both clergies and lay worshippers from all the major religious groups I studied in the quantitative research. There are four Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and two devout lay Buddhists;

there are three folk religion practitioners, one is an accountant in a folk temple, one is Taxi driver, and one runs a computer shop; there is one new religious movement (YGD) teacher; there are seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay members from various social backgrounds; finally, there are seven Protestants from various denominations, with two pastors and five lay Protestants. My qualitative discussions are mainly based on those interviews.

3.5 MEASURES

Religious affiliation

Measuring religion is a complicated issue in Chinese societies. The distinctions between different Chinese religious traditions are vague. Even though in surveys people self-identify as Taoists, Buddhists, or Folk religionists, in reality, there are no clear boundaries between these three religions especially for ordinary worshippers. Deities are worshipped as long as they are efficient in bringing blessings and protection. Thus, scholars tend to treat them under the broad rubric of “Chinese traditional religion.” However, differences may exist between very devout traditional religionists and ordinary lay members. For example, very devout Buddhists will go through a formal conversion ritual. After the ritual, they will be given a formal Buddhist name, become a disciple of a certain Buddhist lineage, and may become vegetarian. Nominal Buddhists usually do not go through the conversion ritual, recite sutra often, or follow rigid meditation requirements. They might worship other folk deities at the same time and are more likely to switch deities when one is not efficient enough (Chiu 2006). In both the 1990 and 2000 surveys, other than the basic question: “what is your religion,”

respondents were also asked: “how important is your religion to you?” I utilize these two questions together to create two dummy variables: *devout traditional religionists (DTR)* and *nominal traditional religionists (NTR)* in order to examine the potential difference between devoted worshippers and nominal ones. If respondent identifies with any of the three traditional religions and he or she also considers religion is “very important” or “important” to them, it will be coded as 1 (devout traditional religionist), or 0 (otherwise); if respondents belong to any of these traditional religionists but do not consider their religion is important I coded them as nominal traditional religionists.

Thus the final categories include: Protestant, Catholic, Devout traditional religionists (DTR), nominal traditional religionists (NTR), New religious movement group Yi-Guan-Dao (YGD), and non-religious respondents. The devout Chinese traditional religionists are the largest group and the reference category in my analyses. ⁹

Education measures

Minimum Educational aspiration for boys and for girls (MIBOY/BIGIRL): In both 1990 and 2000 TSCS, respondents were asked: “What do you think is the minimum education a boy should have,” and “what do you think is the minimal education a girl should have?” Response categories range from 1 (elementary) to 6 (graduate school). I coded the variables in a way that the higher scores indicate higher aspiration for boy or

⁹ In my preliminary analyses, I also created separate categories for “devout Protestant” and “nominal Protestant”. However, as more than 80% of Christians in TSCS consider their religion is “important”, or “very important”, and there are no statistically significant differences between these two categories, I combined them into one category, “Protestant” in the final model. Because Catholics are already very small group (less than 40), I remain them as one group. I also used “nominal traditional religionist”, “non-religious”, “YGD”, “Catholic”, and “Protestant” as the reference groups in a set of parallel models. In order to save space, I did not include these repeated supplementary models in this final version. If interested, please contact author for the full models.

for girl.

Minimum education is university level or higher (BOYUV/GIRLUV): Because Taiwan has 9 years of mandatory education (middle school graduate), and about 98% of Taiwan’s population have access to high school education (Taiwan Yearbook 2004), I expect the actual variation in educational aspirations will exist only in higher education levels. Thus, I created dummy variables indicating whether respondent considers the minimum education for a boy or for a girl is university level or higher (for each gender, 1=yes, 0=otherwise). ¹⁰

Educational aspiration gap between boys and girls (ASPGAP): In order to further examine my hypotheses that religion will have significant association with gender inequality on education, I created a variable measuring the reported difference in aspirations for boys and girls. The value is calculated as follow:

$$ASPGAP= MIBOY-MIGIRL$$

¹⁰ The original questionnaire has a seventh item: “other-please explain.” A large proportion of respondents chose this response option. However, the codebook does not state what answers respondents gave, thus I was unable to recode it. For example in 2000, 110 out of 1895 respondents chose “other” for boys educational aspirations and 116 out of 1895 respondents chose “other” regarding girl’s educational aspirations. More interestingly, Protestants disproportionately choose this category. I assume most respondents meant “Whatever the child wants” or “study abroad,” but I have no way to test this. Future investigation is needed to determine what “other” means and why Protestants are more likely to choose it.

	Boy	Girl
Devout Traditional	5.8% (36)	5.8%(36)
Nominal Traditional	6.1% (43)	6.3%(45)
Catholic	3.9% (1)	3.9%(1)
Protestant	11.0%(10)	12.1%(11)
YGD	4.9% (2)	4.9%(2)
Non-religious	4.5% (17)	5.3%(20)
Total	5.8%(109)	6.1%(115)

A high score for ASPGAP indicates higher preference for boy's education over girl's education.

Other covariates

I also controlled gender (male=1, 0=otherwise), age(in years), region (city=1, 0=otherwise), education (in years), Ethnicity (Minnan-reference group, Hakka, Mainlander, Aboriginal), self-evaluated SES¹¹ (from 1=low class to 6=upper class), and marital status (1=married, 0=otherwise).

3.6 RESULTS

[Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 about here]

Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 compare higher education aspirations by religion in 1990 and 2000 respectively. In each of the graph, the blue bars represents the percent of respondents in each group agree that think the minimum education for a boy is university graduation or higher; the red bars represents the percent of respondents in each group that think the minimum education for a girl is university graduation or higher. For a complete comparison of educational aspirations in 1990 and 2000, please refer to Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. In order to save space, I will not discuss all the differences in these two tables.

Regarding aspiration for boy's education, figure 3.5 shows that in 1990 about 37% of Taiwan Protestants believe that the minimum education for a boy is university graduation or beyond, compared with only 20% of traditional religionists and about 24% of

¹¹ The income measure has many missing cases on the TSCS. For example, on the 1990 TSCS, 329 (13%) responded "don't know," 144 (5.7%) refused to answer, and 4 had "no answer." In totally 477 out of 2532 respondents did not provide their income. The 2000 TSCS had 106 missing cases. Fortunately, on TSCS 2000 there is a measure of "self-evaluated social class background" Thus, I used this measure for SES instead of household income. Unfortunately, in the 1990 data there is no similar measure of social class.

Catholics; the least proportion of YGD believers (11%) view a university education is a must for boys. Respondents' attitudes toward girl's education show a similar pattern: in 1990, about a third of Protestants thought girls should have at least a university graduate education in 1990, compared to less than 8% of YGD and 13% of Catholics and traditional religions.

The 2000 results (Figure 3.6) are similar to the 1990 data (Figure 3.5). Protestants have the highest percentage who favor university degree for women. Specifically, about half of Protestants favor a minimum university education for girls, compared with only 20 % of YGD (the lowest) and about 30 percent of traditional religionists believe so; non-religious respondents show the second highest percentage of favoring higher education for girls (38% respectively); Catholics are not much different from the mass traditional religionists regard aspiration. According to SCHEFFE test comparing the differences and significance of means by pair (in STATA), the differences between Protestants and other religious groups are statistically significant; YGD show significantly lower aspirations compared with other groups. However, there is no significant difference among traditional religion groups and Catholics according to the tests.

We can also compare the gender gap in aspirations for boys and for girls within each group. In every group, it seems that more people think men should have higher education than women, and the gender gap is not significantly larger for any religious group. Further, when comparing the 1990 results (Figure 3.5) with the 2000 results (Figure 3.6), it seems that the gender gap within each groups has reduced overtime, especially for the Catholics. The only exception is that the gender gap for Protestants increased from about

5 % to 9% from 1990 to 2000. This may be also related to random variation because of very small N in both years. For more detailed comparison, please refer to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.

[Table 3.3 to Table 3.4 about here]

To further examine whether religious differences are statistically significant, I added controls for other social factors. I utilize ordered logistic regression models to examine the religious effects on educational aspirations. The dependent variables (minimum educational aspiration for a boy and for a girl) are coded as ordinal variables from “1=elementary school,” to “6=graduate school.” In each table, there are four columns; the first two columns show the results predicting aspirations for boys and the last two columns show the results predicting aspirations for girls. For each pair of models I include a base model with only religion variables and a full model adding other social factors.

Table 3.3 shows odds ratios for ordered logistic regression models predicting education aspirations by religion in 1990. Compared with devout traditional religionists, Protestants show significantly higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls with other factors taken into control (OR=1.85, $p<.01$, OR=2.07, $p<.05$ respectively); nominal traditional religionists and non-religious respondents also have modestly higher educational aspirations for boys but not significantly higher for girls (e.g., for boys, OR=1.24, $p<.05$, OR=1.22, $p<.10$ respectively). In my supplementary analyses, Protestants also have higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls than nominal traditional religionists, YGD, Catholics, and non-religious respondents.

Table 3.4 shows identical models for the year 2000. The findings are consistent with the 1990 data: after controlling all socio-demographic factors, Protestants still have higher education aspirations for both boys and girls compared with devout traditional religionists (OR=2.02, $p<.01$, OR=1.72, $p<.05$ respectively). Nominal traditional religionists also display modestly higher aspirations for boys compared with their devout counterparts (OR=1.22, $p<.10$). My supplementary analyses show that again in 2000 Protestants have significantly higher educational aspirations than any other group for both boys and girls.

Comparing the 1990 and 2000 results, the impact of religion (especially Protestantism) seems to be very consistent. One possible exception is the comparative advantage of Protestantism in educational aspiration for girls may be diminishing over time (OR=2.07, $p<.01$ in 1990 and OR=1.72, $p<.05$ respectively). This is consistent with the descriptive patterns we have seen in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. This “reduction” could merely be the result of sample variation from the small N for Protestants in both years, or it could mean that as the overall level of education increases and the government promotes gender-equal education, the comparative Protestant advantage for girls is being reduced.

Besides the main findings, there are also other findings worthy of notice. For example, people who are more educated, who live in the cities, are married, or are older are more likely to have higher educational aspirations for both boys and girls. Men tend to have lower educational aspirations for boys and girls than women.

However, I did not find significant variation in the gender gap in education aspirations between religious groups. Thus, in order to save space, I did not include those models in this final version.

3.7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In summary, my original hypotheses are partly supported: Religion does have significant estimated association with educational aspiration in Taiwan. Compared with other religious groups, Taiwanese Protestants display the highest levels of educational aspiration for both boys and girls; on the other hand new religious movement YGD members tend to display the lowest educational aspiration; Catholics, Non-religious respondents, and nominal Chinese traditional religionists are in the middle, and there is no significant difference among those groups on educational aspiration. However, my original hypothesis of there will be significant gender gap among different religious groups was not supported, meaning, my original hypothesis is certain religious group, e.g., devout traditional religionists or YGD members would prefer greater gender inequality in education than other groups, especially Christian groups, are not supported. In 2000, there is no significant gap within each group regarding education for boy and for girl, and there is no significant variation among different groups on gender gap of education. The real difference lies in the overall level of aspiration for education.

FIELD INTERVIEWS

My field research shed light on why religion in Taiwan and supported my quantitative findings. There is no significant difference with on gender gap of education across

religious groups. Most of the interviewees with whom I spoke mentioned that boys and girls should have equal education.

For example, when I asked “what is the minimum education you think a boy/girl should have,” Mr. Chang, a pastor at the Church of Revival, a small fundamental/evangelical church, told me that: “the higher the better.” Mr. Chang, added, “Well, for my own kids, I will support them as much as they want to pursue, even if they want to have a Ph.D.” However, he emphasized, “education should be something that children enjoy; if I give them too much pressure, they might not like it anymore. But whatever they want to learn, I will support them.” Although he focuses on his supportive role, he would like to make it clear that it is not like the old-time authoritarian Chinese parents who only want children to study. He also explained that he knows Christians in Taiwan disproportionately study or live abroad including members of his family, that these overseas experiences make people more open-minded and more likely to welcome Western education. In other words, rather than viewing education as a negative influence, he as a pastor, emphasizes on the “modern” and “advanced” side of education. Echoing with what I have mentioned in the earlier section, the special role of Christianity in modern Taiwan’s history might contribute to such views.

Ms. Wang, an active member of a large Pentecostal church, explained why she desires higher education, from a different perspective. Ms. Wang is married with two children and now works in a governmental office as an accountant. She thinks that the minimum education a boy and a girl should get is a university degree. She said: “education can increase people’s curiosity for truth and knowledge, and that will help people eventually realize that the day-to-day material things are not enough for a

meaningful life, that our minds and souls desire something more.” She added.

“Ultimately, this type of thinking will help you to know the Gospel, to desire for God.”

She also mentioned. “Education can help Christians learn effective communication tools when spreading the Gospel to people.” In reality, her daughter has just received her Master’s degree and will go to the New York University to pursue her study in design this summer. This again confirms my hypothesis that one of the reasons Taiwanese Christians value education is because it can be used as an effective tool to spread the Gospel and to fight against the influence of folk pragmatic culture.

On the other hand, my four lay Catholic interviewees presented different explanations. Mr. and Mrs. Chen, who are in their late 40s and both work in governmental bureaus, think that the minimal education should be junior college for both boys and girls. They explained:

During recent years Taiwan has gone through a quick educational expansion. Many new junior colleges and universities are mushrooming in a very short time. However, we are really not sure about those schools’ quality. Nowadays, a college graduate might not be even as mature as a high school graduate 10 years ago... So in terms of current education, I would say the minimum is junior college or university.

Similarly, another lay Catholic, Ms. Gao, shared a similar concern. Ms. Gao, a five generation Catholic, married with two children, now is a fulltime homemaker, said to me: “Men and women should have equal education, that is no doubt. But because the quality of Taiwan colleges or universities is really questionable, I am not sure how much children can really learn from them, so a university education is the minimum.”

The other two Lay Catholics with whom I spoke, Ms. Qiu, the manager of a funeral home, and Ms Hong, a middle school principle, displayed more flexible attitudes toward

education. They both mentioned that they do not have fixed expectations for the minimal education. Ms Giu said: “It really depends on the kids themselves. Whatever they want to do, we will support them.” It seems that compared with the conservative Protestants I interviewed, the Catholics I interviewed said their religious views had little influence on their educational expectations. Instead, their expectations for their children are influenced to a greater extent by their own social conditions, education background, and what they perceive as mainstream culture.

Similar to the Catholics, Mr. Tai, a nominal traditional religionist, an owner of a computer shop and a father of two children, also stressed the importance of having a college degree in current Taiwan. He said: “for me and my wife, we did not have a chance to receive good education. That is why we have to labor so much now to make money... For the kids nowadays if they do not go to college, they will not find any job...” He expects both of his children, a son and a daughter, to finish their study at a local college. He and his wife run the computer shop in the day time, and he works as a Taxi-driver at night, so that they can afford to pay the tuitions. To him, it seems that his nominal religious faith does not influence his views on education much. Instead, he draws his motivations on education from the perceived pressure of mainstream culture.

Interestingly, and different from what I expected, the Executive Abbot of the Zhong-Tai Buddhist Monastery, one of the four largest Buddhist lineages in Taiwan, mentioned their promotion and encouragement of education during our interview. Under the competition with other religions in Taiwan, Zhong-Tai Temple has donated millions of dollars to build elementary schools and high schools throughout Taiwan as their unique contribution to society. He explained that although Buddhism does not focus on

education, the goal for their temple is to “make Buddhism educational, artistic, academic, and close to life” in contemporary Taiwan, so that more educated people can be attracted to Buddhism. Through the process, promoting education is an important task. However, my interview with the very devout lay Buddhist woman, Mrs. Yang, a homemaker and mother of two kids, seems to display more indifferent attitudes toward secular education. When asked what should be the minimum education for a boy or a girl, she did not directly answer my question but said: “well, it does not really matter how much education you have... What matters in life is that you seek the true wisdom in Buddhism, and keep on seeking it.”

3.8 CONCLUSION

Utilizing nationally representative TSCS data from 1990 and 2000 together with field interviews, my study examines the impact of religion on educational aspirations in Taiwan. First, contra expectation, there is no significant gender gap among different religions on educational aspirations. The real variation lies in the overall different levels of educational aspirations for both boys and girls. Because of historical background and religious motivations, Taiwan Protestants have higher educational aspiration than other religious groups; the new religious movement Yi-Guan-Dao members show the lowest educational aspirations compared with other groups; while Catholics and Chinese religionists are in the middle and do not have significantly different educational attitudes between each other. Finally, between 1990 and 2000, the religious and education association seems to have been modestly reduced overtime as the overall level of education has increased in Taiwan.

Figure 3.5 Percent Comparison of Aspiration for Higher Education by Religion in 1990




Figure 3.6: Percent Comparison of Aspiration for Higher Education by Religion in 2000




Table 3.1: Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 1990

	High school		Junior College		University or higher		Freq
	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	
DTR	58.8	69.47	21.65	17.14	19.55	13.38	665
NTR	53.56	67.7	25.55	18.52	20.89	13.78	1096
Catholic	48.28	59.26	27.59	29.63	24.14	11.11	27
Protestant	28.4	41.98	34.57	25.93	37.04	32.1	81
YGD	66.67	84.62	21.57	7.69	11.76	7.69	52
Non religious	46.05	59.95	29.53	23.61	24.42	16.44	432
Total	53.02	66.17	25.43	19.21	21.56	14.62	2353

Table 3.2: Percent Comparison of Educational Aspiration by Religion in 2000

	High school		Junior College		University or higher		freq
	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	
DTR	42.38	45.88	23.29	23.29	34.33	30.82	571
NTR	33.84	38.75	30.05	29.94	36.12	31.31	658
Catholic	41.67	41.67	29.17	29.17	29.17	29.17	24
Protestant	26.25	34.18	16.25	17.72	57.5	48.1	79
YGD	38.46	38.46	38.46	41.03	23.08	20.51	39
Non religious	31.11	35.85	25.28	25.77	43.61	38.38	357
Total	35.62	39.13	27.08	27.82	37.30	33.05	1728

Table 3.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion and Other Factors in **1990** (Odds Ratios).

	Boy		Girl	
	M1	M2	M1	M2
Catholic	1.533	.740	1.412	.711
Protestant	3.082 ***	1.854 *	2.949 ***	2.071 *
YGD	0.778	.693	0.681	.734
Non-religious	1.539 ***	1.067	1.41 **	1.156
Nominal traditionalist	1.185 +	1.049	1.051	1.145
Male		.703 ***		.791 **
Married		1.084		1.328 *
Age		1.013 **		1.011 *
Education		1.108 ***		1.105 ***
City		1.539 ***		1.431 **
Hakka		1.415 **		1.348 *
Mainlander		1.303 *		1.495 **
Aboriginal		1.126		.944
-2loglikelihood	6248	5964	5834.9	5568
N	2394	2394	2394	2394

Table 3.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Educational Aspiration by Religion and Other Factors in **2000** (Odds Ratios).

	Boy		Girl	
	M1	M2	M1	M2
Catholic	.982	.560	1.173	.819
Protestant	2.696 ***	2.027 **	2.099 **	1.717 *
YGD	.861	.795	.985	.922
Non-religious	1.511 **	1.190	1.467 **	1.173
Nominal traditionalist	1.225 *	1.219 +	1.198 +	1.200 +
Male		.798 *		.787 **
Married		1.364 *		1.441 **
Age		1.019 ***		1.018 ***
Education		1.159 ***		1.158 ***
City		1.477 ***		1.400 **
Hakka		1.236		1.222
Mainlander		.901		.898
Aboriginal		1.747		1.292
SES		1.140 **		1.145 **
-2loglikelihood	4830	4645	4803	4616
N	1755	1755	1755	1755

CHAPTER 4: RELIGION AND ABORTION IN TAIWAN

4.1 ABSTRACT

Numerous studies suggest that religion is a major factor leading people to oppose abortion in the U.S. However, most of those studies are limited in two areas: (1) scholars know very little about how religion is associated with abortion in non-Western societies, where non-Judeo Christian religious traditions have been dominant; (2) most of the studies examined the association between religion and abortion attitudes, little research has explored the association between religion and abortion behaviors. Using a nationally representative sample of married women in Taiwan, I investigate how religion affects both attitudes toward abortion and abortion behavior in a Chinese cultural context. The results indicate that conservative religious groups, such as devout Protestants and members of the New Religious Movement Yi-Guan-Dao are the most likely to disapprove of abortion, compared to nominal and secular groups. My field interviews further supported such findings. However, in terms of abortion behavior, nominal Christian report modestly more abortions than other groups do, controlling for other socio-demographic factors.

4.2 INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the Taiwanese government reported that Taiwan has the highest abortion rate in East Asia. As Taiwan has transitioned from a primarily agricultural society to a highly industrialized society over the past half century, the fertility rate decreased dramatically below the replacement level. In 1964 the fertility rate was 3.8 children per woman, while in 2004 it was merely 1.2. At the same time, abortion is widespread. Abortion was practiced in Taiwan long before it became legal in 1985 (Rahma, Katzive, and Henshaw 1998), and private clinics were easily accessible. But now the abortion practice is probably more prevalent. Although scholars disagree over the exact number of abortion obtained in Taiwan each year, they agree that the number is very large. For example, governmental Taiwan Institute of Family Planning estimates suggest that the number of abortions is around 320,000 annually; while non-governmental medical statistics estimate the number is above 500,000 (Tietze and Henshaw 1986, Freedman et al. 1994). Wang and Lin report that in metropolitan areas the abortion rate is about 50%, meaning there is probably one abortion per every live birth (Wang and Lin 1995). This abortion rate is much higher than Western countries (e.g., according to Guttmacher Institute, the current U.S. abortion rate is one abortion per three live births).

On the other hand, Taiwan is also a traditional society. The majority of the population still holds traditional Confucianism family norms and gender role ideologies. One's devotion and obligation to the family is highly emphasized. Why then is abortion

so commonly accepted and practiced? As religion intertwines with Chinese traditional culture, how does religion affect abortion? How do different religious groups view and treat abortion? Does religion matter in such a context, or are religious teachings compromised under conventional family culture? Although abortion is widely studied in the U.S., we know little about how religious beliefs affect abortion attitudes in non-western societies, where non-Judeo Christian traditions are dominant. Thus it is difficult to determine whether it is conservative religions in general or specific Judeo-Christian traditions that discourage abortion. Without empirical studies, we don't know whether Christian religions affect abortion in the same way in other social environments as in the U.S. In order to explore these questions, I utilize a large national survey from Taiwan to explore how religious affects abortion.

Taiwan is an ideal case for testing the consistency of the relationship between religion and abortion, because of its considerable religious diversity (Tamney and Chiang 2002). The majority of the Taiwanese population is religious: approximately 75-80 percent of the population reported practicing various Chinese traditional religions (e.g., Buddhists, Taoists, and many folk religions); about five percent Christian (Protestant and Catholic); and about four percent rising New Religious Movement groups (e.g., Yi-Guan-Dao). Only about 10 percent are not currently affiliated with any religion (Chao 2004, Chiu 2006).

One of the difficulties for abortion-related research is lack of empirical data on obtained abortion. Fortunately, KAP (1998) enumerates the complete pregnancy history of more than 2,800 married women in Taiwan, including their reported abortions. Although any abortion data carries the risk of underreporting, KAP allows the first

empirical study on religion and abortion behavior together with attitudes in a non-western cultural context.

4.3 RESEARCH BACKGROUND

4.3.1 Religion and Abortion in the U.S

Numerous studies show that religion is among the most influential forces influencing abortion in the U.S. Conservative religious groups, such as Catholic and conservative Protestant churches, are more likely to oppose abortion than other groups (e.g., Ebaugh and Haney 1978; Tamney, Johnson, and Burton 1992; Emerson 1996; Evans 2002; Ellison, Echevarria-Cruz, and Smith 2005).

There are several common reasons why conservative religions might oppose abortion: first, conservative Christians tend to hold strict theology and beliefs regarding human life. Citing references in the Bible, they tend to believe life begins at conception (e.g., Psalm 139: 13-16, Job 31: 16). Thus, abortion is often considered “killing” or murder in such context (www.cbn.com).

Secondly, conservative churches tend to emphasize on traditional sexual morality. Sex outside of marriage is strongly discouraged (Adamczyk 2006). They tend to encourage women to delay sex until marriage and to marry earlier. This sexual morality may discourage the chances of having sex outside of marriage and reduce the number of sexual partners. Thus it may reduce the possibilities of having an abortion (Adamczyk and Felson 2006).

Thirdly, religion may also influence abortion indirectly via influencing abortion policies, state legislation, media, and accessibility of abortion clinics (Adamczyk 2006). The percentage of adherents of conservative Protestantism may influence the number of abortion clinics that exist in certain region, and certain religious groups may also put pressure on public media and state legislature to restrict abortion.

Although there are growing variations within certain religious traditions on their view toward abortion, scholars have noticed the convergence among religious traditions in abortion attitudes in recent years (Sullins 1999; Evans 2002; Hoffmann and Johnson 2005). Further, the level of acceptance toward abortion can also be mediated by personal religiosity and church attendance, in that a more devout people are more likely to oppose abortion than their nominal counterparts within the same tradition.

Despite abundant research about religion and abortion attitudes, there is little about religion and abortion behaviors – partially because of lack of data (Adamczyk 2006). Even among demographic studies, most of the work on abortion behaviors is based on data collected from questionnaires distributed to pregnant women in abortion clinics (e.g., Henshaw & Silverman, 1988; Henshaw and Kost, 1996). Without a random sample it is difficult to generalize to the population. Among the few studies of abortion behavior, Amy and Jacobs' work is the only one I can find using a nationally representative sample to analyze this association (Adamczyk and Felson 2006).

Using the data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), they examined the association between religion and abortion decisions for the first out-of-wed-lock pregnancy of unmarried women. However, despite their sophisticated methodology and high quality data, they did not find a significant

association between religiosity and abortion decisions among these young unmarried women. There was no significant association between importance of religion, frequency of prayer, or level of participation of religious youth activities with these reported out-of-wed-lock pregnancies (Adamczyk and Felson 2006). On the other hand, they did find an association between religious denominations and young women's abortion decisions for out-of-wed-lock pregnancy. Young women who are Jews, Catholics, and mainline Protestants are more likely to abort their first unmarried pregnancy, while conservative Protestants are more likely to carry the pregnancy to term (Adamczyk and Felson 2006).

This study might be limited by the characters of research subjects. They only look at young unmarried women up to their mid-twenties who reported having sexual relationship and had an out-of-wed-lock pregnancy between 1996 and 2001. Because religious kids are more likely to avoid both sex outside of marriage and dangerous sexual behaviors, and if they have sex, they are more likely to know how to use contraception correctly (Adamczyk 2006), thus the respondents who are selected in this sample may already be more secular than the general population. Also, this is only based on reported pregnancy from out-of-wedlock sexual relations. People may underreport their sexual relations, pregnancies, and abortions especially when these are related to out-of-wed-lock relations. Furthermore, as large percent of abortions are actually conducted by married women, as 4 out of 10 unintended pregnancies to married women end in abortion each year (Guttmacher Institute 2003), it is important to measure the empirical association between religion and abortion behaviors among married women. This study will contribute in this area.

4.3.2 Traditional Culture, Religion, and Abortion in Taiwan

Reasons for abortion

There are several common reasons why women abort in the U.S.. The most common reason women had an abortion was because having a baby would interfere with their ability to study , work, or have personal development (75% of women cited this as the number one reason) (Finer et.al. 2005). The second most common reason was they could not afford a child. Other common reasons were the women were in an unstable relationship, thus they did not want a baby growing up in a single parent family (Finer et.al. 2005). The percent of abortions due to rape or abuse is less than 1 percent (Finer et.al. 2005). Thus, it seems like the mother's individual choice is highly valued in this context. However, motivations for abortion may be very different in the Chinese context. Especially for married women, her fertility decisions are highly related to the family's wellbeing and the family's overall interests (especially the in-law families). Thus, for a married woman, when there is a conflict between her own interests and her family's benefits, she is often expected to compromise for the sake of meeting her family's needs even the "ancestor's interests."

The patriarchal nature of Taiwanese society is further demonstrated in the Abortion Law. The law authorizes and protects husband's authority over a woman's decision about abortion(Hung 2004). As the law states, when a married woman wants to have abortion, she has to have her husband's consent in order to obtain an abortion. This is very different from the situation in the U.S., where abortion is the woman's choice. In many

cases, a husband's family has great influence over a wife's pregnancy decisions, because a woman's pregnancy is considered to influence family's wellbeing especially the need to continue family lineages. To bear many children is considered blessed, filial, and bringing honor to one's family and ancestors (多子多福, 光宗耀祖). This reveals a core nature of fertility culture in Chinese societies. Not the interest of the woman, nor the interest of the fetus, but the interest of the family, may be the most important element to consider in making an abortion decision. Married women often bear pressure from their spouses and in-laws to have children, especially sons. Thus, I expect that the more traditional the family is, the more likely it is to discourage abortion.

On the other hand, as long as the husband agrees, the requirements for obtaining an abortion are very loose. The law states that if the fetus is deformed or pregnancy might "increase the risk of physical or mental health of the mother," an abortion can be obtained. In reality, government hospitals are very loose in interpreting what "risk of physical or mental health" means, and in most cases, as long as the husband consents, abortions are performed upon request (Moskowitz 2001). In other words, the culture seems to have a very tolerant and pragmatic view toward abortion within marriage. As long as abortion fits family interests, it is generally accepted. So I expect to see that nominal and secular people will be more likely to agree and obtain abortions.

However, compared with abortion inside marriage, abortion outside marriage is more likely to be viewed as immoral. Out-of-wedlock pregnancy and abortion can bring tremendous shame to one's family. In this study, I will only focus on abortion within marriage. In a future article, I will explore the association between religion and abortion outside of marriage in Taiwan.

Religion and abortion in Taiwan

Although certain types of traditional religions such as Buddhism might oppose abortion in theory, Buddhist organizations and clergy in East Asia have rarely articulated their anti-abortion positions (Tribe 1990). Buddhist leaders rarely make clear statements that abortion is killing. Furthermore, many Buddhist and Taoist temples in Taiwan actually provide rituals to bless aborted fetuses (嬰靈); such practices are becoming very popular (Moskowitz 2001). The main goal for such rituals is to bless the aborted fetuses via financial sacrifice from the mother (or parents). By making appeasement with the aborted fetus, the sin and guilt of the mother will be eliminated, and the well-being of the fetuses will be assured, so that she or he will not come back to interrupt or destroy the parent's current life. Such practices may make abortions more acceptable among these traditional religions. Moreover, because family harmony and obligation is often emphasized by those traditions, I expect that in Taiwan the nominal traditional religionists will be more likely to tolerate abortion, compared with Christians.

Further, because traditional religions in Chinese societies do not require regular attendance at a religious institution, there is rarely a solid institutional form of religion (Chiu 2004). Traditional religionists typically come to temples only on religious holidays or when there is an urgent need, such as sickness, preparing university entrance exams, opening a new businesses, etc (Chiu 2004). Nor do fellow believers typically form intense social networks with one another. Moreover, clergies do not function as principle givers or counselors, but more like doorkeepers who collect offerings and maintain the safety and daily routine of the temple. Thus, when there are neither clear beliefs opposing

abortion nor a strong religious community, the influence of religion on abortion might be weak.

New religious movements have been thriving in Taiwan in recent years. The largest one is Yi-Guan Dao (YGD). They are among the fastest growing religious groups, and have about 3.8% of the total population. YGD combines theologies from several major world religions, emphasizes divinely sanctioned morality, and often involves spiritual intervention in their activities. YGD strongly advocates traditional Confucian virtues such as filial piety, loyalty to family, and chastity to fight against the decaying morality in the surrounding secular world (Qin and Ai 2000). Their religious gatherings are intense and secretive, and members are required to follow a strict vegetarian diet (Jochim 2003; Fu 1999; Qin and Ai 2000). Thus, I expect that YGD practitioners will more likely to hold conservative family ideology, and more likely to oppose abortion, than members of other groups.

Taiwan churches, particularly the Taiwanese Presbyterian Church (TPC), have been a leading force promoting Taiwan's political democratization (Chiu 2004; Huang 1996; Chao 2004; Lin 1994). They have been an active voice advocating Taiwan's political reform and independence, promoting human rights for indigenous groups, and initiating the development of mass education and medical care in Taiwan. However, issues related to sexuality are rarely addressed publicly in Christian churches, except by the Taiwanese Catholic Bishop. Still, scholars indicate that Christians in Taiwan have distinct characteristics regarding family morality, sexuality, child-bearing, and ancestor worship (Chiu 1986). Thus, I expect devout or conservative Christians to be more likely to oppose abortion. On the other hand, there may be divisions between devout and nominal

believers regarding abortion and sexuality. Many ordinary members may not follow official teachings from their religious institutions. For example, although Catholic doctrine condemns the use of birth control, in studies from the 1970s to 1980s, about 80% of Taiwanese Catholics think it is acceptable to use birth control (Chiu 2004).

The social-economic distribution of Christians may also influence their attitudes toward abortion. Taiwanese Christians are disproportionately middle class (Chao 2004, Swanson 1981). In the surveys Swanson conducted in the early 1980s, more than one third of church members had college degrees, and they were disproportionately professionals, government workers, officers, students, and other white-collar workers. Overall, I expect Taiwanese Christians will be similar to the Jews in the U.S., a minority, but with high social status and capital, high education rates and high educational aspirations for their children, and small family. Thus, I expect nominal Christians with their comparatively loose spiritual convictions and their western progressive ideas are more likely to support abortion.

However, Most of the Christian churches in Taiwan come from conservative and evangelical backgrounds (Chao 2004). Among these fastest growing Taiwan churches are all the evangelical or charismatic ones who tend to hold conservative and more orthodox Christian theology (Chao 2004). Because of this, they tend to discourage ancestor worship and other folk religious practices, which can be considered as idolatry (Lutz 1971). Not only do they discourage these folk religious practices, they also discourage churches using Confucianism as the primary morality guidance. Instead, the importance of the Bible is often addressed. They tend to reply on the biblical orthodoxy in a way to fight against the “eroding” influence of the surrounding secular and “superstitious”

culture. Because of this, I expect that Taiwan Christians especially devout Christians will be similar to their counterparts in the West that they will be more likely to hold traditional family and sexuality views, thus more likely to oppose abortion.

H1: Taiwanese Christians, particularly devout believers, will be more likely to oppose abortion than other groups.

H2: Taiwanese devout traditionalists and YGD will also be more likely to discourage abortion, and abort less.

H2: Due to reproduction pressure and vague doctrine, nominal Chinese traditional religionists are more likely to approve abortion than other devout religious members.

H4: Non-religious people will be the most likely to support abortion than other religious groups.

4.4 DATA

During the past two decades, Taiwan has had high quality surveys with measures of both religion and gender issues that are analogous to those in major U.S. surveys, but adapted to Chinese culture. This allows me to examine the religion-gender-family connection in a non-western context. Our analysis draws on data from the 8th wave of the *Knowledge of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception Survey* (KAP) in Taiwan, conducted in 1998 by the Taiwan Institute of Family Planning, a governmental institution under the Department of Health. Analogous to the *National Survey of Family Growth* in the U.S., the KAP collected data from a nationally representative sample of ever-married women aged 20-60 in Taiwan every 3-5 years since 1965. The KAP includes rich information on women's marital and fertility histories, family planning

methods and contraception use, actual and desired number and sex of children, gender role attitudes, working histories, religious beliefs and practices, and family background. KAP provides incredible measures of women's abortion history, motivations for abortion, and preference for sex of children. Being the most comprehensive data source on fertility and marriage in Taiwan, KAP enables me to examine how is religion associated with attitudes toward abortion and contraception use in a Chinese cultural context. The data also allow me to investigate the effects of other prevalent religious practices, such as ancestor worship, on abortion and birth control. The data used in this study come from 1998 KAP, the latest available year of data. After eliminating missing values, my working sample contains 2,720 cases.

Besides the quantitative data, I also conducted 22 in-depth interviews in Taipei with "knowledgeable informants" in June 2007. My 22 interviewees come from various religious and social backgrounds. My original sampling method of using the existing TSCS 2000 sampling list was not successful. Thus, in order to obtain a useful sample in a very limited time, Dr. Hei-yuan Chiu and other scholars in Taiwan, he has helped me construct a purposive sample taking the religion, gender, resident place, ethnicity, education and social background of respondents into consideration. My final sample included 22 successful interviews, including both clergies and lay worshippers from all the major religious groups I studied in the quantitative research. There are four Buddhists, including one master, one abbot, and two devoted lay Buddhists; there are three folk religion practitioners, one is an accountant in a folk temple, one is a Taxi driver, and one runs a computer shop. There is one new religious movement (YGD) teacher; seven Catholics, including one priest, one nun, and five lay members from various social

background; and seven Protestants from various denominations, with two pastors and five lay protestants. My qualitative discussions are mainly based on these interviews.

4.5 MEASURES

Dependent variables

Attitudes toward abortion. The first set of the dependent variables relate to the level of disapproval toward abortion. Respondents were asked to report their levels of (dis)approval toward abortion under the following five circumstances: (a) “when a wife wants to space childbirths more widely;” (b) “when a couple does not want to have any more children, but did not use contraception;” (c) “when a wife used birth control, but the birth control failed and she became pregnant;” (d) “when a family has no financial ability to afford more children;” (e) “when an unmarried woman accidentally became pregnant with her boyfriend.” The response items are coded with the higher scores indicating more accepting views of abortion (from “strongly disapprove”=1 to “strongly approve” =5).

Reported number of abortions. One of the greatest advantage of this study is the data not only provide abortion attitudes but also actual abortion behavior. Number of abortions is calculated through pregnancy history. KAP asks respondents how did your xth pregnancy end: if she reported it ended in abortion I coded it as 1; then calculates the total number of abortions by summarizing the total number of abortions after all pregnancies.¹²

¹² *Timing of abortion.* In order to further analyze the timing of abortion, in terms of whether respondent will choose an abortion after certain number of children or after certain number of sons, I also calculate series of dummy variables measuring first abortion after having no children, 1 child, 2 children, 3 children, and 4 children; and also a series of dummy variables indicating first abortion without a son, first abortion

Religion Measures

Religious affiliation. Measuring religion is a complicated issue in the Chinese/Taiwanese context. Because the distinctions between different Chinese religious traditions are vague, even though in surveys people self-identify as either Taoists, Buddhists, and Folk religionists, in reality, there are no clear boundaries between these three groups especially for lay people. The deities of these three religions are not exclusive and the pragmatic orientation of Chinese traditional religions makes lay believers worship multiple deities at the same time. Lay believers are usually not very familiar with the doctrinal differences between specific religions; deities are worshipped as long as they are efficient in bringing blessings and protection. Thus, scholars tend to treat them under the broad rubric of “Chinese traditional religion.” In my analysis I did the same thing. I created a series of dummy variables for each religious affiliation and divided each tradition between devoted believers and nominal ones. Thus the final categories include: devout Christians, nominal Christians, Devout Chinese traditional religionists, nominal Chinese traditional religionists, YGD, and non-religious. Devout Chinese traditional religionists is the largest group and the reference category in my analyses.

Other covariates


I include relevant socio-demographic factors in my models, such as respondent’s age (measured in years), subjective household income, place of residence (1=rural, 0=otherwise), education (measured in years), and a series of dummy variables for ethnicity (Fukien=reference group, Hakka, Mainlanders, and Aboriginal).

after 1 son, after 2 sons, after 3 sons, and after 4 sons. However, I found no significant results in these analyses indicating religious variation in timing of abortion.

4.6 ANALYTIC STRATEGY

The analysis involves three steps: in Table 4.1, I provide the means and standard deviations of abortion attitudes by religion. In Table 4.2 to Table 4.6, I estimate ordered logistic regression models, predicting the net effects of religion on five indicators of attitudes toward abortion. In Table 4.7 using Poisson Regression Model (PMS), I examine the net effects of religion on actual reported numbers of abortions and timing of abortions. I use PMS because the dependent variable “number of abortion” is not normally distributed as shown in the following graph. It is a count variable with a low mean count (Scott and Long 2002). Most people (71%) have not had any abortions. The final sample includes 2,720 respondents.

Figure 4.1 Frequency of Reported Number of Abortions in KAP 1998



4.7 RESULTS

[Table 4.1 about here]

Table 4.1 shows the comparisons of means and standard deviations of abortion attitudes by religion. I coded responses so that the higher score indicates higher levels of support for abortion. I also compared means using SCHEFFE tests in STATA. To save space, I omit the full table for the SCHEFFE tests. According to the results, YGD respondents have the lowest approval for abortion on most questions; and devout Christians show the second lowest scores on most questions. Although the differences of mean between YGD and devout Christians are not statistically significant, these groups are significantly lower than the other groups on all items. On the other hand, nominal Christians display the highest approval of abortion on most items, followed by the non-religious and nominal traditionalists. However, the mean differences among these three groups are not significant. In other words, YGD and devout Christians are more likely to oppose abortion than nominal groups and secular people.

[Table 4.2 to 4.6 about here]

Table 4.2 to Table 4.6 show results from the ordered logistic regression models examining religious effects on attitudes toward abortion. Table 4.2 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion for the purpose of spacing children. Table 4.3 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion because respondents do not want any more children. Table 4.4 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion

because of birth control failure. Table 4.5 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion due to family financial constraint. Table 4.6 examines religious effects on attitudes toward abortion due to pregnancy outside of marriage. The first four justifications seem to deal with practical fertility concerns, while the fifth one also deals with moral aspects of unmarried pregnancy. Because the dependent variables are ordinal variables (from 1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree), ordered logistic regression models are the most appropriate (Powers and Yu 2000). In each of the five tables I include three models. Model 1 is the base model with only religion variables. In Model 2 I added socio-demographic factors such as age, respondent's education, estimated family income, ethnicity, participation in the labor force before first pregnancy, and whether respondent lives in cities. In Model 3, I also controlled for previous abortion experience measuring whether respondent had any abortion before or not. Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported in each table. In all those five models, non-religious is the reference group.¹³

The multivariate results confirmed the descriptive findings: in all of these five tables, devout Christians and YGD practioners are significantly more likely to oppose abortion, compared with secular non-religious people and nominal groups. Nominal groups such as nominal Christians and traditional religion groups do not display significantly different views toward abortion. Thus, contra expectations, devout traditionalists are not significantly more likely to discourage abortion compared with

¹³ In supplemental analyses, I use all the other groups as reference categories—for example, nominal traditional religionists and non-religious groups. The results are consistent with the above tables. Devout Christians and YGD devotees are much more likely to oppose abortion than nominal religious believers and secular respondents.

nominal traditionalists or secular people. Thus, in Table 4.4 predicting abortion attitudes due to birth control failure, nominal Christians and nominal traditionalists have slightly more tolerant attitudes toward abortion compared with secular people and other groups. In other words, most of the original hypotheses are supported in that conservative Christians and YGD are more likely to oppose abortion, compared with secular and nominal groups.

There are also some interesting results involving the other covariates. For example, more education is associated with more favorable attitudes about abortion; people who live in the cities are more likely to favor abortion compared with people who live in the rural areas; people who have had abortion before are significantly more likely to favor abortion under all circumstances, compared with people who report not having abortion before.

[Table 4.7 about here]

Table 4.7 shows a Poisson regression model (PRM) examining religious effects on reported numbers of abortions. Interestingly, nominal Christians report having slightly higher numbers of abortion than secular respondents ($CE=.44, p<.05$), with all other socio-demographic factors considered.

4.8 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

4.8.1 LIMITATION OF QUANTITATIVE STUDY

First, I have to acknowledge the limitations of this study: (1) limited religion measures. I only used two measures of religion, denomination and self-perceived “devotedness.” Because religious phenomena in Chinese societies are very different from the West, an affiliation measure cannot tease out the complexity of religious effect on

abortion in Taiwan. Further surveys with better religion measures are greatly needed. (2) Very small samples for certain religious groups. Christianity and YGD are minority religions. Christians (Protestant and Catholic together) make up no more than 5% of the Taiwanese population, and YGD is only about 3 percent of the population, thus the final number of observations included in the sample are very small. For example, I only have 120 Christians and 40 YGD members vs. more than 2,000 Chinese traditional religionists. Thus comparisons among these groups are limited by these small N, potential significant findings might be suppressed because of large standard errors. (3) This study only includes a sample of married women in Taiwan. I will further explore religious effects on abortion with unmarried women in another paper. (4) In a separate paper, I will also explore the association between religious effects on son preference and sex-selective abortions.

4.8.2 Field Interviews and Discussion

My qualitative field research further examines the quantitative results. Consistent with the survey research, there are significant variations among different religious groups on their attitudes toward abortion.

For example, Mr. Chang, a new pastor for the Church of Revival, a small fundamentalist/evangelical church in Taipei city, expressed his opposition on abortion in all circumstances: “Children are given by God...God has already known us even when we are in our mother’s womb... Any killing is not right.” Interestingly, he also explained “how” this kind of teaching is expressed. “Even though the church has strong opinion opposing abortion,” Mr. Chang said, “the church rarely directly opposes abortion in

sermons or in any public occasions.” When asking the reason, Mr. Chang explained. “Well, Taiwan society is still a traditional society, for the topics related to sexuality, people will still feel it is embarrassing or improper to talk about it directly...So sometimes we will mention this in private conversations, in counseling, or in small Sunday school classes.” This reveals a very typical dilemma these conservative churches face: they hold traditional views opposing abortion, on the hand, because they also have traditional or conservative cultural norms, they are very reluctant to address sexuality related issues publicly. Different from many conservative churches in the U.S. who tend to vocally oppose abortion, this doubly traditional character of Chinese conservative churches may hinder their direct influence on abortion issues.

Similar to the fundamentalist/evangelical church pastor, the True Jesus Church member Mr. Hei also expressed similar attitudes toward abortion. The True Jesus Church is a fast growing but very conservative branch among Taiwan Protestant churches. Mr. Hei, a very devout Christian, goes to church at least five times per week, explained that his church strongly opposes abortion especially abortion due to sex outside of marriage, “because it implies sexual immorality.” In terms of abortion within marriage, he said with strong emotions, “Although the church does not emphasize it as much as abortion outside of marriage, it is still considered as a serious sin!” In his own life, he and his wife have four children. Originally they wanted no more than three kids, but his wife got pregnant again unexpectedly, and because they would not get an abortion, she gave birth to the forth child.

The YGD teacher I interviewed also expressed her opposition to abortion similar to those conservative Protestants. Ms. Bai, said: “Our temple focuses on teaching our

traditional virtues such as chastity and loyalty to one's family. Abortion should be discouraged. You have heard so many stories nowadays about a high school girl or even a middle school girl got pregnant...the world is poisoning for our children...if we allow abortion, it will encourage their behaviors.” “What about abortion within marriage, for example a couple wants to abort because their contraception failed?” She responded. “We do not encourage abortion because abortion kills life...We have seen some of really heartbreaking Video programs showing how much a fetus suffers during abortion...” She also mentioned that during their seasonal classes they will show those anti-abortion programs to teenagers and adults. Similar to Christian churches, Ms. Bai also mentioned that they have many cell group programs. Through these cell groups, they often visit members' homes, counsel their family lives, and if they found out someone wants to abort, they will pay special visit to help them make the “right” decision.

In my interviews, people also emphasized the impact of religion on the transformation of their attitudes toward abortion, which cannot be reflected by cross-sectional survey data. For example, Ms. Wang, an active member of a large charismatic church in Taipei--when asked about her opinion about abortion-- she responded after a long pause. “Well, I have had two abortions before I was thirty five. At that time I was not a Christian. I would have made different choices if I were a Christian then.” She emphasized that her conversion to Christianity changed how she views abortion. “When I was pregnant at that moment, I found there are some abnormal symptoms of the fetuses. I did not have faith...My husband was not a Christian at that moment either. So we decided not to risk it and aborted the fetuses.” She added. “But now I so regret this, because now I know children are given by God, and that the mother does not encounter

fetal physical problems, people should not abort.” Now as a mother of two children and an active member in the church choir, she often volunteers to counsel younger sisters in church who express their desires to obtain abortions.

My interviews also demonstrated the distinct variation among Taiwan Protestants. For example, Mr. Wei, a sixty years old pastor of a small Presbyterian church in Taipei, gave me a very different answers about abortion. He thinks abortion should be allowed for any reason. He explained why he believes so. “I have two sons, but my elder son died when he was only one year and seven month old. When he was born he already had a brain deficiency...At that moment, my wife and I lived in a small rural town in the south. If we could have accessed advanced technology or medical examination, we would have chose to abort the baby, rather than giving birth to him and letting everybody suffer...” He added. “Before I became a pastor, I have been a counselor in elementary and middle schools for thirty years. I have seen so many ‘problematic children’ who are actually the fruits of very problematic families...Our faith teaches us to be responsible, to care about others, so if the parents are not ready to have a child, nor ready to sacrifice for their kids, no matter whether they are married or not, they should choose to abort the baby rather than let him or her live... It is better to abort a fetus than letting a child grow up in unloving homes.” Thus, he agrees with abortion for any condition, no matter whether it is because pre-marital sex, or because of contraception failure within marriage, or just because parents feel they cannot afford another baby. In other words, different from his conservative counterparts, it seems that these social concerns have more weights on his attitudes than religious concern about “taking a life.” In a different setting, my conversations with two other members from this church show very similar attitudes

toward abortion. As one woman, Ms Hong, a member of this church, said: “We should not tell people what to do. Abortion is their own decision. The church should leave to the individuals to decide.”

Scholars suggest that conservative religious teachings can function as a mechanism for building up a collective identity by asserting distinct moral boundaries (e.g., Wilcox 2004). Although the data show association between religious background and abortion practices, they do confirm the idea that religion can function as an identity boundary as scholars suggest. On the other hand, nominal Christians may be less shaped by conservative theology, less monitored by their religious community regarding their religious practices, or encounter pressure to maintain a solid religious boundary with the secular surroundings. More importantly, as nominal Christians are disproportionate upper-middle to middle class members highly educated urban professionals, they may be more attracted to the “Westernness” or “modernness” associated with Christianity. They may also more likely to emphasize education achievement and maintaining comparative elite social status. Thus the pressure to raise “quality” children rather than “quantity” of children may influence them to favor abortion.

I also interviewed a Buddhist authority, the executive Abbot of Zhong-Tai Buddhist Monastery, one of the four largest Buddhist lineages with 1,500 monks and nuns in residence and thousands of lay practitioners throughout Taiwan. “What is your opinion about abortion? How does your temple address abortion issues?” Abbot Yun responded. “As a Zen Buddhist, we focus on meditation and reading (Buddhism) classics... The classics tell us that in each living features there is Buddha. Everybody can have a chance to become a Buddha...A sincere Buddhist does not kill...We hope our members

understand this...” Different from the conservative Protestants or the YGD member I interviewed, The Abbot mentioned this without a strong emotional attachment. He did not seem to be alarmed by this issue as other conservative members. When I further asked him whether the monastery has any classes or teachings specifically deal with abortion issues, Abbot Yun said they do not have any, but he emphasized that he hopes the members will understand this by themselves when studying the classics. As scholars mentioned, Chinese religious institutions have downplayed their positions regarding abortion issues. The passive attitudes the abbot showed is consistent with what scholars have found how typical Buddhist priesthood deal with these issues (Moskowitz 2001; Jiang 1996; Jones 1999). Further, as most Chinese traditional religious groups tend to be un-institutionalized and diffused (Yang 1967), most lay practitioners come to participate in religious rituals without building up a strong social network through religious organizations, the institutional influence on abortion issues may be further limited.

4.9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION

In summary, utilizing a large nationally representative survey from Taiwan, I examine the impact of religion on abortion. The results demonstrate that conservative religious traditions, particularly devout Christians and New Religious Movement YGD practitioners, are most likely to oppose abortion, compared with nominal and secular people. Those groups tend to emphasize the moral aspects of abortion, thus they discourage abortion motivated by pragmatic marital fertility concerns such as spacing children, birth control failure, or financial restraint, or abortion due to pregnancy outside of marriage. There is no significant difference between those conservative groups, nor

among the nominal and secular groups, while there are significant differences between those conservative parts from the nominal counterparts. When further exploring actual reported numbers of abortion, interestingly, nominal Christians in Taiwan report have slightly more abortions than secular groups, with other factors taken in control. However, there is no significant religious variation on timing of abortion, meaning religion does not seem to have significant association with abortion after certain number of children or certain number of sons according to these data.

Study limitation and future directions

(a) Limitation of measures: Although KAP has rich information about women's pregnancy history and marital life, it has only very basic religion questions: affiliation and level of devoutness. There are three other questions about ancestor worship and Feng-shui practice, however, in my preliminary analyses none of these measures were significantly associated with any of the outcome variables. I think that future surveys with better measures for religious practices and beliefs are specially needed. For example, when dealing with abortion, religion questions that are related to understanding of life and death, life after death, spiritual beliefs, and folk rituals specially blessing aborted fetuses, are particularly important. It would also be useful to have open-ended questions asking respondent's reasons for abortion. By doing so, scholars can have a better understanding of the mechanism of the religion-abortion association.

(b) This data only examine woman's attitudes toward abortion. However, in the Chinese context abortion is often a family decision (Moskowitz 2001). Even the law requires a husband's consent for obtaining an abortion (Hung 2004). Thus, future data that also include husband's and other family member's (such as in-law parents) attitudes

toward abortion are needed. It would be helpful if future pregnancy surveys asked questions about spouses' and family members' religious practices and beliefs. Thus, we could examine whether and how family influence women's abortion attitudes and behavior.

(c) A third limitation of this study is that I only examine the association between religion and abortion among married women. In the future I want to expand the current study into examining the link between religion and abortion attitudes and behaviors among unmarried women, as the patterns of abortion of unmarried women may be very different from married women (Guttmacher Institute website). Married women may be more concerned about having a desired number of children and family financial constraints, while unmarried women may face more social pressure and stigma in dealing with pregnancy out of wed-lock. Thus, it will be interesting to examine whether religion influences people's attitudes and behavior in the same way for unmarried women, whether the religion-abortion association will be stronger or weaker in dealing with sexual morality related abortions. Fortunately, KAP also has data of unmarried women that will allow me to examine this association.

(d) In the current study I only use KAP data from 1998. This only provides a snapshot of the association between religion and abortion. It cannot reflect how the religion-abortion association changes over time. Thus, in future research I hope to examine the trend in the religion-abortion association using KAP data from 1965 to 1998 (or later if available) for both abortion attitudes and abortion behaviors.

(e) I would also like to expand my current research of the religion-abortion association in other East Asian societies such as Mainland China, Singapore, and South

Korea. According to Guttmacher Institute, about 60 percent of women in Asia have had an abortion, compared with 17 percent of women in Europe and five percent in other developed countries. It would be interesting to examine whether the findings in this study can be supported in other East Asian societies where similar cultural context are presented. I am interested in searching for data that have both religion and pregnancy questions, or to collect data with scholars who are in these places.

Table 4.1: Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Abortion Attitudes by Religion Groups

	Spacing children		Want no more children		Birth control failure		Financial restraint		Unmarried pregnancy		N
Devout Christian	2.17	(1.01)	2.27	(.99)	2.20	(.92)	2.92	(1.17)	2.77	(1.15)	75
Nominal Christian	2.60	(1.19)	2.91	(1.18)	3.00	(1.22)	3.40	(1.12)	3.31	(1.12)	45
Devout Traditional	2.36	(1.03)	2.57	(1.11)	2.62	(1.06)	3.31	(1.15)	3.11	(1.16)	1385
Nominal Traditional	2.44	(1.07)	2.69	(1.13)	2.75	(1.09)	3.45	(1.08)	3.32	(1.07)	747
YGD	1.85	(.77)	2.28	(1.18)	2.05	(1.01)	2.70	(1.32)	2.68	(1.10)	40
Non-religious	2.45	(1.10)	2.73	(1.16)	2.67	(1.06)	3.45	(1.11)	3.26	(1.09)	497
Total	2.39	(1.05)	2.62	(1.12)	2.65	(1.07)	3.36	(1.13)	3.18	(1.13)	2789

Note: All attitude variables are coded from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating a higher level of approval.

Table 4.2: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitude toward Abortion for Spacing Children

	Model1			Model2			Model3		
Devout Christian	-.454	(.23)	*	-.530	(.24)	*	-.547	(.25)	*
Nominal Christian	.272	(.29)		.234	(.31)		.156	(.30)	
Devout Traditional	-.109	(.09)		.045	(.10)		.035	(.10)	
Nominal Traditional	.022	(.11)		.085	(.11)		.075	(.11)	
YGD	-.973	(.29)	**	-.928	(.30)	**	-.938	(.30)	**
Education				.038	(.01)	**	.039	(.01)	***
Income				.047	(.04)		.041	(.05)	
work before 1st kid				-.052	(.07)		-.059	(.07)	
31-40				.179	(.11)	+	.069	(.11)	
41-50				.220	(.12)	+	.096	(.12)	
51-60				-.023	(.14)		-.119	(.14)	
Hakka				.116	(.10)		.112	(.10)	
Mainlander				.256	(.15)	+	.241	(.15)	
Aboriginal				.445	(.26)	+	.416	(.26)	
city				.065	(.08)		.021	(.08)	
Have had abortion							.853	(.08)	***
-2 log likelihood	7695.4			7253.6			7147.2		
N	2,720			2,720			2,720		

Table 4.3: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitude toward Abortion for not Wanting More Children

	Model1			Model2			Model3		
Devout Christian	-.690	(.22)	**	-.723	(.24)	**	-.755	(.24)	**
Nominal Christian	.315	(.28)		.296	(.30)		.242	(.29)	
devout Traditional	-.219	(.09)	*	-.091	(.10)		-.095	(.10)	
Nominal									
Traditional	-.041	(.10)		.009	(.11)		.006	(.11)	
YGD	-.786	(.31)	*	-.744	(.31)	*	-.717	(.31)	*
Education				.053	(.01)	***	.055	(.01)	***
Income				.023	(.04)		.023	(.04)	
work before 1st kid				.118	(.07)		.115	(.07)	
31-40				.307	(.10)	**	.201	(.10)	+
41-50				.432	(.11)	***	.313	(.12)	**
51-60				.168	(.14)		.071	(.14)	
Hakka				.029	(.10)		.038	(.10)	
Mainlander				.183	(.15)		.175	(.15)	
Aboriginal				.280	(.25)		.255	(.26)	
City				.050	(.08)		.000	(.08)	
Have had abortion							.892	(.08)	***
-2 log likelihood	7968.4			7510.6			7398.4		
N	2,720			2,720			2,720		

Table 4.4: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion Due to Failed Birth Control

	Model1			Model2			Model3		
Devout Christian	-.743	(.22)	**	-.752	(.23)	**	-.777	(.23)	**
Nominal Christian	.602	(.29)	*	.614	(.30)	*	.569	(.30)	+
devout Traditional	-.067	(.09)		.036	(.10)		.049	(.10)	
Nominal Traditional	.157	(.10)		.190	(.11)	+	.202	(.11)	+
YGD	-1.113	(.30)	***	-1.086	(.31)	***	-1.042	(.31)	**
education				.043	(.01)	***	.044	(.01)	***
income				.106	(.04)	*	.106	(.04)	*
work before 1st kid				-.019	(.07)		.115	(.07)	
31-40				.294	(.10)	**	.183	(.10)	+
41-50				.411	(.11)	***	.294	(.12)	*
51-60				.214	(.14)		.112	(.14)	
Hakka				.136	(.09)		.131	(.10)	
Mainlander				.076	(.15)		.058	(.15)	
Aboriginal				.273	(.26)		.262	(.26)	
city				-.112	(.08)		-.161	(.08)	*
Have had abortion							.852	(.08)	***
-2 log likelihood	7964.1			7530.6			7420.4		
N	2,720			2,720			2,720		

Table 4.5: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion Due to Financial Constraint

	Model1			Model2			Model3		
Devout Christian	-.820	(.22)	***	-.783	(.24)	**	-.772	(.24)	**
Nominal Christian	-.054	(.29)		-.072	(.30)		-.116	(.30)	
devout Traditional	-.201	(.10)	*	-.048	(.10)		-.050	(.10)	
Nominal Traditional	.021	(.11)		.090	(.11)		.090	(.11)	
YGD	-1.163	(.31)	***	-1.104	(.31)	***	-1.096	(.31)	***
Education				.065	(.01)	***	.066	(.01)	***
income				.070	(.05)		.064	(.05)	
work before 1st kid				.058	(.07)		-.017	(.07)	
31-40				.162	(.11)		.086	(.11)	
41-50				.107	(.12)		.013	(.12)	
51-60				-.071	(.14)		-.144	(.14)	
Hakka				-.270	(.10)	**	-.274	(.10)	**
Mainlander				-.101	(.15)		-.103	(.15)	
Aboriginal				.153	(.26)		.127	(.26)	
city				.183	(.08)	*	.158	(.08)	*
Have had abortion							.615	(.08)	***
-2 log likelihood	7693.4			7236.6			7177.8		
N	2,720			2,720			2,720		

Table 4.6: Ordered Logistic Regression Models Predicting Attitudes toward Abortion of Unmarried Women Pregnant with Boyfriend

	Model1		Model2		Model3	
Devout Christian	-.733 (.22)	**	-.562 (.23)	*	-.551 (.23)	*
Nominal Christian	.122 (.28)		.231 (.29)		.188 (.29)	
devout Traditional	-.203 (.09)	*	-.030 (.10)		-.035 (.10)	
Nominal Traditional	.116 (.10)		.214 (.10)	*	.216 (.10)	*
YGD	-.868 (.29)	**	-.835 (.29)	**	-.814 (.29)	**
Education			.067 (.01)	***	.068 (.01)	***
Income			.098 (.04)	*	.094 (.04)	*
work before 1st kid			.063 (.07)		.068 (.07)	
31-40			.243 (.10)	*	.171 (.10)	
41-50			.321 (.12)	**	.238 (.12)	*
51-60			.261 (.14)	+	.200 (.14)	
Hakka			-.098 (.10)		-.099 (.10)	
Mainlander			.097 (.14)		.096 (.14)	
Aboriginal			-.303 (.27)		-.327 (.27)	
City			.300 (.08)	***	.267 (.08)	***
Have had abortion					.542 (.08)	***
-2 log likelihood	8386.2		7889.8		7845.8	
N	2,720		2,720		2,720	

Table 4.7: Poisson Regression Model (PRM)
 Predicting Numbers of Abortion by Religion
 and Other Factors

	Model 1		Model 2	
Devout Christian	.280	(.17)	.086	(.19)
Nominal Christian	.494	(.20) *	.439	(.20) *
devout Traditional	.120	(.08)	.094	(.09)
Nominal Traditional	.064	(.09)	.065	(.09)
YGD	-.116	(.28)	-.144	(.28)
Education			.007	(.01)
Income			.038	(.04)
work before 1st kid			-.159	(.06) **
31-40			.739	(.11) ***
41-50			.887	(.12) ***
51-60			.769	(.13) ***
Hakka			.020	(.08)
Mainlander			.157	(.11)
Aboriginal			.262	(.20)
City			.165	(.07) *
-2log likelihood	5120.8		4889.7	
LR chi2	8.6		94.0	
Model P value	.1		.0	
N	2720		2720	

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

5.1 SUMMARY OF STUDY

This study is to examine the effects of religion on gender and family issues in Taiwan. I explore whether religion matters and how religion is associated with gender relations, particularly in the areas of family gender roles, educational aspirations, and abortion attitudes and decisions. This study is not to explain the total variation in social influences on gender issues. There are many other social factors such as urbanization, participation in the labor force and family status which may also influence gender equality in Taiwan; however these topics are not the focus of this dissertation.

Based on data from the *Taiwan Social Change Survey* (TSCS) and the *Knowledge of, Attitudes toward, and the Practice of Contraception Survey* (KAP), my findings show that religion is significantly associated with gender roles and family relations in Taiwan. Conservative religious groups such as Taiwan Protestants and Yi-Guan-Dao members are more likely to support traditional gender role ideologies and traditional norms regarding abortion and sexuality, while Catholics and secular groups tend to hold more liberal attitudes than their conservative counterparts.

On attitudes toward education, there is no significant gender gap among religious groups; the difference lies in overall educational aspirations. Taiwan Protestants show the highest aspirations and Yi-Guan-Dao members the lowest; Catholics and Chinese religionists are in the middle and do not have significant differences in their educational attitudes. My field interviews in Taiwan further supported these findings.

One unexpected finding is that nominal Christians actually reported slightly more abortions than others. This may be due to the very small N in the sample; but it may also be because nominal Christians are less affected by conservative Biblical teachings and have more liberal views regarding abortion and sexuality. Their disproportionately middle or upper middle social status and their closeness with “Western” culture, may further accentuate the liberal practices concerning family and fertility issues.

W. Bradford Wilcox and other scholars argue that the reason why these conservative groups focus on traditional ideology is that it functions as a symbolic boundary which helps them distinguish themselves from the surrounding secular culture (Wilcox 2004). However, there may be a loose connection between ideology and practice in the day-to-day life of members.

Another unanticipated finding is that unlike conservative Protestants in the West (e.g., Darnell and Sherkat 1997, Sherkat and Darnell 1999), Protestants in Taiwan have the highest educational aspirations for both boys and girls despite their conservative gender and sexuality ideologies. This may be partly due to the intimate relation between Protestantism and the development of Taiwan’s modern education. Because early Protestant missionaries promoting mass education in Taiwan, Taiwanese Protestants may have more positive attitudes toward modern education. Moreover, as Christianity is often associated with Western civilization in non-western societies, Christians in Taiwan may further welcome modern education to resist the over-whelming influence of “superstitious” folk culture. Their minority status may further pressure them toward greater social and educational achievement like Jews in the U.S.

5.2 SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE RELIGION, GENDER, AND FAMILY ASSOCIATION

Theological Beliefs and Perception toward Family Modernization

Consistent with the literature in the U.S., conservative groups such as fundamentalist/evangelical Protestants, are more likely to hold traditional gender and family ideologies compared with other religious groups (Wilcox 2004). They are more likely to think modernization is “eroding” traditional family life, destroying marriages and family stability, and bringing harm to children. According to my study, it seems that conservative groups also tend to draw on religious concerns such as life and death issue, or Biblical principles to resist family “modernization,” while liberal religionists seem to rely more on humanitarian and social concerns to develop their response to modernization.

Instead of being changed by the secular culture, conservative groups emphasize their transformation from a secular perspective back to religious orthodox (Biblical guidance). On the other hand, Catholics and mainline Protestants (in my case the Taiwan Presbyterians) tend to accommodate to the changing family culture; they tend to feel more comfortable with the generic cultural norms and more likely to welcome them. This is also consistent with the situation in the West.

However, it seems that religion has greater influence over beliefs than practice. This is demonstrated by one of the unanticipated findings in this dissertation: although devout Christians and YGD members tend to strongly oppose abortion, there is no significant difference in the actual number of abortions between religious groups.

The Influence of Religious Community

This study shows that religion has the strongest association with gender and family relations for members of religious groups with intense religious networks and community life, such as conservative Protestants (CP) and YGD members. Although CPs and YGD members have very different theological beliefs, they are similar organizationally. Both emphasize close social networks among members and between clergies and laity. Both require frequent attendance to a fixed religious place (temple or church) and have frequent gatherings at member's or teacher's homes. The clergy or elders I interviewed from both traditions mention their frequent home visits to members as an effective way of mentoring. Such close networks also function as an accountability system to help members understand the religious teachings and solve family issues according to the principles given by these religious organizations (e.g., dealing with an abortion).

On the other hand, Chinese traditional religionists, and even Catholics, do not have such strong community life and organizational contacts. It seems this lack of close network accentuates the loose connection between church/temple teaching and laity's family practices. Because mainstream folk and traditional Chinese religions tend to be diffused, non-institutional and have vague ethical teachings, their impact over gender issues and family life seems to be weak. Unlike the dominant religious groups in the West or the highly organized small conservative groups in Taiwan, the diffused nature of Chinese religions dissipates influence over both member's family behaviors and the ability to mobilize social movements to influence legislation and public opinion.. Large traditional organizations such as Zhong-Tai Monestry, Ci-Zi Charity Association, Buddhist Light Mountain, Xing-Tian Temple, etc, are generally indifferent to family and

moral issues (Moskowitz 2001). The influence of these religions over people's gender and family relations does not seem to be strong.

SES and Cultural Background

On the other hand, it may be that differences in the socio-demographic character of different religious groups indirectly influences these outcomes. For example, Christians in Taiwan are disproportionately from the middle or upper-middle classes, tend to have more education, and tend to work in government or other white-collar professions. Even after controlling for respondent's current SES and education, Christians are still very different – especially in their educational attitudes. However, this could result from generations of accumulated status and educational advantage. The effect of this family background and this accumulated cultural or social capital needs more scholarly attention.

At the time of the survey, respondents' opinions may be influenced not only by their own religion and SES, but also the accumulated cultural capital they receive from their religious community. For example, fellow religious members may have more contacts with the West, have a high proportion of friends who have studied or lived abroad, etc. Churches may often bring in speakers from other countries, introduce materials from the U.S. or other countries, provide library facility to read books or materials in other languages, etc. These may not only provide a "second-education" resource outside of one's formal education, it may also influence respondent's views on family and gender relations. Further research needs to better measure and examine such "indirect" influence of religious or cultural capital that are associated with certain religious traditions.

5.3 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION

This dissertation makes several methodological contributions. First, it contributes to a new field: the empirical study of religion and family life in East Asia. This is the first empirical study utilizing large-scale representative survey data to examine the association between religion and gender and family issues in a Chinese society. The current Chinese literature is dominated by ethnographic study of religion and descriptive studies of religious data from surveys without examining religion's influence in other fields of human life.

Second, this dissertation tests theories developed in the Judeo-Christian West, to see how they work in a non-Judeo-Christian context. This helps us understand how much of differences found between religious groups are related to inherent aspects of that tradition, and how much are they associated with unmeasured contextual factors.

Third, this study combines qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative research enriches the quantitative arguments and helps us understand the deeper mechanisms through which religion influences gender and family life in Taiwan. Hopefully, this dissertation will inspire future research using both methods to study religious influences on human life in societies around the world.

5.4 Future Research Plan

One limitation of this cross-sectional study is that I can only look at a snapshot of the association between religion and gender and family issues in a certain year. Thus, it is difficult to understand changes in the association between religion and family. This is particularly problematic because Taiwan has gone through tremendous social and

economic change in the past several decades. Thus, in future research, I plan to examine the changing religion-family association using data from 1984 to 2009 in TSCS, and from 1965 to 1998 (or even later) in KAP. Has religions influence increased or decreased? What is likely to happen to the religion and family association in the future? In order to answer these questions, trend analysis using data from different years are needed.

Another limitation of this study is the very small N for minority religious groups like Protestants, Catholics and YGD members. Although these small groups seem to have extremely interesting and distinctive characteristics, they are less than five percent of entire population, thus the number of respondents in each year is very small. This prevents testing distinctions between Presbyterians and other Taiwanese Protestants or between indigenous Christians and Chinese Christians, for example.

Fortunately, both TSCS and KAP are repeated cross-sectional data with many repeated questions in different years. Thus, in future research I plan to pool several years of data and reexamine the religion and family association using a larger sample. Currently, TSCS has data from 1984 to 2004, but they are already preparing the 2006 to 2009 data with another module focused on religion and culture (for 2009). Thus, it will be promising to reexamine these findings using a bigger sample and more detailed distinctions.

I also plan to examine some subgroup variation using these pooled data. For example, how do men and women differ within each religious groups in their views about gender and family issues? Is it possible that religion has a stronger association with women's beliefs than with men's? Moreover, many demographic studies suggest there is great variation in their attitudes toward family life, gender roles, sexuality, and

educational aspirations. Is religion more influential among people from certain age groups or cohorts? Or is religion's effect mediated or buffered by education?

Another problem is the limited measures of religion on surveys that ask about "non-religious" attitudes and behaviors. The religion questions are all clustered in the religion modules that have very limited measures for other domains of human life. Unfortunately, the family and culture modules only have one of two basic religion questions – affiliation and importance of religion. Data that has both good measures on religion and family or gender issues are needed. In response to this problem, I wish the following aspects of religion questions would be covered:

(a) Family religious practices:

It would be interesting to also know respondent's spouse's religion, parent's religion, and the religious beliefs and practices of respondent's close friends. Numerous studies in the U.S. have shown the important association between spouse's religious practices, the homogeneity of spouse's religious beliefs and family practices such as household division of labor, gender role attitudes, marital quality, etc. Thus, it will be particularly interesting to see how spouse's religion and compatibility of religion among spouses influence other family practices in Chinese societies. Also, numerous studies in the West have shown the strong link between parent's religious beliefs and practices and their long-term influence on their children's attitudes and behaviors. It would be interesting to examine how family or parent's religion influences children's family attitudes and practices in the Chinese context.

(b) Religious conversion and family life

One of the themes that constantly emerged in my interviews is the influence of religious conversion on people's attitudes and family practices. The devout believers I interviewed mentioned how their views were changed because of their conversion, and that they believe and behave differently now because of their religious transformation. However, the current survey data do not allow me to examine this issue. I hope future religion surveys will include questions covering conversion experiences (if there is any). Even better, with panel studies scholars can examine how religion influences individual's attitudes or family practice over time.

(c) Religion and media

When reflecting upon how researchers can capture the vivid religious phenomena in contemporary Chinese societies, I think it would be useful to analyze the consumption of religious media. From my field research in Taiwan and my experience in Mainland China, it seems that religious practices that go beyond the "traditional format" are particularly attractive to young generations, especially among people who "live" on the computer, You-Tube, and television.

In Taiwan, not only are temples and churches everywhere, religious channels are thriving. Among the regular cable programs, there are two Christian channels, several Buddhist television, and various religious programs on regular channels. It would be very useful to measure the frequency with which people watch these media programs, such as how often do they watch religious channels, how long do they watch these programs, how often do they visit religious websites, how often do they participate in online religious forums, participating in online religious rituals (such as lighting Buddhist oil,

reading Sutras with others, participating in Bible Study online, giving donations online); or the amount of religious newspapers or books they purchase or read.

In places where traditional religious organizations are regulated (such as in mainland China), or young professionals can not easy to attend fixed religious services because of busy lifestyles or long work hours, this type of “virtual” religious practice may be particularly significance (Wei 2005). Thus, it would be interesting to examine this type of religious behaviors together with traditional religious activities, so that we can have a more comprehensive look at how religion may influence attitudes.

Extension of Research Interest

Besides my current research topics, I would also like to explore the following topics:

(a) Religion, Perception of Marriage, and Desire for Children in Chinese societies:

Like other East Asian societies, Taiwan is still a traditional society where marriage is almost universal. However, the desire for and fulfillment of marriage can mean many things: to fulfill a family’s need to continue their family line, to have children, to have financial security, to fulfill social expectations of being a good person, etc. As part of the family modernization process, Taiwanese may also start to focus on the link between marriage and individual happiness, mutual love, and friendship. Many young people have started to delay marriage, and increased numbers of young people choose to have no-marriage lifestyle. Thus, it will be interesting to know whether there is any association between religious beliefs and practices and perceptions of marriage and desire for marriage. Related to this, it will be interesting to examine how religion influences the

desire for children and size of family. Do certain religious groups have stronger preference for sons, or desiring more children, while others desire smaller families? As Taiwan's fertility has already dropped below replacement level, it will be important to know how religion is associated with people's desire and decision for fertility.

(b) Religion, divorce, and sexual morality in Chinese societies

I plan to explore the link between attitudes toward divorce, extra marital affairs, and other sexuality related topics in Taiwan and Mainland China. Although in these societies, economic and living standards have increased, family morality seems to be loose. As scholars argue that a sexual transition and revolution is well underway in urban China, the morality regarding sexuality has become increasingly permissive (Parish et.al. 2007). The rates of divorce, cohabitation, extra-marital affairs, and pornography use are increasing at the same time. As in the West, religion has been one important force in producing and legitimizing sexual morality, it will be interesting to examine whether religion and sexuality have such association in modern Chinese societies.

(c) Religion, intergenerational living arrangement, and child-rearing in Chinese societies

In the Bible it says, "A man should leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife," while in Chinese societies elder parents always live with their sons, especially their oldest son. This is one of the core practices for filial piety. Although Taiwan has become a very modernized and urbanized society, scholars still report that majority of Taiwan population live with their elder parents in the same household (e.g., Yi 2002). So it will be interesting to see whether religion will influence living arrangement in China. More specifically, whether Taiwanese Christians will have different patterns of living arrangement compared with Taiwan's traditional Chinese religionists and YGD members;

whether Taiwan Christians are more likely to live separately from their elder parents, or if their “biblical concern” may be comprised under Chinese filial piety culture and limited living housing conditions in Taiwan. Also related to this, how do different religions influence child-rearing style (such as authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive)? Do Christians favor “western” ways of rearing children, while Chinese traditional religionists hold more orthodox “Confucian” principles in rearing children?

In all, although religion has been flourishing in Taiwan, China, and East Asian countries, the empirical study of religion in Chinese societies is still in its infancy. To date, sociology of religion in East Asia still has clear separations both between quantitative and qualitative research and between research on religion and research on demography and the family. In both Chinese and English languages there is almost no empirical research about the association between religion and family issues either by religion scholars or by family or gender scholars. I hope this study will encourage more comparative study in this area.

Appendix A: Basic Interviewee Information

	Interviewee	Religion	Denomination	Religious Involvement	Marital status	Occupation	Education background
1	Mr. L.Chang	Protestant	Fundamentalist/Evangelical	Pastor	Married	/	Masters
2	Mr.. Y. Chang	Protestant	Fundamentalist/Evangelical	Lay elder	Married	Computer engineer	Bachelor
3	Ms. Li	Protestant	Fundamentalist/Evangelical	Member	Single	Export business	Bachelor
4	Mr. Wei	Protestant	Presbyterian	Pastor	Married	/	Masters
5	Ms. Chang	Protestant	Presbyterian	Member	Married	Sales	Junior college
6	Ms. Wang	Protestant	Charismatic	Lay leader	Married	Government accounting	Junior college
7	Mr. Hei	Protestant	Conservative	Member	Married	Security manager	Junior college
8	Mr. Chen	Catholic	/	Member	Married	Government officer	Junior college
9	Mr.s Chen	Catholic	/	Member	Married	Government officer	Junior college
10	Ms. Qiu	Catholic	/	Member	Married	Funeral home manager	High school
11	Ms. Mei	Catholic	/	Member	Separated	School principle	Bachelor
12	Ms. Gao	Catholic	/	Lay leader	Married	Homemaker	Masters
13	Father Wu	Catholic	/	Priest	Single	/	Bachelor
14	Ms. Ai	Catholic	/	Nun	Single	/	High school
15	Ms. Bai	Yi-Guan-Dao	Chong-De lineage	Lecturer	Single	/	Junior college
16	Ms. Wang	Buddhist	Independent	/	Married	Homemaker	Bachelor
17	Ms. Zeng	Buddhist	independent	/	Widowed	Real estate	High school
18	Master Yun	Buddhist	/	Abbot/Master	Single	/	Masters
19	Mr. Cha	Buddhist	/	Master	Married	Publishing house owner	Masters
20	Mr. Tai	Folk/Taoist	/	/	Married	Computer store owner	High school
21	Mr. Qi	Folk/Taoist	/	/	Single	Taxi driver	Military school
22	Ms. Miao	Folk/Taoist	/	/	Married	Temple cashier	Junior high school

Appendix B: Comparison of Mean and Standard Deviation of Gender Role Attitudes by Religion (TSCS 2002)

		Catholic	Protestant	Traditional	YGD	Non-religious
women work bad for kids	Mean	3.34	3.17	3.16	2.94	3.03
	S.D.	(.91)	(.99)	(.97)	(.89)	(.91)
	Min.	2	1	1	1	1
	Max.	5	5	5	4	5
women work harm family	Mean	2.71	2.79	2.6	2.39	2.52
	S.D.	(.93)	(.96)	(.89)	(.64)	(.87)
	Min.	1	1	1	2	1
	Max.	5	5	5	4	5
women want family and kids	Mean	3.51	3.75	3.77	3.69	3.62
	S.D.	(.78)	(.88)	(.76)	(.71)	(.80)
	Min.	2	1	1	2	1
	Max.	5	5	5	5	5
Both Contribute Financially	Mean	4.14	3.75	3.88	4.03	3.88
	S.D.	(.81)	(.76)	(.74)	(.61)	(.75)
	Min.	1	2	2	3	2
	Max.	5	5	5	5	5
Men as Breadwinner	Mean	3.57	3.16	3.23	3.33	2.93
	S.D.	(1.19)	(1.10)	(1.03)	(1.17)	(.99)
	Min.	1	1	1	1	1
	Max.	5	5	5	5	5
men do more Housework	Mean	3.63	3.35	3.25	3.16	3.35
	S.D.	(.97)	(.94)	(.92)	(.84)	(.85)
	Min.	2	1	1	2	1
	Max.	5	5	5	5	5
men spend more time childrearing	Mean	3.77	3.31	3.35	3.44	3.45
	S.D.	(.91)	(.95)	(.88)	(.81)	(.79)
	Min.	2	1	1	2	2
	Max.	5	5	5	5	5
N	1959	35	92	1294	36	502

Appendix C: Cross-tabulation of Religion and Ethnicity in TSCS 2000

Freq\Row\Col	Ethnicity				
	Minnan	Hakka	Mainlander	Aboriginal	Total
Religion					
Devout Traditional	518 83.01% 37.95%	57 9.13% 27.94%	47 7.53% 18.43%	2 0.32% 4.65%	624 100% 33.42%
Nominal Traditional	546 77.23% 40%	81 11.46% 39.71%	78 11.03% 30.59%	2 0.28% 4.65%	707 100% 37.87%
Catholic	3 11.54% 0.22%	0 0% 0%	7 26.92% 2.75%	16 61.54% 37.21%	26 100% 1.39%
Protestant	37 41.11% 2.71%	3 3.33% 1.47%	27 30% 10.59%	23 25.56% 53.49%	90 100% 4.82%
YGD	32 78.05% 2.34%	4 9.76% 1.96%	5 12.20% 1.96%	0 0% 0%	41 100% 2.20%
Nonreligious	229 60.42% 16.78%	59 15.57% 28.92%	91 24.01% 35.69%	0 0% 0%	379 100% 20.30%
Total	1,365 73.11% 100%	204 10.93% 100%	255 13.66% 100%	43 2.30% 100%	1,867 100% 100%

References

HIDDEN TEXT: RENAME THIS SECTION EITHER “Bibliography” OR “References”.
DO NOT USE “Bibliography/ References” AS THE TITLE OF THIS SECTION.

- Adamczyk, Amy. 2006. “Religious Contextual Norms, Structural Constraints, and Personal Religiosity for Abortion Decisions.” Unpublished manuscript.
- Anika Rahman, Laura Katzive, Stanley K. Henshaw. 1998. “A Global Review of Laws on Induced Abortion, 1985-1997.” *International Family Planning Perspectives*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 56-64.
- Baraka, Jessica L. 1999. “The Gap Remains: Gender and Earnings in Taiwan.” *Research Program in Development Studies*, Princeton University.
- Barkowski, John P., and Xiaohe Xu. 2000. “Distant Patriarchs or Expressive Dads? The Discourse and Practice of Fathering in Conservative Protestant Families.” *Sociological Quarterly* 41: 465-85.
- Bendroth, Margaret L. 1993. *Fundamentalism and Gender: 1875 to the Present*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Brinton, Mary C, Yean-Ju Lee, and William L. Parish. 1995. “Married Women's Employment in Rapidly Industrializing Societies: Examples from East Asia.” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 100 (5), pp. 1099-1130
- Brinton, M. C. 1993. *Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Burgess, Robin. 2002. *Modernization and Son Preference in People's Republic of China*. *Asian Development Bank*. Manila, Philippines.
- Chao, Hsing-Kuang. 2004. “Sociological Perspective of Church Growth in Taiwan: An application of the Theory of New Religious Movements.” Paper presented at the conference of “Theoretical and Methodological issues of the Study of Christianity in Taiwan.” [in Chinese]
- Chao, Hsing-Kuang. 2006. “The Man Who Has Will Always Be Given More? Winners of the Protestant Market in Taiwan.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Sociology of Religion.

- Chiu, Hei-yuan. 1986. Translated title: "Religious Beliefs and Family Ideology." 宗教信仰與家庭觀念。《中央研究院民族學研究所集刊》59, 頁111-122。
- _____. 1989. "Education and Social Change in Taiwan." From the book: "*Taiwan: a newly industrialized State.*" Edited by Hsiao, Michael, Cheng, Wei-yuan and Chan, Hou-sheng. Taipei. National Taiwan University.
- _____. 1990. "Taiwan's Folk Religion." In *the Evaluation and Perspectives of Cultural Development of R.O.C. in 1989*. Taipei: Ministry of Interior Affairs, pp 23-48. [in Chinese]
- _____. 1997. *Social Political analysis of Taiwan Religious Change*. Gui-Guan publication. Taipei, Taiwan. [in chinese]
- _____. 2006. Translated Title: *Religion, Occultism, and Social Change: Volume Collection of Research on Religions in Taiwan*. 宗教, 術數與社會變遷。桂冠圖書股份有限公司。台北, 台灣
- Chiu, Hei-yuan and Shu-ling Tsai. 1992. translated title: "Stratification of Education in Taiwan." From Taiwan National Science council Research Journal: humanity and Social Science. <臺灣教育階層化的變遷>, 《國家科學委員會研究彙刊: 人文及社會科學》, 2(1): 98-118。
- Darnell, Alfred and Darren E. Sherkat. 1997. "The Impact of Protestant Fundamentalism on Educational Attainment." *American Sociological Review* 62: 306-315.
- Ellison, Christopher G. and John P. Bartkowski. 2002. "Conservative Protestantism and the Division of Household Labor among Married Couples." *Journal of Family Issues* 23: 950-85.
- Ebaugh, Helen Rose Fuchs and C. Allen Haney. 1978. "Church Attendance and Attitudes toward Abortion: Differentials in Liberal and Conservative Churches." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 17(4): 407-413.
- Ellison, C.G., S. Echevarria-Cruz and B. Smith. 2005. "Religion and Abortion Attitudes among U.S. Hispanics: Findings from the 1990 Latino National Political Survey." *Social Science Quarterly* 86:192-208.
- Emerson, Michael O. 1996. "Through Tinted Glasses: Religion, Worldviews, and Abortion Attitudes." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol 35, No.1, pp. 41-55.
- Evans, John H. 2002. "Polarization in Abortion Attitudes in U.S. Religious Traditions, 1972-1998." *Sociological Forum* 17(3)

- Finer, B. Lawrence, Lori F. Frohworth, Lindsay A. Dauphinee, Susheela Singh and Ann M. Moore. 2005. "Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives." *Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health* 37(3):110-118
- Freedman, R., M.C. Chang,, T.H. Sun, and M.W. Iinstein. 1994. "The fertility Transition in Taiwan." In *Social Change and the Family in Taiwan*, ed. By Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, 264-304. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fu, Zhong. 1999. *Yi Guan Dao Fa Zhan Shi (translated name: The Modern History of Yi-Guan-Dao)*. Tai Pei: Ban Qiao Press. [In Chinese]
- Granberg, Donald. 1991. "Conformity to Religious Norms Regarding Abortion." *The Sociological Quarterly* 32(2) 267-275.
- Gallin, Rita S. 1982. "The Impact of Development on Women's Work and Family Research." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 52: 866-884.
- Greenhalgh, Susan. 1985. "Sexual Stratification: The Other Side of "Growth with Equity" in East Asia." *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 265-314.
- Glass, Jennifer, and Jerry Jacobs. 2005. "Childhood Religious Conservatism and Adult Attainment among Black and White Women". *Social Forces* 84: 555-580.
- Grichting, W. 1971. *The Value System in Taiwan, 1970*. Taipei: Privately Printed.
- Guo, Wenban. 1999a. "Church and State Relations of Taiwan Catholic Church." In the *Research Report for the National Science Council of R.O.C.*
- Guo, Wenban. 1999b. Translated Title: "Localization of Taiwan Catholicism." Paper presented at the conference of "Social Science Theory and Localization" hosted by Nan-hua management Institute. "臺灣天主教本土化." 本論文於南華管理學院所主辦「社會科學理論與本土化」研討會.
- Gupta, Monica Das, and Jiang Zhenghua, Li Bohua, Xie Zhenming, Woojin Chung, Bae Hwa-Ok. 2002. *Why is son preference so persistent in East and South Asia?: a cross-country study of China, India, and the Republic of Korea*. The World Bank: Washington D.C.
- Guttmacher Institute online report, 2003.
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/nr/2003/05/30/nr_gr060203.html
- Henshaw, Stanley K., and Jane Silverman. 1988. "The Characteristics and Prior Contraceptive Use of U.S. Abortion Patients." *Family Planning Perspectives* 20: 158-168.

- Henshaw, Stanley K., and Kathryn Kost. 1996. "Abortion Patients in 1994-1995: Characteristics and Contraceptive Use." *Family Planning Perspectives* 28: 140-158.
- Hoffmann, John P. and Sherrie Mills Johnson. 2005. "Attitudes toward Abortion among Religious Traditions in the United States: Change or Continuity?" *Sociology of Religion* 66(2), pp 161-182.
- Huang, Xinxian. 1996. *Christian Education and Social Change in China*. Quan Zhou, China: Fujian Education Press. [In Chinese]
- Hung, David Sho-Chao. 2004. "Abortion Rights in the United States and Taiwan." *Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law*, <http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2004/Abortion%20Rights%20-%20David%20Sho-Chao%20Hung.pdf>.
- Hunter, Alan and Kim-Kwong Chan. 1993. *Protestantism in Contemporary China*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jiang, Xiuqin. 2004. *Humility*. Forerunner Christian Church, training materials. <http://www.forerunner.cc>.
- Jiang, Canteng. 1996. Translated title: *Researches in One Hundred Years of Taiwan Buddhist History*. Taipei: Nan Tian publisher. 江燦騰, 台灣佛教百年史之研究 [in Chinese]
- Jochim, Christian. 2003. "Carrying Confucianism into the Modern World: the Taiwan Case." In *Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society*. Ed. By Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Jones, Charles B. 1999. *Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the state, 1660-1990*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Keister, Lisa A. 2003. "Religion and Wealth: The Role of Religious Affiliation and Participation in Early Adult Asset Accumulation." *Social Forces* 82 : 175-208.
- Keysar, Ariela, and Barry A. Kosmin. 1995. "The Impact of Religious Identification on Differences in Educational Attainment among American Women in 1990." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34: 49-62.
- Lai, Mei-Chih. 2001. *An Empirical Study of Son Preference and Fertility Behavior in Taiwan, 1980-1992*. Dissertation. University of Hawaii at Manoa
- Larsen, Ulla., Woojin Chung, and Monica Das Gupsa. 1998. "Fertility and Son Preference in Korea." *Population Studies*, Vol.52, No.3, 317-325.

- Lehrer, Evelyn L. 1999. "Religion as a Determinant of Educational Attainment: an Economic Perspective." *Social Science Research* 28, 358-379.
- Lin, Benxuan. 1994. Translated title: *Church and State Conflict in Taiwan*. 林本炫, 《台灣的政教衝突》。台北: 稻鄉出版社。
- Lin, Zhengping. 1996. Translated title: *Christianity and Taiwan*. 基督教与台湾。林治平主编。宇宙光传播中心出版社。
- Lin, Jinshui. 2003. *The History of Christianity in Taiwan*. Beijing, China: Jiu Zhou Press. [in Chinese]
- Lutz, Jessie G. 1971. *China and the Christian college from 1850 to 1950*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mo, Yan-chih. 2005. "Adoption Becoming More Open." Published on [Taipei Times](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/08/15/2003267800) <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/08/15/2003267800>, Monday, Aug 15, 2005, Page 2
- Moskowitz, Marc L. 2001. *The Haunting Fetus: Abortion, Sexuality, and the Spirit World in Taiwan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Muller, Chandra L., and Christopher G. Ellison. 2001. "Religious Involvement, Social Capital, and Adolescents' Academic Progress: Evidence from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988." *Sociological Focus* 34: 155-183.
- Ng, Peter Tze Ming. 2003. *Christianity and University Education in China*. Beijing, China: China Social Science Press.
- Pas, Julian. 2003. "Stability and Change in Taiwan's Religious culture". In *Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society*. Edited by Philip Clart and Charles B. Jones. Honolulu: University of Hawai 'I Press.
- Parish, William L. and Robert J. Willis. 1993. "Daughters, Education, and Family Budgets Taiwan Experiences." *The Journal of Human Resources*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Special Issue: Symposium on Investments in Women's Human Capital and Development, pp. 863-898.
- Parish, William L., Ye Luo, Ross Stolzenberg, Edward O. Laumann, Gracia Farrer and Suiming Pan. 2007. "Sexual Practices and Sexual Satisfaction: A Population Based Study of Chinese Urban Adults." *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 36(1).
- Pston, Dudley L. Jr. 2000. "Social and Economic Development and the Fertility Transitions in Mainland China and Taiwan." *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 26, 40-60.

- Qin, Baoqi and Lebin Ai. 2000. Translated name: *the Rise and fall of the mysterious underground kingdom of Yi-Guan-Dao*. Fu Zhou: China. [in Chinese] 地下神秘王國一貫道的興衰
- Regnerus, M.D. and G.H. Elder, Jr. 2003. "Staying on Track in School: Religious Influences in High and Low-Risk Settings." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42:633-649.
- Roberts, Dina. 2002. *Gospel Bearers, Gender Barriers: Missionary Women in the Twentieth Century*. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.
- Rubinstein, Murray A. 1991. *The Protestant Community on Modern Taiwan: Mission, Seminary, and Church*. Armonk, New York, London, England: the M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
- _____ 2003. "Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan. The Presbyterian Church and the Struggle for Minnan/Hakka Selfhood in the Republic of China." In Philip CLART & Charles B. JONES, ed.: *Religion in Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, pp. 204-56.
- Song, Guang-yu. 1983a. *Tian Dao Gou Chen*. Taipei: Privately printed. [In Chinese] 宋光宇. 天道钩沉。
- Sherkat, Darren E. and Alfred Darnell. 1999. "The Effect of Parents' Fundamentalism on Children's Educational Attainment: Examining Differences by Gender and Children's Fundamentalism." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 38:2335.
- Sherkat, Darren E. 2000. "That They be Keepers of the Home: The Effect of Conservative Religion on Early and Late Transition into Housewifery." *Review of Religious Research* 41: 344-358.
- Su, Jennifer. 2006. "Every Tribe and Class: If These Missionaries Have Their Way, Millions of Taiwanese will No Longer be Too Embarrassed or Intimated to Go to Church." *Christianity Today* Vol. 50, Issue 5, pp 45-48.
- Tamney, Joseph B. and Linda Hsueh-ling Chaing. 2002. *Modernization, Globalization, and Confucianism in Chinese Societies*. Praeger Publishers. Westport, Connecticut London.
- Tamney, Joseph B., Stephen D. Johnson, and Ronald Burton. 1992 "The Abortion controversy: Conflicting Beliefs and Values in American Society." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 31(1) 32-46.

- Taiwan yearbook. 2004, 2005 <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/>.
- Tsai, Shu-Ling. 1987. "Occupational Segregation and Differential Educational Attainment: A comparison between Men and Women." *Chinese Journal of Sociology* 11: 61-91 [in Chinese].
- Tsai, Shu-ling, Hill Gates, and Hei-yuan Chiu. 1994. "Schooling Taiwan's Women: Educational Attainment in the mid-20th Century." *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 243-263.
- Tietze, Christopher, and Standley K. Henshaw. 1986. *Induced Abortion: A world Review*. New York: the Alan Guttmacher Institute.
- Tribe, Laurence H. 1990. *Abortion the Clash of Absolutes*. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Thornton, Arland and Hui-Sheng Lin. 1994. *Social Change and the Family in Taiwan*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Vermander S.J., Beniot. 1997. "Religions in Taiwan: Between Mercantilism and Millenarianism." *Inter-Religio* 32.
- Wilcox, W. Bradford. 2004. *Soft Patriarchs, New Men*. Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press.
- Woodberry, Robert D and Timothy S. Shah. 2004. "Christianity and Democracy: the Pioneering Protestants." *Journal of Democracy*. Vol 15 No 2:47-61.
- Wilcox, W. Bardford, Mark Chaves, and David Franz. 2004. "Focus on the Family? Religious Traditions, Family Discourse, and Pastoral Practices." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 43: 4, pp 491-504.
- Wang, Zhi-yu. 1997. 《台湾的恩主公信仰—儒宗神教与飞鸾劝化》 [translated name: *The Beliefs of En-Zhu-Gong in Taiwan*] Taipei: Wen Jin Publisher.
- Wang, Pair Dong and Ruey S. Lin. 1995. "Induced Abortion in Taiwan." *The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health*, Vol. 115, No. 2, 100-108.
- Wei, Dedong. 2005. "The Virtual Freedom of Religion: Buddhist and Christian Websites in China." Presented at the Chinese Society and Religion lecture Series at Purdue University.
- Xu, Xiaohe and Shu-chuan Lai. 2002. " Resources, Gender Ideologies, and Marital Power: the case of Taiwan." *Journal of Family Issues*. Vol 23 No 2 209-245.

- Yang, C.K. 1967. *Religion in Chinese Society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Yi, Hung-Tak. 1982. *Causes of Son Preference in Korea: a Socio-Demographic Analysis: a Research Report to W.H.O.* World Health Organization.
- Yi, Chin-Chun and Wen-Yin Chien. 1999. "Females' Employment patterns across Family Life Cycles: Taiwan and Tianjin Comparisons." Paper presented at the Transformation and Continuities: Chinese Societies in 21st Century Conference of the North American Chinese Sociological Association, Chicago.
- Yi, Chin-Chun. 2002. "Taiwan's Modernization—Women's Changing Roles." In *Taiwan's Modernization in Global Perspective*, edited by Peter Chow. Greenwood Press, pp 331-359.
- Yu, Wei-hsin. 2001. "Family Demands, Gender Attitudes, and Married Women's Labor Force Participation: Comparison Between Japan and Taiwan." in *Women's Working Lives in East Asia*, edited by M.C. Brinton. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp. 70–95
- Yu, Wei-hsin and Huo-hsien Su. 2006. "Gender, Sibship Structure, and Educational Inequality in Taiwan: Son Preference Revisited." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 68 (4), pp 1057-1068.
- Zheng, Yangen. 2005. Translated title: *Rooted in its own land: Taiwan Christianity*. 定根本土的台湾基督教。 郑仰恩著。台南：人光出版社。
- Zveglic, Joseph E., Yana M. Rodgers, and William M. Rodgers. 1997. "The Persistence of Gender Earnings Inequality in Taiwan, 1978-1992." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 50(4), pp 594-609.

Vita

Jiexia Zhai was born in Jinan, Shandong, China on October 13, 1978, the daughter of Zhonggui Zhai and Yuping Dong. After graduating from Shandong Experimental High in 1997, she entered Peking University and earned her Bachelor of Art in sociology in the summer of 2001. Since then, she has attended the University of Texas at Austin to pursue her Masters and Doctoral Degree in sociology.

Permanent address: Qi Lu Hua Yuan, Building 4, Unit 2, Room 202, Tianqiao district, Jinan, Shandong, China 250031

This dissertation was typed by the author.